

FINAL REPORT

Trans-Atlantic Dialogue on Combating Crime-Terror Pipelines

Dismantling Converging Threat Networks to
Strengthen Global Security



National Defense University, Washington, DC

June 25-26, 2012

Trans-Atlantic Dialogue on Combating Crime-Terror Pipelines

Dismantling Converging Threat Networks to Strengthen Global Security

In July 2011, the United States released a National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security. The Strategy calls for the dynamic integration of all elements of American power to combat transnational organized crime and related threats to national security. A key pillar of the Strategy is to enhance international cooperation with key partners and allies to combat the lethal nexus of organized crime, narco-trafficking, and terrorism, and protect our communities from the violence, harm, and exploitation wrought by transnational threat networks.

U.S. National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, 2011

The first duty of Government is to protect national security. Organised crime and terrorism threaten that security, and the prosperity and freedoms of nation states. We need to understand the extent to which these threats may be converging, and where this is happening, so that it informs the decisions and responses that we make in the future.

Rt. Hon. Theresa May, MP
Home Secretary of the United Kingdom
Message delivered at the opening of the Dialogue

Protecting communities around the world from harm and exploitation at the hands of organized crime and terrorist networks requires collective action.

Maria Otero
Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights

Executive Summary

The U.S. Department of State, in partnership with the U.S. Department of Defense, hosted the Trans-Atlantic Dialogue on Combating Crime-Terror Pipelines on June 25-26, 2012, on the campus of the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington, DC.

Participants numbered more than 150, including representatives from the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, European Union and Member States, and several countries in West Africa, the Western Hemisphere, and South Asia, as well as international and regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organization of American States (OAS), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), INTERPOL, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and others. Globally-recognized experts from academia, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector also participated on panels and in the audience.

The Dialogue launched an international discourse examining crime-terror pipelines across the global threat environment with the goal of strengthening cooperation to identify interlocking nodes, critical threats, and vulnerable jurisdictions.

Today's global threat environment is characterized by convergence: the merging and blending of an ever-expanding array of illicit actors and networks. In an interconnected world, the pipelines linking these threat actors and networks cut across borders, infiltrate and corrupt licit markets, penetrate fragile governments, and undercut the interests and security of our partners across the international community. The direct links among specific illicit actors concerned those who gathered for the Dialogue, as well as the growing illegal economy that supports and enables corrupt officials, criminals, terrorists, and insurgents.

While the Dialogue explored the regional and global reach of today's threat networks, it also focused on the required responses to these challenges. Numerous experts and practitioners identified smart law enforcement tools, strategic capabilities, sanctions, and other levers to: disrupt and dismantle networks of illicit actors and their financial pipelines; maximize information sharing across the international community; and facilitate the development of concrete policy recommendations to isolate financial hubs and deny safe haven to criminals, terrorists, and their facilitators.

Above all, the Dialogue underscored a need for greater collective action to combat converging threat networks, protect citizens, break the financial strength of criminal and terrorist networks, shut down corrupt and illicit channels, and strengthen the rule of law and judicial systems.

Opening keynote remarks were provided by Maria Otero, Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights; the Honorable Philip Barton, Deputy Head of Mission at the British Embassy in Washington; and William Wechsler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats. Leon Fuerth, Distinguished Research Fellow at NDU, and Daniel Glaser, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorist Financing, delivered lunchtime keynotes on the first and second days, respectively.

The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) of the U.S. Department of State, in partnership with the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy at the U.S. Department of Defense, hosted the Dialogue in close collaboration with the Center for Complex Operations at NDU. The United Kingdom will host a follow-up meeting on October 22-23, 2012, in London.

This note provides a summary of proceedings and is not intended as a representation of government policy.

Thematic Overview

Prior to attending the Dialogue, panelists were challenged to address several key questions about crime-terror pipelines, third-party facilitators, and possible international responses:

- What are the dominant paradigms of crime-terror interaction, and what are the future consequences of these trends?
- Who are the major brokers of crime-terror interaction, and what are the incentives for “legitimate” actors to facilitate crime and terror networks?
- How do criminal and terrorist networks exploit financial pipelines such as the international banking system, *hawala*, and kidnapping-for-ransom?
- How can the military and the intelligence community enhance law enforcement operations in this area?
- How can the international community deepen existing multilateral mechanisms to combat this threat, and what challenges remain for international cooperation?
- To what extent do corruption, weak governance, and failed, conflict, or criminal states facilitate crime-terror pipelines?

These questions came together in a panel on June 25 devoted to Lebanese Hizballah, a terrorist organization recently implicated in the Lebanese-Canadian Bank drug money laundering case, which demonstrates Hizballah’s criminal activity. According to several panelists, Hizballah is active in both West Africa and the Tri-Border Area where Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil meet. Some noted that the zero-tolerance approach of the United States, United Kingdom, and other partners to state sponsorship of terror may have forced Hizballah to cultivate alternative sources of funding. Ideology is not an obstacle: when it comes to money, Hizballah will do business with anyone. Violent Extremists may justify their involvement in drug trafficking in many creative ways, including as a weapon against “infidel” consumers.

Several panelists challenged the notion of crime and terrorism as distinct threats and observed a possible evolution of these threats towards the fusion of networks, creation of hybrid organizations, and joining of co-conspirators. Case studies illustrated different paradigms of crime-terror interaction. These included Boko Haram; al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which is involved in trans-Saharan trafficking networks and kidnapping-for-ransom; the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey; and the increasing use of terrorist tactics by drug trafficking organizations in Latin America.

Six principal areas of consensus emerged over the course of the two-day Dialogue as panelists sought to answer the questions above. They address the definition of crime-terror pipelines, identify a range of possible responses, and link converging threats to global development and economic growth.

I. Paradigms

The global illicit economy is becoming increasingly flush with cash derived from a wide spectrum of illicit activities: narcotics, kidnapping-for-ransom, arms trafficking, human smuggling and trafficking, the trade in stolen and counterfeit goods, bribery, and money laundering. According to some estimates, the illegal economy accounts for 8 to 15 percent of world GDP. The wide availability of unregulated cash creates opportunities for illicit actors and networks of every persuasion to tap into the global illicit economy to finance their operations and campaigns.

Some panelists sought to expand the traditional paradigm of crime-terror interaction as an instantaneous “nexus,” while others cautioned that ad hoc opportunism remains the primary motivation for any crossover among crime and terror networks. Participants discussed an ongoing research study [see *Annex II*] that illustrates abundant connections among the terrorists, criminals, and financiers examined, suggesting at least the potential for an increasingly systematic relationship between these converging threats.

Several participants asserted that the distinction traditionally made between terrorism and crime may be an artificial one. Terrorism is not separate from crime; terrorism is crime, especially when terrorist groups engage directly in crimes such as drug trafficking, kidnapping-for-ransom, and extortion. It was noted, for example, that the PKK has sought to compensate for a decrease in donations with an increase in funding from extortion and organized crime.

The terrorist tactics adopted by several criminal organizations demonstrate that the reverse is also true: criminal organizations have resorted to terrorist methods to achieve their ends. Los Zetas, for example, seem to draw inspiration from the terrorist tactics employed by al-Qa’ida to intimidate the populace and law enforcement in northern Mexico.

Furthermore, the linkages between crime and terror networks can be symbiotic, as seen among some Asian networks. One example is the close coordination between the Pakistani terrorist organization Lashkar e-Tayyiba and Dawood Ibrahim’s D-Company, a hybrid organization, as well as other groups, such as the Haqqani Network. It is insufficient to focus on each of these extremist groups separately. Rather, international law enforcement should target the illicit activities that sustain them financially.

Many acknowledged that the existence of crime-terror pipelines reflects certain policy successes in the past decade and presents opportunities for policymakers:

- First, terrorist groups risk losing legitimacy in the eyes of their followers if they are seen to engage in “common” criminal activity or associate with criminal organizations. Hizballah presents itself as a pious, righteous political movement that seeks to improve the well-being of its constituents. Exposing it as a criminal enterprise presents strategic opportunities to delegitimize the organization. Thus, organized crime may sustain these networks in the short run but damage their reputations in the long run.
- Second, as noted above, the international community’s efforts since September 11, 2001, to reduce state sponsorship of terrorism have forced terrorists to seek broader means for financing and supporting their operations. By continuing to combat terrorist financing by degrading crime-terror pipelines, states can further shrink the space in which terrorists are able to maneuver.
- Third, it can be easier for states to combat terror networks as criminal networks, provided the crime nexus can be proven. Law enforcement and criminal justice tools to fight crime are typically less politically charged than tools to combat terror, enabling states to take action more efficiently and with less pressure from partisan elements. Furthermore, terrorists must launder the proceeds of their criminal activity through the international financial system, which presents opportunities for states to use financial tools such as sanctions and asset forfeiture to combat them.

II. Pursuit

Military and law enforcement operations against terrorist networks and criminal syndicates are critical in many contexts, but are more efficient and cost-effective when combined with non-kinetic methods of enforcement. Chief among these are financial and legal tools, which eliminate safe havens for illicit networks while law enforcement targets the individuals involved.

Financial Tools: Following the Money

Money has been the common denominator of both terrorism and crime since before the term “crime-terror nexus” entered the policy lexicon. All illicit networks need money to finance their activities, and where these funds move through the international financial

system – they can be detected or monitored. This is the Achilles' heel of crime and terror networks alike, since the international financial system is subject to sanctions and other anti-money laundering measures.

Following the money is a particularly effective strategy for states to combat crime, terror, and the pipelines that connect them using a common set of tools. Although some participants argued that the cost of committing an act of terrorism is so minimal that the money involved can be traced only with difficulty, others noted that the cost of supporting the infrastructure of a global terrorist network is much greater than that of a single attack.

One useful financial tool is the designation of certain entities as transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). In the United States, Executive Order (E.O.) 13581 grants the Treasury Department the authority to make such designations. President Obama identified four significant TCOs in the Annex to E.O. 13581 on July 24, 2011, and charged Treasury with pursuing additional sanctions against its members and supporters in consultation with the State and Justice Departments. The designations trigger the freezing of those entities' assets and effectively limit their ability to launder money and access funds already in the financial system.

Legal Tools: Leveraging Laws

The legal system can significantly strengthen financial enforcement against crime-terror pipelines. Section 311 of the U.S. PATRIOT Act permits the Secretary of the Treasury to require domestic financial institutions and agencies to take certain “special measures” against a foreign financial institution, class of transaction, or type of account that is determined to be of “primary money laundering concern.”

In the U.S. legal system, it is also possible to bring a civil action against terrorist networks even if the criminal link cannot be proven. Such a case went before the Southern District of New York in 2011 against the Lebanese-Canadian Bank, Ellissa Holdings, and other Hizballah associates suspected of involvement in drug trafficking. Civil action requires a lower burden of proof than criminal cases, and can result in the forfeiture of the defendant's assets and ultimately a criminal case, as new information and evidence emerges. Title 18, Section 981 of the U.S. Code governs civil forfeiture, including of foreign proceeds of crime.

III. Prioritization

The success of international efforts to fight terrorism is directly attributable to high-level government and public attention and robust resourcing since September 11, 2001. Transnational organized crime, by infiltrating legitimate commerce and economic activity, also has a profound impact on national and international security (institutions, economies, and communities), yet limited resources have been devoted to date to studying and combating it.

Consensus at the Dialogue built around two recommendations:

- First, the widespread and serious nature of the threats posed by transnational organized crime justifies allocation of more resources to address it; and
- Second, that facilitators of crime and terrorism should be punished as criminals in their own right, rather than as secondary enablers.

A challenge in garnering greater public attention and securing additional resources, several panelists noted, is that, unlike terrorism, transnational organized crime rarely manifests itself in spectacular scenes of carnage or calamity that tend to spark widespread and prolonged public outrage or concern. While smaller-scale violent events occur daily in Mexico and other areas, they are still largely viewed as national or regional problems that do not warrant the commitment of additional resources to anti-crime programs in other countries.

Regarding the second recommendation, several private sector and criminal justice representatives argued that governments do not hold facilitators of crime and terrorism accountable enough. In the Wachovia money laundering case in the United States, for example, courts punished the bank, but not a single employee was prosecuted. Prison terms are often shorter and fines often smaller for facilitators, who include accountants, lawyers, weapons specialists, travel facilitators, professional money launderers, and even lobbyists.

The issue, some argue, is that facilitators are too often viewed as enablers of crime, rather than co-conspirators. In order to fully target crime-terror financial pipelines, governments must target the facilitators just as thoroughly as the core organizations and their members.

IV. Planning

Information is king in the fight against crime-terror pipelines. Evidence-based policy, which draws on intelligence collection, mapping, research, and data analysis, is the key to enabling law enforcement and other actors to target and dismantle crime-terror pipelines. Intelligence must be seen as a source of evidence, and must develop the ability to forecast long-run trends, not only respond to the short-run demands of policy consumers.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has developed the Illicit Pathways Attack Strategy (IPAS), which takes an intelligence-based approach to transnational illicit networks. IPAS directs ICE to leverage interagency expertise to produce analytic assessments of threats and develop and share actionable intelligence. IPAS also emphasizes collaboration with Transnational Criminal Investigative Units (TCIUs) in other countries. TCIUs identify targets, gather evidence, share intelligence, and facilitate the prosecution of individuals through joint investigations. IPAS was successfully implemented in Operation Pacific Rim, in which the Colombian National Police, ICE, TCIUs, and others were able to dismantle an entire global cartel.

Evidence of this type can also be rooted in research. Several projects of this nature are ongoing across the U.S. interagency. In the United Kingdom, the Home Office has taken the lead on developing evidence-based research to support the fight against transnational organized crime.

Beyond quantitative metrics, evidence-based research must examine interpersonal relationships and clan dynamics that may drive crime and terror networks together. Whole villages often rally behind one terrorist network. Even in major cities like Miami, young adults may carry on the illicit business of Lebanese *émigré* family members in Paraguay, to cite one possible example.

Once the data exists, public-private partnerships must form to allow the private sector to profile organized crime groups who may threaten the integrity of their supply chains or investments through extortion and other means, and to build blacklists and other tools.

V. Partnerships

The diversity of the participants reinforced that partnerships among agencies, countries, and regions are essential to fighting global crime-terror pipelines. Effective partnerships can be as simple as having a direct line phone number to a law enforcement counterpart across the border or as complex as a formal information sharing mechanism.

Panelists noted that sovereignty is a vulnerability that transnational illicit networks exploit. Bound by treaties and regulations, states cannot cross borders with the agility of non-state actors. States can overcome this limitation and still respect sovereignty by forming close partnerships with likeminded states.

Several concrete recommendations emerged to improve information and intelligence sharing among countries. These include the creation of a common email system to share classified information, the transformation of bilateral memoranda of understanding (MOUs) into multilateral ones, and the development of an international strategy to combat transnational organized crime, to which each committed partner country would contribute a piece based on its area of interest or expertise.

Domestic interagency cooperation is no less important. Targeting threat finance requires a whole-of-government approach [see *Annex III*] with emphasis on law enforcement and prosecutions. In the U.S. Department of Defense lexicon of “Find, Fix, Finish,” for example, the “finish” should be a law enforcement finish—not necessarily military. The U.S. military has pledged to take a supporting role in intelligence collection, investigations, and other components of the fight against crime-terror pipelines.

VI. Prosperity

The link between organized crime, terrorism, governance, and economic development must not be overlooked. Crime-terror pipelines hinder the ability of law enforcement to protect citizens, deprive the state of legitimate revenues, enable corruption to become even more entrenched, and thrive on bad governance.

As they converge, organized crime and terrorism will hobble economic growth in the long run because they present a structural problem. Governments will not achieve land reform and other policies in areas controlled by crime and terror networks, and the illicit economy will deprive them of the resources to build and maintain critical infrastructure. This, in turn, will inhibit foreign direct investment, since multinational companies will be reluctant to invest in areas where they will incur high costs due to the lack of infrastructure, a culture of bribery, and the risk of physical violence.

Eliminating safe haven for crime-terror pipelines requires an understanding of local and regional politics, languages, social networks, and other factors that could help explain why crime-terror pipelines converge in certain areas but not others. Governance and economic reform must accompany military and law enforcement programs.

It is also important to understand that in many cases, illicit funds act as life support for fragile governments that would otherwise collapse due to a lack of tax revenue. In such countries, crime-terror pipelines are integrated into the state itself through corruption and thus difficult to eradicate. This is an area deserving significant further research.

Recommendations for Further Discussion

The areas detailed above naturally lend themselves to ten key areas for future discussion. (These are a summary of discussions and not an indication of government policy.)

1. **Build a Trans-Atlantic Network:** Combine joint national capabilities to develop an anticipatory approach to crime-terror interaction, and coordinate actions to mitigate the current threats posed by adaptive actors and hybrid networks.
2. **Paint the Crime-Terror Panorama:** Re-evaluate the traditional separation of terrorism and organized crime as distinct threats.
3. **Drain the Illicit Economy:** Strengthen non-kinetic methods, especially financial tools and criminal justice responses, to target corrupt actors and illicit pathways, and follow the money to disrupt and dismantle pipelines, target their facilitators, and eliminate their financial resources.
4. **Elevate Transnational Crime as a National and International Security Threat:** Governments should treat transnational organized crime as a national and international security priority. This should have regard to the relative long-term impacts of organized crime and terrorism, based on a common understanding of shared threats. Possible actions may include sanctioning terrorist groups as transnational criminal organizations where there is intelligence and evidence that specific terrorist groups are engaged in criminal enterprise.
5. **Target the Facilitators:** Examine legislative powers to combat corruption. Some participants argued in favor of treating facilitators of crime and terrorism—from individuals such as professional arms brokers to corporate entities such as banks engaged in money laundering or facilitating terrorism financing—as criminal actors in their own right.
6. **Expose Safe Havens and Sanctuaries:** Coordinate efforts to identify and uproot safe havens and exploitable sanctuaries that enable criminals, terrorists, and other illicit actors and networks to corrupt governments, access illegal markets, and stage operations without fear of reprisal from law enforcement. Expose and prevent conditions for the nesting of illicit forces with criminalized states.
7. **Invest in Evidence-Based Research and Intelligence:** Develop evidence-based research to target and dismantle crime-terror pipelines at key nodes and along major

pathways, including mapping, data analysis, network analysis, forecasting, and other intelligence tools in both unclassified and classified formats.

8. **Strengthen International Consensus:** Build a common understanding of crime-terror pipelines across borders, and promote bilateral and multilateral partnerships to carry out operations and investigations, and to share information and intelligence.
9. **Safeguard Private Sector Investment:** Form public-private partnerships to enable the public and private sectors to exchange relevant information on organized crime groups in certain markets that threaten the integrity of supply chains or the ability of companies to make sustainable, responsible investments.
10. **Promote International Development:** Employ all tools of power and persuasion by integrating policies and programs aimed at improving governance, economic development, and foreign direct investment with policies targeting crime and terror networks.

These recommendations will inform the next round of the Trans-Atlantic Dialogue on Combating Crime-Terror Pipelines in London in October 2012.

Annex I: Dialogue Agenda

Monday, June 25 – PIPELINES, PLAYERS, PLACES

8:00-8:30 Registration and Coffee Service

8:30-9:00 **Welcoming Remarks**

MICHAEL MIKLAUCIC, Director of Research, Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University (NDU)

Opening Keynote Remarks

- MARIA OTERO, Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights
- PHILIP BARTON, Deputy Head of Mission, British Embassy
- WILLIAM WECHSLER, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats

9:00-10:30 **I. The Crime-Terror Panorama: New Paradigms**

Chair: DAVID M. LUNA, Director, Transnational Threats and Illicit Networks, Anti-Crime Programs, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), U.S. Department of State

- JAMES FOREST, PHD, Senior Fellow, Joint Special Operations University
- XAVIER RAUFER, PHD, Director, Department of Organized Crime and Terrorism, Institute of Criminology, University of Paris
- VANESSA NEUMANN, PHD, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute
- RYAN CLARKE, PHD, Asia-Pacific Head of Protective Intelligence, Deutsche Bank

10:30-10:45 Coffee Break

10:45-12:30

II. The Global Reach of Hizballah: A Case Study

Chair: TIMOTHY B. MOYER, Senior Forensic Accountant/Acting Unit Chief, Counterterrorism Division/ Terrorist Financing Operations Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

- SHMUEL BAR, PHD, Director of Studies, Institute for Policy and Strategy, IDC Herzliya and IntuView
- DAVID ASHER, PHD, Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- BRIAN DODD, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Special Operations Division, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
- UAL BRADLEY, Special Agent, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

12:30-1:15

Lunch

12:45

Keynote

LEON FUERTH, Distinguished Research Fellow, Anticipatory Governance and Forward Engagement, NDU

Introduced by: Michael Miklaucic

1:15-2:45

III. Players: The Role of Facilitators and Super-Fixers

Chair: MICHAEL MULLANEY, Counterterrorism Section Chief, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice

- DOUG FARAH, Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center
- RICHARD RILEY, Head of the Strategic Centre for Organised Crime, UK Home Office
- JEFF CORTESE, FBI
- HEATHER LOWE, Legal and Government Affairs Director, Global Financial Integrity

2:45-3:00

Coffee Break

3:00-4:15

IV. Pursuit: Following the Money – Cross-Border Pipelines and Illicit Financial Hubs

Chair: COLLEEN STACK, Acting Director for Global Affairs, Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, U.S. Department of the Treasury

- MICHAEL GREENWALD, Policy Advisor, Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, U.S. Department of the Treasury
- MATTHEW FORMAN, Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, United Kingdom
- ROBERT G. SAALE, Unit Chief, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI
- JOE BURKE, Director for Bulk Cash Smuggling Center, DHS/ICE
- DONALD CONROY, Customs and Border Protection, DHS

4:15-5:30

V. Prosecution: Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Responses

Chair: BRUCE OHR, Counselor, Transnational Organized Crime and International Affairs, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice

- SHARON LEVIN, Chief, Asset Forfeiture Unit, Southern District of New York, U.S. Attorney's Office
- GERRY LIDDELL, Executive Director, UK Serious Organised Crimes Agency (SOCA)
- BOB HOUSTON, Acting Director, International Organized Crime Intelligence and Operations Center (IOC-2)
- NICHOLAS JOHNSON, FBI, INTERPOL Washington Counterterrorism Division, U.S. National Central Bureau
- LOU ORSINI, Senior Maritime Law Enforcement Advisor, U.S. Coast Guard, DHS

6:30

Reception hosted by the Honorable Philip Barton, Deputy Head of Mission, United Kingdom

Tuesday, June 26 – PARTNERSHIPS AND PREVENTION

8:00-8:30 Coffee Service

8:30-9:15 **Practical Perspectives on the Prosecution of Threat Networks and International Cooperation**

Moderator: PETER VINCENT, Office of International Affairs, DHS/ICE/HSI

- BRUCE SWARTZ, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice
- KUMAR KIBBLE, Deputy Director, DHS/ICE
- ALUN MILFORD, Head of Organised Crime Division, UK Crown Prosecution Service

9:15-11:00 **VI. Crime-Terror Networks and Nodes: Case Studies**

Chairs: BRIGADIER GENERAL MARK SCRABA, Joint Interagency Counter-Trafficking Center (JICTC), U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and FRANKIE SHROYER, Director, Interagency Task Force (IATF), U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)

- MARK DESTITO, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
- STEPHEN JOHNSTON, U.S. Africa Command
- COLONEL RYAN WHITTINGTON, Director, Narcotics and Transnational Crime Support Center (NTC)
- GENERAL CARLOS RAMIRO MENA, Director, Directorate of the Judicial Police and Intelligence, Colombian National Police
- ROGER BENCZE, PHD, Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S)

11:00-11:15 Coffee Break

11:15-12:30 **VII. Current Strategies of Key International Organizations**

Chair: ANNE R. THIMM, Transnational Organized Crime Lead, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)

- STEFANO SANTAMATO, Strategic Analysis Capability, Emerging Security Challenges Division, NATO
- GORDON DUGUID, Executive Secretary, Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), Secretariat for Multidimensional Security, Organization of American States (OAS)
- REINHARD UHRIG, Deputy Head of the Action against Terrorism Unit, Transnational Threats Department (TNT/ATU), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
- KAREN KRAMER, Senior Expert, Law Enforcement, Organized Crime and Anti Money Laundering Unit, UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

12:30-1:30 Lunch

12:45 **Keynote**

DANIEL GLASER, Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing, U.S. Department of the Treasury

Introduced by: Michael Miklaucic

1:30-3:00 **VIII. Prevention: Combating Corruption and Denying Safe Haven**

Chair: AMBASSADOR JANE BECKER, Advisor, Anti-Kleptocracy and Denying Safe Haven Initiatives, INL, U.S. Department of State

- ADRIAN SCOTT, Head of Counter-Terrorism Department, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office
- ROB GREENWAY, Senior Intelligence Officer, Af-Pak Threat Analysis Center, U.S. Central Command
- GRETCHEN PETERS, Author, *Seeds of Terror*
- IBRAHIM LAMORDE, Chairman, Economic and Financial Crime Commission, Nigeria

3:00-3:15 Coffee Break

3:15-4:45

IX. Fighting Networks with Networks: Net-Centric Pathways for Future Cooperation

Chair: FRANK REEDER, DHS/ICE

- SANDRA CONLIN, Assistant Commissioner, Chief of the Criminal Intelligence Executive, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
- NICK LEWIS, Regional Director, North American and the Caribbean, SOCA
- DAVID STEWART, Manager Counter Terrorism International, Australian Federal Police
- MIKE PANNETT, Detective Superintendent, Liaison Officer to USA, Canada, and South America, New Zealand Police
- ED REGULA, Chief of Program Development, Intelligence Division, DEA

4:45-5:15

Looking Ahead: Presentations on Current Research

- SCOTT HELFSTEIN, PHD, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point
- LIANA WYLER, Analyst for International Crime and Narcotics, U.S. Congressional Research Service

Introduced by: Kristen Larson, Transnational Crime and Illicit Threats Advisor, INL, U.S. Department of State

5:15-6:00



Closing Perspectives: Way Forward

Chair: ELIZABETH PHU, Director for Global Threats, Office of the Secretary of Defense-Policy, U.S. Department of Defense

- DAVID ASHER, PHD, Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security
- RICHARD RILEY, Head of the Strategic Centre for Organised Crime, UK Home Office

Annex II: Terrorism along the Illicit Super Highway: A Preview of Findings
 (Dr. Scott Helfstein, Combating Terrorism Center)

	Individuals	Relations	Connectivity
Financial	17	123	7.24
Individual	652	2249	3.45
Legal	3	3	1.00
Military	11	41	3.73
Narcotics	340	2927	8.61
Organized	37	167	4.51
Other	39	121	3.10
Political	33	155	4.70
Terrorism	273	1531	5.61



How interconnected are these groups and individuals?

- The experiment: 40 top transnational smugglers
 - How long does it take for terrorists to enter the network and how many?
 - Leveraged a private database produced from open source material for use in anti-money laundering and financial compliance
- The dataset includes **2,800 individuals** with **over 11,000 relationships**
- Terrorists are often only one degree removed from top criminals
- **Highly connected across purpose and geography**

Annex III: A Whole-of-Government Approach to Crime-Terror Pipelines (Dr. David Asher, Center for a New American Security)

COUNTER-THREAT FINANCE: BALANCING NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES

