

Dynamics of Conflict Management in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

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The situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) presents a classic ongoing conflict with many tragic twists that is testing the resolve of sub-regional actors and the entire international community. Any indicators of success are often quickly snuffed out, giving way to palpable collective frustration. Even when the international community attempts to ignore it, the problem keeps coming back with new challenges. Negative events, which are most common in the Eastern DRC, affect both the Great Lakes and the South African Development Community (SADC) Regions, and ignoring the problem is no longer an option. This conflict is particularly unique because, with no tangible enduring solution in sight, the international community keeps experimenting with “new concoctions” of interventions in the vain hope that they may succeed.

As is always the case in such situations, the conflict draws in numerous actors and continues to test the international community’s ability to manage conflicts. Many different actors have been lured to the core and yet do not seem to actually influence events on the ground, rendering particularly the Eastern Region highly dysfunctional, and allowing the conflict to drag on seemingly interminably. That situation now appears to be changing. The advent of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) seems to have brought a glimmer of hope that may just be the solution, or at least the beginning of one, if only it can be sustained. But is the FIB the lasting answer to such an asymmetric conflict? Is the FIB concept a new template for future UN missions?

This paper attempts to put the dynamics of the whole DRC conflict into perspective, while critically focusing on and analyzing the effectiveness of the concept of the FIB by using the experience of Malawi as one of the three Troop Contributing Countries (TCC’s) fighting rebels in the region. This is not an easy task considering that, despite the defeat of the M23 rebel group, there are still about 40 armed rebel groups dangerously prowling the region. Government control is

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almost non-existent in most areas for seemingly genuine reasons, but as Mills states, “as Kinshasa pretends to govern, the world pretends to help.”¹

The cycle of violence continues to contribute to the inability of the government of President Joseph Kabila to function properly and stamp its authority on the territory. Vestiges of all sorts of official and non-official criminality are all too familiar to the locals. With either weak institutions or none at all, many disparate localities are simply inaccessible and in the hands of undisciplined rebel functionaries.

The FIB has, however, achieved some significant gains in terms of stabilizing the region by keeping some rebels on a leash and others on continuous run since 2013. The question then raised is how long the FIB can continue to maintain the status quo given that rebels in the region have a tendency to bounce back once government forces or peace enforcers begin to show signs of losing momentum.

It follows therefore that the ability of the rebels to rebound will very much depend on the tenacity and synergy of the FIB and the Congolese Forces (FARDC) to maintain the initiative through containment and, gradually, the building of institutions that will guarantee lasting peace.

Background to the DRC conflict

No study of the DRC or any part of the DRC can be complete without anchoring it within history, since this is the only way of avoiding the risk of generalization and oversimplification. The DRC has been plagued by conflict since independence, with civil wars that originally revealed broad political and economic root causes. The situation has since become more complex and, because of its

asymmetrical nature, there are now multiple challenges compounded by the absorption of numerous players during its relatively short history.

To this end, it must be emphasized that any simple analysis of the conflict is bound to be superficially flawed if one chooses to dwell on the widespread violent spin-offs. They, in the author’s view, are only symptoms of the original serious animosities that were planted at the birth of the nation, and the tragic residual effects of greed which were accentuated along the way. Understanding the origins of the clash of interests and the dichotomy in the country is a more useful starting point in the desperate attempt to manage the present.

The DRC has a long history of colonization, exploitation and slave labor that goes back well before its independence in 1960. Within weeks of independence there was a number of dramatic events: the Katanga secession under Moïse Tshombe; Joseph Kasavubu’s military coups; the assassination of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and the involvement of foreign powers and the UN Forces. By the time Dag Hammarskjöld was killed in a plane crash on the way to mediate the issue, the conflict had taken on a new dimension that drew worldwide interest. Eventually Kasavubu himself was ousted by Mobutu Sese Seko.

General Mobutu Sese Seko took over the government in 1965, changing the country’s name to Zaire, imposing a long dictatorial rule before being ousted in 1997 by Laurent Kabila with the help of neighboring countries. In 1998, Congolese rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda almost toppled Kabila until Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe came to Mobutu’s rescue under a controversial interpretation of the SADC collective security principle. When

Laurent Kabila was assassinated in 2001, his son Joseph succeeded him. This marked the end of almost all central government influence over the territory as tribal loyalties that extend beyond borders began to resurface, leading to an unprecedented breakdown of law and order that continues to the present. A terrain fertile for insecurity was now in place.

The Military Factor

Just like most of the African militaries who found themselves heavily politicized and

embroiled in civil wars, the DRC armed forces were subjugated by autocratic rulers and rules that were, in part, a result of the colonial legacy and subsequent dictatorships that saw them often used as ruthless political tools. The military developed a habit of toppling its own governments, sometimes for “seemingly justifiable reasons.”

The conflict itself is a unique reflection of many facets – the domestic political, economic, military, geographical and ethnic aspects – that combine with external



Mobutu Sese Seko with Prince Bernhard of Lippe-Biesterfeld in 1973

interference to provide an interplay that leaves all sides seizing the opportunity to plunder the country's vast natural resources. Nzongola-Ntalaja sums this up by stating that throughout the 116 years of Congo's existence as a state external interests have always been a major factor in the political equation because of the strategic position of the country and its enormous natural wealth, which has made it a prime candidate for imperial ambitions, mercenaries and looters of all kinds.

There are some significant similarities with the South American state of Colombia. The sheer vastness and inaccessibility of the land make it a complex military affair far from traditional civil war. This has left the society to endure instability in the human, physical and environmental security spheres. By 2003, DRC was hobbling toward complete collapse and state failure. This finally prompted the battle-weary warlords to agree to experiment with democracy once more.

The Role of External Actors

Several international state and non-state actors have tried to assist, but their efforts have ended as merely tragic twists in the tale. Peace is still elusive because of the deeply entrenched mistrust: to such a degree that whichever leaders emerge, whether through the gun or falsified ballots, face the same challenges. William Zartman describes such a scenario by stating that when so many actors and beliefs are present in a collapsed system, loyalties shift to various individual rulers and not to the nation.³

Perhaps this explains why so many politicians and the locals do not seem patriotic enough to rebuild their nation. As Mills advises, "foreigners must not be seen to love the country more than the citizens

themselves."⁴ It follows therefore, that when the system breaks down, many Congolese people often find themselves reverting to their tribal lineage, which makes them too proud to follow any leader they consider not to be their own. These dynamics tend to produce a picture-perfect conflict that is easy to define but very difficult to resolve.

Any analytical narrative of the recent history of the DRC shows that some actors tend to appear and disappear depending on the situation. This lends itself to the explanation that the international community has only rushed to the assistance of the DRC when the need became especially pressing. There seems to be an eerie correlation between interference by the so-called "international community" and deteriorating conditions for the local population. Colette Braeckman states that the real reasons and answers to why Africa's "first World War" has dragged on for so long lie outside of the Congo.⁵

The DRC has seen a lot of activity and frantic reconstruction efforts that have tried to stitch the military together to avoid lapsing back into anarchy. Although thinly deployed, the 22,000 strong UN Peacekeeping Force in DRC is the largest such effort and covers almost all the regions, with the Eastern Region being the main focus.

The TCCs in particular have made tough decisions to intervene driven by their collective moral conscience. In 2005, almost ten years after the genocide in Rwanda, a UN Summit formally agreed that the responsibility to protect does indeed rest with the state, and that if peaceful methods fail, all states - meaning the international community - have a responsibility to act collectively in a "timely and decisive manner," through the UN Security Council and

with the use of force. This has been termed the “responsibility to protect.”⁶

The question of involvement of other countries in the Great Lakes Region is another important storyline. Many experts have rightly stated that one root cause of the conflicts can be traced to the arbitrary carving of states during the colonial era that was done without due regard to the then-existing nations and tribes, which were subsumed within the newly-created colonial states. These inherently divided nations created problems of irredentism, power struggles, the search for identity and divided loyalties, leading to intra-state conflicts.

Although this argument is generally accepted, it is exposed if one is asked to suggest any alternative formula of how boundaries should have been drawn without causing equal dispute. The other contention is to ask why other states are symbols of stability today and yet they were also created out of the same “Berlin” arrangement. This lends credit to the assertion by Barry Buzan who argues that peace and security are simply derivatives of power, and as long as there is a desire to dominate others, conflict will always be inevitable. His prescription is a willingness to accept others as equals.⁷

The entry of China and of private companies constitute another phenomenon that needs to be analyzed with regard to its impact on the security landscape in the DRC. There is no denying that their influence extends beyond the confines of commercial parameters. Can these be brought on board to assist if we all accept that the DRC situation needs help from every corner?

The common thread passing through the security analysis of the Eastern DRC is that it is an aggregate of many ills, all characterized

by endless storylines of internal and external negative spinoffs.

Amidst the special relationship between the DRC and its neighbors, one must never lose sight that simmering tensions between the Congolese and neighbouring Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi have never entirely subsided, and hence their footprints remain visible. Rwanda has repeatedly been accused of supporting the M23 militia, while the Congolese are in turn accused of not doing enough to combat the FDLR (the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda – remnants of the genocidal primarily Hutu forces that escaped Rwanda following the victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front under now President Paul Kagame in 1994). It also remains to be seen how the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGL) / SADC Meeting’s decision to forcefully disarm the FDLR will pan out, recognizing that the group had offered to surrender but, like some other militia groups though unlike the M23, they are not distinct from the population. Will the SADC TCCs be willing to face the likely humanitarian consequences?

Malawi and the Force Intervention Brigade

Having participated in the UN Mission in Rwanda (1994-1995), it was no surprise that Malawi became part of the AU and UN Missions in the DRC and elsewhere, recognizing that the capacity of the UN to reduce human suffering was severely constrained by the unwillingness of member states to respond by contributing troops. Nothing that Malawi does in the future should detract from her place in history as a humble but regular contributor to a greater cause.

Since the 2003 ceasefire in Eastern Congo, the Kabila Government had been pressing for these forces to pull out. The force was accused of doing very little and in 2010, these accusations took a new turn when 150 women were captured and repeatedly raped only few miles away from a UN encampment. In an attempt to recover from this, the UN mandate became to protect civilians and help reconstruct the country and the mission changed from United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) to the UN Stabilization Mission (MONUSCO).

The situation deteriorated to a new low in 2012 when Goma fell into rebel hands, followed by reports and horror stories of atrocities committed. The ICGLR and SADC felt duty-bound to do something immediately to ensure the protection of civilians. The UN adopted the recommendation proffered by the countries of the Great Lakes Region to create an offensive-oriented fighting force to “neutralize and disarm” the notorious March 23 Movement (M23) and other violent forces in the region. UN Resolution 2098 was adopted to create a specialized “Intervention Brigade” on an “exceptional basis” within the already existing MONUSCO, to deal with the situation. The parameters for disarming the rebels “in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner,” including the exit strategy, were clearly spelt out in the mandate.⁸

There were reservations in some quarters arguing this could compromise the “neutrality” of the force. Others argued that it was indeed a “new territory” but doable if executed meticulously.⁹ In short the Resolution *per se* was the culmination of a long decision-making and consultative process that required brinkmanship to succeed.

Pledges for troop contributions came from Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa – all SADC member states – and their activities were placed under the operational control of MONUSCO. It was a bold decision in that Africa had demonstrated a rare determination to ensure that a humanitarian crisis was averted. The German politician, Martin Kobler, was appointed UN Special Representative for MONUSCO and Head of Mission in June 2013. General Carlos dos Santos Cruz, a Brazilian was appointed Force Commander.

The specialized Brigade is made up of 3,069 troops and consists of three Infantry Battalions, one Artillery Battalion, one Special Forces Company and one Reconnaissance Company. MONUSCO itself has a troop ceiling of 19,815 military personnel countrywide, 760 military observers and staff officers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 formed police units. It has one Pakistani and Indian Brigade each in North Kivu and South Kivu respectively.

FIB Successes: Reprieve at Last?

With a semblance of stability appearing, but residual effects of the bitter past just thinly buried underneath, everybody believes that the taming of the country’s own Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC), first by letting them tackle the threats, may just provide the right window of opportunity needed to prevent this democratic experiment from going wrong yet again. The conflict has taken a long winding road but the military has been the common denominator throughout. The irony is that the citizens have suffered in the past at the hands of their own army - the very institution that was supposed to protect them. That seems now to be changing.

The first Malawi Battalion (MALBATT I) completed its full deployment on 10 October, 2013. In military parlance, the FIB had to undertake the aggressive task of striking whereas the tasks of *finding*, *fixing*, and *holding* were assigned to brigades of MONUSCO. On the ground, the FIB worked in close support of FARDC.

The initial successes of the FIB have been widely documented. This section seeks to critically analyze what the future holds for the FIB and suggest possible solutions to the challenges by drawing lessons from a case-study of Colombia and the FIB's own experience.

When the FIB managed to dislodge the notorious M23 from towns such as Kibumba, Rumangabo and Rutshuru within four days (25-28 October 2013), it brought a sense of triumph and confidence to many as nobody had predicted such a quick defeat of the rebels. Apart from the mastery of tactical ground successes, much can also be attributed to the professional complementarity of both the strategic and operational planning efforts. In essence, the FIB's role was supposed to remain that of providing direct combat service support to FARDC and striking where necessary. To this end, the tactics employed included multinational configuration of the Task Forces. These were organized into three sub-units and deployed near Kiwanja, Munigi, Kibati and Rutshuru as blocking forces to provide forward passage for the three FARDC Task Forces. The infantry units (41, 805, and 806 respectively) were backed by heavy artillery, rocket and air support near Kiwanja, Kibati and inside Virunga National Park. Despite the poor road infrastructure, the FIB ensured it prepositioned logistics in each axis, thereby overcoming the challenges of sustainment.

At the height of the resistance, Malawian troops were placed in Task Force C, which was responsible for the Luindi-Mabenga-Kiwanja Axis. With Force Headquarters at Goma and the Main Operating Base at Sake, the Malawi Contingent established its own Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) at Luindi, Tongo, Ishasha and Lubar. Apart from the routine missions in the area of responsibility, Malawian troops had at one time to provide relief to the Republic of South Africa contingent by manning one of the South African Defense Force's (SANDF) FOBs for about a month as its troops were conducting rotations.

The fiercest combat took place between 25 and 28 October 2013, in a battle which dislodged the main M23 rebel group. The Malawian Defense Force (MDF) had deployed on 10 October 2013, much later than the Tanzania People's Defence Force (TPDF) and SANDF. They entered the fray straight away at this crucial moment, thereby ensuring there was full capacity to maintain the tactical initiative and keep the rebels on the run. The new leadership of the 8th Military Region, under the late Major General Bahuma Ambamba, ensured that there was total discipline in the force, well aware of the events of 2012, which had embarrassingly led forces to abandon the town of Goma.¹⁰ With these initial successes, the triumphant mood became palpable and the people's confidence grew. MONUSCO itself played a critical role in pushing the rebels back and pursued a more nuanced proactive stance within the new more robust mandate.

The sound tactical utilization of the integrated assets available was embraced by leaders at all levels, and became the trademark of the FIB. M1-24p and Rooivalk attack helicopters, artillery, mortars, surveillance equipment and anti-air assets all added synergy as combat

multipliers. The Force Commander and the Special Representative have continued to give calculated, decisive strategic directions, mindful of the possible ramifications if not handled well.

Although this is not the first time that Malawi has operated under a robust UN mandate, the uniqueness of the FIB and the dynamics on the ground are forcing the mission to explore new territory, and increase the pressure to succeed. At the outset of the mission the rationale for creating a 3,000 strong force of the FIB, to carry out tasks that a 20,000 strong MONUSCO force had been unable to achieve over many years was questioned. One year on, this has come to pass.

It will be recalled that while the MDF has participated in peace-support operations missions in Europe, the Middle East and Africa, each mission has had its fair share of distinct

challenges. There are no templates that fit all scenarios. The decisiveness exhibited at the beginning of the engagements under examination set the tone and served as a signature and a statement of the FIB's serious intent.

Perhaps one of the most remarkable operations that came early in Malawi's deployment took place at Kahunga and Mabenga during FARDC's advance to dislodge M23 rebels in Kiwanja and Rutshuru. In October 2013, FARDC's advance had been halted at Kahunga by heavily armed M23 rebels who had dug in and threatened to disrupt the FIB's plans by denying them access on this axis. There was incessant heavy fire and as the Congolese began to withdraw because of injuries and fatalities the two Malawian platoons and a medical team proceeded not only to conduct casualty evacuation, but also got heavily involved and, supported by a Tanzanian



A soldier from the Force Intervention Brigade of MONUSCO aims his rifle during a training exercise

Artillery Battery, regained the initiative, counter-attacked, and successfully overran the position, surprising the enemy's main force at the rear, in the next town.

Casualties were heavy but Task Force C's resolve was not affected despite losing a Congolese Commanding Officer during the battle. Friendly forces, especially the forward Congolese elements, suffered some casualties while the FIB itself had a remarkably small casualty figure. Elsewhere, at almost the same time, the FIB also lost a Tanzanian Lieutenant – shot dead in an almost similar situation. Since then, the momentum has been sustained with no sign of mission creep, resulting in the rebels fleeing or surrendering before any contact. Rebel positions at Karengera and Tonga are a case in point.

Lessons Learned

The FIB mandate was extended an additional year and upon exit the force will be replaced with an independent Rapid Deployment Brigade (RDB) to carry out similar tasks. This suggests that future operations can be assured of having a “readily available insurance cover” that will give them more flexible latitude.

The FIB deployment continues to be a test case for the UN's future missions, and the UN is all too aware of this, hence the proposal of the RDB concept. For now there is overwhelming evidence that the existential threats in the region have been drastically reduced.

On Malawi's part, it has been yet another learning curve and a more fulfilling, challenging experience which has thus far not put a negative strain on the physical and moral components of the force, nor has it affected the psyche or public opinion at home.

Africa has come of age by ensuring that decisions made at political levels are not mere

rhetoric, but that they are backed by timely and decisive action. Once the decision was taken, pledges came from Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa. The nagging question is what happens if any of the TCCs decides to withdraw from the FIB prematurely. There is no doubt in the case of Malawi that at least today there is sufficient political and public determination to see this through with no skewed interests but, politics and perceptions being what they are, one cannot guarantee that forever.

The UN's swiftness in changing to a more proactive mandate once the situation deteriorated helped avert anarchy. The process is usually long and tedious, typically causing frustration and unnecessary suffering. By letting the FARDC take the lead misconceptions on the sincerity of the UN were avoided. This brought confidence and much needed co-operation from the local population. The concept of having a Joint Task Force Planning Cell, although not new, ensured maximum utilization of resources and continuous consultation through sharing of information. Visits and briefings also ensured development and continuity of buy-in. However, the question of using UN civilian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, whose valuable information is used for military purposes, needs to be addressed quickly to avoid challenges to mission legitimacy.

The professional attitude that is being inculcated into the new FARDC, as exemplified by the improved discipline, is doing a lot for the image and reputation of the force. There is a growing sense of goodwill among the locals.

Although there are some Congolese who do not seem to care for their own country, exemplified by their plundering acts and association with unscrupulous foreigners, the

majority would like to see the peace process work. One of the locals, questioning the level of patriotism and lack of desire to seek solutions for his motherland, sums up these feelings by lamenting:

Are we genetically predisposed to seek solutions in violence, with an innately warped view of the world? Are we ignorant of any other peaceful solutions? Are we so backward looking and blinded by clan loyalties that we are unable to see we are all blood brothers and sisters? Why do we hate even those who come to help us?¹¹

Indeed there are many Congolese with such passion for their motherland. The challenge is how to identify them within the large constituency in the diaspora in order to harness their collective desire to live in harmony, particularly in this part of the region where geo-politics seems to deny them the opportunity to unite on the basis of collective human identity. That primordial prejudice has enabled different detractors to take advantage of the vacuum to create anarchy.

Many experts warn that stability in the DRC must be looked at with guarded optimism because of the root causes of the war. Mills states that conflict in the DRC is an example of the wars that never ended. These wars, otherwise termed as “the forever wars,” are not fought over national interests, grievances or even over resources and greed, but have their own tautology where groups fight as a way of life precisely because there is no state. They become conflict entrepreneurs, making money rather than aiming to seek power from fighting.¹² Given such circumstances, caution ought to be taken to ensure that well-meaning players do not unconsciously become part of the problem.

Can the offense-oriented Force Intervention Brigade become a new kind of template for the future in handling these “forever wars?” One thing is clear: if the FIB concept succeeds, it will create a dilemma for the UN since many will view it as a panacea for all conflicts given the number of other failed peace missions. The war-weary international community will believe that the benefits of ending the violence early with an aggressive force far outweigh the disadvantages, particularly because of the *problème diplomatique* and the usual fatigue of watching perennial violence on our TV screens whose *raisons d’êtres* were artificially created decades ago.

On the subject of local governance and policing, it is common knowledge that the police have notoriously been more a part of the problem than the solution. This sector needs equally urgent innovation and reform. There are currently only three pilot reform programs in three regions with assistance from civil society and the hope is that these can be expanded to additional areas. Given the fact that there is some correlation between governance, security and weak institutions, it is up for conjecture as to what strains such challenges as the Ebola outbreak or Jihadism will impose on the situation. The impacts of such additional responsibilities can be catastrophic and indeed these threats are not too far away.

Conclusion

Extrapolating from this discourse, and having seen a glimmer of hope in what once appeared a hopeless situation, one can draw lessons from Colombia on how to recover from a devastating conflict. A more nuanced Colombian-style recovery plan is suggested as a possible solution because there are similarities, but

emphasis must be placed on political will as the point of departure.

This approach has been suggested mindful of the fact that solutions to the DRC conflict cannot holistically be achieved by providing “total recipes” that have succeeded elsewhere, because of some of its unique conditions which tend to evolve and follow different patterns over time, allowing detractors to take advantage of these dynamics. To this end, the approach should focus on simultaneously rebuilding institutions that complement one another in phases, such as the security sector along with judicial institutions.

This plan requires international assistance to help the DRC embark on a broad rebuilding process even before the FIB begins to withdraw. Realizing that resources are a key factor, ways of harnessing the country’s own resources such as by attracting genuine investments, taxing the rich and stopping corruption, must be put in place to help finance and sustain what the author terms, “the DRC’s Marshall Plan.”

Caution should also be taken on how to handle the socially-constructed nature of the root causes of conflict, and other dominant assumptions. To this effect, some experts suggest a concept of “conflict sensitive assistance,” which means that the reconstruction, policies and projects should consider their potential impact to ensure any interventions do not contribute to the escalation of the conflict.¹³ Previous assistance efforts have created numerous subaltern entities of armed groups and international actors that are benefiting from a situation of stateless disorder, rendering any conflict management efforts seem like diplomatic exercises in futility.

For now, peace seems to be holding, but this current situation must be embraced with cautious optimism mindful of the complex

dynamics of the DRC. The concept of the Force Intervention Brigade is simply a new tool that is being tested for the first time and it must be given time. Given the circumstances, it is only fair to conclude that it is a work in progress.

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Notes

¹ See Mills Greg (2014), *Why States Recover, Changing Walking Societies into Winning Nations* from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, Picador Africa, p 220.

² Nzongola-Ntalaja Georges, (2002), *The Congo: From Leopard to Kabila – A People’s History*, Zed Books, p258.

³ Zartman William I.,(1995), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Lynne Rienner.

⁴ See Mills Greg, *Perspective on African Security*, Brenthurst Foundation Paper 3/2014.

⁵ Braeckman Collette, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, “Congo: A War Without Victors,” (April 2001).

⁶ See The UN Millenium Report, 2000.

⁷ Buzan Barry,(1983), *People, States and Fear*, Ecpr Classics

⁸ The UN Security Council 6943rd Meeting (PM), Resolution 2098 (2013) Enables Offensive Combat Force to ‘Neutralize and Disarm’ Congolese Rebels, Foreign Armed Groups. 28 March 2013.

⁹ Ibid, United Kingdom’s representative Beetiner Lionce ‘(Nov 2013 is UN Offensive Intervention in Congo New Model of Peacekeeping, <http://politicalviolence@glance>, accessed 30 June, 2014, p 2.

¹⁰ General Ambamba died in RSA Hospital after suddenly collapsing while attending a meeting in Uganda on 31st August, 2014.

¹¹ See Abdcadir H., (2007), *A Failed State, The Red Sea*, p 2.

¹² Mills Greg (2014) *Why States Recover, Changing Walking Societies into Winning Nations – From Afghanistan to Zimbabwe*, Picador Africa pp 216-17, Quoting Jeffrey Gentleman’s article by the same title in *Foreign Policy*, Feb 10, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/africas-forever-wars>

¹³ See West G Garry (1997), *Conflict and its Resolution in Africa*, University Press, MD, p 56.