Oct. 19, 2017

Facilitator's Guide: Sierra Leone: The Revolutionary United Front

Sierra Leone: The Revolutionary United Front

Oct. 19, 2017

Facilitator's Guide: Capacity Building, Institutional Development, and Accountability

Capacity Building, Institutional Development, and Accountability

Oct. 19, 2017

Facilitator's Guide: Criminal Patronage Networks and the Struggle to Rebuild the Afghan State

The year 2014 was supposed to have signaled a full return to sovereignty in Afghanistan and an end to the twelve-year-long NATO security mission. Instead, while Afghanistan in 2014 was stronger than it had been in decades -- possessing a sizable and increasingly capable set of Afghan National Security institutions -- factionalism, corruption, and the criminal subversion of state institutions left its politics fragile and its long-term security uncertain. The “Criminal Patronage Networks and the Struggle to Rebuild the Afghan State” case study explores how strategic failure occurred, and offers insights that enable readers to identify risks and possible remedies in current and future conflicts.

Oct. 19, 2017

Facilitator's Guide: Traffickers and Truckers: Illicit Afghan and Pakistani Power Structures with a Shadowy but Influential Role

Traffickers and Truckers: Illicit Afghan and Pakistani Power Structures with a Shadowy but Influential Role

Oct. 19, 2017

Facilitator's Guide: It Takes a Thief to Catch a Thief: Understanding the Operational Environment

It Takes a Thief to Catch a Thief: Understanding the Operational Environment

Oct. 19, 2017

Facilitator's Guide: Illicit Power Structures: An Introduction

Illicit Power Structures: An Introduction

Oct. 19, 2017

Module 1: Introduction to Illicit Power and the Problem of Convergence – Definitions, Objectives, and Taxonomy

Module 1 provides an orientation to the problem. It does so by introducing the concepts of “Convergence” and “Illicit Power,” the implications for national sovereignty and security, and overarching insights from the totality of the research.

Oct. 18, 2017

Module 2: Peace Matters: The Impact of Peace Agreements and Political Accords on Illicit Power – Why is this an operational problem?

By comparing case studies from Afghanistan and Sierra Leone, and including a prospective look at Colombia, this module highlights one of the enduring insights from Impunity – that peace agreements and political settlements directly impact our ability to contain the rise of illicit power in a post-conflict environment. A critical learning objective is to create a bridge between policy and implementation. Discussions should center around the impact of peace agreements on every level of operations, how such strategic accords fit in the analysis of the operational environment, and how implementers can identify the ways in which agreements and settlements themselves create risk. During beta testing of the model syllabus, this module proved to be the most popular among JPME students as it was the least well-understood prior to instruction.

Oct. 17, 2017

Module 3: Understanding the Operational Environment and the Intelligence Challenge

This module addresses another of the enduring insights from Impunity – the persistent failure of the U.S. and its international partners to understand the operational environment in which illicit powers structures arise and thrive. Building on Module 1, Module 3 offers several frameworks for analysis, suggestions for how to adapt commonly used doctrinal frameworks, and case studies that illustrate the value of open source intelligence and publicly available information. Multiple case studies are available to facilitate wide-ranging discussion, but the module outline focuses on the Odessa Network in particular, as an example of end-to-end analysis.

Oct. 17, 2017

Webcast: Defining "Success"

In this thought-provoking interview, National Defense University Professor Tom Marks analyzes insurgencies in Sri Lanka and Colombia to illustrate the difficulty in determining what “success” looks like when confronting the problem of impunity and illicit power. He further discusses the adaptation that enabled those nations’ militaries to turn defeat into victory, and the cost of that adaptation to international reputation and support.