May 24, 2016

CHAPTER 15 The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Intelligence-Led Policing

The term “intelligence-led policing” (ILP) has been in use at least since the 1990s, and its origins trace back even further, to the early 1970s. The term shows up everywhere in plans, policies, and procedures for transition from foreign intervention to domestic operations in enforcing the rule of law. And yet, most planners and policymakers have little practical understanding of what ILP means, what it looks like when it works, and what it takes to build sustainable, civilian-led ILP capability within the host nation’s security and justice system. Intelligence-led policing is critical to a state’s ability to check the rise of illicit power and control illicit organizations and activities where they already exist. Thus, a solid understanding of the principles behind illicit power, and of the capacity required to conduct it, is key. This chapter intends to fill our own ILP knowledge gaps so that planners and implementers alike will understand its impact and ask the right questions when assessing need, capacity, and risk.

May 24, 2016

CHAPTER 14 Make It Matter: Ten Rules for Institutional Development that Works

The preceding chapters show how illicit actors function as primary roadblocks in the path to peace. Illicit power structures emerge and are energized in the vacuum left by the chaos of war, civil upheaval, subregional disorder, and the attendant destabilization. First to go during conflict are the legitimate power bases that arise from the legal framework of the state. Constitutions, laws, and codes of criminal procedure, even vehicular codes, fall by the wayside as the channels of power disbursement are upended and the relevant, legally appointed leaders abandon their posts. Courts are looted, and judicial officers withdraw in fear as tribally and self-appointed power grabbers dictate the law. Police institutions are taken over by militias that impersonate the actual police, usurping the legitimate power of the state to enrich themselves and their criminal organizations. Prisons become the locus for illegal detention at best, and torture and extrajudicial executions at worst.

May 24, 2016

CHAPTER 13 Recruitment and Radicalization: The Role of Social Media and New Technology

As parts of the Middle East imploded following the euphoria of the Arab Spring, some Americans shocked friends, family, policymakers, and pundits alike by leaving home to join the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other terrorist organizations operating in the chaos of Syria, Iraq, and Libya. By May 2015, hundreds of U.S. citizens had joined the fight on the side of the extremists, and many others had been apprehended in the attempt. Even greater numbers of recruits left Europe, making their way across the Mediterranean, or overland through Turkey, to join the self-declared caliphate in its latest call to jihad. In 2014 in the UK alone, conservative estimates pegged the numbers of radicalized individuals leaving to join ISIL at five per week.1 By 2015, the numbers were generally believed to have climbed significantly.

May 24, 2016

Chapter 12 Financial Tools and Sanctions: Following the Money and the Joumaa Web

In 2011, two units of the U.S. Treasury Department, acting on DEA-led investigations, imposed closely aligned financial countermeasures to expose, disrupt, and incapacitate a major international drug trafficking and money laundering network linked to the terrorist organization Hezbollah. The network, headed by Lebanese national Ayman Joumaa, had exploited the U.S. and international financial systems to launder hundreds of millions of dollars from narcotics trafficking and other criminal activities in Europe and the Middle East, moving the illicit moneys through West Africa and back into Lebanon. The U.S. dollars moving through this scheme included the proceeds of car sales between the United States and West Africa, transacted to conceal the money’s criminal origins. A significant portion of this illicit money moved through courier and security networks controlled by Hezbollah or affiliated individuals.

May 24, 2016

Chapter 11 Weapons Trafficking and the Odessa Network: How One Small Think Tank was Able to Unpack One Very Big Problem, and the Lessons It Teaches Us

Today’s security environment is very different from the one we faced even two decades ago. Asymmetric and hybrid threats take advantage of the industrial-age doctrine, law, and organizational and geographic boundaries that we created to fight the World Wars and manage the Cold War. Informal and illicit power structures embed themselves in licit systems to promote political violence and gain control of vital resources. Persistent security challenges, such as arms trafficking and environmental crime, feed the local conflict economies and empower the illicit networks. This expansion of mission scope provides a daunting challenge for the intelligence community. But the arrival of the information age also provides the tools necessary to understand and influence these power structures. Using these tools, a C4ADS report, The Odessa Network, has mapped the intricate web of entities and processes used to execute a series of illicit arms transfers.

May 24, 2016

Chapter 10 It Takes a Thief to Catch a Thief: Illicit Power and the Intelligence Challenge

Viewing the current chaos in the Middle East through a 2015 lens, it seems almost quaint that only a few short years ago, within certain defense circles, serious discussion and debate about the theories behind Islamic jihad was seen as a distraction. Not that people were not interested or that jihadists’ motivations were deemed unimportant. Interest was high, and no responsible military commander would ever conclude that understanding the enemy was not a priority. But at the same time, there was an underlying sense of a limit to how much academic discussion was constructive while in the midst of prosecuting two wars. Was jihadist motivation really a military problem to solve? And how deep must one dive into philosophy or legal theory to address the immediate security imperatives in Afghanistan and Iraq?

May 24, 2016

Chapter 9 Sri Lanka: State Response to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam as an Illicit Power Structure

Until recently, Sri Lanka was the homeland of an illicit power structure unlike any other. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was an insurgency that privileged terrorism as a method of action yet ultimately fielded land, air, and sea regular forces, rounded out by powerful special-operations and information capabilities. LTTE grew in capacity until it was capable of forcing the government to agree to a February 2002 cease-fire and the de facto existence of a Tamil state, or Tamil Eelam. But this victory of sorts produced a host of unforeseen consequences leading to the July 2006 resumption of hostilities. The result, in May 2009, was complete military defeat of the insurgency.

May 24, 2016

Chapter 8 Sierra Leone: The Revolutionary United Front

Sierra Leone represents one of the most successful cases of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding. More than 10 years after the declared cessation of its decade-long conflict in 2002, the country remained relatively stable.1 Three successful national elections were held in 2002, 2007, and 2012. Two of them (2007 and 2012) resulted in the defeat of the theretofore incumbent Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) government by the opposition All People’s Congress Party (APC). Thus, a key test for nascent democracy—the peaceful transition of power to an opposition party—albeit fraught with tension, occurred twice in the decade following one of the most brutal African civil wars in modern times. This is a major achievement that should not be overlooked.

May 24, 2016

Chapter 7 The Philippines: The Moro Islamic Liberation Front - A Pragmatic Power Structure?

Conflict in the Southern Philippines has traditionally been seen as a historical struggle between contending religious and ethnic identities: the majority Christian population and the Muslim minority. This discourse was tacitly accepted by both belligerents and victims of the conflict. Unfortunately, such a dualistic perspective obscures the complex roots of insecurity in Mindanao and overemphasizes the role of ideational rather than material factors in sustaining armed violence. Filipino Muslim secession, stripped of its overlaid ethnic and religious signifiers, can be seen more holistically as a manifestation of postcolonial tensions that resulted in a dysfunctional state-building process. These inequitable beginnings gave rise to an illicit power structure, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

May 24, 2016

Chapter 6 Colombia and the FARC: From Military Victory to Ambivalent Political Reintegration?

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Colombia entered a decade of civil war from which it has never fully emerged. A key contributor to the violence throughout has been las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), or FARC, an organization that reached its peak during the presidency of Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) but declined precipitously thereafter when decimated by a military-led national resurgence. This occurred, in the first instance, during the initial term of President Álvaro Uribe (2002-6), with consolidation continuing in the second Uribe term (2006-10).