Introduction

The SOF Role in Combating Transnational Organized Crime

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In April 2015, military and civilian personnel from Canada, Mexico, and the United States came together at Colorado Springs, Colorado, for a symposium hosted by U.S. Special Operations Command-North and facilitated by Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) and Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM). Their task was to examine the role of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in combating transnational organized crime (TOC). After opening remarks by Rear Admiral Kerry Metz, a U.S. Navy SEAL and SOCNORTH commander, the panelists and plenary participants set to work considering a wide range of issues attending to the TOC threat. Symposium panelists and speakers synthesized the results of their research and panel discussions about TOC, and these are found in the chapters of this report of proceedings, *The SOF Role in Combating Transnational Organized Crime*.

So what is TOC? President Obama in his strategy to counter TOC advances this description:

Transnational organized crime refers to those self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption and/or violence, or while

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protecting their illegal activities through a transnational organiza-
tional structure and the exploitation of transnational commerce or 
communication mechanisms.¹

The United Nations (UN) defines TOC as a:

structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of
time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences … in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.²

Douglas Farah, author and veteran analyst of financial crime, armed
groups, and TOC, focuses upon TOC as drug trafficking, money laundering, and human trafficking, plus trafficking in weapons of mass destruction.³ Compiling a complete list of TOC activities is challenging.

The TOC Threat

The scope of the TOC threat is consuming: “fifty-two activities fall under the umbrella of transnational crime.”⁴ Drug trafficking tops the list and it brings in about $320 billion a year; human trafficking is worth about $32 billion; and gunrunning earns about $300 million annually.⁵ Just moving all this illicit money around the globe is lucrative too. Money laundering involves 2 to 5 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP), or $800 billion to $2 trillion in current U.S. dollars on which banks make a commission.⁶ More important than the money involved, the human cost is horrific, as is the impact on weak and struggling states that become corrupted and cannot provide basic governance and services for their countrymen.

Weak or failing states and attendant TOC are identified in the 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) as among the top strategic risks to the country because of the significant security consequences. Weak states provide the sanctuary for the crime-terror-insurgency nexus to flourish. William F. Wechsler, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats, provides these examples: In Afghanistan “the Taliban continues to receive a large percentage of its revenue from the heroin trade.” And in Lebanon “Hizballah has become a drug trafficking and money laundering organization as well as a terrorist group.”⁷ This is a reminder of the early 1990s when the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) engaged in TOC (drug trafficking, gunrunning, kidnapping, and
extortion) to fund its “big guerrilla business.” A military role for counter transnational organized crime (CTOC) strategy was made apparent in the execution of “Plan Colombia.” Secretary Wechsler recalls:

In Colombia, the Department’s sustained counternarcotics and security assistance delivered military training, tactical and operational support, capacity building on intelligence sharing and information operations, equipment, and human rights training.

Thus, TOC is a longstanding threat to the interests of democratic nations. TOC is deeply rooted in the preconditions for terrorism and insurgency and the thirst for power and wealth, as well as in the policies of nations that make it profitable. Given TOC as a strategic threat, it is fitting for the international military community, especially the SOF community, to examine the role of special operations in supporting the CTOC effort. This is nothing new, as SOF elements have been involved in countering some dimensions of transnational crime since the early days of the drug war.

**The Backstory**

Military support to counter transnational crime can be traced to the U.S. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (10 USC 1502), which established the creation of a drug-free America by 1995 as a U.S. policy goal. The resulting National Drug Control Strategy outlined two major campaigns: supply reduction and demand reduction. To reduce the supply of drugs entering the United States, the major effort was to stop illicit drugs overseas and in transit.

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the military played the major roles in the overseas actions. Defense Secretary William J. Perry directed that the Department of Defense (DOD) would provide support for the detection and monitoring of the transport of illegal drugs, provide security assistance in source nations, and would support the DEA’s Kingpin Strategy in “Dismantling the Cartels.” At the time of the first National Drug Control Strategy of 1989, Joint Task Force (JTF) 4, under Atlantic Command located at Key West and JTF-5 (Pacific Command, Coast Guard Island, Alameda, California) were established to fulfill the military’s obligation to conduct air and sea detection and monitoring.

At this same time, DOD established JTF-6 (now JTF-North under U.S. Northern Command) at El Paso, Texas. Billeted in an old military jail, JTF-6
provided DOD support to drug law enforcement agencies in the Southwest border area. Typical missions of JTF-6 were to provide intelligence analysis, ground radar sensing, airborne reconnaissance, ground and air transportation, engineer operations, military exercises, ground reconnaissance, and mobile training teams. Guided by a SOF liaison office on staff, the SOF role was to provide training assistance and ground reconnaissance. JTF-North continues this mission today with the new guidance to “support our nation’s federal law enforcement agencies in the identification and interdiction of suspected transnational criminal organization (TCO) activities conducted within and along the approaches to the continental United States.”

It is well established in this volume that there is a military role in countering TOC, and within that role there is a place for SOF support. But with the advent of the new NSS and a supporting national Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (SCTOC), what roles have these new strategic policy documents carved out for SOF?

The Strategic Guidance

The NSS identifies TOC as a “top strategic risk to our interests,” asserting there are “[s]ignificant security consequences associated with weak or failing states (including … transnational organized crime).” One strategic objective, “build capacity to prevent conflict,” relates to a potential SOF supporting role. The strategy explains that weak governance and grievances allow extremism to flourish and therefore:

> [t]he focus of our efforts will be on proven areas of need and impact, such as inclusive politics, enabling effective and equitable service delivery, reforming security and rule of law sectors, combating corruption and organized crime, and promoting economic opportunity …

This suggests the possibility for employing a number of SOF core activities in the context of capacity building: preparation of the environment, direct action, security force assistance, military information support operations, civil affairs, and perhaps more. Examples of likely SOF core operations could include counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense (FID), and counterterrorism (CT). The strategy makes no specific mention of employing military power, but the president intends to “draw
on all elements of our national strength” to accomplish his agenda, and presumably this would include SOF power.20

The national SCTOC lists 56 strategic concepts (called priority actions) in the strategy, and two clearly suggest a military role. First, the U.S. will “strengthen interdiction efforts in the air and maritime domains.”21 Much of this would be under the synchronizing and integrating role of U.S. Southern Command’s Joint Interagency Task Force South, a military-interagency interdiction headquarters in Key West.22 This involves the operations of the U.S. Coast Guard, Navy (with law enforcement detachments aboard), U.S. Customs Air/Border Patrol (for terminal interception in the continental U.S.), and other agencies. The role of SOF here is conceivable, but likely limited to an extreme situation such as countering weapons of mass destruction in a takedown at sea by Navy SEALs. But there is nothing new here, and Joint Interagency Task Force South procedures are well established through 26 years of interdiction experience.

Secondly, the TOC strategy intends to “disrupt drug trafficking and its facilitation of other transnational threats.” To do this it will “leverage assets to enhance foreign capabilities, including CT capacity building … [and] … military cooperation.”23 Here is where SOF can make a significant contribution by its experience with FID missions that support a host nation’s internal defense and development program.

The SCTOC is silent about the kinds of stateside operations that could be conducted by SOF. Nothing is said of Joint Task Force North, which is:

the U.S. Northern Command organization tasked to support our nation’s federal law enforcement agencies in the identification and interdiction of suspected Transnational Criminal Organizations’ (TCOs) activities conducted within and along the approaches to the continental United States.24

JTF North integrates and coordinates DOD support to federal, state, and local drug law enforcement agencies throughout the United States. In past years SOF have provided training assistance, reconnaissance, and rapid response capabilities to JTF North, and this is likely to continue under the SCTOC.
Future TOC Missions

Given the NSS and SCTOC policy guidance, it is a safe bet that the combating TOC support missions assigned to the military, including SOF, will devolve from the counterdrug paradigm of the past. This will possibly include some CT and counterinsurgency tasks in the admixture as we saw in Colombia.

The SCTOC is intended to complement and interlock with the National Drug Control Strategy, but more than that, the U.S. drug war and TOC war have been conjoined. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) will co-chair (with the NSC staff) the Interagency Policy Committee on Illicit Drugs and Transnational Criminal Threats. The strategy does not fix responsibility for a lead agency for the CTOC war, but it provides that the ONDCP-led Interagency Policy Committee will “issue implementation guidance, establish performance measures, and receive regular progress updates from the interagency community.”

The implication for SOF is they must continue to train for meeting the strategic challenges ahead. This will require forward-deployed units that are engaged with their counterparts in the host countries because TOC is both a threat to and a result of weak, emerging democratic governments that need help. Readiness to conduct all the SOF core activities will remain a priority, with FID, security force assistance, counterinsurgency, CT, and unconventional warfare deserving special attention.

The Findings

In this report of the proceedings, the authors have provided their analysis of a broad range of issues related to TOC. The chapters in this report are penned by practitioners who are active in operations, policy, and research concerning crime and terrorism. Readers will want to compare the various views about the nature of the threat and what can be done about it. Most important is the authors’ findings on the SOF role in combating TOC. The chapters have been organized here as they relate to the strategic environment, policy and strategy, and operational issues.
The Strategic Environment

Transnational Organized Crime, a Regional Perspective

Brigadier General (retired) Hector E. Pagan takes a close look at the current environment of transnational crime and corruption throughout Central and South America. While Douglas Farah finds that the overlap of state corruption, terrorists, and TOC “applies most particularly to the Bolivarian states,” General Pagan’s chapter shows the problem is widespread in the region. He identifies TOC as the greatest threat to the nations of the hemisphere. This is particularly evident in the high rate of crime in many of the major cities of the region. Violence between drug cartels and gang violence is the main cause for the uptick in murders.

General Pagan alerts the reader that while TOC continues to increase in the Western Hemisphere, U.S. aid for the region is steadily decreasing. As a result, SOF engagement activities there have decreased by a third. Alas the budget history shows that funding fluctuates as Congress vacillates over the urgency of the terrorism threat. “When the terrorist threat seems less prominent in the perception of budget officers, funding for overseas CT programs typically assumes a lower priority.”

General Pagan gives CTOC efforts in the region a high priority. He enjoins the United States, Canada, Mexico, and other regional nations to integrate efforts to establish a “defense in depth” to counter TOC. He provides 15 objectives for an integrated regional approach by the United States and its neighbors that the reader will want to consider.

SOF and the New Borderless World

Dr. Emily Spencer argues that “the predilection to isolationism is now anachronistic” for countries that must function in an environment of globalization and a virtual borderless world. “[W]hat happens ‘over there’ more often than not impacts us ‘over here.’” Failed and weak states, potent non-state actors, violent extremist groups, and transnational criminal organizations define our surroundings in which today’s threats are “exponentially greater than those of the Cold War era.”

Dr. Spencer advises that in such a world, SOF have become an important tool for Western governments to meet the security challenges in a borderless world. SOF have substantive capability to deal with the threat: high
SOF Role in Combating Transnational Organized Crime

readiness, credibility in sensitive domains, a low profile, and specialized training to deal with unconventional situations.

In this regard, CANSOF has become the “force of choice” for Canada when dealing with complex situations of national import. Dr. Spencer recommends that we tackle issues at their root, namely ‘over there,’ and that like-minded nations with common interests should share collaborative networks to meet the threats. In so doing, SOF are especially well suited to help nations meet their responsibilities for stability and security.

Transnational Organized Crime in an Era of Accelerating Change

Mark Hanna describes how TOC contributes to instability and poor governance in vulnerable countries. He relates how globalization, while contributing positively to global commerce, has also facilitated the activities of criminal organizations. A particularly problematic result of this is the linkage between the lucrative drug trafficking business and terrorist groups.

Especially interesting is Mr. Hanna’s description of the rise of criminal service providers, or the crime-as-a-service business model, that facilitates TOC. “These service providers are typically not aligned with a single organization, but perform services for a variety of illicit actors,” according to Mr. Hanna. Interestingly, the crime-as-a-service business model also comes with some vulnerability for TOC. Criminal groups who use the same service providers (e.g., money launderers, weapons smugglers) “can produce leads against multiple criminal organizations” for law enforcement.

But Mr. Hanna also finds that traditional, well-structured TOC groups that are regionally based are still dangerous. They threaten weak states and tend to be the most violent groups because they must sustain and protect their operations. He concludes that increased public/private partnerships are necessary to tackle TOC since “Private companies are on the front lines of many criminal attacks and have access to important information about organized criminal groups, trends in criminal activity, and new techniques used by criminal actors.”

Transnational Criminal Organizations and the SOF Nexus

Brigadier General Mike Rouleau suggests that an integrated regional approach is required to counter TCOs. TCOs have the money to corrupt
the institutions of government and society; this can erode state legitimacy as political structures and security are undermined. As more people move from villages to the cities, the task of countering TCOs that operate from the sanctuary of poorly governed urban zones will become more difficult. And as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the like challenge Western nations from the sanctuary of acquired territories, those democratic countries are reluctant to intercede in overseas areas to beat back the threat.

To win in this complex, indeed chaotic environment, General Rouleau identifies five factors requisite for a SOF response to the TOC threat. Throughout the chapter he stresses the necessity of a joint-combined-interagency approach, a Global SOF Network to pull together planning and operations, the need for agility and flexibility in environments of chaos and complexity, and the need to have a small footprint in host countries as they take the lead in CTOC operations. General Rouleau concludes that success will be achieved by SOF that have earned the credibility and trust among host nations and civil institutions needed to outpace TOC.

Transnational Organized Crime: The SOF Nexus

Colonel Earl Vandahl addresses the nexus of SOF and TOC. Colonel Vandahl’s extensive experience with Canada’s Strategic Joint Staff enables him to share important insights about how SOF might fill the gaps and enhance the effectiveness of inter-ministerial networking that is critical for a coordinated national approach to countering TOC.

He finds that high readiness and small operating footprint of SOF makes them well suited to deal with TOC issues overseas. This is especially true of applying indirect strategies that seek to enhance host nation capabilities so local forces are trained to deal effectively with TOC. In advancing coordinated national approaches to TOC, Colonel Vandahl cautions readers about the inherent difficulty of achieving interagency cooperation if only for the diversity of core mandates of the various agencies involved in countering TOC.

Colonel Vandahl’s assertion that SOF can be organized to fight as an extension of domestic law enforcement for both overseas and rural domestic settings may give pause to the reader concerned about Constitutional and regulatory proscriptions concerning the use of military forces within the homeland. But he argues that the specialized capabilities that SOF offer,
particularly intelligence gathering, will be especially helpful in integrated SOF and law enforcement operations to defeat TOC. Special permissions, such as Presidential Findings and newly enacted laws, can make SOF and law enforcement interaction permissible even in a domestic setting, making Colonel Vandahl’s concepts practicable. Colonel Vandahl concludes that SOF are particularly well positioned to employ specific attributes and capabilities in the fight against TOC.

Policy and Strategy

CTOC Strategic Guidance

Dr. Pete McCabe discusses the United States, Canada, and Mexico policy and strategies and how they determine to counter TOC. He lays out policy similarities and differences and searches for the guidelines needed to engage SOF in the CTOC effort. Alas, CTOC policy in North America is lacking, but Dr. McCabe does find niches in which SOF unique capabilities might fit (e.g., assisting weak states, supporting law enforcement), particularly in Mexico where the military plays a big role in supporting law enforcement.

The reader will find especially interesting Dr. McCabe’s extensive analysis of Mexico’s security environment and its National Security Program. Dr. McCabe rightly concludes that the CTOC challenges are daunting. The borders north and south remain porous, as are ports of entry. Drug trafficking threatens the three countries, causing grave domestic security issues, particularly in Mexico. This is critical because many trafficking groups are associated with terrorist organizations. While learning from Mexico’s experiences, U.S. and Canadian SOF can assist Mexico in achieving their security goals. With law enforcement having the lead in CTOC, the SOF role will continue as support, train, and assist.

North American Efforts to Combat the Financing of Terrorism

Professor Celina Realuyo provides a comparison of the Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. efforts to counter threat finance (CTF). She underscores the importance of focusing our efforts on combating threat financing because criminals and terrorists need financing to enable their operations to succeed.
And knowing how illicit groups are financed “is instrumental in devising strategies to counter and neutralize them.”

Professor Realuyo describes Canada’s regime of policy and legislative permissions that arm the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Financial Transaction Reports Analysis Center, and other agencies with measures that can disrupt terrorist threats and money laundering. The Mexican government has also “strengthened its legal framework to address … threat financing.” The operations of Mexican agencies like the Financial Intelligence Unit have benefited from amendments to the Federal Penal Code and anti-money laundering legislation.

In the United States, financial intelligence is a critical part of the CTOC and CT efforts, and Realuyo identifies 22 U.S. agencies that are involved in this effort. Since September 2011, the United States has applied the financial instrument of national power to follow the money; and Professor Realuyo sees this as essential for detecting, disrupting, and dismantling criminal and terrorist groups.

**Inside Pandora’s Box: Foreign Fighters and the Lone Wolf Terrorism Nexus**

Colonel Bernd Horn’s chapter reviews another dimension of transnational criminal activity: the foreign fighter and related lone wolf mode of attack. Colonel Horn makes a strong and well-documented argument of the seriousness of the foreign fighter/lone wolf threat to domestic society.

In his chapter, Colonel Horn warns that volunteer foreign fighters, “individuals who leave their home country to participate in conflict in another state … expand the international reach” of transnational threats. His research reveals that about 40 percent of the ranks of ISIS are filled by foreign fighters, and about 10 percent of foreign fighters who return to their home countries become involved in domestic terrorist plots.

In discussing the “blow-back effect” Colonel Horn addresses individual motives and vulnerabilities to increase our understanding of the challenge. To meet this challenge, Colonel Horn describes Canada’s Combating Terrorism Act and how the country plans to counteract foreign fighter and lone wolf attacks.
Operations

Borders and Security

Dr. Christian Leuprecht describes the effectiveness of transnational criminal networks in penetrating traditional barriers delineated by international borders as well as the opportunities these networks can provide for law enforcement to disrupt TOC. International frontiers, protected by government laws and policy, remain important for countries to maintain their sovereign domains *uti possidetis juris*. Yet deviant globalization effectively leverages legal barriers to meet the “demand for goods and services that are illegal or considered repugnant in one place by using a supply from elsewhere in the world where morals are different or law enforcement is less effective.

Dr. Leuprecht explains how networks have become a force multiplier for TOC. He walks the reader through some of the basics of network science and the associated metrics of network structure, such as centrality measures. Social network analysis (SNA), Dr. Leuprecht advises, is critically important for analyzing and disrupting TOC. He asserts, “Networks are the most important unit of analysis in understanding the formation and dynamics of illicit organizations today.”

The premise of this chapter is supported by Dr. Leuprecht’s examination of a counterdrug operation conducted by police in Ontario, Canada, called Project Corral. Through the use of SNA, police were able to identify key personnel in the Canadian and Jamaican drug trafficking organizations. Dr. Leuprecht concludes, “evidence suggests that [TOC] structures are both flatter and more autonomous than generally assumed,” and more importantly, “borders, networks, and their nexus matter to detecting, dismantling, and deterring organized illicit activity.”

An Ontological Framework for Understanding the Terror-Crime Nexus

Colonel Bill Mandrick provides the reader an ontological framework for understanding the nexus between terrorism and TOC, and organizing information about this phenomenon. This framework can provide an understanding of the kinds and structures of objects, properties, events, processes, and relations in every area of reality as they relate to TCOs. The timely and
accurate organization of this data creates information that is the lifeblood of Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE).

In his chapter, Colonel Mandrick applies the tools of philosophical ontology to the nexus between two domains—terrorism and TOC. The prescribed ontological framework facilitates the creation of nodes and links, which represent the constituent elements of these two domains. This data feeds into planning, targeting, and JIPOE.

**Thoughts on Special Operations Forces Roles in Combating Transnational Organized Crime**

Mr. Randy Paul Pearson investigates the use of SOF-unique capabilities that can be effective in countering TOC. He compares the old days when the likes of Al Capone ruled well-structured criminal organizations to the environment of today where organized crime involves a loose amalgam of sophisticated, networked groups that may constantly shift interests and allegiances. While decapitation strategies can be helpful in disrupting TOC, as it was against the Capone organization, this approach does not necessarily lead to dismantlement.

SOF analysis methodology, Mr. Pearson says, can be useful to interagency departments and civilian institutions as they examine today’s complex domestic and international environments and the criminal organizations they enfold. The discipline of determining criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability, with regard to TOC, could prove to be the key to identifying the most effective course of action and the elements of national power needed to dismantle criminal organizations.

Mr. Pearson concludes that SOF’s role in countering TOC could be to help with interagency communications, analysis, and information sharing. “SOF can help build a whole-of-government information sharing enterprise that can be shared across all levels of government and law enforcement, possibly developing a new way of orienting all elements of national power to countering the TOC threat.”
Conclusion: SOF Roles and Future Challenges

World Order or Disorder: the SOF Contribution

Mr. Michael Miklaucic concludes these symposium findings with an examination of the challenges facing states to their sovereign place in the international political domain. He finds that the Westphalian notion of a rule-based system is being gravely challenged by the convergence of illicit networks of terrorists, insurgents, and transnational criminals.

Weak and failing states are especially pressed to maintain sovereign control of the use of legitimate coercive power and provide for the common good. He writes, “Cartels and gangs, as well as terrorists, and some insurgents, can now outman, outspend, and outgun the formal governments of the countries where they reside.”

Mr. Miklaucic finds that it is imperative that efforts be made to meet the need for state-building to counter the scourge of converging illicit networks. While this will require the application of political, economic, and security resources that are in short supply, it is critical that the globe’s viable states make efforts to help ailing countries that are under pressure from various armed groups and TOC.

Mr. Miklaucic finds that SOF “have unique capabilities and strengths that can help meet the sovereignty challenges facing our partner states.” They can both support military and law enforcement operations and training while also participating in non-kinetic activities such as civil affairs—building partnerships, medical and veterinary aid, and setting standards of conduct for host nation militaries to emulate. In these ways, SOF can serve as a major factor in strengthening weak states. Forward looking, Mr. Miklaucic asserts today’s illicit transnational networks threaten our system of nation-states, and these networks “must be countered if the system is to survive the current generation intact.”

Endnotes


Introduction


12. Ibid.


14. JTF-4 is now named JTF South under U.S. Southern Command; JTF-5 is now JTF West under Pacific Command at Camp H.M. Smith in Hawaii.


16. “Joint Task Force North supports Drug Law Enforcement Agencies in the conduct of Counter Drug/Counter Narco-Terrorism operations in the USNORTHCOM theater of operation to disrupt trans-national criminal organizations and deter


18. Ibid., 10.

19. USSOCOM Publication 1, Doctrine for Special Operations, 5 August 2011, 20. A discussion of core operations and activities are provided herein.


22. U.S. Southern Command, SOUTHCOM Component Commands & Units. “JIATF South is an interagency task force that serves as the catalyst for integrated and synchronized interagency counter-drug operations and is responsible for the detection and monitoring of suspect air and maritime drug activity in the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific. JIATF-South also collects, processes, and disseminates counter-drug information for interagency operations,” accessed at: http://www.southcom.mil/aboutus/Pages/Our-Team.aspx.


25. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 96. Kuhn reminds that history repeats as we select familiar and comfortable pathways: “Normal research, which is cumulative, owes its success to… [selecting] problems that can be solved with conceptual and instrumental techniques close to those already in existence.”


27. Farah, “Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, And Criminalized States In Latin America,” 48. Farah writes: “The self-proclaimed “Bolivarian” states (Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua) take their name from Simón Bolívar, the revered 19th century leader of South American independence from Spain. They espouse 21st century socialism, a vague notion that is deeply hostile to free market reforms, to the United States as an imperial power, and toward traditional liberal democratic concepts,” 68.

29. Ontology as a branch of philosophy is the science of what is, of the kinds and structures of objects, properties, events, processes and relations in every area of reality. In simple terms it seeks the classification of entities in some domain of interest. Philosophical ontologists have more recently begun to concern themselves not only with the world as it is studied by the sciences, but also with domains of practical activity such as law, medicine, engineering, and commerce. They seek to apply the tools of philosophical ontology in order to solve problems, which arise in these domains.