CASE STUDY NO. 7
COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

Disarmament in South Sudan

Cecily Brewer
Complex operations encompass stability, security, transition and reconstruction, and counterinsurgency operations and operations consisting of irregular warfare (United States Public Law No 417, 2008). Stability operations frameworks engage many disciplines to achieve their goals, including establishment of safe and secure environments, the rule of law, social well-being, stable governance, and sustainable economy. A comprehensive approach to complex operations involves many elements—governmental and nongovernmental, public and private—of the international community or a "whole of community" effort, as well as engagement by many different components of government agencies, or a "whole of government" approach. Taking note of these requirements, a number of studies called for incentives to grow the field of capable scholars and practitioners, and the development of resources for educators, students and practitioners. A 2008 United States Institute of Peace study titled "Sharing the Space" specifically noted the need for case studies and lessons. Gabriel Marcella and Stephen Fought argued for a case-based approach to teaching complex operations in the pages of *Joint Forces Quarterly*, noting “Case studies force students into the problem; they put a face on history and bring life to theory.” We developed this series of complex operations teaching case studies to address this need. In this process, we aim to promote research and to strengthen relationships among civilian and military researchers and practitioners.

The Center for Complex Operations (CCO) emphasizes the importance of a whole of government approach to complex operations and provides a forum for a community of practice and plays a number of roles in the production and distribution of learning about complex operations, including supporting the compilations of lessons and practices.

Dr. Karen Guttieri at the Naval Postgraduate School provided the research direction and overall leadership for this project.
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SETTING THE SCENE

South Sudan, January 2006. Wutnyang Gatkek, a spiritual leader from the Nuer ethnic group travels to Yuai in northern Jonglei State, a large, undeveloped state in the southeast of South Sudan. During Sudan’s north-south civil war (1983–2005), he had fought with the White Army against the north. The White Army was an unofficial armed group composed almost entirely of Nuer, Sudan’s second-largest ethnic group, many of them armed cattle-camp youth who joined forces to respond to local threats. Yet, he now goes to Yuai as a representative of the official South Sudanese army, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) to encourage Nuer youth to hand in their weapons.

Sudan’s largest ethnic group and Nuer’s frequent adversary, the Dinka, dominate the SPLA. The Dinka, pastoralists renowned for their height, hold many of the coveted administrative positions in the government. Still, Gatkek is chosen for, and accepts, the mission to overcome south-south ethnic tensions.

While the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) [Appendix A] ostensibly ended the twenty-two-year Sudanese civil war in January 2005, as in many “postconflict” states, one form of conflict has been replaced by another. The CPA established a progression of events for north-south conflict resolution, including a census and elections culminating in the 2011 referendum on southern independence. However, ethnic groups in the south often clash with each other in the absence of a common enemy to unite them and in a context still dominated by a warring mentality and rife with arms. Also, the South Sudanese state has had to rise out of the ashes of the civil war, beginning with almost nothing. The SPLA has worked to solidify its monopoly on the use of force, putting down unofficial armed groups that challenge its power where it can. Thus, south-south interethnic conflict and crime continue to threaten the population.

Gatkek is attempting to diffuse a very tense situation, indeed. Nuer-Dinka tensions flared in late 2005 when the Lou Nuer, one of two main Nuer groups, requested permission to graze their cattle on the lands of the Dinka in Duk County. During the dry season, Lou Nuer cattle herders move in search of wetter areas to graze their cattle, and inevitably they tread on
other tribes’ lands. This year, Dinka authorities asked the Lou Nuer pastoralists to surrender their weapons before passing onto the Dinka lands. But the Nuer refused, saying they had never been requested to do so in the past.

To defuse the conflict, the Governor of Jonglei State, Philip Thon Lek, a Dinka from Duk County, brought the disputing ethnic groups and representatives of the White Army together to resolve their dispute and discuss terms for voluntary disarmament. Forced disarmament was threatened should weapons not be voluntarily surrendered. However, the specific terms for disarmament were never clearly established and, while the governor promised compensation, he did not specify where he would get the money. Further, neighboring communities occasionally hostile to the Nuer, such as the Murle, were not asked to disarm simultaneously.

When the debated disarmament campaign was eventually launched in January 2006, the Nuer resist, afraid of being left unarmed and vulnerable to attack. The White Army attacks the SPLA. Gatkek, intending to diffuse the tension and transform a violent disarmament campaign into a voluntary one, is killed.

Meanwhile in Juba, the capital of South Sudan, SPLA leadership and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) Security Committee members consider a heavy-handed approach: a military campaign against the White Army and forced disarmament of the Nuer. In a last-minute attempt to resolve the issue peacefully, White Army leaders are brought together for a conference encouraging the voluntary surrender of weapons to the SPLA, but to little avail. It is rumored that during this time, the Military Intelligence branch of the north’s army, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), is supplying the White Army with weapons and ammunition in order to foment south-south violence, despite other public efforts to aid the internationally backed disarmament process.

On May 18, 2006, the conflict that had been building momentum for over a year explodes. In violent clashes in northern Jonglei State, an esti-

### Timeline of Civilian Disarmament in Northern Jonglei, December 2005–May 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North-South Sudan Civil War</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>January 2005</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 2005</td>
<td>Jonglei governor brings Lou Neur and Dinka together to resolve dispute</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 2006</td>
<td>Disarmament campaign begins, and Lou Nuer attack SPLA</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 2006</td>
<td>Wutnyang Gatkek killed while in Yuai</td>
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<td>February 27- March 7, 2006</td>
<td>Conference on Lou Nuer disarmament encourages voluntary disarmament</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 18, 2006</td>
<td>Major confrontation; at least 113 White Army killed, one SPLA killed; massive looting</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 20, 2006</td>
<td>SPLA meeting of chiefs and local authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Late May 2006</td>
<td>Chief-led disarmament</td>
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mated 113 White Army and one SPLA member are killed. The White Army, recognizing its defeat, retreats north into Upper Nile State. In the aftermath of the fighting, a lawless rampage of looting, cattle raiding, and property destruction by both sides is unleashed.

The SPLA considers pursuing the White Army. Instead, SPLA leadership brings chiefs and local authorities from Jonglei State together to plan a voluntary disarmament campaign. In the ensuing campaign, the chiefs collect an estimated 3,300 weapons from their communities. These are handed to local authorities, who give them to the SPLA. The final number of weapons collected is disputed, as the SPLA is reported to have taken some to unknown locations, and an unspecified number are being held locally.

While the Jonglei disarmament campaign was successful in collecting weapons, an estimated 400 SPLA and 1,200 White Army fighters were killed, and government officials reported at least 213 civilian deaths. In addition, the forced disarmament campaign produced food shortages, as the White Army took cattle and goats from civilians. Some SPLA soldiers died of thirst and hunger during the campaign as well.

THE DILEMMAS OF DISARMAMENT

Traditionally, disarmament is part of a three-part process: disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). Typically, the United Nations (UN) or the host government collects weapons (disarmament), disbands nonofficial armed groups (demobilization), and assimilates ex-soldiers into society through occupational training and support packages (reintegration).

South Sudan in late 2005 is fairly typical of a class of “postconflict” states that are particularly challenging for disarmament, especially because large numbers of the civilian population hold weapons.

The Disarmament Time Line: Speed vs. Ownership

While the CPA provided a framework for the DDR process, like most peace agreements it does not delve into the thorny details, such as how disarmament will be defined and implemented. Thus, the DDR process is left to be defined by the implementers: “The details of the peace agreement can be
regarded as a ceiling for action or a floor from which agents can move forward to implement their interpretation of the intent of the accords."

The international community may only be comfortable with pledging funds for a contained period of DDR, but analyst Nicole Ball cites a three-to-four-year period of demobilization and reintegration as more realistic than the one year often prescribed. Tod Wilson, a U.S. government official familiar with DDR implementation, notes that an appropriate time line is not only essential to determine resource allocations, but it also plays an important role in shaping popular expectations. A short time line can lead to expectation of an immediate postconflict "peace dividend." When the population does not see immediate improvement in their lives to match their expectations, they may become frustrated with the process and disillusioned with their government.

The CPA details the DDR mandate and implementing institutions. Disarmament was defined as the "collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population."

Article 24 states the guiding principles of the DDR process, such as national ownership, transparency, accountability, and flexibility. National ownership is established through the creation of a National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC), Northern and Southern Sudan DDR Commissions (NSDDRC and SSDDRC), and State DDR commissions.

While the international community respected the need for these indigenous institutions, they had to be newly created with little human or financial capital in the south. At the same time, UN and NGO headquarters, donor home offices, and general expectations demanded quick action. The national DDR commissions were established in 2005 and 2006, according to plan; however, the capacity of the fledgling South Sudan DDR Commission was weak and international support slow to arrive, inhibiting early DDR efforts. By 2007, the SSDDRC had a building and trained staff, but the State DDR commissions were barely functional. Setting up these new disarmament structures took time and money and, yet, the need for their role in the immediate postconflict peace was immediate. Should any of the guiding principles listed above be accommodated for speed?

The timing of each stage of the DDR process, which usually overlap, is also complex, and the process is often delayed. The CPA specifies that the first six months of DDR will target the demobilization of child soldiers and vulnerable groups, such as women and the disabled. Next, the thirty-six-month Interim DDR Program aims to develop the capacity of the national institutions and civil society groups to support the assessment, verification, and eligibility processing of ex-combatants. The postinterim period focuses on security sector reform of the national armed forces pending the outcome of the 2011 referendum.

DDR programs have begun but are behind the CPA time line. As of April 9, 2008, there were 182,900 participants in the DDR program, 51,000 of whom were preregistered for reintegration. Over one thousand children
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who were formerly associated with the armed forces have been returned to their families and communities.\(^{12}\) Despite these, albeit slow, successes, weapons collection from civilian populations stands out as an element that has not been adequately addressed. Although two-thirds of arms are held by civilians, there are no clear guidelines or credible mechanisms for voluntary civilian disarmament.\(^{13}\) Should civilian disarmament come early in the process in order to reduce crime and violence, or should it be attempted only after the security situation is in check?

**The Dilemmas of Coordination and Cooperation**

You’ll kill 500, but the rest will hand the guns over. It is necessary to use a well-equipped force to disarm. We don’t want to hurt anyone, but we must start somewhere, and we must do our best to provide security to those disarmed.

— An SPLA official

Another challenge of the implementation process is coordinating the timing and resources of a variety of military, private sector, host government, nongovernmental, international, and donor actors involved in DDR. This coordination can be viewed as an “implementation chain that needs to endure if the process of disarming and demobilizing is to succeed.”\(^{14}\)

Military actors, be they host-country army or UN peacekeepers, often begin the process and then transfer it to civil authorities and police. More significant than the usual interagency coordination issues, these taskings require military institutions to work together with the peace-building development institutions. Yet they do not always share the same approach, language, or culture. When coordination does not occur, disarmed populations are left vulnerable to attack.

A host-government-developed DDR plan through which the international community can coordinate its funding and action aids the process, but it can also take time for the government to develop such a plan. International-host country relations are delicate as well. Joseph Hanlon has criticized international organization and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for undermining the government’s role as a service provider.\(^{15}\) On the other hand, the international community often has good reasons to push for action on disarmament quickly, due to imminent security concerns.

Further complicating matters, international donor resources can be slow to arrive. Tod Wilson suggests that funding conflict management activities, especially through reestablishment of traditional mechanisms, can reduce tensions before disarmament processes are established and resources have time to take effect.\(^{16}\)

The CPA clearly defines the role of the international community, stating that it “shall only play a supportive role to these [Sudanese DDR] institutions.”\(^{17}\) Accordingly, United Nations Security Resolution 1590 identifies the UN’s mandate as: to assist the governments of Sudan in the DDR process with “particular attention to the special needs of women and child
combatants, and its implementation through voluntary disarmament and weapons collection and destruction.” (italics added)\(^{18}\)

On the other hand, the SPLA supported forced disarmament: “You’ll kill 500, but the rest will hand the guns over. It is necessary to use a well-equipped force to disarm. We don’t want to hurt anyone, but we must start somewhere, and we must do our best to provide security to those disarmed.”\(^{19}\) Thus, when the Government of South Sudan chose forced disarmament in 2006, the United Nations opted out but did not interfere. When the SPLA did not arrive to sufficiently protect a forced disarmament campaign in South Sudan, the vulnerable were attacked.

Also, insufficient food supplies meant that SPLA forces subsisted on the cattle of the northern Jonglei communities they were sent to disarm, leading to starvation among the population.\(^{20}\) Further, the Government of South Sudan’s ability to carry out disarmament equally and simultaneously among all communities and ethnic groups, one of the key problems with the Jonglei campaign, was limited by its transport capacity and the terrain. On the topic of equal and simultaneous disarmament, one UN official said: “Forget it; it’s not possible.”\(^{21}\)

Although seemingly straightforward, the UN’s mandate put it in a difficult position when the Sudanese government chose forced disarmament in Jonglei. Further complicating matters, the Sudanese do not have a monolithic approach, as views within the Sudanese Army and government vary.\(^{22}\) The United Nations attempted to remain a neutral actor and to discourage forced disarmament. When asked for logistical support, UN officials have told the Government of South Sudan that they will not support forced disarmament.\(^{23}\) Yet, the Sudanese often do not have the capacity to provide transport and sustained security in Jonglei without the United Nations, thus, UN involvement can save lives. Should the United Nations assist with forced disarmament on occasion?

The UN’s division of labor in South Sudan highlights the complexity of the implementation chain: the UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan supports disarmament and demobilization and reintegration; the UN Development Programme is tasked with adult reintegration; the United Nations Children’s Fund focuses on child reintegration; and the World Food Programme provides food assistance to ex-combatants and their families.\(^{24}\) As mentioned above, one challenge is how to get the units with guns to coordinate with those who pride themselves on serving without.

Sudan was one of the UN’s early test cases for an “integrated” civil-military approach. Yet, UN policymakers and practitioners admit that, despite their best intentions, very little has been achieved so far beyond the approval of a national DDR policy. In Haiti, the UN’s integrated mission has disintegrated into two separate programs.\(^{25}\) Robert Muggah, cofounder of the Small Arms Survey, attributes these failings to “weaknesses in political leadership within and outside the United Nations, the absence of clear direction from headquarters, competing understandings of DDR among managers and practitioners, and confusion over financing mechanisms.”\(^{26}\)
In the area of international resources, UN officials in South Sudan expressed frustration that many key positions remained vacant, especially in offices outside of Juba.\textsuperscript{27} They explained that the UN employment bureaucracy is cumbersome and that finding midlevel experts willing to live in rural South Sudan is a challenge.\textsuperscript{28} At the same time, donors have been attentive to Sudan, funding most of the Interim DDR Program’s 2005–2006 budget of US$69.44 million.\textsuperscript{29}

**Consider the Implementing Environment**

A UN document on DDR warns: “If the possession of weapons is of cultural significance to the population and has been considered a habit that existed before violent conflict broke out, weapons collection programs are likely to fail.”\textsuperscript{30}

Reducing demand for weapons in postconflict societies is difficult, especially if weapons are part of the civilian culture or important for self- or collective defense in the absence of a trustworthy and competent police force and justice system.

Even if there is popular support for weapons collection, the way it is done determines its success. Governments often respond to pastoral violence, through politically driven, coercive measures of weapons collection. Yet, a community’s weapons may be a deterrent to attacks by a neighboring community, and removing them may invite violence on that community.

Collecting weapons, without also reducing crime and the roots of conflict, can also disarm individuals of their means of self-defense. Legitimate security guarantees or disarmament programs in which arms are collected by an authority figure for safekeeping are potential solutions. Resolution of underlying causes of conflict, often through reconciliation and development, is another key element to reducing demand.\textsuperscript{31} In addition to demand, the supply of arms, often a regional dimension, can affect the success of disarmament. How can implementers avoid such traps?\textsuperscript{32}

In 2005, Sudan was perhaps one of the most complex environments in which to attempt disarmament. The country is vast, and pockets of instability, few roads—only a handful of which are paved—and limited air travel make travel logistics a nightmare. In addition, the sheer number of arms, especially the number in civilian hands, was daunting. There were an estimated 1.9 to 3.2 million small arms in circulation, of which about 67 percent were held by civilians.\textsuperscript{33}

In a conflict that saw the arming of almost half of the current population in some areas,\textsuperscript{34} drawing a line between a combatant and a civilian is no simple task. There are multitudes of ex-combatants associated with less-structured militia groups, such as the so-called Other Armed Groups and the White Army.\textsuperscript{35} Much of the general population, including women and children, was involved in the conflict.\textsuperscript{36} Owing to the high numbers of arms, the presence of Other Armed Groups, and the low levels of security and gover-
nance development, the potential for organized armed crime was extremely high after the end of the civil war.\textsuperscript{37} Indeed, almost 85 percent of those surveyed in Jonglei State reported at least one victimization event, and more than half reported being robbed at least once since the signing of the CPA.\textsuperscript{38}

While the abundance of arms is a product of war, as in many pastoral societies guns have long been a part of civilian culture and are now part of coming-of-age rituals. James Wole, a South Sudanese local NGO employee, said: "If I do not carry a gun, the men despise me as a defenseless woman."\textsuperscript{39} Many armed young men were accustomed to a life of war or, in the case of the Nuer, to protecting their cattle from would-be attackers with arms.\textsuperscript{40} As one Lou Nuer citizen described, the society has been changed by "the realization of power that came with the gun."\textsuperscript{41} On the other hand, many civilians express a desire for disarmament, provided neighboring communities are disarmed simultaneously and sufficient security is provided.\textsuperscript{42} Can the "gun culture" be reversed? If so, how?

In some sense, small arms are a commodity like any other: the market (often the black market) sets their value, determined by supply and demand. In Sudan, a ready supply of inexpensive weapons, compounded by porous borders, means that individuals can easily rearm. Stories abound of old or nonfunctioning weapons being traded for compensation cash used to buy newer weapons. A 2004 weapons buyback scheme in Côte d’Ivoire paid three times as much per weapon as a similar program in neighboring Liberia, driving the flow of arms from Liberia into Côte d’Ivoire.\textsuperscript{43}

The Lou Nuer were hesitant to disarm before the neighboring Dinka, likely due to their distrust of the Dinka and lack of trust in the SPLA as an adequate protection force. A public relations campaign that informs the population of the government’s disarmament strategy and wins buy-in from local authorities and chiefs has led to campaigns with limited violence in South Sudan’s Lakes and Warrap states, granted that intertribal tensions are not as pronounced there.\textsuperscript{44} However, the military is unaccustomed to such initiatives and, as in Jonglei, does not always plan and resource them.

**A Political Implementation Plan**

The attitudes of warring parties toward disarmament are another major consideration for disarmament implementers. As previously described, the balance of power implications of disarmament make it a potentially explosive political tool. As exemplified in previous DDR programs, for example in the Central African Republic,\textsuperscript{45} uneven DDR can disrupt the existing balance of power between groups, potentially creating more serious human security threats than existed before disarmament. A well-meaning UN disarmament practitioner, unaware of the explosive politics of postwar South Sudan, could easily become a pawn in a political agenda and potentially do more harm than good. As the saying goes, the road to hell is paved with good intentions or, as Graham Greene puts it in his novel *The Quiet American*: "I never met a man who had better motives for all the trouble he caused."\textsuperscript{46}
Even if an implementer is aware of potential problems with disarmament, he/she does not always have the power to change them. If the Dinka chief had refused to disarm his group when he was asking the same of the Lou Nuer, what should be done?

In South Sudan, the political maneuvering surrounding disarmament is especially present because the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) gained peace through negotiation but did not have a clear monopoly on the use of power. Young argues that the SPLA “needed to assert its hegemonic position in the South. That was best accomplished by forcing allies and enemies to accept [that] the SPLA alone has the right to bear weapons.” Communities, such as former White Army strongholds, that do not trust the SPLA to meter justice fairly likely disagree. Was forced civilian disarmament a convenient way for the SPLA to solidify community power structures? Or, as one MP [Minister of Parliament] put it, “to hit out at the Nuer and SSDF [South Sudan Defense Force]? 

The uncertain political future of Sudan is another key driver of weapons demand and an inhibitor on the will to disarm. As detailed in the CPA, a referendum in 2011 will determine whether South Sudan becomes an independent country or joins fully with the north. Thus, the incentives to retain weapons are strong. The UN DDR guide recognizes this demand-side challenge:

It is assumed that many armed actors (political and opportunistic) and individuals will attempt to retain their weapons and ammunition as insurance for the outcome of elections and the referendum at the end of the interim period, considering the high levels of insecurity and uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the interim period and unresolved violent conflicts in Darfur and eastern areas of Sudan.

In addition to citizen reluctance to turn in weapons, the Government of South Sudan will likely be hesitant to destroy them, but this approach has led to weapons reentering circulation in the past. As the referendum approaches, will people be willing to surrender their guns?

**WHAT DEFINES SUCCESS?**

How do disarmament implementers know when they have succeeded? Some argue that when only old, defunct weapons are turned in, the process is pointless. The incentives are for verifiers to overlook such cheating. Yet, one UN special representative in Mozambique was not concerned by allegations of cheating: “I know very well that they will give us old and obsolete material, and they will have here and there some hidden. I don’t care. What I do is create the political situation in which the use of guns is not the question. So they stay where they are.” In other instances, such as Angola, cheating can be used by one side for military advantage with the intent of breaking the agreement and returning to war from a strengthened position.
The bigger question for disarmament implementation is what defines success? The United Nations and other actors often report the number of weapons collected as a measure of success. This question begs a return to an initial question: What is the goal of disarmament? The UN has this to say about the goal of DDR:

- To increase security, reducing the number of weapons in circulation remains a central goal of DDR;

- The aim of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in postconflict situations so that recovery and development can begin;

- The establishment of security through the management of armed combatants is the primary goal of DDR;

- The primary objective of DDR is to increase human security;

- ‘Do no harm’ is the standard principle against which all DDR interventions shall be evaluated at all times.\(^{52}\)

Is the end goal to reduce weapons? Increase human security? Do no harm? What if these goals contradict each other? Assuming a goal of increased human security, the question remains how to measure results.

“With the exception of a smattering of assessments, post-mortems and superficial indicators relating to the number of weapons collected and the number of ex-combatants demobilized, there is virtually no proof that such interventions strengthen ‘human security.’”\(^{53}\)

What are the prerequisites for civilian disarmament that will have a long-term, positive effect on human security?

As the case of Sudan exemplifies, this confusion of goals becomes more than semantics when put into practice in the far-from-ideal real world. While local authorities in Jonglei State described the campaign as 95 percent effective, it resulted in approximately 1,200 White Army, 400 SPLA, and 213 civilian deaths as well as destruction of property and food shortages.\(^{54}\) On the other hand, Small Arms Survey reported that weapons-carrying had declined and perceptions of public safety had increased after the disarmament.\(^{55}\) Did the 3,300 weapons collected determine success?\(^{56}\) How many lives is one weapon worth? Due to the coerced nature of the disarmament, the integrated UNDDR Unit remained largely on the sidelines. Was this the appropriate position? What if the Nuer in South Sudan circa 2005 had immediately rearmed and retaliated against the Dinka?

Southern Sudanese authorities often say, “There is not development without peace,” indicating that civilian arms control is an essential prerequisite to the development process.\(^{57}\) Yet, as the Jonglei disarmament campaign
Disarmament in South Sudan illustrates, weapons reduction does not inherently produce security. And so, the eternal question: Which must come first, development or peace?

ENDNOTES


4. Ibid.


8. Ibid., p. 150.


12. Ibid.


16. Tod Wilson, Washington D.C., interview with author. In postconflict countries, traditional leaders have often been replaced by military commanders and traditional conflict management mechanisms disrupted. Thus, restoring power to these leaders and facilitating dialogue is a delicate, but important, aspect of postwar conflict management.


24. Ibid.

27. Interactions with UN officials by author, June-December 2007.
35. For a list of Southern Sudan’s Other Armed Groups, see John Young, “The South Sudan Defense Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration” (Geneva: Small Arms Survey), November 2006, pp. 42–48.
36. IDDRP, p. 8.
37. IDDRP, p. 17.
42. Ibid., p. 11.
48. Ibid.
49. IDDRP, pp. 17–18.
50. International Crisis Group, Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts,” p. 18.
56. This is the UN estimate; the SPLA estimate is much higher.
57. Timothy Hayden-Smith (Acting Country Director, Pact Sudan), telephone interview by the author, Juba, Sudan, May 14, 2008.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Wilson, Tod. November 6, 2009. Interview by the author.
Resolution 1919 (2010)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6304th meeting, on 29 April 2010

The Security Council,

Recalling all its resolutions and presidential statements concerning the situation in the Sudan,


Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Sudan dated 5 April 2010 (S/2010/168), and recalling the report on Children and Armed Conflict in Sudan dated 10 February 2009 (S/2009/84), including his recommendations, and taking note of the report on Children and Armed Conflict in the Sudan (S/2007/520) dated 29 August 2007, and recalling the conclusions endorsed by the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict in the Sudan, S/AC.51/2009/5,

Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity of the Sudan and to the cause of peace, stability, and security throughout the region,

Stressing the importance of the full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 9 January 2005, including, in particular, the importance of pursuing further efforts to make unity attractive and respecting the right to self-determination of the people of South Sudan to be exercised through a referendum to determine their future status,

Emphasizing the need for the United Nations and the international community to support consolidation of mutual trust between the two parties,

Taking note of the nationwide elections conducted in April, as elections are a component of CPA implementation, and commending the people in Sudan who are working toward democracy,
Recognizing that regardless of the results of the referendum, both parties to the CPA will need to continue to discuss critical issues in a peaceful and constructive manner and that the United Nations, African Union and other regional organizations can play an important role in supporting and promoting this dialogue,

Commending the work of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the continuing commitment by troop and police contributing countries in support of the CPA and this mission,

Commending the work of the African Union in Sudan, in particular the African Union High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and the role that it has played in focusing attention on the interrelatedness of conflicts in Sudan and assisting the Sudanese parties to comprehensively address these issues, along with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and other regional actors,

Commending the continuing work of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC),

Condemning all acts and forms of violence perpetrated by any party that prevent or hinder peace and stability in Sudan and the region, deploring their effects on the civilian population, in particular on women and children, and calling for compliance by all parties with their obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law,

Stressing the ongoing importance of providing humanitarian and development assistance to the civilian populations throughout Sudan, encouraging comprehensive preparedness efforts by the United Nations in view of the upcoming referendum including the need for increased humanitarian and development assistance in the south for the remainder of the CPA implementation period as well as post-CPA and the need for continued cooperation among the CPA parties, the United Nations and humanitarian organizations and urging donors to support implementation of the CPA and to honour all pledges of financial and material support,

Acknowledging that the CPA has reached a critical stage, and stressing the need to complete all remaining implementation tasks under the CPA,

Welcoming increased and continuing cooperation among UNMIS and all other United Nations missions in the region, and stressing the importance of continued sharing of information among them to help counter regional threats such as the activities of militias and armed groups, including but not limited to such groups as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA),

Determining that the situation in the Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNMIS until 30 April 2011, with the intention to renew it for further periods as may be required;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue reporting to the Council every three months on UNMIS mandate implementation, CPA implementation progress, and respect for the ceasefire;

3. Additionally requests the Secretary General to provide in his quarterly reports information including (1) a detailed plan of measures UNMIS is taking to support the referenda and popular consultation processes, consistent with paragraph 7 below, including lessons learned from the 2010 elections (2) the status of United
Nations engagement with the parties to the CPA and the parties’ progress concerning the critical tasks that will need to be accomplished post-referendum and, as appropriate, information on (3) UNMIS’ planning in consultation with the parties concerning the United Nations presence in Sudan post Interim period;

4. Deplores the persistent localized conflict and violence and its effect on civilians, especially within Southern Sudan, and underscores the importance of UNMIS making full use of its authority and capabilities, as stated in paragraph 16 of resolution 1590 (2005), to take necessary action to provide improved security to the civilian population, humanitarian and development actors, and United Nations personnel under imminent threat of violence, and stresses that this mandate includes the protection of refugees, displaced persons, returnees, and other civilians with regard to the activities of militias and armed groups, including but not limited to such groups as the LRA, as recognized in resolution 1663 (2006);

5. Reiterates its call on UNMIS to coordinate strategies with other United Nations missions in the region for information on the protection of civilians in light of the attacks by the LRA and requests the Secretary General to include in his UNMIS quarterly reports, information on cooperation between United Nations missions in dealing with the threats of the LRA;

6. Calls upon UNMIS to implement a mission-wide civilian protection strategy, comprehensively throughout the mission area, including the implementation of tribal conflict resolution mechanisms, and urges UNMIS to enhance its presence in areas at high risk of localized conflict, including by conducting frequent patrols;

7. Recalls the CPA’s provision for referenda, as well as the parties’ responsibility to pursue efforts to make unity attractive, reaffirms UNMIS’ support for these activities, requests that UNMIS be prepared to play a lead role in international efforts to provide assistance, as requested, to support preparations for the referenda in 2011, including in consultation with those member states able and willing to provide support, an advisory role related to security arrangements for the referenda, and urges the international community to provide technical and material assistance, including referenda observation capacity, as requested by the relevant Sudanese authorities to support the referenda and popular consultations;

8. Stresses the importance of full, and expeditious implementation of all elements of the CPA, agreements on Darfur, and the October 2006 Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, and calls upon all parties to respect and abide by their commitments to these agreements without delay;

9. Requests UNMIS, within its current mandate and capabilities, to continue to assist the parties, as requested, in the implementation of all elements of the CPA, including creation of, and appointments to, the referenda and popular consultation commissions, implementation of the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague regarding Abyei, north-south border demarcation, and wealth sharing, security arrangements, and resolution of conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states;

10. Welcomes continuing military capability reviews conducted into UNMIS’ deployment, stresses the importance of appropriate and flexible deployment of UNMIS in order to deter and prevent violence in areas where civilians are under threat of violence, and requests regular reviews of UNMIS deployment to ensure
that the mission is best placed to support the implementation of the CPA and protect civilians under imminent threat of violence;

11. *Welcomes* the CPA parties’ sustained commitment to work together and *urges* their continued cooperation in carrying out their responsibilities in further implementing the CPA and *calls upon* the CPA parties to cooperate fully with all the United Nations operations in the implementation of their mandates;

12. *Reiterates* its concern over the restrictions and impediments placed on UNMIS personnel and materiel, and the adverse impact such restrictions and impediments have on UNMIS’ ability to perform its mandate effectively and in that regard *calls for* all parties to cooperate by providing full and unrestricted access to UNMIS in monitoring and verification within its area of responsibility with special emphasis on monitoring of the Abyei region, and *urges* UNMIS, consistent with its mandate and within its means and capabilities, to consult with the parties, and to deploy sufficient personnel to the Abyei region to improve conflict prevention efforts and security to the civilian population;

13. *Expresses* its concern for the health and welfare of the civilian populations in Sudan; *calls upon* the parties to the CPA and the communiqué signed between the United Nations and the GNU in Khartoum on 28 March 2007 to support and protect all humanitarian personnel and facilitate all humanitarian operations in the Sudan; and *urges* the Government of Sudan to continue working with the United Nations to ensure continuity of humanitarian assistance throughout Sudan;

14. *Notes* that conflict in one area of Sudan affects conflict in other areas of the country, and therefore *urges* UNMIS, consistent with its current mandate, to cooperate closely with all United Nations entities operating in the region, including the AU-UN Joint Mediation Support Team and other stakeholders, so that implementation of these bodies’ mandates supports the overall objective of peace in Sudan and the region;

15. *Recognizes* the detrimental impact of the proliferation of arms, in particular small arms, on the security of civilians by fuelling armed conflict, *encourages* UNMIS to continue its efforts in providing assistance to the Government of South Sudan with regard to the civilian disarmament process, in particular by strengthening the capacity of local authorities to deter inter-communal conflicts and by monitoring forced civilian disarmament initiatives in an effort to avert disarmament operations that could exacerbate insecurity in Southern Sudan;

16. *Requests* UNMIS, acting within its current mandate and within its current means and capabilities, to continue to provide technical and logistical support to the Technical ad hoc Border Committee, as requested, to help the parties urgently conclude the process of demarcation of the 1956 North/South border, in accordance with the CPA;

17. *Encourages* UNMIS, consistent with its mandate, and within authorized levels of civilian police, to continue efforts to assist the parties to the CPA in promoting the rule of law, restructuring the police and corrections services throughout Sudan, particularly in the south due to lack of development of the police services, and assisting in the training of civilian police and corrections officers;

18. *Encourages* UNMIS to work closely with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) to reinvigorate the
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process and to assist in voluntary disarmament and weapons collection and destruction efforts in implementation of DDR under the CPA; and to ensure the timely provisions of sustainable reintegration programmes, which will help to promote continued and enhanced funding support from donors for the reintegration phase, and to coordinate with local authorities and with the United Nations agencies programmes and funds, initiatives that strengthen DDR with the creation of economic opportunities for reintegrated individuals and further urges donors to respond to calls for assistance to the DDR process, in particular the reintegration phase, and calls on donors to honour all obligations and pledges of assistance, and takes note in this context of the need to also assist the victims in conflict-affected communities;

19. *Welcomes* the adoption of an action plan by the SPLA to release all children still associated with its forces by the end of 2010 and in order to achieve this goal, *calls for* a timely implementation of this action plan, *requests* UNMIS, consistent with its mandate and in coordination with the relevant parties and with particular emphasis on the protection, release and reintegration with their families of children recruited to and participating with armed forces and armed groups, to increase its support for the National DDR Coordination Council and the Northern and Southern DDR Commissions and to monitor the reintegration process;

20. *Welcomes* the continuing organized return of internally displaced persons and refugees to the Three Areas and Southern Sudan, and *requests* UNMIS, within its current mandate, capabilities and areas of deployment, to coordinate with United Nations and other partners to facilitate sustainable returns, including by helping to establish and maintain the necessary security conditions;

21. *Stresses* the critical role of the AEC in overseeing and monitoring implementation of the CPA; and *urges* all parties to cooperate fully with the AEC and implement its recommendations;

22. *Stresses* the importance of achievable and realistic targets against which the progress of UNMIS can be measured; in this regard, *requests* the Secretary-General to report on and assess the progress in meeting benchmarks in each quarterly report, as well as any consequent recommendations regarding UNMIS’ configuration;

23. *Encourages* the periodical update and review of the UNMIS’ concept of operations and rules of engagement, fully in line with the provisions of the UNMIS mandate under relevant Security Council resolutions, and *requests* the Secretary-General to report on progress against the concepts and rules to the Security Council and Troop Contributing Countries in each quarterly report, and to provide the Security Council in the same report specific updates on the security situation in the mission’s area of responsibility;

24. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue the necessary measures to ensure full compliance by UNMIS with the United Nations zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to keep the Council fully informed, and *urges* troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including predeployment awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

25. *Decides* to remain actively seized of this matter.