About

PRISM is published by the Center for Complex Operations. PRISM is a security studies journal chartered to inform members of U.S. Federal agencies, allies, and other partners on complex and integrated national security operations; reconstruction and state-building; relevant policy and strategy; lessons learned; and developments in training and education to transform America’s security and development.

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Editor's Note

Over the years, *PRISM* has had the privilege to interview some of the world’s leading practitioners, policymakers, and scholars. This compilation of previously published interviews is intended to serve as a resource for those seeking insights from this exceptional collection of individuals. Collectively, its pages serve as a time capsule to remind us of the issues most pressing at different moments in our recent history, and demonstrate both the progress made as well as challenges that have endured throughout the years. The interviews cover a wide range of issues, including state-building, counterinsurgency, military overstretch, civilian-military cooperation, international collaboration—all issues which continue to resonate today. We hope that our readers enjoy this unique collection. It offers not only a valuable research resource, but a window into the minds of some of today’s most respected and dynamic leaders.

Jacqueline Page
Deputy Editor
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What surprised you taking on the challenges of Afghanistan and Iraq?

Richard Armitage: They’re completely different places. I found that Afghanistan was an absolutely necessary war; they struck us, and we had to strike back. What surprised me was how quickly we morphed from a fight against al Qaeda—that is, from foreigners, Uzbeks, Pakistanis, Saudis, even Uighers—to the Taliban after coexisting with the Taliban for so long. The Taliban wasn’t really fighting us too much; they weren’t helping us, but they weren’t fighting us, either—so again how quickly that morphed was the big surprise.

The second surprise was frankly how successful we were for the first 4 years—almost 5 years—at keeping the ISI [Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence] relatively out of it. They were so shocked with the speed at which we invaded Afghanistan that I think the ISI felt it was only a matter of time until we prevailed. But as we broadened our scope to the Taliban, we both brought out some antipathies that Pashtuns have against foreigners, and we also made it more difficult to be able to accomplish our “objective.” So how do you declare victory when you completely change the target?

In what way did we change the objective?

RA: We originally invaded to defeat al Qaeda, and in fact we kept the Taliban relationship with Pakistan. [Former Pakistani President Pervez] Musharraf wanted to break the relationship—break off diplomatic relations. We argued, “No, don’t do that please, we have reasons. . . .” We had two NGO [nongovernmental organization] women who were captured. And we were negotiating with the Taliban to get them out. Finally, we got them out with Special Forces, and then we told Musharraf that he could break relations with the Taliban. So although we didn’t declare them to be an
enemy originally, we started using terms, which are understandable, that “anyone who harbors a terrorist is a terrorist.” It was the same language that George Shultz used in the mid-1980s; he was thinking of Germany and France at the time, but we never put it into effect, and here we started to put it into effect.

**What surprised you about Iraq?**

**RA:** I was surprised initially with the speed at which we were going into Iraq, and I never understood it. I was not opposed to attacking Iraq—I was opposed to the timing. I just couldn’t see it. I was surprised at the low number of forces—which Secretary [Colin] Powell was able to get doubled—but still far too few.

The third thing is that we sent over a memo—using Ahmed Chalabi–like language—that explained why we would not be welcomed as liberators; that might have been true in a certain segment of society, but the idea had a measurable shelf life and wasn’t universally the case. Never to my knowledge, and I’m pretty sure I’m right on this, did the President [George W. Bush] ever sit around with his advisors and say, “Should we do this or not?” He never did it.

**Were you surprised by the speed at which the Iraqi army collapsed?**

**RA:** No. The [Iraqi] army was never considered an extremely loyal factor to Saddam. And we had bombarded them with leaflets telling them, “Go home. We’re going to come back and get you and we will reconstitute you as an army,” which was the decision the President made. “And we will use you in the new Iraq.” So that was not what surprised us. If you think back to April 9, when the Saddam statue came down, President Bush looked pretty brilliant. But about 3 days later, once the looting started—which was predicted in the Future of Iraq Project—everything turned out badly.

**What could have been a solution to the looting problem?**

**RA:** The answer depends on whom you ask. We were at every meeting, and we would raise points. We weren’t necessarily opposed to—particularly after 16 UN [United Nations] Security Council resolutions—the notion of removing Saddam Hussein. Secretary Powell was opposed to the number of [soldiers]; he wanted many more. As I said before, I was more worried about timing. And we got rushed into this timing by the military, who kept talking about the heat—that if it got to April and May, it would get too hot and we couldn’t operate.

And I remember thinking and arguing—and it wasn’t just me, but Marc Grossman and others—saying, “Wait a minute, we own the night. We don’t have to fight in the daytime. We’re all-seeing at night—let’s do it! Don’t let the heat be the thing that gets us into war!” So it wasn’t that we were marginalized. We were allowed our voice, but no one wanted to hear it. They were victims of their own prejudices and their own ideology.
RA: Having more people, clearly, and there was a time in there when unit commanders were saying, “What are our responsibilities? Tell us what to do. Should we stop this looting?” And [Donald] Rumsfeld said no. I’ll give you an example. I’m very loyal to Secretary Powell for 30 years as my good friend. But in the Panama invasion of 1989—originally called Operation Blue Spoon—we sent in the SEALs, we sent in the Airborne, we sent in a division. And the fighting was basically over in a couple of days. We still had [Manuel] Noriega holed up in his house, and we wanted to get him alive and that took a couple of days. But Colin flowed, as Chairman, another division even though the fighting had ended. His staff argued that “we don’t need to do this, it’s expensive when you move 20,000 men and equipment,” but he said, “Look—we don’t know what we’re going to find outside of Panama City. So let’s make sure that whatever it is, we’re better than it is. It’s a lot easier to get these fellows out on our timetable, than to get them in when there’s an enemy.” So he flowed another whole division, which was totally unnecessary as it turned out. But that’s the better part of wisdom. So the lesson of Iraq is not to drink your own bathwater. You can’t be victims of your own prejudice. You have to have someone red team this. Really red team it. We didn’t get around to red teaming really until Jay Garner went out to NDU [National Defense University] and did his famous rock drill.

**Was that the meeting at which some State Department people were asked to leave?**

RA: No. We may have been asked to leave, but Tom Warrick and Meghan O’Sullivan, they were all there. It was later. Garner said, “These folks know what they are doing.” He wanted them to come with him. And Rumsfeld said, “No, I’ve got instructions from higher guidance—higher headquarters,” which was the Vice President.

**What role could the civilian agencies have played early on in both Iraq and Afghanistan that they did not play?**

RA: It’s mixed. In Afghanistan, it’s a somewhat more manageable problem. Because of the regional differences, we could have been heavily involved much earlier on in Mazur Sharif and Herat in relatively safe conditions, and really built a bulwark against expansion of the Taliban. But we were at the State Department—we weren’t seized with the mission; we don’t have enough folks. USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development] isn’t the USAID you joined because it has been whittled away so much. So we have to relearn the lessons. It was not in any way a lack of courage among the civilian agencies; in fact, when I give speeches, I’ll say that these fellows—men and women—are out in all these exotic-sounding places—they’re not in canapé lines in London and Paris; they’re in Mazur and Kandahar and other places right alongside the men and women in uniform. Not a bit of difference, except one: they’re not armed. So we have to get more expeditionary, which means we have to get more people. And I like this Civilian Reserve Corps, and all those things.

We’ve got to have access to money. There has to be a limited but readily available fund—I don’t mean without any strings; obviously, we have to get the permission of [Capitol] Hill. But if you knew that you had X amount of funds, you could go in and staunch something. There is also something that I don’t know how to solve. During the 4 years I was Deputy Secretary, I got a lot of money for the
department for everything from IT [information technology] to 1,200 more people, and I got a lot of money in foreign aid.

But the money in foreign aid, outside the PEPFAR [President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief] program, which was the infectious disease program in Africa, was for necessary and feel-good deliverables, such as clinics, schools, et cetera. Now these things are great. Who doesn’t feel good about funding maternity clinics? The U.S. Congress feels good about themselves. They can explain to their constituents. Everyone wants to help some poor Afghan mother. But those very schools depend on several things for their livelihood after the first year or two. A central government, which provides pay for the teachers and the upkeep and all, is very difficult in a developing nation. Number two, they require a certain amount of infrastructure themselves—roads, et cetera. Perhaps the most effective foreign aid programs, whether in Pakistan or Afghanistan, would be those that bridge ethnic divides. Sort of a Kandahar to Mazur Sharif highway, or a great hydroelectric dam that services all the people—gives them buy-in; they all suffer, they all hang together, or hang separately. The same is true of something that brings together the Punjab and Sind, or the Sind and Baluchistan. But those are not popular. The days of the Aswan Dam are gone. There’s a road from Peshawar to Islamabad. It used to be a difficult trip, and dangerous. Now it’s a big four-lane highway; it’s called the Japanese highway. And for good reason—the Japanese built it.

In the end, you need both project funding and infrastructure development funding. If you’re in an emergency situation—a complex operation—you’re going to have to have something that staunches a wound. But you’re also going to have to simultaneously be thinking about larger infrastructure programs that help cauterize and bring together warring parties or different ethnic grievances or religious divides.

I don’t know the answer. This is something that has to be approached head on by an administration. You have to simultaneously have some money available for an emergency. You can’t go through the appropriations process to get it. You’ve got to have certain things that you know you’re going to have to have, such as water purification and medicines. That money has to be available for the Secretary of State now. Then you’ve got to have follow-on “feel-good” items, plus infrastructure programs. I think you can get away with roads pretty well. You know that famous statement, “Where the road ends, the war begins,” out of Afghanistan. I think that’s more popular.

That raises an almost philosophical question. There was a lot of aversion in the early Bush administration to state-building. Do you think that state-building should be explicitly considered a legitimate national security objective in some cases?

RA: I think I would put it a little differently. It shouldn’t be excluded as the Bush administration tried to do. If you look at the Bosnia situation, and what we faced, and if it’s true that al Qaeda is morphing into Africa in a bigger way, then we’re going to have to be
involved in more of this rather than less. So I don’t think it should be excluded. But each of these so-called nation-building exercises is a little different. Afghanistan is an armed nation we’re building; it has never been one, so you’re trying to arm a nation and build it. In Iraq, you’re not so much arming it—they have plenty of weapons—you’re trying to hold it together. That’s a different situation. So they’re all different, and I don’t think the term nation-building is sufficient. It doesn’t capture the complexity or the difficulty.

*What do you think of the notion of the “three Ds?”*

RA: Defense, diplomacy, and development? I think that [Secretary of State Hillary] Clinton has done us a service. I assume, by the way, your question has to do with democracy. As far as I know, every President except John Quincy Adams has been involved in the belief that the world is made better by a U.S. that is involved in the protection of human freedoms and human rights across the board, notwithstanding the second inaugural address of President Washington. And certainly all the great architects of our nation—Jefferson, Madison—they believed in this message. The builders—Lincoln, both Roosevelts—they believed in it, too. And every postwar President has believed we have a duty to spread democracy. The question and the difference among all the postwar Presidents had to do with two things: emphasis and a philosophical belief. The philosophical belief had to do with whether democracy is a journey or an end point. I think you and I would agree it’s a journey—it never ends. It has taken us a long time to get us to where we are. The Bush administration’s push for votes as though voting equals democracy was wrong-headed because a vote is something that happens inside a democracy, but is not necessary for a democracy. You can have a democratic system without having people raise their hands and have a secret ballot. Loya Jirgas to some extent are these. But it appears that Secretary Clinton is focusing on the necessary preconditions that allow democracy to thrive—the rule of law, transparency, party-building, free press—and, frankly, the development of institutions that can provide goods and services.

In 1986, we had something I was intimately involved with, democracy in the Philippines—getting rid of [Ferdinand] Marcos—and immediately after this great celebration of a relatively bloodless, fantastic demonstration of people power, Cory Aquino became president. We got $800 million appropriated, which was serious cash back then. The Philippines couldn’t spend it. And within a year or two, Aquino had six coups. Why? Because the expectations were so heightened by democracy they couldn’t be met. And so you couldn’t eat it, you couldn’t drink it, and it didn’t provide any service, anything beyond getting rid of Marcos. And yet peoples’ expectations were so much higher and so their disappointment was so much greater.

It’s not unlike what you have in Venezuela. By the Bush definition, [Hugo] Chavez is a democrat. He was elected three times—against our wishes—we tried to get a referendum to recall him, but it failed. But he is a populist because he’s not willing to do what’s necessary...
to develop a longstanding democracy. And that's all those things I mentioned before. He has become autocratic and dictatorial.

So I think that President [Barack] Obama certainly is not out of step with every other President. He wants human rights, human freedoms, and democracy. But his general manner, not pushing democracy in the way that Mr. Bush did, is actually a good thing, as long as we concentrate on those necessary preconditions. I've thought a lot about this, and I've been involved in the spread of democracy.

Here's one for the intellectual or academic approach. In the 1980s, I was an Assistant Secretary of Defense, responsible for the Soviet war among other things. That's why every 3 months I would go to Pakistan with my CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] counterpart, and we would sit down with the mujahideen, including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the rest of these characters. We would not only sit with them but also divide up the money, divide up the weapons, depending on who was doing what, how many fighters they had, and all this stuff every 3 months. And this was a wildly popular policy. Democrats and Republicans supported it and threw money at it. And yet we knew beyond a shadow of a doubt that if we accomplished our objectives, the mujahideen would fall in on themselves, which they did. And we knew this clearly. So what I'm sketching is a policy that was relatively amoral—not immoral but amoral. You look at the other side of the coin, you had the contra policy, which was wildly divisive because of liberation theology and the bad behavior of everyone involved, but its heart was much more moral than the Afghan policy.

Is it possible to meet national security objectives in Afghanistan without making it a functioning democracy or at least putting it on a trajectory toward being a functioning democracy?

RA: We've clearly lowered our sights in Afghanistan. I don't know if this is a precursor of Mr. Obama concentrating on fighting al Qaeda again, which could be a way that lets him set up for declaring victory and moving on, but I don't know what that does for Pakistan. If you would accept my view that a Loya Jirga is a form of democracy, what's wrong with it? So you could have a sort of light democracy, like the Diwaniyah process in some of the Arab countries such as Abu Dhabi and its neighbors. So I think we have got to be more precise and cautious in how we push these things, and we've got to be supple enough to change our emphasis when we run up against a hard point. I was in Saudi Arabia recently with Turki Al Faisal, and he was saying in conversation, “What His Majesty is trying to do is bring about in a generation what it has taken you 200 years to do. And in fact it wasn’t until 1965 that you by law enfranchised all your people. So whether we’re moving fast enough for present conditions is an open question. I’ve got my view and you’ve got yours. We can have an argument, but it took you 160 years, and that’s not wrong.” And I particularly like that he acknowledged that we’re moving fast enough for present conditions.

So I've really thought a lot about this whole democratization thing, and I feel quite strongly that it is our duty as a nation to do this. It's harder and made more complex when we abuse the writ of habeas corpus here or

President Obama certainly wants human rights, human freedoms, and democracy
when we torture people. And this causes me to wonder—when I was Deputy Secretary, did I make human rights presentations in China? I absolutely did. Did we get some results? Yes, but they were very disappointing! We got individual results. I could get one dissident or another out of jail, but that’s retail and that plays to Chinese strengths. I want to do whole-sale. But our system puts all the concentration on Rabiyah Khadir, so I went and got her out of prison. But that allows the Chinese then to sit back for 6 months and say, “We did it!” And the heat would be off the Congress, and I would go to them and say, “human rights,” and they would say, “We gave you Rabiyah Khadir.” I would rather leave her in prison, frankly, to better the rights of 1.3 billion Chinese.

**Do you see a similar situation in Egypt?**

RA: The Egyptian situation is a really tough one because it’s going the wrong way with the Muslim Brotherhood, and the constipation and sclerotic nature of the regime. Have you read the novels of Naguib Mahfouz? They’re great, and through them all you get a couple of things, I think. First, the good humor of Egyptians; they have enormous good humor. Second, patience and long suffering, but you realize that at some point in time you can’t joke something away. You can’t outwait it. I would be afraid the tipping point is going to come, and particularly now that the strategic center of gravity in the Middle East has shifted to Riyadh and away from Cairo.

*Egypt had one tipping point in 1953, and it’s possible it could happen again. In the 1980s, USAID was modestly implementing democracy, development, and rule of law programs that were all well intentioned, and had some small results here and there, but were unable to get the kind of change in the country we hoped for. It remains a real dilemma for us.*

RA: It is a dilemma and you could try to move the country in a way that breaks the country and brings about reactions to what you want to do. I’ve been on both sides of the issue, and I’ve come to the conclusion that people are best served when we concentrate on good governance and rule of law and move at a pace congenial to them toward full democracy with the institutions that hold up the code of democracy.

Including traditional institutions such as Loya Jirgas or Diwaniyahs?

RA: Even better. Those are unthreatening democratic institutions.

With Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military was called upon to do so much more than they had done traditionally in diplomacy and development. Do you view that as a threatening development, or to phrase it in the current vernacular, do you have any fear of the “militarization of foreign policy”?

RA: I have a fear of the militarization of all policy. And the reason is not because I fear the military—having come from it—but because there has been a phenomenon I’ve noticed in 28 years of government service, that for a lot of
different reasons, and I’m not sure I can codify them all, people are less able to do things. The culture of the military is to make chicken salad out of chicken poop. The culture of the military is, “Yessir, three bags full sir. I’ll get it done.” The culture of the military is embraced as far as I’m concerned in the most positive way by the first general order of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps (different from the Army), which cautions a sentry to take charge of all government property on this post, and that includes people. And that’s frankly how Powell and I viewed the State Department—all government property at post. So that’s their going-in position, whether they’re a private or a colonel. The going-in position for USAID, State, Commerce, or Energy is not to take charge of all government property in sight, but to take charge of “mine.” I like to say that this is my little cubicle and I keep it clean, and if there is a light next door that’s not there or not on, if you are in the military you are going to go fix it. At least you are supposed to. All government property in sight. You’re doing not just your cubicle, whereas the civilians will just take care of their cubicle or space. When I or Secretary Powell would ever swear in an Ambassador, we would tell him he could not be totally responsible for the development of our relationship between the United States and country X. But he would be held 100 percent accountable for the development of all personnel under his command—as officers and as citizens and people. If they have personal problems, they’re his. If they have lapses in their behavior, it’s his problem. He doesn’t overlook it, he works with them, he cautions them, he counsels them, and he does whatever it takes. And this is more the culture of the military.

**Is that a cultural barrier that can be overcome and that civilians should try to adopt?**

**RA:** Yes, it is. I’ve been very heartened the last 3 ½ years that I’ve been out here, the number of people—many of whom I don’t even know—that worked for Powell and me, and to be frank with you, what they’ve said is, “The Dr. Rice years were terrible. The Powell years were wonderful. But don’t worry. We’re remembering what you said about taking care of your people. We’re remembering what you said about leadership.” So that fills me with enthusiasm, and the answer to your question is yes, it can happen. But it has to be inculcated. Unfortunately, I don’t think Ms. Clinton is from that mindset. She’s very good as Secretary of State, she’ll study her brief, but this takes effort from the bottom up. One has to be inculcated with this.

Look at the first general order of the Navy and Marine Corps—again, the Army’s general order is a little different—and then look at all the general orders. When you go to boot camp, you have to memorize all this. You’ll see, I think, some of the reasons you’re having militarization in general. Remember the big hurricane in North Carolina in 1991? Andy Card was Secretary of Transportation and President Bush sent him down to take charge. And this was so funny to me: Andy Card is standing on a chair in North Carolina, and he’s yelling in his tent, and there are people milling about—people who had lost their homes. And all these different aid agencies and FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] are running around, even some military guys milling around. And Card’s up there yelling, “I’m Secretary Andy Card and I’m in charge here!” Actually, this colonel from the 82d Airborne stood up and said something like, “Now hear this—I’m Colonel So-and-So from the 82d Airborne, 19th Battalion, and I’m in charge here, FEMA!” “Yessir!” It was fantastic, but it was someone used to taking charge of all government property in sight.
That’s a strong characteristic of the military, and I’m concerned when I see that attitude juxtaposed against the typical civilian attitude.

RA: Then you have to change the civilian attitude. As I say, I’m thrilled with the officers Secretary Powell and I brought in. I’m thrilled with them. I see them at different posts, I always stop at the different Embassies and I get great reports. I know a fellow who just went over to work with Senator George Mitchell, and he sent me an email. He said that he was so impressed with these younger officers. They came in at a time when in their A–100 class that’s what they were told. When they went through their Foreign Service training before they went to their post and they came to see Marc Grossman or me, that’s what they were told. So they started it. Now whether they will remember it, I can’t say, but it’s a good base. We just have to do it all the way up. The same is true and it’s harder actually in Commerce and some places. It’s easier to do at State because it’s small enough to get your arms around it, even though there are 48,000 of them with the Foreign Service nationals. But it takes constant—not just repetition—you have to embrace it.

That would be a cultural/behavioral change that you are recommending. Is there an institutional change that you would recommend for the civilian agencies—something like Goldwater-Nichols?

RA: I’ve looked at what Mr. [Arnold L.] Punaro [Executive Vice President, Science Applications International Corporation] is doing and what other people are doing in Goldwater-Nichols–type stuff. I would like to see a lot more cross-pollination. That would be healthy. And we’ve got a fair amount even though Rumsfeld, when he came in, took back all the military officers. Over time, we got them back, we fought like crazy, much to their delight and our delight because it was better for us. I think a lot more of that is good. The Goldwater-Nichols that everyone sings so proudly about in the military is now something that Goldwater-Nichols wouldn’t recognize. This military—because jointness itself has changed, requirements have changed, schooling has gone by the board because of the necessities of the war—has changed so much. And I think most of your military colleagues would say, “Yeah, we’re more joint. Absolutely, but we’re not anywhere near where we need to be.” And when you talk to special operations, they’ll definitely tell you that. So frankly it gets down more to leadership and less to Goldwater-Nichols. We need a cadre of leaders who totally embrace the notion of taking charge of all government property in sight. And that’s why you have a young State officer out on a PRT [Provincial Reconstruction Team], no question State lead, depending on the military, consulting with him, giving instructions to the other departments who are less represented about who does what to whom. There’s something about just naturally going for the flagpole, standing up and saying, “I’m the alpha dog here,” whether you’re a male or a female.

With all the ferment in the area of military and even civilian doctrine related to counterinsurgency, irregular warfare,
unconventional warfare, state-building, reconstruction and stabilization, and the building up of a civilian reserve corps, are you concerned that we’re gearing up for the last war, and not the next war?

RA: We always have. If you look historically, this is not just a military problem. Twelve years ago in the CIA, what would you be studying as a language? Chinese or Japanese? Now what would you be studying? Arabic? Only 3 percent of the population is Arab. There’s a certain inevitability to that. I think that you’re going to be a little behind. Very few people, even George Kennan when he wrote his famous article, didn’t see what was going on. It’s hard to look into the future. But the important thing is to not lose the lessons of the past. And this is what this whole insurgency is. Do you know, by the way, in testimony that I called it an “insurgency”? Dick Myers, General Myers, said, “Oh no. This isn’t an insurgency!” I said, “Well, yes it is!” So when you come so late to a realization of it—what we really did wrong was we undervalued the enemy.

We didn’t understand that al Qaeda is a flat organization. It’s not a hierarchical one. And in a flat organization where there are only cells, we could pick up Osama bin Laden tomorrow and it wouldn’t make a damn bit of difference. He could tell us what he knew. He doesn’t know that much. When you’re a flat organization, you only know a couple of guys in the cell with you. So we never really analyzed the problem we were facing in military terms. In civilian terms, you need the sort of an approach the military commander would take; the commander’s estimate of both the friendly forces and the enemy. For a civilian, you need your estimate of what you have in your kit bag. What you might get from local land. And what’s the real lack. So take a more analytical approach to these things, à la the military. The military does a lot of things not right, but when they organize for a problem, they generally do it pretty well, and I think you’re coming to it. PRISM
Editor’s Note: Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations, coauthored by Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, James E. Barnett, Brooke Stearns Lawson, Terrence K. Kelly, and Zachary Haldeman, is a recently published RAND study funded by the U.S. Army. It is intended to inform the Army how it can contribute to civilian efforts within complex operations involving stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) and how collaborations in strategic planning and field operations between the Army and civilians can be more productive. The study begins by describing the distinct strengths of military and civilian institutions and then delves deeply into questions of relative capacity, priority skill sets, and the civilian agencies most needed for such operations. The study critically examines current and planned civilian approaches to SSTR, including the interagency Civilian Response Corps (CRC), and entrenched structural challenges of civilian agencies and the Army, and recommends a collaborative civilian-military approach that integrates Army Civil Affairs liaison officers assigned to the civilian agencies and SSTR operations.

What do you see as the pros and cons—from a U.S. perspective—of the U.S. military taking an active operational and expert role in SSTR, even in a permissive environment? And what do you see as the pros and cons from the host-nation perspective?

TS: For successful SSTR engagements, it is essential to have effective cooperation of civilians and military. The extent to which the military will play a supportive versus leading role will be determined by the conditions on the ground. If the CRC will be involved in an operation where security is an issue, it will need...
a military escort. In larger operations, it will need military augmentation in terms of expertise because even if the most optimistic numbers of CRC are funded, there still will be a need for a lot of additional people and skill sets. And assuming that PRT [Provincial Reconstruction Team]–like Advance Civilian Teams and Field Advance Civilian Teams were formed, even in a place where the need for military personnel is fairly limited, there is still likely to be a need for substantial logistical resources and augmentation in numbers of experts in governance, rule of law, and reconstruction. Both in terms of readily deployable expertise augmentation and logistical and security elements, the military does and will continue to have a role to play in SSTR operations. Ideally, civilian personnel would play the dominant role, but, realistically, the military is likely to be involved in some form or fashion. In most of the potential SSTR operations, the issue is not whether the military will be involved but to what extent.

As to the host-nation perspective, much depends on the specifics of the operation. If the operation is part of a multilateral effort and the military is in a supportive role and U.S. soldiers are only one of the military components, then any negative perceptions (because of distrust of foreign military presence) are likely to be muted. In a situation where security still needs to be established, military presence may be essential and, at least initially, is likely to have a reassuring aspect.

Does your research show that the military is willing to develop the myriad skills necessary in a reconstruction and stabilization engagement? Are they willing to divert resources from all their other obligations for state-building? Based on your research, how active would the Army and/or the Department of Defense [DOD] want to continue to be in SSTR operations?

TS: If one envisions a true whole-of-government approach, then one should not draw too stark of a distinction between Servicemembers and U.S. agency civilians. The U.S. military has a great deal of capacity for these operations; however, the depth of capability for the military is not as great as on the civilian side. Often, the greatest need is the ability to think on one's feet and interact with the locals, which the military can do very well. Currently, the military cannot match the depth of expertise that civilians have, nor should they. The military should provide complementary capability with overlaps to civilian expertise, as well as supplementary capacity. Given the military's focus on stability operations over the past 8 years, there is a clear understanding within DOD that readiness for stability operations is not a choice but a necessity that it has to prepare for.

If the Civilian Response Corps reserve component [CRC–R] were funded and made a reality, how would that change your assessment of the need for U.S. military supplementary capacity in SSTR operations?

TS: The more the merrier; certainly the CRC–R would offset some of the capability and numbers needed. But it would be difficult to imagine an SSTR operation in a failed state,
or any operation where security is an issue, not needing complementary and supplementary U.S. military expertise and assets.

**What did your research reveal, or what opinion did you formulate, regarding the relationship between the subject matter experts of the U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID] and those of the domestic agencies that correspond to roles that USAID normally would play? Or would the agency affiliations blur under a true whole-of-government approach?**

**TS:** Capability for engagement in an SSTR operation involves three critical criteria: (1) technical expertise within that agency, (2) a developmental perspective, and (3) an external perspective outside of the United States. For example, the Foreign Agricultural Service [FAS] possesses all three of these criteria. Taken a step further, involving the FAS in the strategic planning process from the start would give us not only the premier agency in Agriculture, but also its knowledge of other centers of expertise in its areas. In SSTR operations involving agriculture, therefore, Agriculture’s FAS should have a role, alongside USAID and the Department of State regional and functional experts. In such a scenario, S/CRS [the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization] would be an enabler in its coordinating role. But the overall goal is to diminish agency and departmental lines and bring in expertise wherever it resides in the U.S. Government.

**In your study, there is an intriguing analogy of civilian agencies contrasted with DOD to police contrasted with fire departments in their respective approaches, roles, and capabilities, whereby the police mostly preserve the steady-state and preserve the peace, with limited capacity to react to sudden major outbreaks of crime by diverting essential resources, and the fire department exists to deal with occasional but potentially serious threats to public safety, such as fires and natural disasters, while fire department personnel otherwise spend their days training for putting out a fire and are on call to respond to a disaster. Would you expand on this analogy and what it implies for future success? Now that the Department of State and USAID have received funding to establish the CRC active and standby components, what do you think will be the remaining institutional impediments?**

**TS:** Like any analogy, the fire department versus police department distinction has its limitations, though the overall differences are helpful in understanding the constraints that each faces. The analogy does illustrate the contrasting modes of operation and resulting different approaches to planning and time-horizon orientations. The CRC squares the circle in a way. It augments the number of on-call, highly skilled resources for a surge response. However, these operations are complex and, in operations focused on medium- and larger-sized countries, need a lot of expertise and a lot of people on the ground. The CRC still is constrained by resources. I hope I’m wrong, but I suspect that it will be difficult for Congress to justify a civilian body that would have an on-hold function.
For the time being at least, the CRC seems to provide one part of the solution.

**Given the current resource constraints and ongoing budget cuts, what does your research lead you to recommend as to what could and should be changed now for civilian planning and DOD planning for SSTR engagements?**

**TS:** I see the surge capacity as a sort of “insurance policy” for future SSTR needs. It is up to Congress and the President to decide, of course, what type and how comprehensive an insurance policy would allow the United States to be ready to intervene in future fragile and failing state situations. Having worked on the issue of peace and stability operations since the early 1990s, the remarkable constant over time is that we have experienced the same civil-military problems repeatedly and seemingly have been unable to institutionalize much from the experiences. The formation of S/CRS and CRC offers potential pathways to break that cycle. However, to be effective, we would have to establish a standing corps with great diversity and depth of skills. It is a political question how big that corps should be. Furthermore, if we have a certain capability, we will be more likely to use it than if we didn’t have it. Therefore, I suspect that the CRC likely would always be deployed somewhere. That’s the thing that’s toughest to justify—the on-call capability. Given such likely deployments, it would be wise for the civilians to take a serious look at aspects of DOD’s planning processes—not necessarily the detailed planning techniques that DOD uses, but the overall principles by which it prepares for contingencies. No plan survives its implementation, but planning does allow for better preparation and anticipation of potential problems.

On the military side, the military has enormous resources in this area, which it could utilize more effectively. Army Civil Affairs is probably the greatest asset for enabling civil-military planning. The specific area where Civil Affairs can make an impact is with its planning teams, which are designed to support strategic civil-military operations planning. They need better training, but the mechanism is in place.

**The report notes that current Army Civil Affairs planning focuses primarily at the tactical level, with a shortage of strategic and operational planning for Active and Reserve Civil Affairs officers. Does your research lead you to recommend that the specialized training be integrated with civilian training?**

**TS:** Absolutely. There should be coordination between the military and civilian training in SSTR—an overlap at least. Army Civil Affairs strategic and operational level planners need to have the same understanding of and approach toward SSTR ops as their civilian counterparts.

**The report recommends the passage of a national Goldwater-Nichols–type act. Would you like to expand on this?**

**TS:** The time for such an act has come. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Project on National Security Reform, and others have recommended the same. Given the situation that we have been facing over the last 8 years, this is something that needs to be addressed, realizing that it will take years to work out and implement. It has been too long already that we have been operating under a less than whole-of-government approach. The aim is to build a corps of highly
The aim is to build a corps of highly trained, upper-level civilian U.S. Government employees who see eye to eye and thereby break the vertical stovepipe way of doing things.

In the absence or interim, what did your research indicate are the most pressing and essential elements for the coordination of civilian agencies whether civ-mil or mil-civ?

**TS:** Even without a Goldwater-Nichols-type act, at least there has to be a wider and greater understanding of the structural problems and the gaps and that the problems can be addressed adequately only at the national level by Congress or the President. The shortcomings we’ve experienced repeatedly do not stem from ill-intentioned or incompetent civilian employees. They’re a reflection of the constraints and the incentive systems they face. Other steps include the need to have more specific benchmarks and metrics to assess progress in moving forward in the whole-of-government approach. Such assessment tools could help justify the greater expenditures for the CRC and increased funding generally for USAID. On that note, much greater attention needs to be paid to providing USAID with the resources to meet its mission. Structurally, there are things that DOD can do in SSTR operations, but still, that will be similar to one hand clapping, so to speak. USAID and State are the key agencies with SSTR capabilities. DOD has tried to reach out and bring in civilians but has not always been successful, sometimes because of a lack of understanding of the way the civilian agencies operate. However, bringing together civilian and military planners in regular tabletop exercises will be another essential step. What needs to be done is developing mil-civ and civ-mil familiarization, to get them talking and making it as easy as possible to contact each other when a contingency occurs. The Army is the main provider of the SSTR capabilities on the military side for stability operations, and to improve the situation, the Army could focus on the resourcing, training, and organization of Army Civil Affairs.

Given several recent developments—the authorization of the Civilian Response Corps under the National Defense Authorization Act for 2009, substantial funding of the active and standby components, and the revision of DOD Directive 3000.5—what are your thoughts on how much progress has been accomplished and how much more is still ahead? If you could write an addendum, what would it be?

**TS:** If I could write an addendum to the report, I would note how little seems to have changed substantively. There have been many incremental steps, but most of our recommendations remain relevant. Those who deal with...
the issues of increasing civ-mil cooperation in stability operations can point to numerous steps over the past couple of years that have made a difference. There has been progress and it’s undeniable. However, from the larger perspective of asking the question of how much more effective would the United States be if we were faced with an SSTR operation similar to that in Iraq in 2003, I'm not all that confident that the improvement would be one of kind rather than one of degree. The problems are structural, incremental change can only go so far, and there is a need for national level leadership on this issue. PRISM
How would you characterize the threat to Iraq today? Does the potential for renewed violence or political divisions pose the greatest threat to Iraq succeeding as a viable state?

RO: With our Iraqi and coalition partners, we have made good progress in stabilizing Iraq’s security situation, specifically over the last 3 years. Today, security incidents are down to levels last seen in 2003—and we continue to see slow progress toward normalcy across Iraq. From a purely security perspective, there are three primary threats from groups still seeking to destabilize Iraq, the most dangerous being al Qaeda in Iraq [AQI]. While AQI started as a broad-based insurgency capable of sustaining significant operations across Iraq, our consistent pressure has degraded AQI, and they have had to morph into a covert terrorist organization capable of conducting isolated high-profile attacks. The Iraqi people have rejected al Qaeda, and the organization is no longer able to control territory. However, AQI remains focused on delegitimizing the government of Iraq, disrupting the national election process and subsequent government formation, and ultimately causing the Iraqi state to collapse. AQI remains a strategic threat. In addition to AQI, there remain Sunni Ba’athist insurgents whose ultimate goal is regime change and a reinstitution of a Ba’athist regime. Shia extremists and Iranian surrogates also continue their lethal and nonlethal efforts to influence the development of the Iraqi state.

However, today, the greatest threats to a stable, sovereign, and self-reliant Iraq are political—underlying, unresolved sources of potential conflict that I call “drivers of instability.” Iraqis have yet to gain consensus on the nature of the Iraqi state—an Islamist-based or secular-democratic government, the balance of power between the central and provincial governments, the distribution of wealth, and the resolution of disputed internal boundaries are some of the key
issues they face. They are still dealing with lingering ethnosectarian histories and Arab-Kurd tensions. These are issues that will take time to resolve, and we are seeing incremental progress as the Iraqis learn how to solve these issues through dialogue and the political process. Groups such as al Qaeda in Iraq and other external actors seek to exploit these political fissures and impede Iraq’s continuing progress.

In December 2009, the Iraqis passed an election law stipulating that, for the first time, Iraqis will have the opportunity to vote for individual candidates as well as political parties. The law itself took some time to ratify, but the important aspect was that throughout the political process, all parties worked to build consensus and draft an acceptable law. These are positive indicators of their continued commitment to the democratic process and their ability to independently conduct credible and legitimate elections in March 2010 and the subsequent seating of a new, representative government.

U.S. Forces–Iraq remains focused on assisting Iraq in building strategic political, economic, and security depth in order to provide a stable and secure environment. Our presence provides the psychological and physical support to allow the Iraqis the space required to continue dialogue and discussions, and ultimately reach political solutions to key issues. Overall, assisting Iraq in developing into a viable state will require strategic patience and continuous engagement well beyond 2011.

**How will violence levels affect the withdrawal timeline for the remainder of 2010? Will all troops leave before the 2011 deadline?**

**RO:** In accordance with our bilateral Security Agreement, implemented at the beginning of last year, we will withdraw U.S. forces by December 31, 2011. We are abiding by the Security Agreement, and will continue to do so. Additionally, per the President’s guidance outlined in February 2009, we will end combat operations as of August 31, 2010, and transition to a training and advisory role supporting civil and military capacity-building, while continuing to conduct targeted counterterrorism missions within the Iraqi rule of law through the end of 2011.

We are currently executing this guidance, and I have confidence in our way ahead. Every indicator is going in the right direction. Security incidents are at all-time lows in Iraq: attacks, military and Iraqi civilian deaths, as well as ethnosectarian incidents, have all decreased. I want to point out that these positive trends have continued since we implemented the Security Agreement in January 2009 and began operating by, with, and through the Iraqi Security Forces [ISF] within the Iraqi rule of law—and again, after U.S. combat forces departed Iraqi cities on June 30, placing full responsibility for security with the Iraqis.

What many people do not realize is that over the past 1½ years—since the end of the surge—we have been drawing down. During the height of the surge in September 2007, we had approximately 175,000 U.S. and coalition troops on the ground in Iraq. Today, we have just less than 100,000. We have withdrawn over 75,000 troops and their equipment while continuing to accomplish our mission. Basically, we
have systematically thinned the lines in Iraq, deliberately and carefully turning over responsibilities to the Iraqi Security Forces with U.S. forces still assisting, training, and advising. Over time, as local security conditions improved, we have adjusted our footprint. Where we once had a brigade, we now have a battalion; where we once had a battalion, we now have a company. In fact, the Iraqis have responsibility for security throughout the country now, with our support to ensure success. We have been able to do this because of our solid partnerships, which continue to enhance the operational readiness and capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces.

Another important factor in reducing the violence has been the efforts of our civilian partners. Across Iraq, I have asked all commanders—working with Department of State Provincial Reconstruction Team [PRT] leaders—to understand the root causes of instability in their areas of responsibility and work with local Iraqi leaders to mitigate them. In many areas, our primary efforts are focused on assisting PRTs to help provincial governments provide essential services and economic opportunities for their citizens. We understand that a comprehensive approach is necessary to improve and sustain improved security over the long term.

U.S. forces have evolved from leading security efforts to partnering with and enabling Iraqi forces to overwatching independent Iraqi operations. We remain focused on sustaining the current security environment and enabling an increasingly capable Iraqi Security Forces to provide stability and security for their own people.

**With the drawdown of U.S. forces, can civilian capabilities such as PRTs operate safely? Are more civilian capabilities needed as U.S. forces leave? What will be the impact of reducing the number of PRTs from 23 to 5?**

**RO:** Over the next 2 years, the number of PRTs will reduce slowly as our military reduces its presence. By August 2010, we will have approximately 50,000 U.S. troops essentially supporting 16 PRTs. By the end of 2011, the Department of State will reduce PRTs to five located in areas strategically important to the future stability of Iraq. This is another step in our evolving presence in Iraq—and an example of how we have continuously adapted to the strategic and operational requirements of this complex environment. Our hard-fought security gains have set the stage to transition from a focus on establishing security to a focus on developing Iraqi institutional capacities that will sustain the long-term stability of Iraq. Our efforts in Iraq fully embody a whole-of-government approach with a comprehensive interagency strategy focused on accomplishing our overarching goal as defined by President Obama in February 2009: a long-term and enduring strategic partnership between the United States and a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq that contributes to the peace and security of the region.

At the end of last year, we—U.S. Forces–Iraq and U.S. Embassy Baghdad—published our efforts fully embody a whole-of-government approach with a comprehensive interagency strategy focused on accomplishing a long-term and enduring strategic partnership between the United States and a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq.
our Joint Campaign Plan [JCP] that outlines strategic priorities, integrated goals along four lines of operation (political, economic/energy, rule of law, and security), and risks. The JCP synchronizes our civilian and military elements of the U.S. Government. It also importantly details the transition of enduring functions, once military-led, to civilian entities including the U.S. Embassy, other international and nongovernmental organizations, as well as the government of Iraq. As Iraq continues to build its governmental foundations, economic development and foreign investment become increasingly important, broadening the range and types of required civilian assistance—formal and informal—to the nation of Iraq.

Today, our military forces support the 23 Department of State–led PRTs. Staffed by over 500 personnel from agencies and departments including the U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID], State, Defense, Justice, and Agriculture, PRTs are focused on supporting Iraqi civil development. While providing security, the U.S. military also supports PRTs with military personnel including Civil Affairs and, as required, additional uniformed personnel with required expertise in fields such as engineering and rule of law.

Across Iraq, provincial capacity has matured, although this maturation varies depending on local conditions. Many areas do not require the same level of support as in the past. As a result, we are able to adjust our operational footprint and reduce the number of PRTs over time. However, the U.S. Embassy, in conjunction with U.S. Forces–Iraq, continuously reevaluates and prioritizes efforts and application of resources according to the ever-changing strategic and operational environment.

As we draw down and establish our transition force by September 1, 2010, we will ensure our ability to continue to support civil capacity and ISF capacity-building. An important element of this transition is the establishment of Advisory and Assistance Brigades [AABs], which are structurally designed to coordinate and achieve unity of effort across the civil and security spheres to nurture the growth and capacities of Iraqi civil and military institutions while simultaneously providing force protection. By August, we will have AABs strategically located across Iraq whose primary mission will be to support PRTs, the United Nations, and other nongovernmental organizations, as well as to train and advise Iraqi Security Forces.

From what you have seen in Iraq, are military and civilian advising efforts meeting U.S. objectives, politically and operationally?

RO: Yes, given the courage, compassion, and commitment of our Servicemembers and civilians who have served—and continue to serve—in Iraq, I believe we are on a path to achieve our national goals. As I mentioned, the President clearly outlined our goals of a stable, sovereign, and self-reliant Iraq with just, representative, and accountable government—and an enduring partnership with an Iraq that contributes to the peace and security of the region. At the end of 2008, the United States and Iraq signed two historic bilateral agreements that reflect our maturing relationship and enhanced cooperation between our two nations.

Fully recognizing Iraqi sovereignty, the Security Agreement and Strategic Framework Agreement [SFA] guide our current operations and our future strategic partnership. As we implemented these agreements, we changed our mindset as well as how we operated and interacted with our Iraqi partners who increasingly...
began leading their own civil and security efforts. Last year, Iraq marked a number of additional significant milestones including the successful provincial elections in January and the ISF assumption of security responsibility in urban areas in June.

For nearly 15 months now, we have conducted all military operations in Iraq with complete transparency, full coordination, and open communication with the Iraqis—all within the Iraqi rule of law. We have evolved from leading security efforts to partnering and advising. We also continue to mentor Iraqis at the national and ministerial level, with uniformed and civil-ian personnel embedded in Iraqi ministries, particularly key ministries such as oil, finance, electricity, in addition to the security ministries. As Iraqi civil capacity has increased, our civilian partners have also evolved to advising and mentoring. We have a ways to go, but the Iraqis continue to make progress.

The next step will be the transition from now through 2011 as we reduce our military presence. How we transition and draw down will be critical to enhancing the government of Iraq’s political, diplomatic, economic, and security depth. The SFA, which defines our long-term government-to-government partnership, will be the foundation for our strategic partnership and the continued growth of Iraqi civil capacity.

What cultural changes are needed among military and civilian agencies to be more effective in joint operations (that is, State does not “do” irregular warfare, Defense does not “do” nationbuilding, and so forth)?

RO: In the future, none of our operations can or will be conducted without full inter-agency partnership. The complexity of the
evironment requires a combined government-al approach. From a military perspective, we must understand the total environment and not simply focus on available military capa-
bilities. It’s about understanding how to best leverage our interagency capabilities. After assessing the operational environment, we must then thoroughly assess which interagency partner is best suited to address and solve particular problems. It’s about learning how to achieve unity of effort without always having unity of command over all of the elements operating within an area. The overall level of

it’s about learning how to achieve unity of effort without always having unity of command over all of the elements operating within an area

security and stability will be a key factor in determining the amount of military involvement in nationbuilding and civil capacity-
building. In Iraq, we have learned this through our embedded PRTs at the brigade level and the development of our Joint Campaign Plan at the U.S. Embassy and Force level.

Today’s complexity requires much more of our leaders. We must be able to assess, understand, and adapt. We must have the ability to think through complex, multidimensional problems, taking into account the diplomatic, economic, military, political, and cultural implications of every action. As we’ve learned, battlefield victories alone do not equal strategic success, and effective solutions require both a thorough understanding of the underlying cultural, political, tribal, and socioeconomic situation and a unity of effort. These, plus mindset and cultural changes, are well under way today.
What institutional changes (in Washington and in the field) are needed to enable an improved whole-of-government response to complex operations in the future?

**RO:** Future success in Iraq relies on our whole-of-government involvement in building Iraq’s capacity. It is important to understand that U.S. engagement after 2011 is as important as our continued engagements, including military presence, prior to 2011. The Strategic Framework Agreement is about establishing long-term, non-military partnerships across the spectrum of our government beyond 2011. Through the SFA, we will help Iraq continue to build strategic depth in all their institutions—with an emphasis on economic, diplomatic, and security institutions—to develop into a stable state.

We have adapted and continue to adapt to ever-changing circumstances in Iraq. A perfect example is the Army’s AABs, designed and structured to achieve a unity of effort as we transition to a primary focus on civil capacity-building. Given today’s complexity, our collective challenge is to take what we have developed here and codify it in our educational institutions, doctrine, and leader development across our different institutions. I believe developing adaptive, creative, and fundamentally sound leaders is our cornerstone. Our institutions continue to adjust, incorporating current lessons learned. For example, we continue to emphasize and encourage interagency interaction at our senior Service colleges—at a greater degree than in the past. The real question is not whether our educational institutions have adjusted, but whether they will continue to adjust. I have complete confidence that they will, but it is up to us as senior leaders to ensure this happens.

Institutionally, the Department of Defense has funding and training programs in place with resources dedicated to support an expeditionary military, run the organization, and continue the professional development of Servicemembers and Defense Department civilians. It is critical to fund all of these, including programs designed to prepare our leaders for future complex operations. In the military, we have built the capacity—scope, depth, and breadth—into our system to accomplish this, even during wartime.

As we move forward, it is imperative that other U.S. agencies have the appropriate funding and training to allow them to support expeditionary operations and achieve unity of effort in complex environments. This will require congressional recognition. We are placing additional burdens on the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Treasury, for example, in addition to other agencies because they have the expertise needed to address issues in complex operations such as Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, other departments are not funded to be expeditionary. We are asking them to send people to Iraq and Afghanistan, yet we have not increased their budget allowing them to hire more people so that they can continue with their institutional missions and these new requirements. One specific example is police training. Our Joint Campaign Plan outlines how the military will turn this over to the State Department—which runs foreign police training programs all over the world.
However, they require funding and the capacity to continue this program beyond 2011—when U.S. forces depart—to develop a fully professionalized Iraqi police force.

**It has been argued that the Anbar Awakening and the Sons of Iraq [SOI] helped turn the tide in Iraq. Was U.S. support for the Sons of Iraq critical? How will a reduced U.S. presence in Iraq impact these groups?**

**RO:** In 2006, the Awakening movement began to take hold in Anbar Province as tribally focused Sunnis began to reject AQI and became willing to stand up against extremists. However, they could not do this alone. With the surge, we increased our military presence allowing us to secure—and enhance the confidence of—the Sunni population and therefore set the conditions for the movement to solidify. Building on the success in Anbar, and because of our increased troop numbers across Iraq, we were then able to expand the awakening to other Sunni areas. From a tactical level reconciliation with Sunni insurgents operating in a predominantly Sunni area, we carefully shepherded this into a national, Iraqi-led reconciliation program. Today, the Iraqi government administers the SOI program—with our oversight—building overall confidence toward achieving future reconciliation of all groups as Iraq moves forward.

Last summer, the Iraqis began transitioning SOI into the Iraqi Security Forces and other nonsecurity ministries. However, as they began preparing for national elections, national and provincial leaders decided—with the concurrence of all parties—to slow down transitions in key areas, realizing that the SOI were instrumental to their overall security architecture. As the Iraq government developed its 2010 federal budget, it struggled with the effects of fluctuating oil prices, but the first program it fully funded was the SOI program. This was an Iraqi-led prioritization, which says a lot about the commitment to moving forward. There are still some lingering tensions in various areas, but U.S. forces will remain engaged for nearly 2 more years, and we will continue to play the role of honest brokers and facilitate continued confidence-building measures leading to long-term national unity.

What are two of your key lessons learned from Iraq?

**RO:** First, we have learned that we must do a better job of fully understanding the environment in which we jointly operate. In 2003, nearly all of our military leaders had just a superficial understanding of the tribal, political, cultural, and ethnosectarian dynamics within Iraq itself and Islam as a whole. Today, military leaders at all levels work to understand the intricacies of the operational and strategic environment. With their civilian counterparts, they look for root causes of violence—the drivers of instability—and think through the second- and third-order effects. Taking into account the political, economic, cultural, historical, social, and security factors shaping the environment enables us to identify mitigating actions. Having seen the changing dynamics it goes back to understanding what everyone brings to the table and figuring out how we can employ all of these talents to achieving our goals of providing stability in Iraq.
over the past 6 years reinforces that the U.S. military is an incredible learning organization capable of boundless ingenuity and adaptation.

Second, having spent a significant amount of time as the Corps and Force commander, I have realized it is not about unity of command, but unity of effort of all capabilities and capacities on the ground. In Iraq today, we have the United Nations, nongovernmental organizations, U.S. agencies and departments, U.S. military, and the government of Iraq. We must organize, plan, and synchronize all organizational efforts and assets to achieve our common goals and objectives. Today, we have junior leaders—battalion commanders and even captains on a smaller scale—who understand this imperative. It goes back to understanding what everyone brings to the table and figuring out how we can employ all of these talents to achieving our goals of providing stability in Iraq. As the military continues to draw down, unity of effort will be a tenet guiding our efforts.

*Has Iraq become the “forgotten war”*?

**RO:** In the short term, clearly national attention was diverted from Iraq as the administration focused on developing our strategy for Afghanistan. And, as we increase our military and governmental investment in Afghanistan, it will continue to garner significant attention. However, I do not believe Iraq has become the “forgotten war.” It has seen less attention for good reasons: our civil and military successes have allowed us to reduce our military presence as Iraq develops the capacities and competencies required as a stable, sovereign, and self-reliant state. Ultimately, the U.S. chain of command understands the long-term, strategic importance of Iraq, a country that remains vital to stability in the Middle East having always played a significant role in regional security dynamics. While our combat mission will end in about 5 months, the U.S. Government remains committed to our Iraqi partner and our long-term partnership. Focusing primarily on stability operations, U.S. forces will continue to provide support to civil capacity-building missions with our interagency partners and the United Nations while conducting targeted counterterrorism operations by, with, and through the Iraqi Security Forces.

Iraq is a country rich in history with a culture steeped in tradition, yet it is also a state and a society under construction, struggling to define its identity and its place in the world after decades of oppression and violence. Our military presence through 2011 provides psychological and physical support to the Iraqi people, the government of Iraq, and the Iraqi Security Forces. The level and nature of U.S. engagement with the Iraqis will continue to change as we draw down our military forces and as the Iraqis build their own competencies. Through the Strategic Framework Agreement, the United States has a mechanism for supporting Iraq in developing its institutional and human capacity, essentially its strategic depth. Iraq has made steady progress but has a long way to go. Success will be defined by our ability to support Iraq’s developing institutional capacity—from governance to economics—that will sustain its long-term stability. We must have strategic patience.

We must also resource those agencies that will continue to have a presence and effect positive change in Iraq. Having demonstrated tremendous resiliency, I believe the Iraqis are determined to make their country different from what it once was. And the United States is committed to its enduring relationship with Iraq long after military forces have departed.
An Interview with Peter Pace

The whole-of-government concept, so popular only a few years ago, seems to have lagged a bit. The sense of urgency for national security reform seems to have dissipated, perhaps particularly on Capitol Hill. Do you believe there should be more urgency about national security reform?

PP: There’s a lot on everyone’s plate, and it takes leaders of stature to help focus people with limited energy on which problem to solve. If we think about the interagency process, here is how it works in my opinion, and this is not about any administration; this is about how our government functions, not any particular flavor of government.

If the Nation has a problem that it is facing, the National Security Council [NSC] comes together. For lack of the right terminology, the one-star level gets together, then the two-star, the three-star, and the four-star. Finally, we have an NSC meeting with the President and with all the heads of the agencies. In the process of going through the dialogue and the discussion of what the problem is and the various courses of action are, the cooperation in the room is excellent. Everybody is sharing ideas; everybody is trying to find the right courses that will be successful—great Americans working together trying to do the right thing.

Either during that meeting or some subsequent meeting, the President makes a decision, and that’s where the system starts to malfunction. Why? Because the Secretary of Defense takes his piece, the Secretary of State takes her piece, the Secretary of the Treasury takes his. These Cabinet secretaries take their respective pieces of what’s supposed to be done and go back to their respective agencies, and they start working on it. The problem is that there is nobody below the President with “Choke Con” over this system. So if a problem starts between DOD [Department of Defense] and...
State—unless it is so significant that the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense want to bring it to the President—it just does not get solved. People try to work around it and it just bubbles along. There are great people trying to do the right thing, but nobody is tagged with the responsibility of keeping all of this tied together. The bottom line is if any agency says no, unless it goes to the President, there is no way to move that “no” off center.

Let’s consider Goldwater-Nichols [Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986]. I believe you can take every piece of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation and apply it to the interagency [community]. Maybe not right away, but we should certainly look at it. First, how would it function? Before 1986, we had the best Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps in the world, but they didn’t share their toys with one another. Along comes Congress and they say that’s not good enough. None of the Service chiefs wanted Goldwater-Nichols legislation to pass because they did not want to give up authority. As it turned out, once they were forced into it, what they gave up as Service chiefs they picked up in spades as joint chiefs. Now each of them had a chance to discuss the other Services’ issues in the tank. Most importantly, there was a single person in charge. It took almost 20 years to get where we had worked with each other enough, understood each other enough, gone through enough problems together, all of which builds trust—and we stumbled over everything possible to get to the point where we understood each other. The only way to get there was to go through it.

So if you take a look at the interagency, my belief is that a way forward might be to have somebody in charge immediately below the President, so it would work something like this: the President makes a decision and says the Secretary of State is in charge. Or Treasury is in charge. Or DOD is in charge. Bottom line: the President both makes a decision and decides which department is going to lead.

In DC, all follow-on meetings are run by State if they are the lead. In the regions, the combatant commanders have the facilities, so you meet at the combatant commanders’ table, but whoever is the designated lead runs the meeting using the facilities of DOD. In the country, the Embassy is a great facility. You have the meeting in the Embassy, but whoever in DC has been designated as the lead runs the meeting. Now is it going to go smoothly the first couple of times? Of course not. If there is a problem and the State Department person in any of those locations says something that the military guy does not feel comfortable with, you take it to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Defense takes it to the NSC and they discuss it. It will take years to work through all those problems, but if we don’t get started, if it’s a 10-year process, it’s 10 years from when we start. If we wait 2 more, it’s 12.Initiating this change requires a Secretary of Defense or Secretary of State to really push this process because they are the ones who, in my opinion, have to start giving up the most. If we do not have individuals who are willing to give up some authority to improve the interagency, it is not going to happen.

You need people of stature to stand up and say, “This is something that needs to be done.” You need people on both sides of the aisle in Congress and one or more Cabinet officials to become seized with the idea that we can have the same impact on interagency effectiveness and efficiency with a Goldwater-Nichols–like approach to the interagency process that was the result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that forced the U.S. military to operate jointly.
**How would you characterize the evolution of civilian-military collaboration over the last 10 years?**

**PP:** This is just my own personal experience, so others may have a different view based on where they operated. When I was in the J3 as a lieutenant general around 1996–1997, when there was an NSC meeting at the White House, the Joint Staff put together its own position. We may or may not have coordinated it with DOD staff. If the meeting was at the White House, we would go sit next to each other but really not know what the other guy was going to say. The civilian representing the Secretary of Defense and I, if I were representing the Chairman, did not necessarily know what the other was going to say.

Fast forward to 2001 through 2007. Very purposefully, both on the civilian leadership side and the military side, all of the war planning meetings were run with the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Chairman, and Vice Chairman all in the room together. We heard briefings from both civilian DOD and military Joint Staff. And VTCs [video teleconferences] were always in one room with all of us sitting in that room. When going to the White House for NSC meetings, typically the Chairman or Vice Chairman rode in the same vehicle with the Secretary, talking about what topics were going to be covered and who might say what when. So when we got to the White House, there was absolute clarity on what everybody’s position was. If there were any problems, they had all been worked through before we even left the Pentagon. So from my limited experiences as a three-star and then as a four-star, there is a night-and-day difference as far as sharing information among civilian leaders and military leaders in preparation for meetings about the way forward.

**Do you believe we face new and unprecedented threats?**

**PP:** To the extent that any nation is dependent on computers, it is vulnerable. I am talking about cyber attack and cyber defense. There are 1.1 billion computers globally hooked into the Internet, and it’s estimated that about 10 percent of these are zombie computers, co-opted by someone other than the owner. That means that there are over 100 million computers available to those who would want to use them for reasons other than what the owner intended.

Fundamentally, I believe that the dawn of cyber attacks and cyber defense is going to have the same impact on relations between nations that the dawn of nuclear weapons had. Nuclear weapons were used and—thank God—have been put on the shelf. Cyber weapons are being used literally thousands of times a day. Nation-to-nation, there is still some hope that the old nuclear philosophy of mutually assured destruction will help deter, but it is hard to determine where attacks come from.

The threat of cyber attack is very real and it is available not only to nations but to groups of individuals who may or may not be sanctioned by nations, and to criminals, and to terrorists. So the whole spectrum of possible people you need to defend yourself against has exploded.

All that the national government can do, in my opinion, is understand how to protect itself at the agency level and help set standards to let businesses protect themselves at their levels. Cyber attack and cyber defense are here to stay. We as a nation are ill prepared for it, as is every other nation. We, collectively, are going to have to figure out how to deal with this.

**Do you think we need a new concept of war to respond successfully to cyber warfare?**
And if so, how does a nation get to a new concept of war?

PP: I’m not prescient enough to know whether at the end of the process we end up with a new concept of war because the pieces that we have had to deal with for the last couple hundred years as a nation will still be fundamental to what the U.S. military will provide to the Nation. This is additive. Will the solution that we come up with on how to defeat this new threat be so significantly different that it requires a whole new concept of war, or is this another chapter in the current concept? Not perfectly clear to me. My gut tells me that we’re adding a new, very important chapter alongside land, sea, air, and space. We’ve now added cyber. That to me makes sense, but I’d like to have time to work through the problem as a nation and then understand where we are.

In retrospect, do you believe our initial approach in Iraq was the right approach? Or was General [Eric] Shinseki right—we needed more people from the get-go and we have been catching up ever since?

PP: You’ve asked a question based on a faulty premise. Eric Shinseki was a member of the Joint Chiefs, he’s a National War College classmate of mine, we played soccer together, and I consider him a friend. In the process of working up for the attack into Iraq, not once did he say that we needed more troops. What happened was that we had a plan that was wrong in a couple of aspects. And I’d rather point fingers at myself than anybody else. I was Vice Chairman then, and I will just simply tell you where I was wrong. First, based on intelligence and historical precedent, we believed that there were weapons of mass destruction—at least chemical weapons. We believed that so sincerely that we made sure all of our troops had chemical protective gear, and we fully expected that chemical weapons would be used against us when we got close to Baghdad. And the historical precedent for that belief was that Iraq had used them on their neighbors in Iran. Therefore, they still had them and therefore having used it before in war, they would use it again. Thank God that turned out to be wrong in the case of their using them.

We also believed, based on intelligence, that there were whole Iraqi divisions that, once we started to attack, would surrender en masse and become part of the liberating forces. Those divisions not only did not surrender en masse, they did not fight; they simply disintegrated and went home. So we got to Baghdad with about 150,000 troops, give or take—it was more than that, but I think that number is about right. It was not that we did not have a plan for securing Baghdad and for securing the country. It’s that the plan was based on a false assumption, which was that the Iraqi army, all 400,000, would be intact. That it would serve as the Iraqi nation’s army, and that we as liberating forces could turn over the responsibility of the security of their own nation to the new Iraqi government and the Iraqi armed forces. When they disintegrated, there were only U.S. and coalition troops and not enough to prevent the looting. So everyone understood—that is, the Joint Chiefs and General [Tommy] Franks understood—that U.S. troops alone were not sufficient. But the assumption was that Iraqi troops would be sufficient and therein was the problem. So again, I am not pointing a finger at General Shinseki because none of us believed that we needed more U.S. troops because of that assumption. In testimony, when asked, “How many troops more would it take?” General Shinseki gave
his answer. But the assumption that General Shinseki had been recommending more troops all along is incorrect.

**In Afghanistan, do you think that the increase in troops is going to bring us at least a reduction in the violence and possibly victory? What does victory look like in Afghanistan at this point in time?**

**PP:** Victory anywhere on the planet, with regard to terrorism, looks like average citizens getting to live their lives the way they want to. Here in Washington, DC, is there crime? Yes. But the police keep the crime below a level at which most citizens can live their lives as they see fit. Around the world, in Afghanistan, will there be terrorist attacks? Yes. But will we be able to collectively help the Afghan government keep those terrorist attacks below the level at which most Afghans can live their lives the way they want to? When you get to that point, then, that in my mind is the definition of victory. It is what has been happening over time in Iraq. It is what can happen over time in Afghanistan. We have to go back to fundamentals when we talk about Afghanistan and the addition of troops.

In March of 2003, when we went into Iraq, we knew that we did not have enough troops to occupy Iraq and pursue everything we wanted to do in Afghanistan. In military parlance, Iraq became the “primary theater” and Afghanistan became the “economy of force theater.” Economy of force means you apply enough resources to win local battles, but you don’t have enough resources to prevail. And you accept that based on the resources you have. So in World War II, for instance, Europe and Germany were the first objective and Japan and the Pacific were the economy of force missions until we won in Europe. So that was the intent. It took longer in Iraq than any of us would have wanted. But now that troops are available from Iraq, the question then becomes, “Now that we have the resources, should we apply the additional resources?”

I think it is absolutely right that the additional troops will provide additional stability and additional time for the Afghan government to build its own army. During the 2004 to 2007 timeframe, General [Abdul Rahim] Wardak, who is the Minister of Defense for Afghanistan, and President [Hamid] Karzai wanted to build an army that was significantly bigger than what the international community was building. They wanted to build an army/police force of about 400,000. There were two things that worked against that.

One, there’s a European agreement, I believe it is called the London Compact, which establishes the proper size force we would want to build for the Afghan army—about 70,000. And there was certainly agreement inside our own government that we did not want to build an army bigger than Afghanistan could afford to sustain. About 70,000 troops for a country that had a GDP [gross domestic product] of between $6 and $8 billion—$2 billion of which was drug money—was about as much as we could see them being able to afford.

Over time, other math comes into play. For every 10,000 U.S. Servicemembers, just to have them on our rolls, costs $1 billion a year. To employ them overseas, it gets closer to $1 billion a month. So when you look at recommending 40,000 more troops, and you’re looking at a ratio of 1 year over and 2 years back, to have 40,000 more troops, you’re looking at where you’re going to find another 120,000 more troops—which is billions and billions of dollars just to have them on the rolls and even more billions to employ them. When you look
at it that way, you say to yourself, okay, would it not be smarter to help the Afghan government build their army, and understanding that they cannot afford to maintain it, perhaps we as a nation would, as part of our support, provide them with $1 billion or $2 billion a year to sustain their army, inside their country, doing their work, allowing us to bring our troops home and saving all those other billions and billions of dollars that we're spending right now. So the math works pretty quickly in that regard.

It takes time. It will take years to help them build whatever size army it is, but if it's a six-figure army, a six-digit army with 200,000; 300,000; 400,000; whatever that number is, it's going to take years to build. Significantly, the Afghan government wants us there. The Afghan people want us there, which is different than Iraq. So to the extent that adding U.S. troops now buys for the international community, and especially for the Afghan people, time to build their own armed forces to take over their own work, I think that's a good investment.

That begs one final question: do we have the time? Do you think that we have the staying power to do what's necessary to fight a counterinsurgency, to build a nation, or even its army?

PP: We have the time and the resources to do whatever we think is important to our nation.

PRISM
An Interview with
Husain Haqqani

Pakistan’s policy now is to help Afghanistan attain long-term stability and build national institutions, including the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. But at the same time, we are realistic enough to understand that Afghanistan’s institutions of state will not emerge overnight; it takes decades to build an army; it takes a long time to build an ethos of a comprehensive and integrated civil service. So the first priority in Afghanistan ought to be to beat the insurgency, to contain the Taliban threat, and at the same time to make it possible for reconcilable elements in the insurgency to be brought into the political mainstream through a process of reconciliation. But Pakistan’s own security is important to Pakistanis, and we certainly do not want Afghanistan to be used for intelligence or military operations aimed at undermining Pakistan’s security.

**Could a stable Afghanistan government include the Taliban?**

**HH:** President [Hamid] Karzai has on many occasions said that he does not look upon the Taliban as a monolith. We in Pakistan have also had the experience of the Pakistani Taliban, and we recognize that the Taliban are not a monolithic organization. They are a loose association of likeminded people with different motives. In some cases, the agenda is much more inspired by the global jihad vision of al Qaeda, and
in some cases it is local grievances that have turned the people into Taliban. So there are reconcilable and irreconcilable elements within the broad groupings known as the Taliban, and including some of them in a political process in Afghanistan is definitely a possibility. A lot of the Taliban happen to be Pashtun, and Pashtun inclusion in Afghanistan’s government is significant and important just to be able to create national unity within the country. So I think that we need to make a distinction between reconcilable and irreconcilable elements among the Taliban and engage the reconcilable elements. Of course, it is up to Afghanistan to take the initiative on the Afghan side of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. If the Afghans need any support—political, material, or diplomatic—Pakistan will be forthcoming in providing that support in the process of reconciliation within Afghanistan, but it will have to be an Afghan-led process.

**Do you think that the current U.S. counterinsurgency strategy will defeat the irreconcilable Taliban?**

**HH:** I’m not a military man, so I do not claim superior knowledge on the subject of military strategy, but I think that any counterinsurgency strategy needs to have a military component, a political component, and a socioeconomic component. We are seeing the emergence of a comprehensive strategy. There is a military plan now with the forthcoming surge. There is seemingly a political plan relating to the process of reconciliation and reintegration. And then hopefully there will be a sufficiently effective socioeconomic program so that people do not join insurgents in reaction to their own grievances that emanate from being dispossessed.

A major problem in Afghanistan remains resentment against the presence of foreign forces, so the United States will have to address that resentment as well at some point. There are those who are waging an insurgency because they want to take power in Afghanistan, but there are those who would not even become insurgents if there were no foreign presence there. And I think that is something that is being understood by American military leaders. Not only are we the major source of logistics support for NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] in Afghanistan, but also in recent months, we have been working together to make sure that there is a hammer and anvil strategy where, when Pakistan operates against Taliban on the Pakistani side of the border, there is some attempt on the Afghan side by NATO–ISAF forces to ensure that these people do not escape into Afghanistan, and vice versa. But I think that the weakness of the Afghan military remains a factor in putting the burden of counterinsurgency on the Afghan side almost entirely on NATO and ISAF forces.

**Given what you have said about the resistance to a foreign presence in Afghanistan, do you think that Western aid, which is usually provided through Western civilians or nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], will be able to win “hearts and minds” in Afghanistan and in Pakistan?**

**HH:** The question of Western aid always becomes a catch-22 question because your own legislators would like greater transparency and accountability in the use of money that is essentially being spent on behalf of your taxpayers. At the same time, if you have a large footprint of foreigners going around the countryside in
Afghanistan or the tribal parts of Pakistan, it is likely to create resentment. People turn around and say, “What do these people really want?” So conspiracy theories are easier to spread when there are a lot of foreigners present. Finding the balance is not easy, but I think that everybody would agree that people in Afghanistan, and for that matter in Pakistan, would like American assistance for our economic growth and for our development. The only question is under what terms should this aid flow and how can the Americans find ways of accountability and transparency that satisfy American taxpayers and legislators without causing offense on the ground by having too heavy an American civilian or NGO presence.

The United States over the past 10 years has developed a “whole-of-government” approach to complex operations. What is Pakistan’s strategy for meeting the challenge of its own radical element?

HH: Pakistan, of course, since the election of the democratic government in February 2008, has had a whole-of-government approach as well. Our military has been taking the lead in military operations. We have had successful operations in Swat and South Waziristan and have defeated the insurgents there—cleared a lot of territory. We continue to have the four-step policy of clear, hold, rebuild, and transfer. So the military goes in and clears, and it holds territory that would otherwise have been under Taliban influence. But at the same time, the rebuilding and the transfer require two things: rebuilding requires a lot of resources, but the transfer requires capacity-building. Civilian institutions do not have the capacity at this stage to take over all responsibilities and provide all elements of good governance in formerly Taliban-infested areas. So we hope that we can, with the help of the international community, have an effective policy in which we can use the military to fight, but we can also use political and socioeconomic instruments to ensure that we do not have a recurrence or resurgence of the radicals whom we have already defeated.

So what is the correct approach to the Taliban in Pakistan? Is it the whole-of-government approach or a military answer for insurgency like in Sri Lanka or Algeria?

HH: There is no military answer to an insurgency that involves large numbers of people, many of whom have the support of their tribes or their fellow villagers based on religious sentiment. I think that we need to fight the hardcore and defeat them, but at the same time, we need to create a culture of hope where people realize that they can have a better life here and now and therefore do not need to listen to people who invite them to blow themselves up to be able to have a better life in the hereafter.

We must also understand the social underpinnings of insurgency: the lack of governance or opportunities and the absence of justice that people complain about. One-third of Pakistan’s population live below the poverty line and another one-third live just above. To make the argument that the fact that so many people do not have any opportunity for their future, do not have anything to look forward to, has nothing to do with their willingness to become radicals is to deny a significant contributing factor toward the insurgency. I think that there are hardcore ideologues who contribute to radicalism in Pakistan, but then there are a lot of people for whom this is about global injustice, this is about not having a job, this is about not having been to school
ever or having no chance of an education or an opportunity. So we really have to work on several dimensions and make sure that the 42 percent of school-aged children in Pakistan who do not go to school can somehow come into the schooling system—that we can actually give young Pakistanis hope that they can have a good life making shoes for Nike rather than improvised explosive devices for the Taliban.

Let’s talk about justice for a minute. Some people see the Pakistani judiciary as heroic in upholding democracy and particularly in the movement to return to civilian government. Should the United States provide assistance to the Pakistani judiciary?

HH: We must understand that when people say that they are being denied justice, they’re not talking about the constitutional arguments in superior courts. They’re talking about the day-to-day running of civil and criminal cases, and there I think that Pakistan’s judicial institutions need a lot of investment.

We have fewer judges at the lower levels than we need; our courts are clogged; and litigation usually, especially in civil disputes, proceeds at a slow pace. Similarly, the criminal justice system also suffers from inadequate funding. If we had a good law enforcement machinery, if our police had the kind of equipment and mobility that would help prevent crime, and then if the prosecutorial side of the criminal justice system was able to collect evidence and present it before a court in a timely manner, then we wouldn’t have the spectacle of cases—criminal cases—pending for 10, 12, or 15 years.

Try seeing the thing from the perspective of somebody who has been charged, but wrongly so, and has not even been convicted but has had a case pending against him for many years. It’s a charge that is pending without the ability to clear the name or for that matter to have a sentence pronounced and then completing that sentence. It’s like purgatory for a very long time.

So those are the issues that people are talking about when they say that we need a lot of support for our judicial system. It’s not just the superior courts where constitutional and political issues are sometimes addressed; it’s the lower courts at the smallest level—the judge for the district who sits in the district headquarters but hardly has any influence over some isolated village. That is where the support and investment are needed.

If the United States wanted to develop a strategy to help Pakistan consolidate the rule of law, what would be the characteristics of that strategy?

HH: First of all, any strategy for the consolidation of rule of law in Pakistan would have to be led by Pakistanis, and any role that the United States has would have to be supportive of that Pakistani strategy. In recent years, there has been a tendency, especially among the aid community in the United States, to think that the solution to corrupt or ineffective government is to bypass government and work through nongovernmental organizations. In some areas, nongovernmental organizations work fine—reproductive health, gender issues. You allow certain women’s groups, collectives, etc., to work, and you support them with money and resources. That’s fine. But in matters such as building of rule of law or building a law enforcement machinery—if you bypass government then you really do not help build institutions of state. You have to work through the state. You have to work through the government.
I think what is needed in the case of Pakistan is an understanding of what it is that has prevented Pakistan from becoming a rule-of-law state. At the macro level, it has been the historic pattern of overthrowing of governments without constitutional process. That is being addressed by the force of public opinion, by cooperation among various political parties, and by the fact that we now have a consensus constitutional reform package going through Parliament. The other part of it is what I said, a micro level—and there I think the real issue is the lack of resources, the lack of technology, and in many cases, the lack of training. And those are the three things where American resources, technology, and training can help.

**What does Pakistan look like to you in 10 years? What kind of country do you expect it to be?**

**HH:** I will rephrase the question and say I would like to talk about what kind of country I would like Pakistan to be in 10 years. My vision of Pakistan is that of a country with universal access to education for our school-aged children, with a more advanced infrastructure—a nation that sits at the crossroads of opportunities rather than at the crossroads of conflict. After all, Pakistan is strategically located at the crossroads of Central Asia, South Asia, China, and the Middle East. So far, we have always seen ourselves as sitting at the crossroads of the conflicts of these regions, but we can also transform it into a crossroads of opportunity for these regions.

Also, I would like to see a major economic leap forward in terms of becoming a nation that produces and exports much more than we do. Pakistan’s agriculture, which used to grow at an average rate of 5 percent per annum during the 1950s, is barely growing and contributing to national economic growth now. And I think that there is plenty of potential there with some land reform, with some policy reform, and with some improved inputs, including a revamp of our irrigation system. With these, we should be able to expand our agricultural growth. And then, the massive movement of populations from the rural areas to the urban areas needs to be better managed. Instead of huge slums in cities, we hopefully will be able to create smaller cities and towns that are self-contained. So that would be the vision for Pakistan that I would have 10 years from now.

And a key element would be peace with India, with resolution of our outstanding disputes, including Kashmir, and a much more stable relationship with Afghanistan in which Afghanistan and Pakistan are partners for stability.

**But would Pakistan be a country whose national ideology or national character is oriented toward fundamentalist Islam or a pro-Western orientation?**

**HH:** Pakistanis have time and again voted for democratic, modern, liberal political parties, and I think that trend will continue. Given the opportunity, Pakistanis would like to be part of the 21st century, and while we will always be an Islamic society, we would certainly want to be a modern, democratic, forward-looking, progressive state.

**After 30 years of war, do you think that Afghanistan is going to achieve reintegration and consolidation? Will it require or should it have some kind of justice and reconciliation process or prosecution of people who committed crimes in the past?**
**HH:** I think it’s a question that should be asked of Afghan leaders. In most situations, it’s better to settle and reconcile matters of the past instead of holding grudges, and I think that the Afghan leaders are best equipped to find their correct mechanism for bringing justice to their society, and justice in a manner in which it does not end up becoming or is not seen as settling of scores from the past. Afghanistan has gone through a lot of trauma. It began with the Soviet occupation, but it did not end with the Soviet withdrawal. And the world really neglected Afghanistan, and by extension Pakistan, in the subsequent years. I think it was a big mistake of the United States to walk away from our region after the Soviets left Afghanistan, and I think the international community now recognizes that. That said, all the trauma that the Afghans have gone through would not be resolved if the injustices of the past end up becoming the basis for settling of scores in the present.
An Interview with

Said Tayeb Jawad

As a candidate, Barack Obama campaigned on the principle of reaching out to our adversaries, and he has done so most notably with Iran. If Mullah Omar were to extend an “open hand” to President [Hamid] Karzai, what should and would be President Karzai’s response right now?

STJ: President Karzai has publicly said that he is ready to talk with Mullah Omar. We think that reconciliation is an important part of fighting insurgency in Afghanistan. Of course, the issue of reconciliation, especially with a group such as the Taliban—with a very dark past—is complex not only for President Obama or the U.S. Government. Even internally in Afghanistan, there are different approaches, ideas, and opinions on how to reconcile with the Taliban and what should be the extent of the compromises to be made. If we have full military power at our disposal—Afghan security forces or international security forces—we should continue the military pressure on the terrorists and other groups. But if everyone is in Afghanistan half-heartedly and with limited commitment, then we have to be realistic and seek every possible way of ending the war and violence in Afghanistan.

What do you think of the concept of justice and reconciliation in terms of taking legal steps against those guilty of atrocities in the past?

STJ: When you have limited resources at your disposal in a postconflict country like Afghanistan, you are forced to choose stability over justice. There is no other option: first, because you do not have the enforcement capability; second, you do not have the proper institutions to deliver justice. If you don’t have the proper institutions to deliver justice, what you...
deliver will be revenge, not justice. However, in the long run, if you do not deliver justice, the stability will not last.

What about international institutions for transitional justice? For example, in the case of Rwanda, an international tribunal was established—the same with Yugoslavia. Would anything like that be welcome, acceptable, or viable in Afghanistan?

STJ: I think the solution in Afghanistan will be more like South Africa—people should acknowledge what they did to their own people, the atrocities they have committed, and then decide jointly to turn the page. There has been enough violence and revenge in Afghanistan. We should look forward to a new opening, a new tomorrow based on hope, forgiveness, peace, and stability.

Given the significant perception of fraud in the recent election and the justified doubt about President Karzai’s ability to distinguish between his interest and Afghanistan national interest, what steps do you think the president should take to reassure the international community? Should he state that he will not seek another term when this current term ends?

STJ: First, the perception in the media and the perception among the international community do not comply with the reality on the ground. There has been a lot of intentional propaganda against the political leadership of Afghanistan, unjustifiably. He is an elected leader of Afghanistan; he has a difficult job; he is facing a brutal enemy; he has limited resources at his disposal; and he is the best partner that the West can find. Therefore, he should be supported. As far as seeking another round, no, this is not possible. The president has no intention of doing that, and the Afghan constitution will not allow this to take place. We have to make sure, however, that in the remaining 4 years, we work together to focus on our common enemy of terrorism and work closely to achieve our shared objective of peace and prosperity for the Afghan people.

Afghanistan is in the process of trying to establish a consolidated, independent state. In the past, Pakistan has played an interventionist role in Afghanistan, and if you agree with the Pakistani author and journalist Ahmed Rashid, he has argued that the Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI] in particular has been extremely intrusive in Afghanistan’s internal politics. What is your assessment at this time of the role of Pakistan—the overall net role of Pakistan in Afghanistan’s consolidation?

STJ: First, on the national consolidation of Afghanistan, Afghanistan has been a nation for 2,000 years. Pakistan as a state is younger than I am. These are two different distinctions. We as Afghanistan are a strong nation with weak state institutions. What we need to focus on in Afghanistan is to build state institutions and improve the capacity of the state institutions to deliver services to our historically strong nation. There need be no fear of disintegration of Afghanistan, despite the atrocities of the Taliban, the civil war by the mujahideen groups, the Soviet invasion; we never had a scenario of Afghanistan splitting into different states. In fact, when I was helping with drafting the new constitution, while we were discussing possibilities of even a federal state, people at the grassroots level were very much against it...
because they would consider that a way of weakening national unity. So people are jealously maintaining the national unity of the country. But what you need to do—to establish—is to improve the capacity of the government to serve the people.

The role that Pakistan can play is to recognize that terrorism is a threat to the region—both to Afghanistan and Pakistan. We will not have stability in Afghanistan unless Pakistan fights extremism and terrorism sincerely, both in Pakistan and in its cross-border infiltration. And vice versa. We have to work with Pakistan closely. This is our closest and best transit route to the outside. Pakistan could benefit from stability in Afghanistan to access the Central Asian market, and the flow of energy from Central Asia through Afghanistan and Pakistan would benefit the region. So we are like twins; our destiny is intertwined. What we are hoping is that all institutions in Pakistan work with us to fight against our common enemies and to work together to achieve our mutual goals of financial prosperity and regional economic reintegration.

**Do you believe that the ISI and those people in Pakistan who are considered extremists are continuing to support the Taliban in Afghanistan?**

**STJ:** Unfortunately, the biggest phobia or fear in Pakistan is India. So sometimes in order to confront India or reduce India’s influence, extremism is regarded as a tool of policy. We know that this is a dangerous route. Countries in the region—in the world—have taken that path and have paid a heavy price. We see today in Pakistan that the Pakistani people are paying this price through terrorist attacks. Cities such as Lahore, which were centers of civilization and were known for their libraries and bookshops, are now grounds for suicide bombing and roadside bombing. This is unfortunate, and the people and the civilian government of Pakistan have realized this.

**Could you discuss the ramifications for Afghanistan of the U.S. decision in 2003 to invade Iraq?**

**STJ:** We are grateful for U.S. assistance. I think the United States came rightfully to Afghanistan, as demanded by the Afghan people and supported by strong international consensus, to fight an enemy that was a threat to the Afghan people, to the region, to the world. It is questionable that the same kind of threat existed in Iraq. We were hoping when the invasion in Iraq took place that the United States would have enough resources to handle both crises, but a lot of attention and resources were diverted to Iraq. The consequences of the continued conflict there also made, by oversimplification and analogy, the rightful Afghan struggle to fight terrorism look similar to the situation in Iraq. So we did pay a price not just in terms of reduction of resources and attention from the United States, but also in that the global perceptions changed to a certain degree—a just and fair war in Afghanistan was compared to Iraq.

**Do you believe that if the United States had not diverted those resources, if it had "kept its eye on the ball" in Afghanistan, the problems we are facing today in Afghanistan, the insurgency, could have been headed off much earlier?**

**STJ:** Certainly. If we had had adequate resources to fight the Taliban and terrorists from
the beginning, in a decisive way, we would have permanently resolved the threat. The fact was that the Taliban were not beaten, defeated, or eliminated; they were pushed aside, and military operations stopped when they were pushed aside into the countryside or into Pakistan. If we had continued that fight in a resolute way to completely defeat them and put adequate pressure on the countries in our neighborhood and the region to stop the ideological, financial, and logistical support of the Taliban, we would have not had to pay the prices that we and you are paying today, in terms of military operations and stability costs in Afghanistan.

One of the “solutions” that U.S. forces have concluded will help is the so-called population-centric counterinsurgency. Do you think that will have the effect of defeating the insurgency?

STJ: It will deliver a sense of security, at least to major urban centers, and frankly, it is much more difficult to create a sense of security and stability in big cities than in the countryside because the nature of the terrorists and our brutal enemy is that they use suicide bombing and roadside bombing—tactics that have a lot more psychological impact in more populated areas and big cities. In the countryside, it is less evident.

Talking with my Afghan military folks in Afghanistan—particularly those who fought the Soviets and now are part of our Ministry of Defense—I clearly hear that they have their doubts about the effectiveness of focusing on delivering security only in the big cities. They have fought on the other side, as insurgents too, and they have said to me that if, for instance, you remove a military post on a mountaintop or on the remote roadside in the countryside, then you are making it easier for the terrorist to reach a city in 1 or 2 hours instead of traveling 2 or 3 days over mountain passes to avoid those outposts.

They come to the cities, and they are a lot more lethal in the cities. The point is that if you leave roads in the countryside unattended and these roads are used to supply the terrorists, suicide bombers, and others, then access to the city is much easier. That is what I hear from my generals. That is what I hear from my former anti-Soviet fighters. Once you leave the countryside undefended, the Taliban will not just sit there; they will come to the cities.

So you see this as a risk of the urban population-centric approach?

STJ: The Taliban claim more control of the countryside, and they force more people to join near them. This gives the enemy a bigger playing field. Also, any time and every time that they succeed in bringing a car full of explosives or a suicide bomber, the impact is much greater.

The other side of the coin, if you will, is the so-called civilian surge. In addition to a surge of military personnel, President Obama has proposed a surge of civilian personnel who are diplomatic and development professionals. After nearly a decade of American presence in Afghanistan, do you think that Afghanistan’s citizens will welcome civilian Americans?

STJ: Definitely. If Americans, NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], civilians, or the military came with the mission of helping and protecting Afghan people, they are welcome. Why wouldn’t they be? My country is poor. Our only hope is that we will build
Afghanistan through our partnership with the rest of the world. However, if the civilian surge means bringing an expert with a laptop into our ministry or into a remote province, the impact will be limited. We can use the same resources to recruit qualified Afghans. There is capacity in Afghanistan today. However, there is limited capacity of the Afghan government.

The reason that fewer Afghans are working for the Afghan government is that the international organizations, the donors, and even Afghan businesses can afford to pay a lot more. Fortunately, the economy is growing, but Afghans are making a lot more money by forming their own construction companies instead of working for the Ministry of Rural Development. So I think a combined approach of seeing a capacity or competency surge by Afghans, along with bringing a limited number of technical assistants, would work best. I think the civilians coming to Afghanistan should come with a specific, long-term mission of providing technical assistance. They should not push aside or compete with Afghan institutions. And you are right; if they elbow Afghans out, there might be resentment. Overall, better plans of recruiting, empowering, and enabling Afghans will be less expensive, more effective, and a lot more sustainable than bringing a consultant who comes in with a laptop, writes a report on a laptop, and leaves with a laptop. You should invest more in building Afghan human capital.

**Do you think that the Afghanistan security forces will be able to assume the full responsibility for national security before the withdrawal of U.S. forces or the International Security Assistance Force?**

**STJ:** They are completely willing—the security forces, the Afghan government, and the Afghan people—to do so. However, their ability to do so effectively depends on two factors. First, to what extent their professional capacities are being built. For instance, we are making significant progress by building the Afghan National Army, and they are fighting well. At the same time, the army still depends heavily for their transport and movement on heavy firepower and air protection, and for their surveillance and intelligence on international sources. We have to build these capacities as part of the army—especially air transport, heavy firepower, close-combat air force, surveillance, and intelligence. That is one factor.

The second factor is how serious the threat remains in Afghanistan. The threat coming to Afghanistan has its roots in the neighborhood, in the region. So if you are able to reduce the amount of support that the terrorists and Taliban are getting from the countries in the region, then our job will be easier. But as long as that support continues, not only Afghans, but our allies in the United States and the NATO countries, will have a tough time defeating this menace. So if we work closely and sincerely at the regional level with our partners, with our neighbors, and if we truly build the capacity of Afghan security forces—meaning army and police—and equally important, the capacity of the Afghan government to deliver services, we will be able to take full responsibility. It is not just enough to have capable soldiers and police forces; the court system should be functioning, the school system, the clinics. So here we are talking about truly enabling the Afghan government to deliver services so that the people can say, “Yes, there is a difference. If the government is here, I am better off.” If people do not reach the conclusion that the presence of the government means betterment in their life, they will be neutral; they will take sides as it is
convenient to them. It is the Afghan government’s responsibility to show them that if you take our side, we are there to serve you. That capability and these resources are still not there.

You mentioned the relatively successful performance of the Afghan National Army. What about the Afghan National Police? Why are we doing so much less well with the police, and how do we remedy that?

STJ: First, we had the wrong approach. We had the so-called lead nations concept. Germany was the lead nation in building the police force. This was the wrong concept. The lead nation to build anything in Afghanistan is Afghanistan. Everyone else is in the supporting role, and we—Afghans and the international community—should not feel that if the Germans are doing it then we are off the hook; they’re on it; we are not. That is what happened. And Germany started with a systematic approach of building police appropriate for peacetime. I remember well engaging with German authorities back then and even our Minister of the Interior; they were talking of giving to the Afghan police force only batons and pistols. It is a noble idea of a civil police, but the enemy is coming at them with RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades], and the police cannot just issue a citation that says “you’re wrong being here”; they’d get killed right away. So it was the wrong approach.

And second, there are very limited resources. Since we were initially offering something like $70 per month, we had to enlist whoever showed up, and a lot of people that showed up had no qualifications or had ill intentions. They used the gun and the uniform to make themselves rich. Now this is changing. We are paying better. There is a better training system in place. But still, building police overall is tougher than building the army because in the police force, you have to recruit locally. If you do not have a sense of stability in the locality, in the region, the police force performance will be impaired because the enemy, the terrorists, know who they are—who is their brother, who is their father, who is their uncle—especially in a tribal society. So they get this message, and it says, “Look, we know you are working for the police, but don’t forget that we know where your father lives, too.” As far as equipment and uniforms, the police are doing much better, but as far as professional training, a lot more investment needs to be made—first to recruit better officers, and second to train them adequately and equip them even more properly.

Is there more the international community could be doing on that particular front?

STJ: We are short 3,000 trainers right now. Of course, you, especially your NATO partners, can send more trainers.

Are Pashtunwali and Afghan Islamism compatible with democracy as we understand it in the United States and Europe?

STJ: Beginning in the 18th century, a certain degree of romanticism and fascination with the Afghan culture and history started, mostly by authors and researchers who came from Europe with colonial powers and troops. Pashtunwali is a code of conduct not different from codes of conduct in Senegal or Colombia, or an Indian tribe in Montana. It is completely compatible with values of freedom, and it is based on equality and dignity.

Frankly, what you mention as Afghan Islamism is the most moderate reading of
Islam that existed before the Soviet invasion. Historically, Afghanistan has been a country where mysticism, which is the most humanistic way of looking into Islam and religion, had strong roots. Even if you look at the prominent Afghan leaders such as President Mujadedi, he’s the leader of the Mujadedi, or Naqshbandiya, mystic or Sufi order; so is Pir Gilani, another Afghan leader. So Islam in Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion, before the infusion of extremism from outside and the arrival of the Arabs and other foreign extremists, had the most humanistic, the softest approach that you could imagine.

But yet, are they compatible with democracy? Again, we should look at this question as human beings. If democracy means going to bed without fearing the state secret service or the invasion of an armed group, if democracy means being assured that when your wife gives birth, she and your newborn will survive, if democracy means hoping to have access to basic government services, this is what every human being deserves and demands anywhere in the world. That is our nature as human beings. We want to have a life where we do not have to fear the state police or a terrorist group coming in the middle of the night into our home and ordering us around and asking us if we had prayed that night or not. So the values of freedom, the values of a sense of personal security are universal. Who would want the happy occasion of his wife giving birth to a child turning into tragedy because there is no clinic and his wife is dying? These are the rights to basic services and basic freedoms that people demand. Democracy is a value that is demanded naturally by human beings everywhere. If we think that there are some people who are naturally happy with terror or tyranny, this is racist. That is not right. That is against the nature of human beings.

Furthermore, you are not in Afghanistan to build democracy. We know. But you and I together are in Afghanistan to prevent the imposition of tyranny. We have no option. We have to prevent the imposition of terror and tyranny, and the only way that we can do it is to give a voice to the people, and when they have a voice, when they ask for something, deliver for them. The credibility of democracy is in our ability to deliver. It is not just that you allow a person to express his or her wishes through the media, through the free press or television—we have done that. But the other part is when they say, “I do want a clinic,” “I’m fed up with insecurity,” “I want a capable police force,” you and I should be able to deliver. Otherwise, we undermine this process of building pluralism.

In Afghanistan, we are spending hundreds of millions of dollars empowering people to elect their member of parliament, but that parliament has no say about how the money is spent in Afghanistan, about where the money goes. Imagine you are the delegate of a poor district in Afghanistan and I as a poor Afghan farmer or a poor Afghan teacher come to you and say, “I’m proud I’ve elected you as my delegate to parliament. We need a school in our village,” and you tell me, “Go see the commander of the PRT [Provincial Reconstruction Team] or the director of USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development].” So what will be the level of my confidence in the political system that we’ve established? Why should I go to vote next time if I see that my government and my representative neither have the information about where money has been spent nor the authority to direct these resources?

But there is also the question of corruption—another aspect of democracy to me is fairness. There have been allegations
of endemic corruption in Afghanistan—that some people, some families, some members of families are getting very rich and building very big houses outside of Kandahar, whereas many people are not benefiting from the transition that Afghanistan is struggling through.

STJ: That is right and this is a serious challenge that we have to examine to find out why it is happening. Why is it that, for instance, an official of the government is getting rich with a salary of $100 or $200 a month? Why is it that the international community is giving a contract to the governor of a province? Nepotism is wrong. Why are a lot of the criminals that have formed the so-called security companies getting paid extensively?

So I absolutely agree with you that corruption adversely affects the life of every Afghan as much as waste affects the perception of state institutions and state-building in Afghanistan. You as a taxpayer have the right to ask why the cost to build a school in Afghanistan is $1 million when an Afghan can build it for $200,000. We have these examples that Afghan nongovernmental organizations and individual Afghans have gone and rebuilt their school in their village for $80,000 while next to it, exactly the same school is being built through the international contracting system for $600,000. That is the challenge that we face. Corruption is a serious problem in Afghanistan. You have mentioned some big corruption—of building these huge houses. That is equally as bad as the petty corruption. The life of an Afghan is sometimes more impacted by the $5 corruption by the police because he has to deal with it every day, as much as the big political corruption.

Here we need to work together. We have to. On our part, we have started the process of registering the property of every government official. We have to take the next step—and the laws are right now being changed—not only to register but ask, “Where did you get this?” “What is the source of this income?” We have just conducted the trial of a former minister accused of taking bribes under new, strong anticorruption laws [designed] to strengthen the mandate of the Anti-Corruption High Office. There is no way to justify waste with corruption or corruption with waste. Both of them are equally bad and both of them create a perception of impunity. I know that there is increased pressure on the contracting system in Afghanistan and that is very welcome. This has been, unfortunately, the case. Most of the post-conflict countries are suffering from this kind of problem because of the big infusion of money coming into the country, and in Afghanistan the matter is even worse, with narcotics, which generate a lot of money.

What is the strategy that you would propose for dealing with the narco-economy that has become such a huge part of Afghanistan’s economy?

STJ: That’s an excellent question. The international community and the Afghan government together at the beginning did not actually make fighting narcotics a high enough priority in the struggle against terrorism. I think that fighting narcotics and corruption both should be part of the mandate of fighting terrorism because both endanger the lives of Afghans and people in the region and the world. We will only win the fight against terrorism if we deliver the safety and security of the Afghans. If we say that we are here to kill some foreign terrorists who are operating in the mountains, they say, “It’s not my fight. I’m not interested.” If we fail
to protect the interests of the people, we lose the fight. From the beginning, the mandate for fighting terrorism did not include fighting narcotics. That was a mistake.

Second, a lot of resources—billions of dollars—were spent on eradicating poppy fields. Mistake. Second major mistake. You cannot fight narcotics with eradication. The way to fight narcotics is to prevent cultivation. Once it is cultivated, it is too late. If you eradicate, you push the farmers into the hands of the terrorists. If you do not eradicate, part of the proceeds and money will go to the terrorists. So how we prevent cultivation is by giving an alternative to the farmers. People are not criminal by their nature. If you give them a dignified option, they will take it. But if you push them against the wall, they will kill to survive. Everyone will do this—it’s not just in Afghanistan but anywhere. If you and I have to keep our family alive, you would probably break the law if needed. And so, the way to prevent cultivation is to give an alternative. That alternative on one hand could be some new crop, let’s try soybeans in Afghanistan. Noble idea, not such a bad idea. However, people have been growing things in Afghanistan for 2,000 years. An Afghan farmer knows exactly what grows in his province, in his village. What we need to do is to add value to this crop by building processing facilities, cold storage, cold transport, and opening new markets for our agricultural products. If people are growing pomegranates in Kandahar or grapes in the Shomali plain north of Kabul, we should be able to transport that to Dubai, to Frankfurt, to Moscow, to somewhere where the value of that increases—or turn it into pomegranate juice instead.

Of course, alongside that we need to keep the pressure on by focusing on interdiction and removing some of the big criminals. The real money in narcotics is in trafficking. It is not in cultivation, it is in trafficking. That is where the value is added. But to answer your question, the best strategy is really to prevent cultivation by providing alternatives to the farmers.

I like the way that you started out with the connection of corruption, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking. It sounds like what you envision is a holistic approach that realizes their connectivity. Is that a fair description of your comprehensive approach?

STJ: Absolutely. I grew up in Afghanistan. As a child, we did not have a problem of addiction or corruption in government or society. If it were some corruption of paying 5 Afghanis, which is like 10 cents, to get some certificate from some government office, then that kind of money might be going on in many other countries; it might be going on in Afghanistan, too. But we never had someone paying $200,000 to a judge. That kind of money did not exist in the entire village where I grew up. We never heard of it, nobody could have seen, actually, 200,000 or 2 million Afghanis. As I grew up, I never saw that much cash in one place. So the issue of corruption is related to narcotics and to insecurity and to these huge infusions of cash through narcotics, through neighboring countries, through development assistance.

We can fight these phenomena only if we assure the Afghan people that what we are doing is to improve their lives. In the fight against terrorism, one of the problems is that we have lost the interest of some of the Afghans. Everybody welcomed the United States when they came into Afghanistan—with open arms—and the Taliban was pushed aside quickly,
mostly with the assistance of the Afghan people because people’s anticipation was that the whole world was here to help us out.

But then, when gradually the mission was defined that no, really, it is al Qaeda and certain groups who pose a threat to the region and to the world, Afghans felt that, “Well, my life is endangered by poverty, by the fact that the warlord is taking away my land or my shop. So al Qaeda is a threat. I never liked them, but it does not impact my life on a daily basis.” It was not their fight. They became indifferent and said, “If you kill them, if you take them away, good for you, but it's not my fight. If you can help me against the local warlord, if you can help me build a clinic, then I’m with you. If you can’t, then good luck.” We have to turn this around, so with any decision that we make, any military operation that we conduct, Afghans should see a benefit to themselves that says, “Yes. If you come here and you stay in my village and make sure that the Taliban and criminals are chased away, and you build a school and a court system, I’m with you.” And they will be with us. We should show them that if they are with us, they are better off. But if our police are abusive like the terrorists, why should a guy stick out his neck for any of us? You will be pragmatic. When the Taliban is in his village, he is with them. When we come with the military operation, he changes sides and is with us. But he is not going to get himself killed for us, unless we convince him that we are here to serve and protect him and his village permanently.

What should we focus on over the long term? Over the 50-year time span?

STJ: Investing in people and supporting your friends, moderate Afghans. So much was invested in elections, then there were allegations of fraud. A lot of the money that was spent in Afghanistan to finance these plastic boxes, or put them in a helicopter, should have been invested before that in moderation. Empower women’s organizations. Empower a young Afghan student from Kabul University who says I want to be the president of the country or in parliament. Go with him and support him and say, “That is a good vision. I want you to be president.”

The United States is doing a great job of funding processes and institutions such as elections and a police force. But invest more in building Afghan human capital, the Afghan professional capacity to run and manage these processes and institutions. Support Afghan civil society, support moderation, and support the new generation of young Afghan leaders.

People love the United States for the values it stands for. But still, Afghans need assistance, but assistance should not be giving them cash. Invest in moderation, invest in people, strengthening the culture and political parties in Afghanistan. That is the way to fight warlords, not just replacing one warlord with another. PRISM
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fter almost a decade of war, our Soldiers and leaders continue to perform magnificently in the harshest conditions and within the incredibly complex operating environments of Iraq and Afghanistan. They operate as part of increasingly decentralized organizations, and their tasks are made even more challenging by the unprecedented degree of transparency and near-instantaneous transmission of information. These trends are not an aberration. The future operating environment promises to grow even more complex. Because of that, we believe it is important to reflect on what it means to be a part of a profession. We are asking ourselves how 9 years of war and an era of persistent transparency have affected our understanding of what it means to be a professional Soldier.

To begin the discourse, we are adding “The Army Profession” as a key objective in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Campaign of Learning over the next year and as a ninth imperative to our Leader Development Strategy. The Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE) will collaborate with the Center for Army Leadership and author a white paper that will serve as the catalyst for discourse on this subject as part of an Army-wide campaign. Ultimately, the results of this campaign will be incorporated as chapter 1 of Army Field Manual 1. To get the conversation started, Don Ahern of the Ahern Group, who was commissioned by CAPE to conduct a series of interviews with Army leaders on The Army Profession, recently interviewed me. By sharing this discussion with readers, I hope to make it clear that we will never take our stature as a profession for granted.

**The Army’s professional ethic, though steeped in tradition, has evolved over time and will continue to do so. Why at this**

General Martin E. Dempsey, USA, is Commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.
time does the Army seem to be renewing its emphasis on the professional military ethic?

General Dempsey: An insight that has remained with me from my own professional development comes from a comment General Eric Shinseki made when he spoke to my class of brand new brigadier generals several years ago. General Shinseki was Chief of Staff at the time and someone asked him, “If we only remember one thing, what is a general officer’s principal responsibility to the institution?” His answer was, “Manage transitions.”

So to answer your question, “Why now?” I believe that we’re an Army in transition. Transitions are not discrete moments in time but have a temporal dimension. The transition we’re in now is a reflection of the institutional adaptations we’ve made in response to this era of persistent conflict. For example, ARFORGEN [Army Force Generation] is an institutional force management process that has allowed us to keep pace with operational requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan. We’ve adapted our force structure from an Army of Excellence organization to modular organizations. While we’ve always task-organized, we now move units around differently than we did before, and we’ve organized them differently to achieve this modular brigade-centric organization and structure within an ARFORGEN force management process.

However, in pursuing these adaptations, we may not have done so with a full appreciation of the challenges that would accrue in areas like leader development. So if you accept my premise that we’re an Army in transition—becoming more mindful of what it really means to be in persistent conflict, what persistent conflict does to leader development, what ARFORGEN does to leader development, what modularity has done to leader development—then I think it becomes imperative now that we examine our profession. We need to ensure that we’ve got the right emphasis in place to maintain our standing as a profession and to develop leaders of character despite the pressures of managing an Army in transition.

We talk about leadership at every level of the Army being indispensable and a fundamental part of the fabric of our Army ethic. What do you see as a leader’s responsibility to the profession?

General Dempsey: I think the leader’s responsibility is to preserve that which defines us as a profession. For example, expert knowledge, a commitment to continuing education, a certain set of values, notably among them the idea of service. We are a service-based profession that must remain apolitical in the American system of governance.

I think it’s also a leader’s responsibility to mold the young men and women who may join our ranks off the streets of America with a different set of values. I’m not trying to be judgmental, but I think we’d all agree that our particular skills, qualities, attributes, and values are different than what you would expect to recruit from the streets of America today. For that reason, I believe it falls to leaders to build our profession and to reinforce it over time. We have to “see ourselves.” We have to take a look at the pressures that impact upon our professional ethic. It falls to leaders at every rank to be introspective against this code of professionalism and to apply that code in how we lead the organizations under our control. In the case of Training and Doctrine Command, my job is to ensure not only that we’re delivering the hard skills required for combat operations, but also that we’re developing the
character of our Soldiers and leaders. In the end, it all comes down to character. We can’t afford to be a force absent character; it’s the foundation on which we have to build the American Army. Leaders must take ownership of that responsibility and avoid being pulled and tugged to the hard skills exclusively. I’m not suggesting that we have succumbed to current pressures and are neglecting character development, but there’s a risk there and we should always be mindful of it. Were that ever to happen we certainly couldn’t call ourselves a profession. Ultimately, it’s a leader’s responsibility.

How can we best shape the mindsets of Soldiers with respect to the profession?

General Dempsey: First and most important, the young Soldiers and leaders in our formations will emulate what they see, not what they hear. Recall that in my answer to your first question we discussed the effects of modularity on leader development. We’ve changed the way leaders interact with each other. The traditional mentoring, coaching, and teaching two levels down have been somewhat disrupted by modularity. Our corps and divisions are unencumbered in the traditional sense because our brigades and battalions have a different operating relationship with higher headquarters as a result of modularity and the ARFORGEN process. We don’t have the same structures in place that in the past have allowed us to cultivate mentoring and coaching, so we’re going to have to work through that.

We had great discussions recently up at the West Point Senior Conference about why we stayed in the Army. What lit our fire? What we were really doing in that exercise was describing the act of emulation. If you find someone you want to be like when you grow up, so to speak, it’s much easier to follow a path that will get you there. If you’ve got a way to cultivate relationships that allows emulation, then I believe you have a recipe that will allow the profession and its values to permeate organizations. So I think first and foremost it’s in that context that leaders are able to influence the behavior of their organizations.

Secondly, we just have to enter into a discourse about our profession. We can’t take it for granted. We have to encourage, coerce if necessary, discussions within our ranks and within each cohort. By cohorts I mean officers, noncommissioned officers, warrant officers, and civilians. We need to collectively discuss what it is that makes us a profession and then encourage self-examination to help us understand whether we’re living up to it.

Then we need to reinforce our commitment to the profession through our policy, doctrine, and leader development. We have to make some revisions in our evaluation reports, in our promotion board guidance, and in other ways that provide an assessment of whether or not we’re reflecting the values of our profession. In other words, we can talk about it, but unless we place value on it and that value is reflected in promotions, advancement, and selection for command, then the discourse I described won’t much matter. To me, it’s some combination of personal conduct and setting the example ourselves while we in turn emulate the professional values of those we aspire to be, so it becomes an unbreakable cycle. It’s also encouraging this discourse but not without following through to find ways to reward professional ethic behaviors in our promotion and selection processes.

You’ve described why now is the time to focus on the profession, but what makes the Army a unique profession?
General Dempsey: First and foremost, I always remind audiences broadly that the Army can do a lot of things, but it must do one thing on behalf of the Nation. It must have a monopoly on violence. It must have a monopoly on the use of force. That’s the foundation. Lethality, if you will, is the foundation on which everything we do must be built, but lethality brings with it incredible obligations and responsibilities. And I think it’s in understanding those responsibilities that we find the ethic, that we find the ultimate requirement for character. Although it probably goes without saying, you simply do not want men and women who lack integrity, who lack character, who lack a sense of belonging to something greater than themselves wielding the instrument of force.

So what makes us unique is not only what the Nation asks us to do, but also the very values derived from that tremendous responsibility. We’re unique because the stakes are much higher for us than they are in other professions.

What do you believe will come from this renewed emphasis on the Army profession? For example, as TRADOC commander, do you foresee future changes to training programs and doctrine?

General Dempsey: I’ll answer that, but first let me describe what we plan to do to emphasize the profession over the next year or so.

We’re starting with a white paper that the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic and the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth are collaborating on. The intent is for that white paper to be the catalyst for the discourse we want to have about our profession. To expand the discussion farther and wider, we’ll use social networking—everything from blogs to Twitter to Facebook to whatever it happens to be—to begin to gain an appreciation for what the profession thinks about itself against this kind of benchmarking white paper.

From there, we’ll encourage senior leaders and stakeholders who own those processes you described—the doctrine, training programs, as well as organizational development, leader development, and personnel policies—to adapt them as required because they all reflect and affect our profession. For example, our personnel policies on command tour lengths or on professional military education are important. We have to examine whether we have the proper incentives. Are there disincentives? All of these things affect this thing we call the profession. What we want to do is expose what we’re doing well because we’re doing a lot of things well. But we also want to know what we’re not doing so well. With that gap analysis we want to take a DOTMLPF [doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities] look and then decide what we should do and what we can do. We will likely decide to do some things immediately. Others might have to be deferred because of the pressures of the current fight. But we need to understand it.

In describing my current concerns, I’d say that I sense some “weak signals.” My instincts born over 36 years of service are telling me that we’ve got some challenges that we need to address. In this first year or so, we’ll take time to understand the problem, to frame the problem, and then we’ll endeavor to make the adjustments we need to make.

Are there any other insights you’d like to share as you go forward?

General Dempsey: I’m always alert for ways to bring these issues alive for people, make it something tangible and understandable. To make
changes in a big organization, you have to appeal not only to reason but also to emotion. Generally speaking, people will accept your rationale but may not change because they haven’t been captured emotionally by what you’re asking them to do. So I think one of the challenges we’ve got is to bring it alive. I’ve been looking around a lot to find examples of why we should change. When I say change, by the way, particularly when we’re talking about the profession, there are many things we do that are enduring and must endure, but there are also some things that we are asking our profession to do differently.

I think probably the word adaptation or adaptable as an attribute has always been somewhat important, but in the context of an operating environment that’s largely decentralized, I think that adaptability becomes more important. Today it’s more important for a young captain to be adaptable than when I was a young captain. So what we’ve got to do is figure out how we get at that earlier as we develop our leaders.

Secondly, we’ve got to figure out what it means to decentralize. Decentralization has become a kind of unquestioned good. It’s in our joint and Army doctrine. We talk about pushing responsibility and authority to the edge. We talk about enabling the edge. My concern is that as we push capability and authority and responsibility to the edge, with it we’re also pushing all the risk. In pushing all the risk to the edge, at some point we begin to rub uncomfortably against one of the foundational aspects of the profession: trust. Because when we’re pushing all the risk to the edge and holding junior leaders accountable for failure, we may not be sharing that failure with them back up the chain of command. As failures occur, and they will, we begin to erode trust, and when we begin to erode trust, we begin to erode the profession.

That’s another reason why I think that now is the right time to conduct a comprehensive assessment of how these things intersect. One is our profession. One is this idea of leader development more broadly. Not just professional development, but leader development in general. Then there’s this issue of decentralized operations and what they mean to our profession and to the development of the leaders who will lead the profession.

But I mentioned trying to find some examples to bring it alive. You may have noticed that I walked into the room reading. What I was reading was a New York Times editorial by David Brooks called “Drilling for Certainty” that describes the crisis with the [April 20, 2010] oil well explosion in the Gulf of Mexico. The piece makes note that at the end of the day, the event was caused by a combination of failures. It was a failure of processes and a failure of systems. But most importantly, it was a failure of imagination and a failure in leader development. Because what engineers and corporate executives apparently failed to appreciate is that they were asking their subordinates to deal in increasing complexity. The act of drilling at 5,000 feet was exponentially more difficult than drilling at 1,000 feet. As complexity was building and risk was accumulating, they continued to push that risk to the platform. We can learn from that.

We’ve said that the operating environment in which we ask a leader to perform is complex, but we make some linear assumptions about it, and in so doing we assume that it’s manageable. Yet I think we’ve learned and continue to learn that risks and complexity are exponentially growing over time. If that’s the case, then the example of this catastrophe in the Gulf can potentially inform our thinking about leader development.

In terms of images that may help us understand our challenge, that’s a pretty good one. PRISM
An Interview with Jim Webb

Are we better at protecting our national security today than we were 10 years ago?

Senator Webb: Certain things are better. For example, our intelligence systems are much more advanced. Tactically, our people have adapted well to different situations, first in Iraq, and then in Afghanistan. But in terms of protecting national security, we’re really talking about national strategy. And if you look at where we are in terms of our national strategy—that involves economic policy, overall strategic forces, and how you connect and communicate to the rest of the world—here we have a lot of issues to address.

One is our vulnerability economically, with respect particularly to China, in terms of trade and how that impacts our diplomacy and our military operations. I have been talking about this for 20 years as this situation has evolved. I wrote a piece for the Wall Street Journal in April of 2001 basically warning that we were reaching a tipping point in terms of how vulnerable we are when our economy reaches a certain level of reliance on trade with a country, particularly one with a different economic and ideological system. We’ve held hearings on these issues in the Foreign Relations Committee—I chair the East Asia Subcommittee. We just recently saw in the Senkaku Islands, a sovereignty dispute between Japan and China that I was warning about 4 years ago.

So in terms of our ability to deal with the terrorist threat, per se, I think we’re really doing a good job. In terms of our overall national strategy, the economic vulnerabilities that we have, and the composition of our strategic forces, I think we could do a lot better. Look
at the size of the Navy right now; its floor for strategic planning is 313 ships. The Navy is now, I believe, at 288 combatants. When I was commissioned in 1968, we had 930 combatants. It was a different era, with different types of ships, but we went from 930 down to 479 post-Vietnam, and we got it up to 568 when I was Secretary of the Navy; now we’re back down to nearly 290. That is our strategic presence around the world. So the question requires a careful answer. We tend so often to focus on the tactical issues of the day, particularly when we’re committed on the ground, but we have to understand the larger vulnerabilities that we have as a nation.

**We are face to face with China in Africa. Should we be doing more strategically in Africa?**

**Senator Webb:** The Millennium Challenge Corporation [MCC] is an interesting case; MCC was designed to provide American tax dollars for infrastructure projects, particularly in Africa, without the money getting lost inside the governmental structures of these countries, which frequently have problems with payoffs and corruption. We discovered a couple of months ago that a significant amount of the MCC money was going to Chinese-owned companies. We were looking at the MCC in Mali specifically. I immediately wrote the head of the MCC saying no taxpayer dollars should be going to fund state-owned companies, particularly Chinese state-owned ones, as a part of this process. We got a commitment that will be taking effect, I think, at the end of October when they’re going to stop doing this. But it shows how strategically careless we have been with this mammoth governmental process in terms of protecting our own interests.

**We have made a lot of executive branch changes over the last 10 years, most notably the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and a proliferation of interagency processes. Does more need to be done in terms of restructuring the executive branch to be more effective in responding to national security challenges?**

**Senator Webb:** First I salute Secretary [of Defense Robert] Gates for having the courage and wherewithal to state that we need to reexamine DOD [Department of Defense] structure. I wouldn’t want to presuppose a result, but the first step is to have a proper analytical model to evaluate what we have today. That wasn’t done with JFCOM [U.S. Joint Forces Command], and that’s why we asked for hearings before deciding to dismantle the command.

I made a comment last week about the process—and this gets to what you’re talking about because the bureaucracy of DOD has grown and grown since 9/11. I would want to start with an analytical model from year 2000 baseline up to 2010 in terms of all 10 of the combatant commands and see where growth has occurred. Then we should start examining in a structural way how we can downsize rationally. I’m not saying we need to preserve any one command at the expense of any other command. We need to be able to show in a very specific way the analytical model that was being used and why we made the decisions we made.

**What about the architecture for interagency collaboration: the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, DOD, the National Security Council and how they interact?**
Senator Webb: It is, as you know, very personality-driven—driven by relationships. It depends who the National Security Advisor is and who the principals are in terms of how they relate. My reaction is that they seem to be functioning well together. Structural changes are ways to get around the realities of process, personnel, and personal interaction. That's something that's pretty well driven by the President—any particular President, how he uses his Cabinet, his National Security Advisor.

The Project on National Security Reform [PNSR] proposed certain legislative changes. It argued that the committee structure reinforces stovepipes between foreign affairs and defense and between appropriations and authorizations. PNSR argued for a change in the way the committee structure addresses national security issues. Do you agree?

Senator Webb: Let me give you a different take on that. This is my third tour through government. I've spent most of my professional life in the private sector; I have 4 years Active duty in the Marine Corps, 4 years as a committee counsel in the House 1977–1981, and then 5 years in the Pentagon (1 year as a Marine and 4 as a defense executive 1984–1988), and now I'm a Member of Congress. I'm comfortable with the structure of the committees in Congress. My greatest surprise in the Senate was the lack of true oversight by Congress of the executive branch. It's one of the major objectives that we have in this office—to rebalance the two branches. After 9/11, everything was moving fast; the money was moving so fast that DOD went off on its own inertia unchecked. I started from 2007 forward asking prototypical management questions: how do these things work? I'll give you a couple of examples. There are two problems to be addressed in terms of congressional structure. One is whether Congress has the wherewithal to reassert its proper position and its proper role, and the other is the relationship between the authorizing committees and the appropriating committees. The authorizing committees, for instance the Foreign Relations Committee, just stopped authorizing. And that gives too much power to the appropriations side, where we don't really get the right sort of policy hearings.

When I mentioned oversight with respect to the executive branch, I think this is what's happened. People [in Congress] have confused a requirement for a report with what real oversight means. So the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs comes in with a thick book of reports and says, “I have to deliver to you every year a stack of reports this high.” I said to him, “Show us the ones you don't think are appropriate.” A lot of times people in the agencies think they've solved a problem by submitting a report, and as you know, paper doesn't solve a problem. With true oversight—like we had in 1977–1981 and 1984–1988, when I was on Caspar Weinberger's staff and then Secretary of the Navy—agencies would not dare cross authorizing committees because they would be reined in. There was great respect between the two branches, and I don't see that now.

When I came to the Senate in 2007 I saw—I'll give you two data points here because you'll see where I'm going—I read in the Wall Street Journal that San Diego County was protesting a facility that Blackwater was going to use to train Active-duty Sailors how to go room by room, or compartment by compartment, to determine if there were unauthorized persons on their ship. I wrote Secretary Gates a letter; I asked him: Was this ever specifically authorized by Congress? Was there any paper trail? (The Navy's training
contract had a ceiling price of nearly $64 million.) Was it ever authorized or appropriated in specific language, and, quite frankly, how have we reached the situation where a private contractor should be training Active-duty people how to do their job? It would be like Blackwater teaching me how to patrol when I was going through Marine Corps training in Quantico years ago. And we got stiff-armed. It's just like, "I'll have someone talk to you about it." We got a non-answer. And I said, "All right, I'm holding up all civilian nominations from DOD until we get specific answers."

Then they started talking to us, and the answer was that there was never any specific authorization. In other words, Congress never reviewed the use of these funds. They moved hundreds of millions of dollars of O&M [Operations and Maintenance] money through the appropriations committee to the Navy. I was told that such contracts had to exceed $78.5 million before they would be reviewed by the Service secretary. So without specific approval from Congress, they could kick these things off as long as the cost was $78 million or less. They called it "needs of the service/O&M money." We've been working with DOD to get a more rigorous management model in place for senior-level oversight of such outsourcing contracts. That's example number one.

Now we have the proposal to close JFCOM. My way of coming to positions is to try to go from the data to the answer. Emotional arguments are best made through facts; examine the data. I've done years of work inside the Pentagon; I know where the numbers are. I said, all right, let's look at the OSD staff, JCS staff, the Service secretary staff. Give us the data models—how many people were on these staffs in 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and today? That could be answered in a day and would give us a structured way to engage in the discussion. We're still waiting. We sent them a notice yesterday that if I don't get the data, we're going to hold up DOD civilian and flag and general officer nominations again. That's what's happened in the breakdown of the process.

The Foreign Relations Committee has an important role to play. I chair the East Asia Subcommittee, and I spend a lot of time in East Asia. We can have discussions that go beyond simply military discussions, and on occasion we can pull the issues into the Armed Services Committee, like the planned realignment of Marines from Okinawa to Guam.

You mentioned Secretary Weinberger a minute ago. Does the Weinberger Doctrine, also called the Powell Doctrine, still have any relevance? Should the kinds of thresholds described in the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine still determine when we should apply military force, or is that outdated?

Senator Webb: I think you have to define what you're doing in terms of use of force. In the situations that we're in right now, these are campaigns—they're long campaigns—and their strategic validity can certainly be debated in terms of how we're using our people. I don't think that it's the same thing they were considering. Weinberger was very much the driver of that doctrine; I was on his staff when they were doing it. The year I was in Vietnam, 1969, we probably had in 1 year at least twice as many dead as we've had in all 10 years in both the Iraq and Afghanistan engagements combined. In 1969, we lost 12,000 dead in that 1 year, and 1968 was worse.

It's not low intensity if you're in it, but in terms of national policy, it's a long campaign. So we have to shape the use of our military
to national strategy, not to one enunciation of one doctrine or another. So I know where Weinberger was going with that, and I fully agree that we need to be able to articulate the end point of what we're doing, which has been a big problem in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I actually wrote an article for the Washington Post in September of 2002, 6 months before we went into Iraq, and said, “Do you really want to be there for the next 30 years? You need to be able to clearly articulate your exit strategy.” And they don’t have one. It’s hard on the people who are doing this, it’s hard on the country—we’re burning up a lot of money. This was one of al Qaeda’s strategic objectives: to burn us out economically. So the real question with respect to the Weinberger Doctrine is that we have to follow our national interest in terms of massive use of force. If we define the war in Iraq as the decapitation of the Saddam Hussein regime, it was over very quickly. But then we went into this interminable occupation, which I do not believe we should be involved in. The question for us is how can we get out of there—what’s the process we should use to get out of there without further destabilizing the region. It’s a delicate process; I don’t think we should keep 50,000 troops in Iraq.

Over the last 10 years, the military has started going into some nontraditional military mission objective areas, perhaps because of the lack of civilian manpower, or strength, for example, conflict prevention, development, and stabilization. Do you think these are appropriate roles for the military?

Senator Webb: I lived in that environment as a Marine in populated areas in South Vietnam. Almost all of the villages in the area I was in, the An Hoa Basin, were what they called “Category Five” villages; Category A was completely government-controlled, Category E was completely Vietcong-controlled, and Category Five was politically hopeless. These zones had free-fire zones—that didn’t mean you could shoot anyone that moved, but it meant you could get your artillery without having to go through political clearance.

But every day in this environment where you’re making moral decisions, you’re up against a civilian population that is very, very similar to what you have in Afghanistan right now—very similar in that mindset. When you’re in that environment as a young military leader, a part of what you’re doing is unavoidably those sorts of things you’re talking about. You have to try to connect. We did MEDCAPS [Medical Civic Action Programs]; we’d take care of stuff. It is wise that the young military leaders get the training so that they can carry on some of that environment, to connect and survive in the places that they’re operating. In the long term, though, on the larger scale, that should be something the State Department does.

We talk about the “three Ds,” diplomacy, defense, and development, as co-equal. If those three elements are co-equal in status, shouldn’t the three governmental departments leading each of those three elements be co-equal in status?

Senator Webb: I’m not sure I accept the premise that they are co-equal. In terms of importance to national security, they are co-equal, but not in terms of resources. You have to deal with all three in order to get the desired end result. So I would say in terms of access to the decisionmaker, you need to have all three at the table, no doubt about that.
Do you see any future for the concept of the national security professional as opposed to professionals from different agencies? That is, some title called a national security professional and taught at a national security university?

Senator Webb: You can do that with the right kind of cross-fertilization that we're seeing right now. I'll give you an anecdote. When I returned from Vietnam, I was stationed at Quantico. I had spent all these years reading the strategists, you know, the great makers of modern strategy, studying the history of national defense and warfare, etc. I was 24 years old, and I suddenly said to myself, “I am a military professional,” which is very similar to what you're talking about here.

I was assigned to Officer Candidate School, so I’d go over to the Breckinridge library and get every book I could get and read it, just a part of what I believed was my duty in order to be able to advance and eventually be in a position where I could affect policy. It didn’t happen in uniform. I think that’s endemic to our system; I’m not sure you would need to teach it in a separate place. PRISM
An Interview with
William E. Ward

As the first combatant command to embed the 3D [diplomacy, defense, development] concept in your structure, what would you say are the impediments to better integration between civilian and military agencies?

General Ward: I don’t know if impediment is the right word. As our experience continues with respect to planning and understanding the various cultures in the planning process, we are getting better; and the integration will continue to improve. Once you get things going on the ground, the integration at the tactical level tends to be very good. The diplomatic, defense, and development professionals want to make it work. So our planning effort to get to effective integration is what we need to continually reinforce. It’s a function of how the various organizations do that work; the culture of planning that the military brings is from a unique perspective, as is the planning culture of USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development]. How we bring those distinct cultures closer together at the initial stages of planning is where we need continued improvement.

Do you have adequate civilian personnel at U.S. Africa Command [AFRICOM] to achieve that improved 3D integration?

General Ward: At AFRICOM headquarters we would like as much 3D integration as possible, but because of resourcing constraints and staffing levels, we don’t have the civilian complement we need to do that as effectively as I would like. For example, we have a very thin layer of USAID professionals who can be made available to us at AFRICOM. But Secretary of Defense [Robert] Gates, [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] Admiral [Mike] Mullen, other geographic commanders, and I are actively supporting increased civilian capacity with our interagency partners so that those additional
resources for personnel, for manning, and for staffing become available in the future.

**How would you characterize the differences between military planning culture and development planning culture as you’ve experienced it?**

**General Ward:** I’m not very familiar with the development planning process, though working together with development professionals is helping the military to better understand those processes. The military planning cycle is very deliberate. The military decisionmaking process is a very deliberate step-by-step process that in a crisis mode has to be compressed and accelerated. When you compress and accelerate [the process], a lot of assumptions are made, and under duress many things have to be done that may not have been anticipated. Those assumptions and decisions must be socialized throughout the interagency, but often at very high speed. Increasingly important to the military is how our activities are affecting the overall environment, and how we understand that environment. We need to improve in this area. The more we work together, the more our deliberate processes will become accessible to our partners; and at the same time we will increasingly have the flexibility to bring into our military processes awareness of our partners’ planning cultures because we know they have an impact on what we do. We haven’t been doing this together very long, but the good news is the more we work together, the better we will get at it.

**One of the things you hear quite a bit about at AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart is Phase Zero planning. Would you elaborate a bit on AFRICOM’s experience with Phase Zero?**

**General Ward:** Phase Zero operations are not totally new; the concept has been around for a while in a formal way. This is the business of doing things day to day that are designed to promote stability in a proactive way as opposed to having to react to a crisis. Phase Zero might seem to imply the first step toward Phase One, Two, and so on—the first step in a process that will continually move forward. In my mind, we should always be doing Phase Zero work, even in the midst of more kinetic activity as in Phase Two; we should still be doing the sorts of activities that put in place and support the elements of stability. The constant application of these soft power tools to reinforce success and to help maintain stability is crucial.

**Could you describe some AFRICOM activities that you would describe as Phase Zero?**

**General Ward:** I would include our multiple engagement activities with our partner nations to build increased capacity and professionalism in the military through officer development. I also include those things we are doing in conjunction with our other governmental partners in the developmental area—things that the local population view as clearly to their benefit. For example, I would include those activities where we play a supporting role in humanitarian projects or medical civic action projects, or veterinary civic action projects done in conjunction with local authorities. These types of activities combined with teacher education, professional medical training, and building of appropriate facilities are Phase Zero activities that help create conditions to reduce the local population’s susceptibility to outside agitators. We also support agricultural development, not as the lead agency, but in a way...
that is supportive of others’ efforts. That’s why understanding the full picture of what’s being done is so important—so that we can be inside the planning process of those activities we can add value to.

Those are some examples of Phase Zero activities. It’s those steady state military-to-military engagement activities that we consistently engage in—helping to build stable security structures so that the partner nations can provide for their people’s security. But it’s also those broader developmental activities where our participation can add value and help achieve the objectives or complement what’s being done by our interagency partners.

**Have you encountered any resistance from civilian agencies when AFRICOM has engaged in these kinds of activities?**

**General Ward:** Yes, but it’s less and less the case. Because once we sit down and communicate clearly our understanding that we don’t see the military in the primary role, but in a complementary or support one, and we find ways to work together, the resistance ends. It could be simply transportation—you need to get from point A to point B. Maybe we can provide that assistance. So as you have dialogue about your programs and you find ways where we might be able to support, that angst, that suspicion goes away. Where there is a reluctance to engage with the military, it’s often because of a lack of understanding. So you establish a relationship, you establish a dialogue, you find where there are common lines of operation, if you will, supporting lines of operation, and we fill those in. This is even increasingly the case with the NGOs [nongovernmental organizations].

As to USAID, I can’t say our relationship gets better every day, but it’s improving through working together, and there are fewer skeptics who want nothing to do with the military. We are day by day reducing that anxiety, reducing that misunderstanding, reducing that suspicion, reducing that reluctance to work together. We at AFRICOM certainly are respectful of our USAID and other nongovernmental partners. We understand that in certain environments if you are seen as working with the military, your security might be at risk. I think NGOs and civilian partners increasingly see themselves being threatened regardless of that and are beginning to see the advantages of working together. Yet understanding those who might have that concern, or where we can’t find ways to be supportive, we’ll certainly not push, not impose, not dictate, and not direct. I believe there is a growing comfort and desire to work together because there is growing understanding that there are things we can do to assist them as they carry out their jobs. And that is what we want to be able to do, to work as partners.

**Do you think that the Soldiers who join up thinking “we’re here to fight and win wars” accept these nontraditional roles, such as conflict prevention, as opposed to warfighting?**

**General Ward:** Oh, absolutely. The thing about today’s force—the young men and women we have the privilege of serving with today—they get it like no other. This is a flexible, versatile, agile force. They understand the difference; they also understand the positive role that they can play in both the warfighting and conflict prevention arenas.

**In the 2 years since AFRICOM was formally established, would you say the**
**General Ward:** Our partners traditionally think of themselves as the dedicated combat and command force that’s there solely to engage in military activities. As a result of our increased mil-to-mil activities, we’ve been able to devote attention and time to them, listening to them, determining what sorts of things are important to them. They seem to want to become more capable of providing for their security, protecting their borders, working in regional cooperation with their neighbors. And as we have exhibited our interests transparently, and they have seen a benefit to them from this association, there are requests for more mil-to-mil engagement and coordination. In fact, I met with several African ambassadors just the other day, here in Washington, DC, and got absolutely no questions about why AFRICOM exists or why we’re doing what we’re doing. It was all about what more can we do. Now there’s clearly a desire for engagement with us—with AFRICOM and with the United States more substantially. And that desire to work with us is evident around the continent, including the island nations. Our ability to engage is only impacted by our foreign policy objectives for the various countries, the regions that are there, and the availability of resources given where we are in today’s global situation with the employment of forces in other parts of the world. As those things change and partner nations come to us with additional requests for interaction and engagement, given resources being available and a foreign policy that supports engagement, I think we will see continued activity in the mil-to-mil engagement area.

**General Ward:** I think so, yes. I think the message has been that the United States is serious about partnering with you as a partner—as an equal partner—listening to your thoughts, listening to your desires, listening to your objectives, and then integrating those as best we can; and having a command that is focused only on Africa provides that type of clarity, vision, and purpose. AFRICOM is not distracted by other things that in past times were prioritized by the three commands covering Africa at the expense of Africa.

**How do you mitigate the risk that the African militaries that AFRICOM supports and assists might turn on their own civilian leaderships, or worse, their own people?**

**General Ward:** That’s why the integration of the 3Ds is so important. Military-to-military work can’t be done in a vacuum. That’s why it’s a part of the totality of our engagement, along with the diplomatic and development pieces. I don’t control or command those military forces. That’s where the diplomatic work comes in; the political leaders of our partner nations are working with our diplomatic and political leaders. State intent, state purpose . . . the sorts of things that are important from a civilian control of the military perspective help ensure that the work we do is in fact being used in ways commensurate with legitimate military activity. Therefore the integration of the defense business with development and diplomacy is critical. And when this integration is effective, you help achieve the position that you have trained.
forces that support order and good governance in a society. That’s why it has to be done hand in hand. That’s why the integration of all 3Ds is so critical.

Have you seen signals from any African militaries of an interest in helping to develop their own countries economically?

General Ward: Sure, absolutely. In fact, all our civic action projects seek to reinforce that; for example, whenever we do Civil Affairs projects, we always encourage the partner nation’s military to be side by side with our military so that the people see their militaries working on their behalf and for their benefit. Many of the nations see their military institutions as a substantial element in their development projects. Engineering comes up quite often—they help with some of the infrastructure work that needs to be done in the countries. That is an increasingly important consideration being taken by the partner nations as they look at what their militaries are and the role that their militaries play in their societies.

Are there specific country cases where this is actually taking place, where the local military is getting involved in the national development program?

General Ward: Liberia is one case. There are clearly cases where some of the East African armies—Kenya and Uganda, for example—play significant roles in disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. These are clearly roles that these countries see as appropriate for their militaries. More African leaders than not see such roles as appropriate for their militaries. There is very little hesitation for the countries to call upon and use their militaries when it comes to disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, but also in some cases more routine developmental activities as well. Engineering units getting involved in agricultural projects is pretty widespread throughout the continent.

Again, that is one of the goals of our Civil Affairs program: to let partner militaries know that these are appropriate roles and doing so in ways that support overall country objectives. When they see our guys doing Civil Affairs work, and especially when we are partnering side by side, their populations see it as well. This reinforces the notion that their militaries are there to be their protector as opposed to being their oppressor, which has been the situation in many of the nations of Africa for many years. The military was seen as predators of the people as opposed to being there to protect them.

If not officially AFRICOM’s headquarters on the continent, the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa [CJTF–HOA] is certainly the command’s biggest presence on the continent. How would you characterize its evolution since its early days as a capture and kill operation?

General Ward: Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa is still focused on countering violent extremism and still focused on helping to create the conditions that reduce the potential for extremism to take hold. It’s working through our various civil action programs and delivering the sort of benefits to the people—to the local populations—by the work being done with the Country Teams and USAID. Our efforts are supporting an environment that is less hospitable to outside negative influence. The people see things being done on their behalf by their legitimate government and by others who also care for them. So you have
the CJTF–HOA doing this in their operational area, predominantly the area in East Africa, that’s focused on these mil-to-mil engagements that are helping to reinforce the positive contributions being made by those nations’ militaries to provide for their security, to secure their borders, and to protect their populations.

**What do you see as the emerging national security threats to the United States on the continent of Africa right now? What’s on the horizon?**

**General Ward:** The thing that we are most concerned about is stability across the continent and the potential threat from undergoverned or ungoverned spaces that create opportunities for those who would seek to do us harm to come in and exploit for training and recruitment. Some of our programs in East Africa and in North Africa are designed to address just that; where you have internal instability governments transitions can cause more instability. In this age of global society high levels of instability have indirect and sometimes direct impact on us. When we see upcoming elections in unstable countries, we recognize the possibility of violence that could negatively impact us. Here again is an example of the importance of the integration of the 3Ds. We are involved in elections but we rely on our diplomats to help create the conditions for successful elections. AFRICOM certainly encourages the militaries in those countries to behave appropriately, to stay apolitical, not to get involved in political competition. Our training reinforces that as the proper role of a military in a democratic society—not being involved in political competition. We do things to address the potential threats from transitions in unstable environments and from ungoverned spaces.

I also see environmental issues as potentially threatening to stability, and thus to us. Energy and water shortages and natural disasters where huge populations are impacted all have the potential to contribute to instability. There is also the connectivity between Africa and South America with respect to drug trafficking. The drug trade often comes from South America, through Africa, up into Europe, and back to the United States. All of these are things that I see as threats. How we work with our various partners to help counter those threats is the work not just of my command but also other parts of our government, as well as the international community.

**Can you foresee any realistic scenario that might result in significant U.S. combat forces on the ground in Africa?**

**General Ward:** Not that I can envision today. We have some partnerships such that some great humanitarian disaster could result in requests for U.S. military help and assistance. That is certainly a possibility. The President is the one who makes that decision based on the circumstances. If huge innocent populations were threatened with violence, international powers could decide that we won’t allow that harm to occur—then some kind of intervention could take place. I don’t see anything on the horizon, but should something like that occur and the President or other decisionmakers decide to intervene, we would clearly be in a position to do our part and react accordingly.

**How do you assess the risk to U.S. interests posed by China’s growing involvement in Africa?**

**General Ward:** China is clearly in Africa pursuing its national interests in ways that are
typical of how China does business. We’re there as well in a way that makes sense to us—hope-fully in ways that will promote long-term sta-

bility in Africa from a security point of view, as well as from a developmental point of view and diplomatic point of view. Where we have common purposes with China, such as stability, good governance, professional security forces, and effective police, borders, customs, and judicial systems, working with anyone who shares those purposes makes sense. I’ve heard many policymakers say that. We’re not in Africa compet-

ing with China or any other nation; we’re in Africa to do what we can in pursuit of our national interest in a more stable continent. We pursue our national interest in an African stability that enhances our stability at home and helps to protect our people both at home and abroad from threats that might emanate from the continent of Africa. And so to the degree we can work with China or any other country in pursuit of those common goals or objectives, we would seek to do that.

But do you think we might be losing influence in Africa, relative to China, in terms of major power politics, grand strategy?

General Ward: I don’t see it that way. I think that the nations of Africa pursue their own interests. They will partner with whoever is partnering in ways that are conducive to their interests. We need to continue our activities and partner with them because we are still welcome across the continent by and large in most places. Our economic and development support activities such as the Millennium Challenge Account, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and various other projects and programs are still welcome and deeply appreciated. Our security assistance, engagement, and involvement are still welcome, and we just need to do our best to participate when we’re asked, where we’re asked. Given the resources to do that, we will continue to be a country that African countries will seek to partner with. I believe that’s the case today, and will be the case in the future as well.

But do you think we might be losing influence in Africa, relative to China, in terms of major power politics, grand strategy?

How can the forces assigned to AFRICOM, both civilian and military, prepare better for the assignments that they’re going to take on, both at headquarters and in the field?

General Ward: Actually, AFRICOM doesn’t have any assigned forces. We have components—an Army component, naval component, air component, and a Marine component. Special Operations is a subunified command. We talked about the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa. Our men and women, both military and civilian, come to work either at headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, in one of the components or the subunified command, or go to work on the continent as a part of some exercise, some program, or multilateral engagement. We want them to enter those contexts with a better understanding of culture, the environment, the history, so that our activities are informed of and by the local environment and cognizant of the traditions in the local area. Language skills and appropriate cultural orientation are important so that our men and women who work with our African partners approach them from a perspective that reflects more than just our own perspective. One of our objectives is to ensure that anyone who goes to the continent and works with our African partners approach them from a perspective that reflects more than just our own perspective. One of our objectives is to ensure that anyone who goes to the continent and works with our African partners approach them from a perspective that reflects more than just our own perspective. One of our objectives is to ensure that anyone who goes to the continent and works with our African partners approach them from a perspective that reflects more than just our own perspective. One of our objectives is to ensure that anyone who goes to the continent and works with our African partners approach them from a perspective that reflects more than just our own perspective.
At AFRICOM headquarters, for instance, we have routine programs bringing in speakers, authors, and scholars to help give us the understanding that we need. We use cultural anthropologists to help us better understand the environment and the culture, so that when we go to a particular place on the continent we know specifically about that place. It’s a big continent with 53 nations, and vast subcontinental regions. Each is different, and so in each case, having specific orientation and cultural insight helps us better understand the context and do things that are in keeping with the traditions, the norms of that location, as opposed to our own purely, uniquely American point of view.

What advice will you give your successor? What is the biggest challenge he is going to face, what to look out for or what to prioritize?

General Ward: I don’t think I will tell my successor anything different than any commander would say to those who follow. Obviously it’s a dynamic environment. Have your senses about you, build relationships so that you understand better where you are operating. Be sensitive to those things we talked about earlier—the potential sources of instability and how you work to mitigate or contain them. How to bring resources to bear to help achieve our objectives are things we will have to always pay attention to. I think building on where we are is important because as I mentioned, the command has done some pretty substantial work helping to create an environment where our African partners know that we can be trusted and that they can rely on us. That’s because we’ve listened to them. Maintaining that as we go down the road is important. Let’s not start over from scratch, but build upon what we’ve accomplished in this regard.

Obviously the specific programs and activities will reflect the crisis of the day. Yet while there will always be a crisis of the day, we have to keep our eye on the long term. We have to keep our eye on the 20-, 40-, 50-year timeframes, and provide the sustained engagement needed to create the environment our African partners have told us they want to create—a more stable environment where peace and development can occur. In the end, it is that development that produces enduring stability in these societies: determining how we the military can continue to be a contributing factor, working with the other parts of our government and the international community and our host nations to move toward this objective. These are the sorts of things my successor will be faced with, and bringing all of that together is the job that the Nation asks of the commander. PRISM
An Interview with David Petraeus

Recent polling shows that two-thirds of Americans do not believe the war in Afghanistan is worth fighting anymore. What makes you think it is worth fighting?

General Petraeus: 9/11. I think it is important to remember that the 9/11 attacks were planned in Afghanistan by al Qaeda when the Taliban controlled the bulk of the country and that the initial training of the attackers was carried out in Afghanistan in al Qaeda camps prior to them moving on to Germany and then to U.S. flight schools. And it is a vital national security interest for our country that Afghanistan not once again become a sanctuary for al Qaeda or other transnational extremists of that type.

In your prepared statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, you said that the core objective is to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a sanctuary for al Qaeda. What makes you think that a Taliban-led Afghanistan would permit al Qaeda to return?

General Petraeus: First of all, they did it before. History does show that there is a strong connection between the Afghan Taliban, or the Quetta Shura Taliban, and al Qaeda. We know that there is a continuing relationship, and we think there is a strong likelihood—especially if al Qaeda is under continued, very strong pressure in its sanctuaries in the tribal area of Pakistan—that it is looking for other sanctuaries and that Afghanistan will once again be attractive to it.

Beyond denying Afghanistan to al Qaeda, what do you believe are our responsibilities to the Afghan people with respect to the kind of state we leave behind?

General Petraeus: To achieve our core objective in Afghanistan, we need to enable it to secure itself and to govern itself. It is up to...
Afghanistan to determine how to operationalize those concepts, particularly with respect to governance, and I think we can be reassured by developments in that regard as reflected in their constitution—for example, the fact that there are 10 percent more women in their parliament than there are in the U.S. Congress, and that 37 percent of the 8.2 million students in Afghan schools this school year, this academic year, are female. By the way, that contrasts with virtually none during the Taliban time when there were less than a million in school overall. There are also many other areas in which there are progressive steps that have resulted from the new constitution and the new Afghanistan.

Do you believe that we have any ongoing commitment or responsibility to ensure that there is forward progress in democratic governance once we leave militarily?

General Petraeus: To be candid, I think that is probably a topic for the policymakers. Having said that, I do think that since stability comes from a government that is representative of and responsive to the people, we would like to see those characteristics resident in Afghan governance.

If counterinsurgency depends on legitimizing the host government, why do you think the Karzai government will endure our departure when it is largely perceived as corrupt, ineffective, and unable to effectively protect the civilian population?

General Petraeus: The Afghan government is developing the capability to secure itself, and it has made considerable strides in that regard over the course of the last year in particular. But, again, it has been working at this for a number of years. As I mentioned on Capitol Hill, it is only in the last 6 or 8 months that we’ve gotten the inputs right in Afghanistan to conduct the kind of comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency campaign necessary to help our Afghan partners develop the capability to secure and govern themselves. With respect to some of the other challenges that face the government, I believe that President Karzai is very focused on dealing with the issues of criminal patronage networks that threaten the institutions to which we will need to transition tasks in the years ahead. I have seen steps already taken in that regard, such as with the firing of the Afghan Surgeon General, the relief of the military chain of command of the National Military Hospital, the replacement of governors, chiefs of police, and so forth.

With respect to those illicit connections and patronage networks, do you think that continued access to substantial revenues from the poppy crop will compromise the accountability of the security forces to the state and government, as it provides them an alternative income source?

General Petraeus: In areas where there is Afghan governance and Afghan security, there has been considerably reduced poppy cultivation. The Afghan government is serious about reducing the poppy crop. It is serious about the illegal narcotics industry. It recognizes that there cannot be the establishment of rule of law if the major agricultural crop produces illegal export goods.

Can enduring stability and security be achieved in Afghanistan while the Taliban and Islamic extremists have relatively safe sanctuary in Pakistan?
**General Petraeus:** Clearly, anything that Afghanistan’s neighbors do to reduce the activities of groups causing problems for Afghanistan is beneficial for the country. Having said that, there can be considerable progress made in Afghanistan, especially if reintegration of reconcilable insurgent members develops critical mass and sets off a chain reaction through the country, so that senior leaders sitting in Pakistani sanctuaries call up their cell phones and high frequency radios and don’t get any answer from the fighters on the ground.

**Do you think that you could do a better job in Afghanistan if you had the concurrence of Pakistani authorities to be able to engage in hot pursuit over the border?**

**General Petraeus:** I don’t think anyone is seeking the ability to conduct ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] ground operations or U.S.-only ground operations on Pakistani soil.

**Unlike in Iraq, which has a reliable stream of revenue, do you see a need for long-term international financial support to maintain the Afghan security forces?**

**General Petraeus:** As the Australian prime minister noted when she was in Washington, and as a number of other troop-contributing nation leaders have noted, Afghanistan is going to require sustained support even beyond the 2014 goals established at the Lisbon summit. Having said that, the levels of support should be substantially reduced and the character of support should substantially change in the years ahead.

**What is needed in Washington and in the field to ensure unity of effort in a counterinsurgency operation? Do you have that in Afghanistan?**

**General Petraeus:** I believe we do. What is needed is civil-military coordination, the achievement of unity of effort among all of those engaged in the effort, regardless of department or agency, or country for that matter. We have 48 troop-contributing nations active in Afghanistan, and some other major donors like Japan. There is a Civil-Military Campaign Plan in Afghanistan now that helps enormously to coordinate the activities of civil and military elements, to synchronize the effects that they are seeking to achieve, and so forth.

**And are you getting today what you need from the civilian agencies of the U.S. Government?**

**General Petraeus:** We are, although there has never been a military commander in history who would say that he wouldn’t welcome additional civilian assistance, or frankly a variety of other augmentations and resources or funding authorities, bandwidth, as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

**Do you think that we are going to need the kind of interagency capacity that we have developed over the past couple of years, in the post-Iraq/Afghanistan era?**

**General Petraeus:** I do. I can’t envision necessarily where we will employ it. There may be periods during which we need less of it than we need right now with the two major operations ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as some new endeavors unfolding. I definitely think that there will be a need for the kinds...
of partnerships between civil and military elements that we have forged over the course of the last 10 years.

*How do we ensure that the lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq this last decade are preserved and institutionalized and internalized for the future?*

*General Petraeus:* You try to capture them by lessons learned organizations, in journals such as PRISM, in books and edited volumes and conferences, in schoolhouses, in doctrinal revisions, in leader development courses, and in the collective training centers—every component of the military term *DOTMLPF*: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities.

*So that’s how to do it. Do you have any fear that we might not do that? That we might just recoil from this engagement the way that we did after Vietnam?*

*General Petraeus:* No, I don’t actually. I think there is a clear recognition that there will be a continuing need for capabilities to respond to efforts that require civil-military partnerships.

*What impact does our ongoing commitment to Afghanistan have on our ability to respond to other challenges that may be of equal or even greater threat to our national security?*

*General Petraeus:* I think that we’ve actually reconstituted reserves over time in the past year or so, as we’ve been able to draw down in Iraq, in particular, even as we have increased our forces in Afghanistan. We have expanded the pool of certain elements that are described as high-demand, low-density, as our forces have grown in endstate as well.

*In the positions that you’ve been in over the last decade, what would be your advice to the civilian agencies right now, as they are looking at their future? The U.S. Agency for International Development, for example, or the State Department or Justice Department?*

*General Petraeus:* It would be to get to know the appropriations committees on Capitol Hill even better than they already know them. PRISM
Notes


2 Most of the arguments presented here apply equally well to other capabilities rapidly fielded in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (for example, biometrics and forensics, U.S. Agency for International Development funds, counterthreat finance cells, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and the Human Terrain System).

3 There is no formal definition of Quick Reaction Capability. It has entered Defense Department discourse as a means of describing a capability fielded in response to an urgent operational needs statement.

4 Administrative guidance for the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds is found in “Money as a Weapons System Afghanistan,” U.S. Forces–Afghanistan Publication 1–06, Commanders Emergency Response Program SOP, updated February 2011, 2. This document does not offer guidance on how to use CERP to greatest effect.

5 Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) is the designated Significant Activity reporting tool of record in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.

6 Each entry supports specific reporting requirements.

7 See, for example, Patterson and Robinson; Berman, Shapiro, and Felter; Moyer.

8 “Money as a Weapons System Afghanistan,” 2.

9 Memorandum for Record Addressing Fiscal Year 2011 CERP Guidance from Commander, Regional Command–East.


11 There is a field in the CIDNE CERP database in which practitioners can identify primary and secondary effects.

12 “Money as a Weapons System Afghanistan,” 2.

13 Our foundational data-gathering effort has initially focused on the Regional Command–South and Regional Command–Southwest areas of operation.

14 “Money as a Weapons System Afghanistan,” 2–3.

15 General Richard B. Myers, USAF (Ret.), was 15th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He currently holds the Colin L. Powell Chair for National Security, Leadership, Character, and Ethics at the National Defense University.

In 2003, did you believe that Iraq posed a clear and present national security threat to the United States?

General Myers: The fact that everybody thought Iraq had WMD [weapons of mass destruction] made [it] a threat because of the nexus between WMD and violent extremists. If you had known that Saddam Hussein did not have WMD at that time, according to the Powell Doctrine, among the questions you should ask before committing troops are “Is there a vital national security threat? Is there a clear and obtainable objective?” And “Is there broad international support?” Do you feel that you had a clear objective?

General Myers: It’s interesting that some-one, especially someone who was in the military when he did that, thinks that you can establish...
a “doctrine” for the President to follow. The President makes these decisions. You can have it in the back of your mind that “Okay, we better have a pretty clear mission here before,” but the President in the end will decide, and the President may decide that’s not important. I think those are good principles—great principles actually. And I think we did have a pretty good way forward, but you have to remember in all this we can have the best way forward in the world, but we are just one part of the equation. There are other parts of the equation that you don’t have any control over, and you can think about it and so forth, but in the end, the other variables play a part, too. We had a plan with an end in sight, and it turned out to be more complex. Here we are 10 years later. We are where I thought we’d be earlier, but still a place where they have a constitution; they’ve elected a government. It’s not the government we would necessarily pick, but they’ve started the process we wished them to start.

There was a State Department effort prior to the invasion, the Future of Iraq Project. Why was that plan not brought in or not used as a template for building a plan or used as a stepping stone?

**General Myers:** That’s a good question. I don’t know. What we often find in the U.S. Government—at least in this particular case—is that there were a lot of bodies, not at the Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell levels, but below that, where there was an attitude of “anything coming out of Defense, we don’t want to hear about,” or “anything coming out of State, we don’t want to hear about.” Not with the military; this is civilian to civilian, bureaucracy to bureaucracy, below the level of the principals, but it goes on and that’s not helpful. That’s one of the issues I think we have in our government. We don’t have a good mechanism to focus all of our instruments of national power on a problem. You can argue, as I did as Chairman, that in Iraq the military instrument would be predominant in the early stages of major combat and perhaps early stages of stability and reconstruction, but then these other instruments of national power—the diplomacy, economic, informational—have to play their roles as well. It’s really frustrating that we couldn’t harness these in a way to focus more effectively in Iraq.

And do you believe that was because of institutional rivalries?

**General Myers:** It’s a combination. There are clearly some in our government who did not buy into what was going on in Iraq, and there were also departments and agencies that were not well-resourced. Let’s think about this for a minute: the Department of Justice was picked to “go stand up a new judiciary inside Iraq.” They don’t have people sitting around the Justice Department with their bags packed ready to go to a worldwide contingency. That’s not what they do. Their focus is on the United States. So we were asking Justice to take people out of their domestic responsibilities for a foreign mission. No doubt that important departments and agencies that were clearly some in our government who did not meet, the Department of Defense would know. We are, as the facts bear out, terrible at helping nations in appropriate ways, and to meet, the Department of Defense would be given “priority comparable to combat operations.”

**General Myers:** I think traditionally they have for not many reasons. I was on a State Department group that Secretary [of State Condoleezza] Rice organized to look at what she called transformational diplomacy. What you find out quickly is that they need more resources, but their relations with Congress are not as robust as, for instance, the Department of Defense’s relations with Congress. So there isn’t the continuing dialogue to articulate the need. Since I’ve left office, I think State Department has been plussed up with a considerable amount of personnel and probably budgets as well. My guess is that it is still not sufficient, though, for what they ought to be doing in the world. That’s going to be hard, especially in difficult fiscal circumstances.

In November 2005, after you had left the Joint Staff, the Department of Defense issued Directive 3000.05, which stated that stability operations are a core U.S. military mission and shall be given “priority comparable to combat operations.” It then went further to say that whatever requirements the civilian agencies could not meet, the Department of Defense would develop internally—everything from the city planner to the training of the judiciary. Do you think such roles are appropriate for the U.S. military?

**General Myers:** If you are going to be effective at those types of tasks, you have to be educated and trained. It’s hard to believe that we have military members with a lot of extra time to learn another skill set who would be better at it than someone who has developed and worked with these skills in the private sector. The military can do that—we’ve filled in a lot of places. We had artillerymen and privates developing town councils based on what they learned in high school civics—I’ve talked to them. It’s a great thing, but not a perfect thing. It’s a great thing that they were so enthusiastic. It’s a great thing the Iraqis were enthusiastic about their guidance as well. And as one said to me up at Walter Reed [Hospial], “Well, in any case, I knew a lot more about it [civics] than they did.” Which is true. Apparently, he paid attention to it in high school. But that’s not the way it ought to be done. If that’s the way we are doing it, I’m not going to criticize it, but I think whoever does it should be educated and trained in the task. Otherwise, we are not going to be effective.

Do you think it likely the United States will be involved in major stabilization and reconstruction operations involving substantial troop deployments in the near future?

**General Myers:** That’s impossible to know. We are, as the facts bear out, terrible at being able to see what’s around the corner. If you are talking about military capabilities and you are the President of the United States, from whatever party, you require a spectrum of response capability from all-out conflict to helping nations in appropriate ways, and you need people trained and ready. But when we look at the issues that are confronting some of these countries, there are a couple
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When they stood up the Coalition Provisional Authority [CPA], it was supposed to be manned with civilians. I know it wasn’t fully manned well into its existence, but even a year after [L. Paul] Bremer pulled out, I don’t think it ever got fully manned. It was the military that had to fill in the gaps—partially because the agencies were not making it happen and partially because of resource constraints in the civilian agencies. If it takes all the instruments of national power to succeed, the civilian agencies have to be resourced in a way that will allow them to do that.

In these uncertain economic times, do you believe the civilian agencies will be able to get the resources they require to play the role that you describe?

General Myers: I think traditionally they have not for many reasons. I was on a State Department group that Secretary [of State Condoleezza] Rice organized to look at what she called transformational diplomacy. What you find out quickly is that they need more resources, but their relations with Congress are not as robust as, for instance, the Department of Defense’s relations with Congress. So there isn’t the continuing dialogue to articulate the need. Since I’ve left office, I think State Department has been plussed up with a considerable amount of personnel and probably budgets as well. My guess is that it is still not sufficient, though, for what they ought to be doing in the world. That’s going to be hard, especially in difficult fiscal circumstances.

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Do you think it likely the United States will be involved in major stabilization and reconstruction operations involving substantial troop deployments in the near future?

General Myers: That’s impossible to know. We are, as the facts bear out, terrible at being able to see what’s around the corner. If you are talking about military capabilities and you are the President of the United States, from whatever party, you require a spectrum of response capability from all-out conflict to helping nations in appropriate ways, and you need people trained and ready. But when we look at the issues that are confronting some of these countries, there are a couple
of characteristics that they have in common. For one, they have a huge youth population and usually poor economic situation. I don’t know if there is a role for the military, but there certainly is a role for the developed world to help these nations develop in a way that makes them viable international players without fomenting extremism along the way. Economic issues and huge unemployment can certainly spawn extremists and that will have to be part of any grand strategy.

The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States stated that America is threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones. Do you believe that’s still true today?

**General Myers:** That’s a good question. I think the greatest threat to America today is from nonstate actors. This doesn’t mean nation-states are no longer a threat, but in isolation. I think the more immediate threats are the nonstate actors. But 19 terrorists carried it off. We still must pay attention to those nation-states that have state-on-state conflict; that’s clear. But I think it’s something we have to discuss around the National Security Council table to decide if our vital national interests would be threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran and where that nuclear potential might wind up.

I’d like to go back to the point you made about the tension between agencies as we were going into Iraq. Another of the goals of the 2002 National Security Strategy was to transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century. Fast forward to today—10 years and a couple of trillion dollars later—do you think that we’ve done that?

**General Myers:** My personal opinion is that the national security apparatus that we have today is an outgrowth of the National Security Act of 1947. Though it has been modified five or six times, it is still an act that was born out of our experiences of World War II. So, I say flippantly, that we are perfectly modified five or six times, it is still an act that was born out of our experiences of World War II. So, I say flippantly, that we are perfectly organized for the 21st century, what would your guidance be?

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**General Myers:** Yes. So how does that bode for the security of Israel when Hezbollah has the backing of Iran which is a terrorist-supporting state? It’s not a good sign.

Given what we know of Iran’s possession of WMD, do you think there is a rational argument to be made for a military strike against Iran?

**General Myers:** I thought initially probably not. Certainly any concept of U.S. boots on the ground in Iran is not appealing. But I don’t think we can take a military response totally off the table when we are considering all the ways we can deal with the current problem. If the United States and the international community were to decide that a nuclear-armed Iran was a threat to our vital national interests, then certainly military action should be on the table. But it’s an evolution of discussion and thought to come to that point.

Then we would have to ask the military, “What can you do, what impact would it have, and what would be the consequences? Can you assure us that through strikes you can delay [Iran’s nuclear] program by 1 year, 2 years, 3 years or just 1 week?” Then our decision might be different depending on the answers and anticipated ramifications. What is the potential for Iran to make it difficult to get oil out of the Persian Gulf—which would bring the world economy to its knees? All this would have to be considered. I don’t think military action is something we can just dismiss. I think it’s something we have to discuss around the National Security Council table to decide if our vital national interests would be threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran and where that nuclear potential might wind up.

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**General Myers:** There has been some great work done by Jim Locher and others who have looked at this. I did not participate in that work [the Project on National Security Reform], but I know some of the folks who did. They have given serious thought to this question. In my book, Eyes on the Horizon, I offered a solution that might be tenable that is not new bureaucracy-building. You can’t say the President is in charge because the President has a lot of things to be in charge of. Right now he’s worried about our economy, he’s worried about our economy, he’s worried about jobs, he’s worried about health care; there are a lot of issues on his plate in addition to national security. He can’t be the one who is responsible and has the authority. Somewhere that has to be delegated. I think the threat from violent extremism is sufficient that we should have somebody in charge who has the responsibility and authority to work with the other departments and agencies. Not the tactical control. I’m not saying, “You need a platoon of tanks at 12th and Maine in Baghdad.” But in developing the strategy and ensuring the resources
of characteristics that they have in common. For one, they have a huge youth population and usually poor economic situation. I don’t know if there is a role for the military, but there certainly is a role for the developed world to help these nations develop in a way that makes them viable international players without fomenting extremism along the way. Economic issues and huge unemployment can certainly spawn extremists and that will have to be part of any grand strategy.

The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States stated that America is threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones. Do you believe that’s still true today?

**General Myers:** That’s a good question. I think the greatest threat to America today is from nonstate actors. This doesn’t mean nation-states are no longer a threat, but in terms of the ones that are the most immediate. It took 19 people to attack us on 9/11, and that has dictated our actions for 10 years. More than 19 in terms of planning of course, and that has dictated our actions for 10 years. It took 19 people to attack us on 9/11, which is a terrorist-supporting state. It’s not a good sign.

**General Myers:** Yes. So how does that bode for the security of Israel when Hezbollah has the backing of Iran which is a terrorist-supporting state? It’s not a good sign.

**General Myers:** Given what we know of Iran’s possession of WMD, do you think there is a rational argument to be made for a military strike against Iran?

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**General Myers:** My personal opinion is that the national security apparatus that we have today is an outgrowth of the National Security Act of 1947. Though it has been modified five or six times, it is still an act that was born out of our experiences of World War II. So, I say flippantly, that we are perfectly organized for World War II, but we are not particularly well organized for the 21st century. We see that in the way that we’ve dealt with the current conflicts. I used to ask people who they thought was in charge of our efforts in Iraq or in Afghanistan. When I talked to civilian audiences, they’d often say, “Oh, well, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld or Secretary Gates.” I would say, “Oh, so he’s in charge, he’s responsible?” What authority does he have over the State Department, National Security Council, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, Homeland Security? What is his authority there?” The answer is that he has no such authority. So how can you put someone in charge if we’re talking about all the instruments of national power focusing to solve a problem when this person “in charge” doesn’t have complete authority? We don’t have a system that provides a belly-button, or even two belly-buttons, to allow you to say, “They’re the ones responsible and they have the authority.” You just can’t say that about our government in the current conflicts.

If you were to advise on how to evolve our system, in order to be a more national responder to the challenges of the 21st century, what would your guidance be?

**General Myers:** There has been some great work done by Jim Locher and others who have looked at this. I did not participate in that work [the Project on National Security Reform], but I know some of the folks who did. They have given serious thought to this question. In my book, Eyes on the Horizon, I offered a solution that might be tenable that is not new bureaucracy-building. You can’t say the President is in charge because the President has a lot of things to be in charge of. Right now he’s worried about our budget; he’s worried about our economy, he’s worried about jobs, he’s worried about health care; there are a lot of issues on his plate in addition to national security. He can’t be the one who is responsible and has the authority. Somehow that has to be delegated. I think the threat from violent extremism is sufficient that we should have somebody in charge who has the responsibility and authority to work with the other departments and agencies. Not the tactical control. I’m not saying, “You need a platoon of tanks at 12th and Maine in Baghdad.” But in developing the strategy and ensuring the resources...
are flowing to fulfill that strategy as well as the clout to make it happen. We don’t have a system like that.

Would you then propose something like a “Super-Secretary?” Someone with authority over multiple cabinet agencies?

General Myers: We could do it that way—somebody who doesn’t have a whole lot of staff. In the past, it has been fashionable to create a “czar” in the National Security Council. I have a real problem with staff being in charge of anything. We need somebody who is, I’ll use “in command” in the military parlance, somebody who is in charge and knows he’s in charge and has the authority to make things happen so he can be held accountable. When it doesn’t go right, we can say, “Hey!” the President says to the new person in charge, “I thought we were going to do this.” “We were, but Defense didn’t kick up their resources,” or maybe State. Somebody can start working those sorts of issues and then be responsible. I think the threat is sufficiently serious. I’m not just talking about Iraq and Afghanistan, but I think the threat is beyond those two places; they are merely the current issue at stake here.

Returning to the subject of Iraq, in retrospect what is your assessment of the decision of the Coalition Provisional Authority to dismantle the Iraqi Armed Forces?

General Myers: I think at the time it seemed reasonable, although that particular decision did not get a good hearing inside the Beltway. There was not a good discussion by the policy folks on that particular decision. My understanding was that it was a decision the CPA sort of preformed and just did it. You can argue it a couple ways: It was always the plan to keep the young conscripts around to do real work. On the other hand, there were a lot of generals in that army that could never be a part of what was to follow in Iraq because they had too much blood on their hands, most of them Sunni. That was never going to sit well with the Shi’as or Kurds. The CPA thought otherwise. I wish we’d had more of a policy debate of some kind, but CPA just did it.

It left us with a situation where we had to rebuild the Iraqi Armed Forces.

General Myers: We were probably going to have to do that anyway because the leadership was not going to be acceptable. A lot of the acceptable soldiers did come back. I don’t think the notion that we had a ready-made armed force was realistic if you are talking about conscripts; their hearts weren’t in it. We were going to have to invest in a lot of training anyway, and equipping, because they didn’t have much. When it was all said and done, we took care of a lot of it.

In Afghanistan, we are rebuilding the Afghan National Security Forces. The military side seems to be going fairly well. The law enforcement side doesn’t seem to be going quite as well. Any insights as to why it seems more difficult for us to train law enforcement forces than a military force?

General Myers: We’re not used to training law enforcement. That’s traditionally a State Department task. Right as I was leaving office, the President decided that the Department of Defense would have that mission in Iraq because we were already doing the training, and we were the ones who were frustrated that it wasn’t going as fast as it should be going. It’s a skill set normally brought in from the international community and usually from those countries that have national police forces. Part of the problem is that police are local. Your army and air force are probably not. Once police are trained, they go back to a local setting within the corruption and local pressures, even though they are newly trained and enthusiastic, remain the same. They are pressured to do things that perhaps aren’t the right things. I think it has a lot to do with geography. It ought to be the national police forces providing local security in both countries, not the army, which should be focused outward. Unfortunately, we seem a long way from that.

Some people have argued that we’ve lost a lot of time in Afghanistan. Do you think that our preoccupation with Iraq from 2003 to 2008 set us back in Afghanistan?

General Myers: I’m not sure if I agree with that. Certainly we were concerned about Iraq and gave it a lot of attention. On the other hand, look what was happening in Afghanistan, at least up to about 2008; a constitution was adopted, elections—secure enough to be fairly peaceful elections. President [Hamid] Karzai was a pretty good president, and the Taliban were not a threat to the central government. The question was, to me at least, whether we would be in a big hurry in Afghanistan and spending a lot of U.S. resources. We were training at a pretty rapid pace anyway, but should we double that? I think the allocation of resources between Iraq and Afghanistan was about right. I don’t know when the intelligence kicked in, but our intelligence never told us that the Taliban were regrouping and that they were going to be a threat to the central government pretty soon. All of a sudden they were, and we had to take different action.

You have to have some knowledge of what’s happening. If we didn’t have enough intelligence folks on the ground in Afghanistan finding out what was going on because they were all being utilized in Iraq, that’s a factor to consider. I don’t know. There was always this notion that I held that you want to help these countries, but you can’t do it all for them. It’s the old dilemma: How long and how many resources do I bring to their aid and when do I start withdrawing so they can stand on their own two feet? You have to consider the taxpayer in this, local capabilities and all that. When people say we just weren’t paying attention, maybe the intelligence wasn’t paying attention, but actually things in Afghanistan were moving pretty well by Afghan standards until the Taliban became a threat. I remember when I first heard the Taliban in resurgence, several years after I retired, I began thinking somebody’s not reporting this right because it just wasn’t anything I had ever worried about. But apparently the Taliban regrouped and became a factor to the point where we are experiencing large-unit conflict. More force-on-force than we’d had before which is kind of a new development this time around.

More force-on-force than in Iraq?

General Myers: I think so. Al Qaeda in Iraq would do things like they always do—it wasn’t force-on-force, squad-on-squad. In Afghanistan, you didn’t see this stuff early on. This time around, they’re better trained, they actually exhibit pretty good tactical prowess.
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General Myers: History tells us that most counterinsurgencies run 8 to 10 years or something like that. If we look at Vietnam, if we look at the last 10 years, if the importance of being involved can be described by our senior leadership to the American people in a way that makes sense to them, almost anything is possible, but it has to be seen in our vital national interest. President Bush and President Obama both said clearly that it is in our national interest to have a secure and stable Afghanistan; otherwise, we are going to see more of what we saw on 9/11. It’s up to the President to convince the American people that this is in our national interest and dedicate the resources to it. There is always a tension and there ought to be.

In situations such as Afghanistan and Iraq, do you think there is a blurring of the lines between combatants and noncombatants—as in “farmer by day, Taliban by night”?

General Myers: In any insurgency, we have that issue. That’s what makes fighting an insurgency so tough. It’s important for the United States, given our values and the way the world looks to us to uphold those values, but we have to be cautious when we go into combat in those kinds of situations—cautious in the sense that we need to avoid as much collateral damage and civilian deaths or injuries as we can. It is after all conflict, so it’s not always going to be possible, but it’s a special burden. All-out war is one thing, but this is a special burden when the enemy could be a child or a woman with bombs strapped to them. We have to make these judgments to show that we have this high set of moral values and at the same time carry out our duties.

Do you think that the laws of war themselves are in need of an update to be able to account for such nuances?

General Myers: Personally, no. I think they are adequate for the task. They put a huge burden on international coalitions in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and particularly on the U.S. military. Some countries are out front fighting, and some countries are keeping the fires at the forward operating bases burning. For those who are out front, it puts a huge burden on the young and middle-aged men and women; I don’t deny that. I think the law of armed conflict is appropriate. I don’t know how we’d change it. You wouldn’t make it easier to kill civilians, I don’t think. I think we can train and educate our people, and they’ve responded pretty well. So, no, I don’t think it will change.

What do you think is the future for complex operations?

General Myers: In the past, we had military operations followed by other things. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, there were phases where there were more military, but quickly within a matter of weeks, we needed to bring to bear all the instruments of national power. That’s why this whole idea of “Are we organized properly to develop that?” came from. I don’t think we’re going to see the sequential application of our national and international instruments of power. I see the trend going into the future of more simultaneous application of all instruments of national power, which means the planning capabilities between our various departments and agencies in this government and with our friends and allies need to be a lot more robust than they are today. PRISM.
Their [tactics, techniques, and procedures] are pretty good.

**How do you see the end of the Afghanistan War?**

**General Myers:** For me it ends when the Taliban are no longer a threat to the stability and security of the central government. There are always going to be Taliban around. The end is when the central government can deliver goods and services to the provinces without threat. A lot of that is up to Afghanistan; they have to shoulder the load. Right now there are lots of questions. Some say President Karzai can still do the job. Others have already dismissed him and that’s too bad. This kind of debate shouldn’t be taking place in public. If we are critical of the Afghan government, we ought to do it in private and be supportive to get them ready for their tasks. If we are successful in thwarting the Taliban to the point where the Afghan government doesn’t have to worry about its legitimacy and its ability to provide goods and services, that’s success. I think it will take a long time and we will be training Afghan security forces for perhaps a long time. I don’t necessarily believe its going to require the massive forces that we have there today. Having said that, one of the questions in all this is Pakistan. I don’t believe we are going to have a secure Afghanistan, one where we can steadily reduce our forces, as long as Pakistan is a safe haven for the Taliban. It’s just not possible in my view.

**Everything you read about counterinsurgency suggests that it is a long-term process and that it cannot be done in one night. Yet here in the United States we have a short attention span. Do you think we can ever be a successful counterinsurgency practitioner as a country?**

**General Myers:** History tells us that most counterinsurgencies run 8 to 10 years or something like that. If we look at Vietnam, if we look at the last 10 years, if the importance of being involved can be described by our senior leadership to the American people in a way that makes sense to them, almost anything is possible, but it has to be seen in our vital national interest. President Bush and President Obama both said clearly that it is in our national interest to have a secure and stable Afghanistan; otherwise, we are going to see more of what we saw on 9/11. It’s up to the President to convince the American people that this is in our national interest and dedicate the resources to it. There is always a tension and there ought to be.

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After a career at the Department of State, and now serving as Deputy Administrator at the U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID], how would you characterize the differences in organizational culture between State and USAID?

Ambassador Steinberg: I think the emphasis on cultural differences is overstated. There is a traditional assumption that State Department officers are striped-pants diplomats who are most comfortable working with foreign ministries and other government officials in capital cities, and that USAID officers are in cargo pants, getting their hands dirty working with civil society and grassroots populations in the countryside. To the extent that this stereotype was true in the past, the lines are merging these days under Secretary [Hillary] Clinton’s vision of an operational State Department and a fully empowered USAID. You will find many State Department officials in the field negotiating agreements at local levels, linking with lawyers’ groups and women’s organizations, and taking American diplomacy to the people. At the same time, you find USAID officials with Ph.D.s working with prime ministers, finance ministers, and foreign ministries in capitals.

The QDDR [Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review] and other documents define a multifaceted, team-based approach working under our Chiefs of Mission authority in which the State Department drives the diplomatic agenda and USAID drives the development agenda. We recognize that these roles may overlap, for example, insofar as diplomatic initiatives can promote development by engaging governments on issues such as creating the proper environment for trade and foreign investment, ensuring that all elements of society are engaged in establishing goals for
equitable and inclusive development, and so on. It’s all about maximizing the influence that we can have in a particular country or region, and using the proper tools for the challenge at hand.

*The development space is a lot more crowded, though, with the State Department and Department of Defense [DOD] working in areas such as security sector reform and public safety. How has USAID adjusted to that greater density of personnel from other agencies in the same space?*

**Ambassador Steinberg:** There are now more than two dozen separate U.S. Government agencies that have a role in the international development arena. While USAID accounts for just over half of the total development spending abroad, the Defense, State, Health and Human Services (including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), Justice Departments, and other agencies are significant actors as well. We welcome this engagement since it means greater resources, greater expertise, and greater capacity to contribute. The QDDR states clearly that the default position is that the USAID mission director serves as the Chief of Mission’s principal assistance advisor, and this means that USAID needs to coordinate the various types of development assistance flowing into a country. This involves USAID serving in an inclusive leadership role, where it drives mutually agreed upon development goals and empowers the priorities, talents, skills, and resources of other U.S. Government agencies. We’ve said for a long time that no agency has a monopoly on resources, on ground truth, on good ideas, or on moral authority.

There will also be times when USAID has to be an inclusive follower, where we use our skills and resources to support broader administration goals. This is especially true in conflict situations around the world where USAID’s role in supporting stabilization operations will be affected by the security situation. In these environments, we will continue to work with our colleagues from Defense and State in order to determine the best approach.

*How do you envision the relationship evolving between USAID and the State Department’s new Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations [CSO]?*

**Ambassador Steinberg:** The proliferation of conflict situations abroad makes it clear that there’s room enough for many actors in this space. Ambassador Rick Barton is uniquely positioned to lead the CSO bureau given his long history of engagement with U.S. Government agencies and international organizations. For example, in his role as Deputy [United Nations] High Commissioner for Refugees and his founding role in creating the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives [OTI], Ambassador Barton pushed processes that ensured collaborative approaches among civil society, donor and host governments, and international organizations. He understands that in pursuing the Secretary's vision of a more operational State Department response to conflict situations, we need to avoid redundancies and work respectfully toward common goals. At USAID we have, for example, within our Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, core capabilities to address prevention, response, and recovery in areas suffering from shocks or conflict.

Equally important, CSO will help ensure consistency and common purpose among the many State actors in this arena, including the Bureaus of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement; Population, Refugees, and Migration, and others.

Has USAID given thought to the problem of rapid turnover in the kinds of conflict-ridden environments that you are talking about? In other words, how do we get people to commit to more than 1 year?

Ambassador Steinberg: Absolutely. As a good example, in July 2011, Administrator Rajiv Shah launched a new 2-year pilot program, the AfPak [Afghanistan-Pakistan] Hands program. The basic principle of the program is to use our Foreign Service Limited Officers, who serve for up to 5 years, to develop specializations in the AfPak region. An officer will serve for a year in Afghanistan or Pakistan; return to Washington to work in a related area such as food security, health, or gender issues for that region; and then return into the field. In addition, we’ve already noted that about 25 percent of our officials in these countries are now requesting extensions. But I don’t want to underestimate the difficult challenge of dealing with these environments from a human perspective. I’ve served in a number of hardship posts, including the Central African Republic in my first tour and, more recently, as Ambassador in Angola from 1995 to 1998. I understand the physical and emotional effects of living constantly in insecure situations, hearing gunfire everywhere, watching aircraft go down, and witnessing colleagues being killed or injured. The last thing we want to do is subject our officials to psychological challenges like post-traumatic stress disorder or create family problems from overly lengthy assignments.

You mentioned the Foreign Service Officer and OTI as a well-known brand.

OTI is populated mostly by contract employees. Has USAID thought of creating a career path for the kinds of officers who work in OTI and are frequently deployed to these kinds of areas?

Ambassador Steinberg: We have a de facto system in effect in the form of a broad pool of personal services contractors who work for us time and again in these situations. We call quickly on these individuals, who have proven their capabilities in the field, when we need people for Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, or elsewhere. They have the skills we need, whether it’s in transitional justice, domestic governance, local government, or employment generation. This gives us the flexibility we need to get the right kind of expertise for stabilization and complex development environments when we need it. The system works well and we have quickly ramped up in a number of situations that required immediate attention. So if you go back to proven performers time and again, it’s very similar to having a dedicated corps.

Where is the Civilian Response Corps idea going? Is USAID actually developing a viable expeditionary capability? How are these people being deployed?

Ambassador Steinberg: Last year, the Office of Civilian Response at USAID deployed some 38 staff members to 27 countries around the world. They provided about 6,200 days of support in the field for efforts related to civil engineering, conflict mitigation, rule of law, logistics, administration, and other technical areas of expertise. It’s also important to have experts on gender given that women are both the primary victims of conflict and are key to
the successful conclusion of peace processes and postconflict reconstruction and reconciliation. The program has been very successful so far. In particular, our Civilian Response Corps demonstrated an immediate capacity to respond in South Sudan as the country was moving from an uncertain past to its referendum in January 2011 and its independence the following July.

Right now we have Civilian Response Corps supporting many crisis hot spots including Libya, Tunisia, Senegal, and Burma.

**The Civilian Response Corps originated in the lack of capacity to respond to the huge personnel needs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Do we now have a stepping stone toward that ultimate larger capacity, or do you think the corps has reached its maximum size?**

**Ambassador Steinberg:** We’re going to be expanding our operations in complex emergencies and transitional periods, but USAID is also taking our existing capabilities and linking them to ensure we are addressing the so-called relief-recovery-development continuum. The Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, where the Office of Civilian Response lives, is a good example. The bureau has nine offices that have technical expertise, teams, and funding essential to addressing response, recovery, and transition efforts, while keeping inclusive democracy and governance at its core. The Civilian Response Corps feeds into this model by providing surge personnel with the critical expertise needed to address crisis and transition needs.

In addition, we have to ensure a seamless transition where, from the moment you enter a humanitarian relief situation, you are already planning for postconflict, post-emergency situations and enabling sustainable development. To this end, we have organized a new initiative to focus on smart planning for areas of chronic crisis.

**DOD now has tens of thousands of personnel with extensive experience in areas traditionally thought of as within the development domain—such as infrastructure development, governance, public security, security sector reform, and even economic growth. How would you assess that asset and how does USAID work with that asset?**

**Ambassador Steinberg:** It’s important to remember the shared goals that we all have in supporting economic and political stability around the world. As Administrator Shah frequently points out, countries that are prosperous, well governed, and respectful of human rights tend to not traffic in drugs, weapons, or people. They don’t transmit pandemic disease or spew out large numbers of refugees across borders and oceans. They don’t harbor terrorists or pirates. And they don’t require American ground forces. Admiral James Stavridis [Commander of U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe] spoke to the USAID global mission directors’ conference last November, and he noted that the international community is not going to fight its way out of Afghanistan—we’re going to develop our way out of Afghanistan. So we all have a stake in international development.

That said, development is a discipline. Working under Chief of Mission authority, trained and experienced USAID officials are best suited to bring together the different elements of development in terms of a comprehensive approach toward good governance, human security, economic growth, development of civil society, and promotion of trade and investment.
These are complex paradigms that we need to pursue in a holistic manner. There is a key role for Defense in this effort, both in countries facing kinetic environments and in areas like security sector reform and demobilization of ex-combatants, but it is part of a larger environment where USAID helps drive the process.

**When we talk about the 3D approach, are we talking about three departments, three disciplines, or three principles?**

**Ambassador Steinberg:** We are indeed talking about roles and responsibilities when we discuss diplomacy, development, and defense, rather than strict tasks that conform easily to the State Department, USAID, and Defense Department, respectively. There will be times when Defense and USAID officials serve in essentially diplomatic roles, and the same can be said of development. During my career as a Foreign Service Officer in the economics cone of the State Department, I served as the development officer in several posts where USAID did not have a presence, such as the Central African Republic and Malaysia, and collaborated closely with USAID in places where they did, such as Angola and South Africa. I described before the security motivation for development, but there is also a key economic motivation as well. We are pursuing overseas development because it’s in our economic interest. Our fastest growing export markets today are former large recipients of development assistance, whether that’s South Korea, South Africa, Brazil, Taiwan, or India. This means U.S. exports, U.S. jobs, and opportunities for U.S. foreign investment. We have a real interest in these emerging countries, especially as we see declining growth rates in our traditional markets. One estimate states that 85 percent of the growth in U.S. exports in the next two decades will go to developing countries.

**Over the last 10 years, we’ve learned a lot. What is USAID doing to make sure that we can capture the lessons of the last decade?**

**Ambassador Steinberg:** The last 5 years in particular have been a period of real change for USAID. From 1990 to 2005, the agency lost some 40 percent of its staff, even as budgets were rising. USAID lost a lot of its capacity to serve as a development agency; in some ways, we became an assistance agency. In many cases, we sought contracts with large contractors or similar activities with nongovernmental organizations where they would not only do the projects but would also design and evaluate them. These groups are filled with talented, dedicated professionals who can serve as partners, but it must be USAID who drives the process. Furthermore, USAID ceased to have a planning division or a budget office. In addition, many of the larger initiatives in the development space were housed elsewhere. Whether that was the Millennium Challenge Corporation (set up as a separate entity), the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief set up at the State Department, the Global Climate Initiative, or the Global Health Initiative, USAID ceased to provide leadership for these Presidential initiatives.

In the last 5 to 7 years, this trend has reversed. We have now brought on about 850 new officers who are filling important gaps, and we’ve essentially returned to previous staffing levels. We have been asked by the President to lead the Feed the Future Food Security Initiative. We have established an Office of Budget and Resource Management that prepared USAID’s fiscal year 2013 budget to be
incorporated into the Secretary’s broader development budget, and we have created a Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning. The latter bureau is responsible for incorporating the lessons learned and best practices from USAID’s proud history into our development strategies as we move ahead. Already we have prepared a policy framework for 2011–2015 that spells out a new, better focused and concentrated set of priorities. We have developed strategies for dealing with climate change and education, and plan to release soon policies or strategies for countering trafficking in persons, gender issues, and water in the 21st century. In late 2011, we released a policy that addresses how we can use development to combat violent extremism and insurgencies around the world. We are once again a learning organization. We have reasserted our role as a thought leader in this space.

Equally important, we are working to empower our local partners—both governments and civil society—by channeling additional resources through those institutions in cases where we are certain they can transparently and effectively conduct effective programs. We are also reincorporating science, technology, and innovation into our development activities. This is all a part of the agency’s ambitious USAID Forward agenda.

**Is Congress giving greater strategic latitude to USAID than it has in the past?**

**Ambassador Steinberg:** It goes back and forth. Last year, fiscal year 2011, our budget contained directive language but fewer earmarks. For fiscal year 2012, we saw some backtracking: much of the “USAID should” language reverted to “USAID shall.” This affected primarily basic education and water and the Development Grants Program. Still, I think our relationship with Congress now is quite good. We’ve just completed a budget process for 2012 that essentially maintains our commitment to international development, which is quite impressive in the tough budget environment we face.

I might add as an aside that this total still represents less than 1 percent of the total Federal budget. Members and staffers on our authorizing and appropriations committees are extremely knowledgeable about development, committed to development priorities around the world, and have a sophisticated understanding of where our priorities should lie. As in all of Washington, the key is open and transparent communications, and making certain that we keep the number of surprises to a minimum. In the last year, Administrator Shah and I have had approximately 200 meetings with Members of Congress in both the House and Senate. We have a good understanding of their priorities, and, I like to believe, they have a growing confidence in our capacity to promote development while being responsible stewards of the taxpayers’ dollars.

In this regard, we all have to recognize that this is a new world in the development space. Official development assistance today makes up a small percentage of the total requirements for investment capital in developing countries. It’s instructive to remember that total U.S. official development assistance last year was about $30 billion. That is less than the $36 billion in funds that private American citizens gave abroad to support development and humanitarian relief. It is far less than the $100 billion that American residents sent to people in remittances and a fraction of the $1 trillion in private investments flowing to these countries.

In this environment, development assistance is no longer intended primarily to fill fiscal and savings gaps, but it must instead have a catalytic role. And so, we’re trying to encourage...
partnerships and innovative approaches and use our dollars to leverage assistance from foundations and private companies. We can also help reduce the risk associated with long-term development investments, use our convening authorities to coordinate with host governments, introduce new technological and innovative solutions, share experiences from other countries, and so on. Congress recognizes that the whole development space has changed. The fiscal year 2012 budget bill authorized enterprise development operations, loan guarantees programs, and debt relief initiatives—all of which are designed to take advantage of the vast resources out there.

Has USAID had a chance yet to reflect on the President’s new national security guidance that indicated that the United States would be pivoting toward Asia? What does this mean for USAID?

Ambassador Steinberg: Asia has always been a significant area of emphasis for USAID and will be even more so under the President’s guidance. We have active development, reconstruction, and humanitarian relief programs throughout the region, whether it’s Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Vietnam, the Philippines, or many other nations. The opening of Burma is particularly encouraging. We are also seeking to partner with the emerging powers of Asia on triangular development efforts, such as working with India to promote agricultural development in Africa. But the President has also made clear that USAID doesn’t have the luxury of focusing exclusively or even primarily on one region. We need to continue to alleviate disease and poverty, address illiteracy and weak governance, and promote sustainable growth in Africa; to consolidate political and economic transformation in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia; and to support the awakening in the Middle East by promoting socioeconomic systems that can deliver a transition dividend through jobs and economic growth. These are the challenges of a modern development enterprise. PRISM
An Interview with Álvaro Uribe Vélez

When you assumed the presidency in 2002, what was the overall condition of Colombia? Was it a failing state?

Uribe: I never thought that Colombia was a failing state, but during my first month as president, I was surprised by many international analysts. For example, people from the World Bank and other multilateral agencies came to see me saying, “Be careful because Colombia is becoming a failing state.” Colombia has long been a democratic state. The failures of the 1980s and 1990s were not because of our state but because of the advancement of terrorist groups attempting to defeat our democratic institutions in many areas of the country. By the mid-20th century, Colombia’s traditional political parties—the Colombian Conservative Party and Colombian Liberal Party—came to terms, putting an end to their historic violent confrontation.

During that period, however, [Fidel] Castro’s revolutionary movement in Cuba succeeded, and it chose two countries in which to replicate its revolution: Colombia and Bolivia. The irreconcilable remnant of partisan guerrillas in Colombia reinvented themselves as communist guerrillas. Colombia did not have a long period of peace. No sooner had the violent political confrontation ended then the new Marxist guerrillas opened fire. Later, communist violence resulted in the birth and growth of anticommunist self-defense groups. Both the guerrillas and self-defense groups were ultimately co-opted by narco-trafficckers. The vast majority of them converted into narco-trafficking mercenaries.

What we found when we assumed the presidency was a country with almost 30,000 homicides per year and with more than 3,000 cases of kidnappings—a country with 56 percent of the population living in poverty, with 16 percent unemployment, and a very low investment rate. This is what we found. But we also found excellent people in Colombia with whom to work.

Álvaro Uribe Vélez was the 58th President of Colombia (2002–2010).
VÉLEZ

When you assumed office, approximately what percentage of Colombia was under the control of the insurgents?

Uribe: I would not say “under control of the insurgents,” but I would say “in anarchy” because of the advancement of violence: two-thirds. The other third was in danger of falling into anarchy.

What were the root causes of the conflict of the 1980s and 1990s?

Uribe: During that time, the dominant cause was narcotrafficking. I remember the political agitators used to say, “If Colombia widens its democracy, we are going to cease. We are going to stop our cause.” In 1988, our constitution adopted a popular direct election of mayors, and later on, the 1991 constitution brought the popular direct election of governors.

In 1994, I was the second governor to be elected in my province of Antioquia. But the question is this: How well did Colombia succeed in widening democracy? Instead of dropping their guns, guerrillas began to threaten mayors, to coerce them, to penetrate mayors’ offices and the political system, to rob their wallets. Pablo Escobar even became a member of Colombia’s congress, though by the time of my election to the Senate, he had been chucked out by our armed forces.

It’s sometimes said about people like Pablo Escobar and other drug kingpins and warlords that they provide social services for the people in their community—public safety, soccer teams, stadiums, and other things that the government doesn’t provide. It is an excuse. It is not uncommon that criminals want to legitimize their actions. Many times they do what they think they need to do to win community support. But the vast majority of Colombians have never supported these criminals.

What was your first priority when you assumed the presidency?

Uribe: Because I was the first president elected with a platform based on establishing security, my pledge to my fellow Colombians was: “If I am elected I will fight day and night, every minute during 24 hours a day, to restore security, but security with democratic values and to promote investment as a source of the resources we need to advance social cohesion.”

Did you attempt at first to negotiate with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [FARC]? Or had you already made a decision that there was no point in trying to negotiate with the FARC?

Uribe: No. When I was elected, Colombians were already fed up with failing negotiations. I said the only way for me to renew this process is if they would accept one condition: to cease any criminal activity. If they didn’t accept this condition and cease all criminal activity, my government couldn’t undertake negotiations with them.

What were the basic principles and objectives of the democratic security policy?

Uribe: In Latin America, there was an idea that any proposal to bolster security was a way to support dictatorships. In Colombia, many politicians were feeble on security. What I proposed was security with democratic values—I call it Democratic Security Policy. But not only security, but security in the company of two oth-
Security is a democratic value. There is a strong link between security, democratic institutions, and of course human rights. Security is a prerequisite for the development of resources. This is the link between security, investment, and social cohesion. Coming back to the relationship between security and human rights, I have always said that we need security as a long-term vision for Colombia. In a democratic society such as Colombia, the only way for people to support security in the long term is by making security credible. And credibility depends on effectiveness and transparency. Transparency needs order and respect for human rights. And we did our best to protect human rights and to not sanction any abuse of human rights.

**Did you have a timeline?**

**Uribe:** No. Many times I was asked about a timeline, and what I answered was: I cannot promise when we are going to solve this problem. My pledge was that I would devote all my energy day and night to lead this effort.

**How did you reconcile the competing and sometimes conflicting imperatives of human rights and security?**

**Uribe:** Security is a democratic value. There is a strong link between security, democratic institutions, and of course human rights. Security is a prerequisite for the development of resources. This is the link between security, investment, and social cohesion. Coming back to the relationship between security and human rights, I have always said that we need security as the long-term vision for Colombia. In a democratic society such as Colombia, the only way for people to support security in the long term is by making security credible. And credibility depends on effectiveness and transparency. Transparency needs order and respect for human rights. And we did our best to protect human rights and to not sanction any abuse of human rights.

**What was the division of labor between the police and the military?**

**Uribe:** This was quite difficult because the problems were as serious in rural areas as in cities. We couldn’t apply a strict division. The original division was for the military to protect our borders and the police to secure our cities. We couldn’t stick with this. We had to involve the military in the fight against narco-trafficking, and we had to involve the police in our fight against terrorist groups such as guerrillas and self-defense groups. Regarding the involvement of the military in the fight against narco-trafficking, there have been discussions in Colombia and in Mexico. I have two practical conclusions and one theoretical approach. The practical conclusion is that during the years before Colombia engaged the military, narco-traffickers expanded and finally penetrated some sectors of the military itself. Secondly, attacking the criminal power of narco-trafficking requires the involvement of the military. My theoretical conclusion is that we were instilled with the belief that the military was created to protect national sovereignty and that the risks are coming from external threats. But the only risk for sovereignty was coming from terror threats—not from distant lands but a domestic threat in the rise of narcoterrorists. Narcoterrorism can be so powerful that it has the ability to undermine the state and to inflict huge damage to our democratic institutions. And when someone undermines the state and damages the institutions, it is the beginning of the destruction of sovereignty. It is important that we think of resorting to the military in order to protect sovereignty, not to think exclusively in terms of external threats. We must think of the necessity to confront domestic threats against sovereignty such as the threat of narco-trafficking, and this led to engaging the military in the war against narco-traffickers.
Is it fair to say you consider the collusion of narcotics networks with terrorist networks and insurgency networks to be not just a law enforcement problem, but an international security threat?

Uribe: Of course, of course! Weakening institutions could gradually eliminate the state. First, these networks eliminate the supreme power of the state. They then reduce the state to a formal state without the capacity to impose the law. And when you have the formal state without effective powers, the state begins to dissolve.

Did restoring the police presence throughout the country result in problems within the judicial system, such as having people arrested by the police but not being tried quickly and effectively by the judiciary?

Uribe: Sometimes there were complaints on these cases, but the general outcome of taking the police to every place in Colombia was that we began to restore security. And the more we advanced security, the more autonomy the judges could reestablish in every city, in every place. I have said that our policy got some intangible results and intangible outcomes. Let me mention two. We restored the monopoly of law enforcement to the state. There were self-defense groups that had been created to fight guerrillas. We recovered the state monopoly to fight the guerrillas, as well as self-defense groups—to fight any criminal. Second, we restored the monopoly of justice. Attorneys, judges, and prosecutors had been displaced in many parts of the country, and they had been replaced by eager guerrillas or self-defense groups. With the presence of the police throughout the country, we could restore this key element of the rule of law—the monopoly and administration of justice.

How did you deal with corruption when you found it in the government?

Uribe: We had a rule. When our government complied with this rule, things were going on fine. When our government did not comply with this rule, things were going on badly. What was the rule? I said: We in government should be the ones who detect corruption, denounce corruption, impose sanctions against corruption, and punish corruption. We cannot wait for the opposition, for the media, to come here to detect corruption and to blame our government. When my administration fully complied with the rule, everything was fine. In cases where corruption was denounced by outsiders, by the media, by the opposition, my administration, instead of accepting the problem, went after the problem and punished those responsible.

One of the elements of your Democratic Security Policy was to reestablish a strong connection between the population and government. How did you balance the requirements of winning the hearts and minds of the Colombian people with the counternarcotics policies of eradication and criminalization?

Uribe: First, I believe in the necessity of equilibrium between participatory democracy and representative democracy. Representation without participation is without legitimacy. Participation without representation becomes anarchy. Therefore, we need this balance. Second, through sincere participation and sincere dialogue, people become much more confident in their institutions. This permanent dialogue we had with our communities during
What role did Plan Colombia play in the improvements in the country’s stability and security?

*Uribe:* It was a very hard time. At the beginning, it was economically important. Nowadays, it is not. While Plan Colombia has a [U.S. Agency for International Development] commitment of something over $300 million per year, Colombia’s security program value is somewhere over $11 billion each year. But in the year 2000, at the beginning of my administration during the years 2002, 2003, and 2004, it was very important economically. Politically, it has been always important. We received a lot of support, for instance, gathering intelligence. And the United States made two important decisions. I am always grateful that, first, President [George W.] Bush made the decision to reestablish air bridge denial in my country. It was effective for us to track and interdict illicit flights. The second decision made by the United States was to allow various authorities to sell Colombia smart weapons. These led us to a tipping point in our battle against the guerrillas.

Politically, it has been always important. We received a lot of support, for instance, gathering intelligence. The United States made two important decisions. I am always grateful that, first, President [George W.] Bush made the decision to reestablish air bridge denial in my country. It was effective for us to track and interdict illicit flights. The second decision made by the United States was to allow various authorities to sell Colombia smart weapons. These led us to a tipping point in our battle against the guerrillas.

Much of Plan Colombia was military-to-military and law enforcement assistance. Did economic development assistance in Plan Colombia make any significant contribution?

*Uribe:* No. Although in the narrative of Plan Colombia there were aspects directly going to the economy, solving the problems of impoverished communities was made by the...
Colombian government. We expanded the chapter of social cohesion. The idea was to interpret security as a source of resources. When we promote investments and provide investors with security, the economy prospers. With prosperity, you can have more resources to increase social cohesion. If at the same time, people perceive that their lives are improving because of the social policies, this chapter of social cohesion becomes a validator for the other two main policies: security and investment. Therefore, security with democratic values, investment, and social cohesion made up what I call the triangle to restore confidence in my country. Security and investment promotion were the means. Social cohesion is the end and validator.

Can an insurgency be effectively defeated when the insurgents have safe havens in neighboring countries?

Uribe: I don’t use the term insurgency because insurgency was the word used in Latin American countries to describe left-wing guerrillas fighting against dictators. In Colombia, guerrillas haven’t had to fight dictators because, in the last century, Colombia has had continuous democracy with the exception of a 4-year interruption between 1953 and 1957. When communist guerrillas appeared, my country had already long ago restored democracy. Colombia was the most stable democracy in Latin America. This is one reason to make the distinction between Colombian terrorist groups and insurgents in other countries. And there is another reason. I remember talking with people in El Salvador, specifically with Joaquin Villalobos, former guerrilla leader there. At Oxford University, he told me that Salvadoran guerrillas had decided to join in peace talks with the government for three reasons: first, they were in a military stalemate; second, they had run out of resources because Western European [nongovernmental organizations] no longer sent money to them; and third, the government agreed to introduce democratic reforms. In my country, the government has introduced many democratic reforms as I have already mentioned—direct popular elections of mayors and governors and so forth. Our government promotes the rule of law. These government terrorists may live from extortion, from kidnapping, from illicit drugs. The conjunction, the accumulation of all these factors, creates the idea that they are not insurgents, that they are terrorists.

Are there specific lessons that those countries can learn from the Colombian experience?

Uribe: The best lesson from Colombia during our 8 years was that we resolutely adopted the decision to defeat terrorism, and we maintained our determination.

What is the best U.S. strategy to help build strong liberal states in the Americas in your opinion?

Uribe: What is important is the combination of the rule of law, security, necessity to cease all illicit drug commerce, and, of course, advancement of social policies. It is important that the United States helps our countries solve the social problems that lead to drug production. At the same time, the United States can help by interdicting shipments, reducing consumption in the
VÉLEZ

United States, fighting money-laundering in the United States, and confiscating illicit wealth kept in the United States. There are many channels through which the United States can work with great effectiveness in our countries to accomplish these goals, for example with the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank. PRISM
An Interview with
J. Brian Atwood

_Dambisa Moyo and other critics claim that the global development enterprise has been a failure. What is your response to these critics?_

**Atwood:** I was once on a panel with Dambisa Moyo, and it’s interesting that perhaps her publishers write better headlines than what she actually believes. Her concern is that foreign aid has created dependencies in the past, and I share that concern. I think that the way to go with respect to development assistance is country ownership. Developing countries do not always have the capacity, so there’s always a tradeoff between whether or not you feel that you can risk using taxpayer money in a country that doesn’t have capacity. But we’ve studied these issues and believe there is more capacity out there than we’re responding to. If we really embrace the notion of country ownership and the developing countries genuinely buy in, and we use the budgets of the recipient country, we can create a situation where there is mutual accountability that does away with the dependency problem. But Moyo is right that a lot of foreign aid in the past has created dependency and that has caused many governments to simply sit back and fail to do the job they’re supposed to do as part of this mutual accountability prism.

**Considering recent profound economic troubles in developed countries and the value-based challenge coming from the Islamic world, do you think the modernization paradigm that development has been based on is still relevant?**

**Atwood:** I would dispute the fact that we’ve been basing development on the modernization model. I think we learned a few lessons from the effort to try to modernize Iran. We realized that it isn’t the stark question of the “Lexus or the olive tree”; that development has to be in context;

_J. Brian Atwood is the Chairman of the Development Assistance Committee at the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Previously, he served as Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development._
that we’ve got to work with countries; that we’ve got to understand the cultural issues and the institutions of the country; that we’ve got to build those institutions in those countries where they’re ineffective. There hasn’t been a modernization motif per se. There is, however, another aspect of modernization: we need to get these countries somehow tied into the global economy, and some of them resist that. They’re not sure they want to do that.

We long ago dismissed the notion that we could operate on the basis of comparative advantage, meaning that if a country has minerals, you exploit the minerals, if you’ve got oil, you exploit the oil. We understand Dutch disease and that single-source economies haven’t worked. If countries manage their resources well, then that’s fine, but they have to find a way to compete in the global economy or else they’re not going to develop. They have to make the decision as to what extent integration compromises their own values, their own norms, their own culture, their own history. I think if we do embrace the idea of country ownership, then they will make those decisions, and they will come up with the strategies that best fit their circumstances.

Since the 1980s, development agencies have been promoting development based on the model of consumer market capitalism. Is this model still the way to go for less developed countries?

Atwood: A lot of people are asking that question now as they look at some of the emerging economies and their success in achieving growth. Those emerging economies are moving along a timeline themselves, and the pressures that the Chinese feel, for example, are: should we become more consumer-oriented? Are we doing ourselves any favors by being so export-oriented? They have a huge backup of capital now. Their balance of trade with other countries is skewed. They’re worried because they have to operate within a global economy. Is their currency valued at the proper level? No. Most people think that it’s tremendously advantageous to their exports. The fact is that they have had another model that isn’t entirely based on capitalism and consumerism, but on a controlled capitalism.

Today, Chinese consumers are demanding a bigger slice of the pie. Everyone is looking at this. What the Western countries are looking at is the fact that they are hitting a demographic wall; they can’t seem to grow fast enough to get out of normal economic downturns as they have in the past. People are beginning to ask the question: do we have this right? Should it be exclusively free-market oriented? To what extent should the government regulate the market? To what extent does government contribute to the economy by investing in education, health care, and human development? All of these issues are constantly debated, and now more than ever as we observe the growth rates of the emerging economies.

China is the most cash-rich country in the world. It is becoming a significant donor in certain regions. What is your assessment of the Chinese model for development assistance?

Atwood: It’s a self-interested model. The Chinese are beginning to ask serious questions about their own model. Premier Wen Jiabao has said they need to do a better job of investing their money. They have only recently announced to their own people that they have
a foreign aid program. The Chinese people didn’t know that until recently. The authorities have been getting feedback through Web sites that they put out there—they don’t take public opinion polls, but they put out Web sites and allow the elite to comment. The feedback they’ve been getting asks, “why are you spending money overseas when we’ve got problems at home?” They still have serious poverty problems in China. They have problems with the quality of their economy. The Chinese development budget is probably in the range of $10 billion [per year]. Compared to $30 billion [per year] for the United States, that’s pretty significant for a new South-South provider, as they like to call themselves.

They have what I call a “foundation model.” They sit back and wait to see what African or other countries are making requests of them. They generally choose to build infrastructure. They will then send Chinese workers in to do the work. The sustainability of the development effort is questionable, and they’ve been making some bad investments so they have been seriously looking to share information. For the past 2½ years, the Development Assistance Committee [DAC] has had a China-DAC Study Group, and we’ve gone to Africa with them. We’ve had meetings in Beijing with Chinese development authorities; the exchange has been interesting. They’re really thirsty for knowledge about these things.

**Do you think the Chinese will try to take advantage of the lessons that U.S. and European donor countries have learned from their own development experience?**

**Atwood:** For ideological reasons they won’t admit this, and I think we’ve already learned some things from them because they’ve done more in the area of poverty reduction than anyone. We’ve met the extreme poverty goal of the [Millennium Development Goals] because of the Chinese and their economic reforms, but it has been a kind of reform that might not work in a democracy. The question becomes whether their reforms will work in the long run if they don’t have more democracy. Wen Jiabao himself has given a speech stating that they need political reform in China just as he’s leaving office. He has also given a speech saying that they need to break up the banks; they’re too powerful. So there’s a lot going on inside China that we’re not fully aware of. It’s interesting to watch.

**The United States became involved in formal development aid programs after World War II, when it was the strongest and richest country in world. As of today, U.S. outstanding public debt is $15.6 trillion, and if you add in debt of households, businesses, individuals, and subnational government, national debt is well over $50 trillion. Should the United States still be a donor nation?**

**Atwood:** Yes, of course, because if you really want to work down the debt, you need to create new markets. That has been part of the philosophy for many years. That may sound like a hard, high number, but as a percentage of U.S. GDP [gross domestic product], we’re not yet in the danger zone. The U.S. economy is beginning to grow again; we still have a triple-A rating, and we have the international currency. The American people are going to wake up one day and say this isn’t healthy, and we’re going to have to go through some serious reform, but it has to
be done carefully and over a period of time. We’re going to have to cut back government spending, but if we do it too drastically, too soon, we will face another recession. It has to be done sensibly, though it’s difficult in this political context to do it sensibly as you can imagine. Still, as a percentage of GDP, it’s not such a huge debt. When you talk about official U.S. development assistance, you’re talking about $30 billion; that’s a small amount compared to our defense budget, which is $600 billion. A lot of people ask why Europeans have done so much better, many of them having reached 0.7 percent of their GDP. U.S. aid is at only 0.21 percent of GDP. Part of the reason is that the United States provides the defense shield for Europe. The Europeans can afford to invest in soft power as a result. They see that as a security investment as well as an investment for value reasons.

*A development that has been marked over the past decade is the drawing closer together of the development and security communities, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in other places as well. What are the consequences of these two communities working side by side?*

*Atwood:* It’s very interesting because when John F. Kennedy’s administration created USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development], it, for the first time, separated security assistance from development assistance. Today, you can honestly say that in many countries in which we’re working, you can’t have development without security, and you can’t have security without development. It’s obvious to me that the two have to work together, and that in many of the fragile states in particular, we have to find the way to ask the military to coordinate its activities so they provide a secure area.

I was at USAID talking about Somalia. The military was working in some parts of Somalia. I asked the question: Is our military doing anything in that area? Can it possibly provide a little more security against al Shabab? If we really want to deal with the problems in Somalia, which is al-Shabaab—and al Qaeda–related terrorism and the pirate groups, Somalia needs development. We can’t do development without security, so we need to train and work better together. We need to understand the concepts on both sides. When I was trying to rewrite the senior officers’ course at the Foreign Service Institute, I wrote a whole section on defense and why Foreign Service officers ought to know more about the military, the way it builds and acquires weapons, the way it deploys, the doctrines that it follows. And some of the military officers in the groups asked, “Why do civilians need to know that?” They need to know more about the way the military operates, and the military needs to know more about the way civilians operate, if we’re to take advantage of the strengths of both sides.

*Should the U.S. development elements and defense elements of our foreign policy fuse even closer together, the way they were prior to the Kennedy administration separating them?*

*Atwood:* No. Part of the challenge in development is trust. Unfortunately when people in developing countries see the American military in operation, the American military is obviously the point of a policy that is designed to protect American interests explicitly. That’s why the military is there. That’s why they are in Afghanistan. When
those same people see development civilians in the field, they know that those development civilians will only succeed if the country itself succeeds. There’s a natural trust factor that comes into play. As much as I appreciate the fact that students at West Point and the Naval Academy are learning a lot more about development, and they’re actually undertaking a lot of it, it’s very difficult to effectuate that degree of trust when you have to carry a gun or wear a uniform.

*Can military forces be effective purveyors of development assistance?*

*Atwood:* They can do some things better than civilians in postconflict situations. There are many examples of this: civil engineers going in and building roads so that they can improve the security environment within a country. They do things extremely well when it comes to building things and logistics. But again, when it comes to the human development aspect of it, civilians are much more effective.

*The military has a long tradition of helping in humanitarian disasters.*

*Atwood:* But even in those situations when the President authorizes its mobilization for humanitarian assistance, it operates under a strategy that is designed by USAID.

*Can development buy hearts and minds?*

*Atwood:* I think development has bought hearts and minds over the years. I was moved at a recent conference the DAC held in Busan, Korea. Busan was the port where a lot of humanitarian relief was delivered during and after the Korean War, and so many Koreans say, “I wouldn’t be here today if I didn’t have milk provided by USAID or food provided by USAID.” Korea is the newest member of the DAC. Their per-capita income in the 1960s was under $100. There is great appreciation for what we did back then. The USAID logo is a symbol of two hands clasping; I think that has bought friends for the United States all over the world.

*What are your current thoughts about the priority or nonpriority status of democracy and democratization in development?*

*Atwood:* I think it’s a high priority because we’ve learned over the years that unless you enable the people of a country to participate in the development process, you really can’t achieve sustainable development results. You can’t just operate on a top-down basis. Those people have to have the institutions and the rule of law that protects their rights to private property, be they entrepreneurs or citizens, or to free speech or assembly. It’s a question of institutions; it’s a way of enabling this participatory development aspect. It’s also frankly the way you keep governments accountable. If you don’t have full democratic institutions that work, obviously consistent with the history and culture of the country, then the accountability factor is missing. Then you get issues like dependency and other problems that exist, and you may be able achieve a few results for a short period of time, but it’s questionable as to how sustainable those results will be.

*As an international development leader, do you think that the United States abandoned or diluted its commitment to democracy and*
democratization in its efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq?

Atwood: No. The United States encouraged elections in Iraq. Some could argue that it was done top down, and it should have been done locally first and moved its way up. You can argue about how it was done. But one of the rationales—and I want to make it clear that I did not support President [George W.] Bush’s decision to go into Iraq, which I think was a big mistake—was to have a democratic Arab nation in the heart of the Middle East. I don’t know how Freedom House ranks Iraq today, but they have an elected government that has some degree of legitimacy even if it has all kinds of problems. I don’t think we abandoned democracy in Iraq. We certainly haven’t abandoned it in Afghanistan. The job that Lakhdar Brahimi did in setting up the parliament of Afghanistan and creating the election process is much more democratic than it would have been without the international effort. Certainly something has been created that is much more democratic than it could have been under the Taliban.

Many believe U.S. civilian agencies need some kind of expeditionary capacity. Is such a capacity still required in the post-Iraq, post-Afghanistan environment?

Atwood: Yes and no. I don’t have any question that a surge capacity is needed to be able to respond to postconflict situations or in fragile states. The conference I mentioned earlier resulted in the Busan agreement, called the New Deal on Conflict and Fragility. I think we need to be able to create a policing capacity. We have a hard time reconciling issues that came up in the 1960s and 1970s with respect to police training when police trainees were abusing people. But we do need that capacity in postconflict situations. It isn’t right to ask our military, which is a vertically organized unit, which is top-down oriented and not supposed to be operating on a horizontal basis with the community at large. The police basically organize themselves along horizontal lines. We need that kind of civilian capacity. I created something when I was at USAID called the Office of Transition Initiatives [OTI]. That could be strengthened.

Just as defense is a different profession from that of diplomacy, so is the case with development and humanitarian assistance being different professions. The kind of people that do transitional work are a unique profession as well. They have to be a little more politically oriented than traditional development requires. Their job is to bring reconciliation to a war-torn society, and OTI has performed that function. I don’t think that the function belongs in the State Department; it belongs at USAID where the profession can evolve.

Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice used to speak of the 3Ds—diplomacy, defense, and development—working together. When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton took office, she said that two of those Ds are under her control. It has been observed that during her tenure, USAID has a lost a good deal of its independence. As the former administrator of USAID, how do you feel about that?

Atwood: USAID had lost control over its budget long before Hillary Clinton came in. I think in some ways because of Secretary Clinton’s intense interest in development, USAID has been strengthened. There are people who act as though the State Department
is in charge of development, but I don’t think that’s what Secretary Clinton intended or intends. I think she wants to—and she has said it a number of times and actually acted on it—strengthen USAID as an institution. It’s fighting its way back toward a more strengthened role. The fact that the President and Secretary of State have asked USAID to coordinate all government activities with respect to the next G8 meeting, where food security is the top issue, is an indication that USAID is fighting its way back. Whether it will ever be on a plane with development and diplomacy is another question. I think the only way it will ultimately be on the same plane as the other two Ds is if it were to become a separate Cabinet department.

Do you advocate that?

Atwood: I’ve always advocated that. I advocate it with less enthusiasm when there’s a Secretary of State such as Hillary Clinton who cares about development. But when she’s gone, I will advocate it enthusiastically again.

U.S. foreign assistance is currently dispensed by numerous agencies. Many of these agencies have their domestic core activity, which is not development assistance. Do you think that there is an ongoing need to have a separate USAID, Millennium Challenge Corporation, and President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or could those be fused into a single agency?

Atwood: They definitely should be fused. I’m less concerned about MCC. PEPFAR, I think, has modified its approach to its business somewhat. I’m more concerned about the domestic-oriented agencies, even the CDC [Centers for Disease Control]. The CDC is concerned about communicable diseases affecting Americans, and it operates that way. When it goes overseas, and it has a lot of PEPFAR money, it operates on a short-term basis. The CDC vision is “let’s get at this disease and let’s control it right now” because that’s its business. It doesn’t think about putting a healthcare system in place that will take 10 years to accomplish, whereas USAID people think in those terms. How do you create a sustainable healthcare system? A surveillance system? A system that delivers healthcare and can be sustained by the people of the country? CDC has a domestic mission.

The same is true of the other agencies. They’re thinking about their domestic mission first; that’s what they get their money for. I really do think it’s been dangerous to see this proliferation of development agencies throughout the U.S. Government. It began at the time the Berlin Wall came down, and the Congress in its infinite wisdom decided that they would assign the responsibility for development in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union to the State Department. The diplomats in charge of these programs said, “I don’t want the Secretary of State to be receiving a call from the Secretary of Agriculture or the Secretary of Energy wanting a role, so I’m going to disperse some money to them and let everyone have a role.” Those other agencies got the money, but didn’t have the capacity to deliver overseas. Often they would put out public requests for proposals and they’d end with the same contractors or grantees that USAID used. However, they didn’t have the capacity to evaluate the programs or oversee them in the field because they didn’t have people in the field. It was a huge mistake. From the point of view of the
DAC at OECD, when we critique the United States it’s because of this proliferation of development agencies that don’t have any business doing development.

One thing that the military does well is its disciplined approach to learning from its experiences. Does the development community need to develop such a capacity and practice?

**Atwood:** It most certainly does, and it’s being developed. Development is a far more complex mission because we’re talking about developing entire societies, and every sector is somewhat different. Some sectors lend themselves to quantifiable results and measurements, while others can only be measured by qualitative evaluations. It is really complicated. Then there is the question of attribution. Who is responsible for success, or the result? You want it to be the government you’re working with; it’s a partnership. You may be overlapping with another donor. Who’s to take credit for the results? The Government Performance and Results Act requires all government agencies to be able to measure results. Unfortunately, in the aid business, congressional authorizers haven’t enacted a new authorization bill since 1985. The appropriators have a different outlook: “I want you to spend the money we give you.” It’s an input-oriented perspective. Development should have an outcome-oriented perspective. We ought to have a new authorization bill that says this our overall national strategy as it relates to development, and these are the outcomes we want you to achieve, and you need to report to us and be held accountable for achieving those outcomes, not just to spend the money we give you by the earmark but to look at the outcomes.

**How should leading donors such as the United States condition their assistance to countries that are corrupt or behaving in ways that we find unacceptable? For example, how should we respond to Egypt, having recently arrested a number of American workers from the USAID Democracy Development Program?**

**Atwood:** First of all, we should react when they do something foolish like that. We should react the way we have reacted. What the Egyptians did is frankly outrageous, especially given the fact that these organizations had asked for licenses to practice as they’re required to do as far back as 2006 during the Mubarak administration. They’ve asked every 6 months since, and they’ve asked for more information. They were never given the licenses and they were never told to leave. Then all of sudden they’re arrested. However, you have to recognize that this is a transition situation. You have to play. You can’t just leave the playing field because you’re offended by something like this. The Egyptians are working their way toward a legitimate government. We need to be there. We’ve got too much at stake. Too many investments have been made over the years—investments in peace. I hope that Egypt will become again a leader in the Arab world and that it will become a democratic leader in the Arab world. The best aspiration would be that it would become a country like Turkey that is an Islamic people in a secular, democratic country.

**Pakistan reacted strongly to certain conditions placed on our development program. How do we deal with that?**

**Atwood:** Some countries obviously have insecurity problems. Pakistan has both
insecurity and security problems as well. Politics in Pakistan are difficult. People are looking to really go after the current civilian government, which isn’t very popular. It makes them overreact—even though we should be offended by the fact that Osama bin Laden was sitting there all those months, and obviously someone knew it. It becomes a question of do you leave the playing field or do you try to work the problem. I think that we need to engage and we need to work the problem. It presents us with a diplomatic issue. I used to be the Assistant Secretary of Congressional Relations and I tried to sit down with Members of Congress who are trying to respond to a certain constituency without understanding what the implications are and how it will be read in a foreign country. We also need to work the congressional side of this as well as the diplomatic side with the Pakistanis. Don’t do anything that’s going to cut off your nose to spite your face. PRISM
Should the Bush administration have been better prepared for the national security threats that were crystallized in the attacks of 9/11?

Richard Haass: Armchair quarterbacks or Monday morning quarterbacks might say so. It’s fair to say that mainstream national security thinking at that time did not place that high of a priority on terrorism. It wasn’t that terrorism was inconceivable, but the scale of it was seen as modest, so people who were working on these issues were not as focused on it as they ought to have been. It took 9/11 to make clear that the nature of the challenge had changed. Hence the comprehensive response from the Intelligence Community, Homeland Security, [Department of] Defense, you name it. It wasn’t just the administration—most of the people working in foreign policy or national security did not approach terrorism or counterterrorism pre-9/11 with anything like the intensity that became the new normal after 9/11. Any criticism you would lodge with the Bush administration, you would have lodged with any other administration, and indeed you probably could have lodged with the field at large.

Was the Global War on Terror, in your opinion, an effective and appropriate response to the challenge?

Haass: I never much liked the wording “Global War on Terror.” A “war” suggested too many things that were unhelpful. First of all, it suggested that the main instruments were military. Not
necessarily. Intelligence is at least as important, as are politics, economics, and other tools. Second of all, war connotes concepts of battlefields. With terrorism, anything and everything could be a battlefield. Also, by definition, we were all combatants. You can’t choose just to enlist in the War on Terror or choose to opt out. There’s no Canada to go to. I never found the image or the jargon—of Global War on Terror, GWOT—helpful, and to some extent it was unhelpful because of the mindset it created.

**Was there another construct that could have been used instead that would have been better?**

**Haass:** “Campaign, struggle”—words that suggested something larger than the military and traditional battlefield soldiers. I wouldn’t have used anything that was narrowly military. I’d have to think about what produced an acronym or something like that. The main thing is that I would have demilitarized, if you will, the framing of the issue.

**But initially, wasn’t the U.S. response primarily military?**

**Haass:** Yes and no. The initial effort in Afghanistan, for example, actually had a very large Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] component. What was interesting was how much of the operation was handled by CIA people, in some ways leveraging their relationship with Afghans much more than any large American military footprint. Second of all, the global response was anything but military. It was the big ramping up of intelligence. It was the creation of a much more resilient society. It was efforts to go after terrorist funding. So again, most of the reactions beyond the narrow battlefield of Afghanistan were actually nonmilitary.

You’ve written in your book *War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars* that there is a distinction between the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq. Do you consider that the war in Iraq was a diversion from the war of necessity in Afghanistan?

**Haass:** Two things. I think more has been made of that than bears scrutiny. One of the criticisms of the Iraq War by those who were against it was that the United States took its eye off the ball. The more I looked at it, I’m not sure if that was true. Yes, some forces were taken out of Afghanistan for Iraq, but just as many forces were inserted into Afghanistan. Second, while a few people in the administration mentioned Iraq in September, October, November, and December 2001, people were not for the most part talking about Iraq. People were focused on Afghanistan. The reasons we didn’t do better in Afghanistan were not because of Iraq. Whatever tactical mistakes we made in Tora Bora were not because we were somehow husbanding these forces for Iraq. They were simply tactical mistakes about expecting too much of our “Afghan partners.” I also think that the inclination of the Bush administration not to do more in Afghanistan in 2002 had less to do with Iraq and more to a kind of discomfort if not allergy to doing nation-building in a place like Afghanistan. There was a real sense by Secretary [of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld and others, such as Vice President [Richard] Cheney, that this was not a place to get ambitious. So I actually think if Iraq didn’t exist, there was a pretty
powerful argument within the administration that Afghanistan was not a place where a massive investment would likely pay off, which is ironic given that the United States ultimately came to make a massive investment in Afghanistan. In a funny sort of way, some of the skeptics early on will ultimately have their skepticism largely proven right.

_The Bush campaign was explicitly opposed to state-building, and yet, after 9/11, the Bush administration engaged in the biggest state-building project since Vietnam. What role should state-building, stabilization, and reconstruction play in U.S. national security policy?_

_Haass: State-building plays an inevitable role. In a second, I’ll condition my answer. We can’t do everything ourselves. We need partners. In many cases, the partners may be willing but aren’t able; that’s where state-building obviously plays a role. We can’t be everywhere, particularly if your struggle is against terrorism, where any place is a potential source of a problem. You need host governments that are willing and able to exercise and meet their sovereign responsibilities. In that sense, state-building obviously plays a role. We can’t be everywhere, particularly if your struggle is against terrorism, where any place is a potential source of a problem. You need host governments that are willing and able to exercise and meet their sovereign responsibilities. In that sense, state-building gives us partners and makes them less vulnerable. So in that sense, and given the inherent limits of how many places we can do things on scale, state-building makes more than a little sense. Where I think state-building gets you in trouble is in times where we don’t look enough at willingness as opposed to capability. And state-building to what? What is the definition of adequacy? What is the division of labor? What is it we’re asking our partner to do as opposed to what we ourselves are prepared to do? I actually think that over the last decade, we have shifted that balance, and we continue to do elements of state-building. But we’ve dialed down the expectation on what they will do, and we’ve dialed up our role from zero, but we’ve also dialed down our role from the kind of Iraq or Afghanistan large template. So I actually think state-building makes sense, but only if you’ve got a partner that’s willing, if you’re quite modest in what you are trying to build them toward, and you’re quite modest in what you’re prepared to do. We’ve gotten into trouble when we have defined our goals as too high at what they need to do and too high for what we’re prepared to do.

_There was a lot of talk over the last decade of the need for an expanded civilian capacity by the U.S. Government to take over inherently civilian roles such as town planners (in expeditionary operations). There was discussion of a civilian reserve corps, a civilian response corps. Do you think that that is an idea past its prime, or do we still need that kind of capacity?_

_Haass: We made a mistake by assigning way too much to the State Department. It was a real misunderstanding of the culture of the diplomatic corps to ask it to play that kind of boots on the ground, local role. That’s not what people join the Foreign Service to do. It’s not by and large what they are inclined to do or good at or trained to do or experienced at doing. To think that very quickly you could put some of these people in these remote places—without, by the way, adequate security (because all of this depends on having security)—just seemed seriously flawed, and it’s not surprising that it’s come to naught. A lot of this has to be scaled back. Almost emblematic of that is the Iraq presence. You look at the scale of the Embassy, you look at
the thinking of the civilian presence. No way that’s going to happen. We’re not welcome in those numbers. We don’t have the manpower. We don’t have the security. We need some of this function, but it ought to be far more modest, and we ought not to look in the first instance to the Foreign Service to do it. I was one of the advocates of a civilian reserve, and it was very much modeled on the military Reserve. You would have people in our civilian society who were known to have certain capabilities—police officers, firefighters, engineers, language teachers, and people with local languages—who could make societies work. They, like the military, would train up for a couple of months at the outset and then have refreshers maybe a weekend every month, i.e., whatever you needed to develop and to maintain skill levels. These would be people who would then be prepared in the right conditions to go overseas. I would have created a special corps to do that, and I would not have asked the Foreign Service to do it. I would have had a small standing capability, whether located at State or Defense, or you stand up some new small agency that would have that express function. I still think that makes sense even if the overall numbers are probably less or more modest than people were thinking.

*Stuart Bowen, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, has been advocating for and has written in this journal in favor of an independent agency for reconstruction and stabilization.*

*Haass:* I’m not familiar with that, but that sort of thing makes more than a little sense to me. I also think that there’s a lesson in the State Department experience. It’s something that I remember learning and then teaching at the Kennedy School: Whenever you ask an organization to take on a new task, you should be very wary about asking it to take on a task that’s more than one step removed from its existing task. You really ought to build on existing culture, existing standard operating procedures, and then you can ask it to do it. What people were asking the Foreign Service to do was multiple steps removed from its culture. That ought to have raised a red flag.

In November 2005, the Department of Defense issued Directive 3000.05 [“Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations”]. It specifically stated that while the military would prefer for civilian agencies to do all these jobs, if they failed to step up to the plate, the military would do it and in fact, in Iraq, they did. *Is the military a viable place to retain those kinds of capabilities?*

*Haass:* The short answer is it’s a possibility, but at a certain cost. We’ve only got a military of a certain size, and there are other things that only the military can do, that they are uniquely equipped literally and figuratively to do. You have to ask yourself, do you want them then to take on these other tasks? I also think there’s a certain symbolic issue there. At times we want to have a transition, and there’s something to be said that we’re now civilianizing the American presence. That’s another argument for not having the military do this. The military has wars to fight. There are things they can uniquely do. One of the reasons the Bush administration early on was against state-building was because so much of state-building was done by people trained for the military, trained to fight wars, and then we ask them to do a civilian function. If you’re
asking people to do predominantly civilian functions, then you probably want to have predominantly civilians doing them.

*The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America made a significant point when it stated that we have as much to fear from weak and failing states in terms of threats to national security as we do from peer adversaries. Do you agree with that assessment?*

**Haass:** I believe that that is one of the characteristics of this world. So much of 20th-century history was about powerful states, or to use Henry Kissinger’s language, “revolutionary states.” They wanted to overturn the international system of the day, whether it was Germany at two points in the 20th century or the Soviet Union later on. At the moment I don’t see any country out there with a global reach that has those kinds of ambitions. I’m not saying it couldn’t happen, but at the moment, there’s no 21st-century equivalent of a revolutionary Germany or Soviet Union. I’m much more concerned about weak states. I’m also concerned about some strong, medium-size states—North Korea and Iran. They can pose real threats to regional borders with global repercussions. Weak states are what people ought to be concerned about because in a global world, what happens within weak states can have global consequences, whether it is the use of their territory for terrorism or the transit of certain types of materials, be it drugs or nuclear weaponry or disease. Pandemic disease could very well come out of a weak state that doesn’t have monitoring or related types of capabilities. Then there is piracy. These are legitimate threats. If states are weak and the challenges sufficient, they can get hijacked. Lebanon to some extent is a classic weak state that has been taken over by a nonstate actor called Hizballah. Weak states are a real concern in the case of terrorism with a global reach.

**Going back to our discussion of Iraq and Afghanistan, what is your diagnosis of the problems in the interagency process that resulted in so many controversies within the U.S. Government during operations in Iraq?**

**Haass:** The biggest problem was that early on the Defense Department was given the responsibility to oversee the aftermath, and the center, the National Security Council, didn’t have proper oversight. For many people in the Pentagon, their approach to the aftermath was driven by assumptions. Well, it turned out that none of those assumptions was correct about how taxing it would be, the kinds of capabilities and tactics that would be required, and the nature of Iraqi society. The problem was to some extent corrected when the White House regained control over policymaking. But up to then, there was a lack of central oversight and the organization that was given responsibility did not go about it in a competent way.

**Now that we’re about to leave Afghanistan and many people have already forgotten we were ever in Iraq, what’s your assessment of the impact on America’s global stature in terms of our ability to influence global outcomes of our engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan?**

**Haass:** Actually, not that great. There is a pattern among people in this field to exaggerate the lasting repercussions of either successes or failures, and it gets to the heart, to some extent, of the credibility argument. You look
Haass: Within the Arab Muslim world, there are so many other things that are affecting the way the United States is perceived. For example, how the United States acted in Egypt and Libya, and what we are or are not doing in Syria or Iran. If you go to Bahrain, they want to know what we’re doing about the internal situation in Bahrain. For others it might be the Palestinian issue. All I’m saying is that there are any number of issues out there, and I don’t think that somehow these concerns you mention are necessarily dominant in the Muslim world. In Pakistan, these are not the dominant concerns. It’s much more what the United States is doing or not doing in Pakistan. Politics is local, and again there is a tendency among analysts to exaggerate the precedential impact of what it is we do and don’t do. To me it’s slightly reassuring because it means two things. One, even when we make mistakes, we can bounce back from them. Second, we don’t have to pour good money after bad simply because people are worried that if we somehow don’t see something through as much as some want, that we create a terrible precedent. I’m not saying there’s no truth to that argument, but it tends to be exaggerated in that the United States will always have opportunities to act if it wants. Even if it chooses to put a limit on its actions in place A, the United States has opportunities to change perceptions of the United States in places B, C, and D very quickly.

Would you include in that our reputation within the Arab Muslim world, specifically in respect to our values—democracy, human rights, those sorts of things?

Haass: I don’t see that as really connected. Iraq and Afghanistan have had some very positive implications for how we think about our engagement militarily in these kinds of situations. As institutions, the military, and the U.S. Army in particular, are great learners. I’ve always been impressed by that. They are
as systematic at learning as any organizations in American society—very professional, really admirable. The Army and military in general are admirable in the way they train people beforehand and throughout their careers. They learn from successes and failures alike. The civilian sector, both the nonprofit and for-profit sectors, could learn an extraordinary amount from the way the military deals with its people and deals with experience. They’ve learned a lot of lessons, but I don’t think we’ve been very good at integrating the civilian and military elements of American capability.

The Arab Spring is not a phrase I like. I never use it because it’s certainly not lasting for 3 months and it’s not obvious to me that it’s going to be positive. I tend to be someone who enjoys spring, and I don’t think that I’ll necessarily enjoy what comes to pass. I prefer words like “upheavals” or “intifada.” It’s a very different set of diplomatic calculations and it’s more the classic set of tensions between often specific interests—economic, security, what have you—associated with regimes that are somewhat authoritarian. They might be to some degree reformist, but they are also somewhat authoritarian and they’re challenged from people below. We’re not always sure what the agendas are of the people who are challenging them, and we’re also not always sure who will necessarily prevail. It is a classic faultline in foreign policy: to what extent does one think about the behavior of countries as opposed to their nature. It’s an extraordinarily difficult tactical situation, as we saw in Egypt or as we’re seeing in Bahrain, which is how you play your hand when you’ve got these various moving parts. There’s a price to be paid from supporting the governments. There’s a price to be paid for moving away from them. I found this difficult strategically and tactically, but they’re different situations than the sort of thing we had in Iraq or Afghanistan.

**How do you think we should be playing it in Syria right now?**

**Haass:** The United States has clear humanitarian interests in stopping the fighting and getting rid of this government, and we have clear strategic interests given its connections with Iran. Strategic and humanitarian interests are often in some kind of competition. Well, here they’re actually aligned very closely. On both grounds you’d love to see this regime gone. If there ever was a moment for a diplomatic settlement, it’s over, if by that you mean the regime can remain and bygones will be bygones. Way too much blood has been spilled. This regime has lost its legitimacy. It’s for that reason that I think the diplomatic mission conducted by the United Nations was flawed. The regime needs to go. I don’t know how much of it needs to go. Now you can no longer have an Alawite-run Syria. Those days are over. The moment may have existed early on where if there had been a decapitation, a regime change at the top, large elements of a reformist successor regime could have survived, but I think that’s over.

Now the political future of Syria is much more wide open and will hopefully be determined by some kind of widespread political participation, so there would be tolerance, a safe place for minorities, and there would not be the politics of vengeance and retribution. One of the reasons that change hasn’t happened is that the Alawites aren’t persuaded of it. One of the failures so far is that the opposition has not put forward a credible agenda that reassures the Alawites of Syria that they are not going to suffer, to put it bluntly, the same fate
as the Sunnis in Iraq. A minority that had the upper hand is not suddenly going to fall, given their fear not just of becoming disenfranchised but of being physically attacked, losing their homes or their lives, which is what happened to many Sunnis in Iraq. I would put as much emphasis as I could on creating an opposition that would send a credible political message to the effect that there’s a place in Syria for all Syrians, and that except for a very narrow layer, there would not be war crimes charges. I would put a great emphasis on that political message. I want to peel away most of the regime supporters, Alawite as well as Sunni, who are behind this regime. I want to up the sanctions. I want to send positive messages of political reassurance; these need to come from the Syrian opposition. I want there to be war crimes threats lodged against people who are helping Bashar al-Asad in a significant way. I want these people to know that they have got to choose and that they have got to move away from him, or they will end up dead or on trial and in prison.

I would be helping the opposition, and I would consider specific, limited transfers of anti-air or anti-armor weapons to select individuals or groups we had confidence in, but all things being equal, arms do not appear to be what the opposition lacks most. First of all, I’m not sure having an all-out civil war will bring forth the kind of opposition we want. I would look for ways through covert operations or military operations to stop arms from reaching the government. I would try everything to prevent that. It would be another sanction, and I’d look for a way to physically enforce it. I would basically do just about everything I could both to create a positive opposition and to weaken and isolate the government. This regime’s days are numbered. I don’t believe we will want or need to mount a “Libya operation,” which would be problematic given their ability to resist as well as questions of consolidation in the aftermath. I actually think there’s a pretty good chance that this will unravel pretty quickly from within if we set up the right context.

**Arms embargo, enhanced sanctions, war crimes at the top layer, no-fly zones, sanctuaries. This reminds me of post–Desert Storm, our approach to Iraq. How would you do it differently from what we did in the 90s in Iraq?**

**Haass:** But Iraq was not at that point; the big emphasis there was not on regime change. The 90s in Iraq were really about containment—to keep Saddam Hussein in his box. It actually succeeded fairly well. In Syria, there will have to be a regime change. I would pointedly go after that.

Because the regime in Syria today is fundamentally worse than the Saddam regime was in the 90s or . . . ?

**Haass:** They’re both awful in their own way. Ideally, Saddam would have gone sooner. There was a strategic assumption that he would fall in the aftermath of Desert Storm, but he survived. But we never gave up on regime change there; as you know, there were various efforts to do so. Regime change was always the most desirable policy, but the fallback was at least containment. The Syrian situation is unsustainable, and we need to look harder at what more we can do to bring about change.

**Going back to process, over the last decade, the homage paid to the whole-of-government approach, the comprehensive**
approach, the 3Ds, has been virtually religious in tone. In your time in government and since you left government, have you seen any improvements in the way that the government’s defense, diplomacy, and development communities work together?

Haass: No.

Is this due to that perennial problem, parochialism?

Haass: It’s hard to generalize. A lot depends on the specific incidents. I don’t think it’s the kind of thing that lends itself to systemic change. By that I mean—and this administration ended up spending a lot of time on it—there is no bureaucratic change or reform that can solve this problem. You have to bring together the right people, the right policy on individual issues. For example, years ago in the Reagan administration, people from various agencies dealt very effectively with political change in the Philippines. We’ve had successes in the U.S. Government. I tend not to be the reorganizational type; I don’t have that bias. It means having an interagency process that works with talented people. Things worked, for example, under George H.W. Bush, when Brent Scowcroft was National Security Advisor. Certain things worked pretty well, not everything, but certain things worked pretty well without systemic reorganization. There is an American bias toward systemic organization that will “solve the problems.” That’s an American cultural bias. Whether it’s homeland security or intelligence, we tend to move a lot of boxes around and create new layers. I’m not sure that’s the way to go about these things. A lot of it is cultural. The fact that data or intelligence are not always shared cannot necessarily be solved organizationally. It might have to be solved culturally. It might take certain individuals and certain leadership. I’m just skeptical every time I hear about organizational or institutional approaches or fixes. It tends to be too top-down.

What is your assessment of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review?

Haass: I am frankly skeptical that it will lead to significant changes.

In the recently released Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, there’s an indication of a strategic pivot toward Asia and the Pacific. Do you think that is a wise move?

Haass: I’m not wild about the word “pivot.” It’s too sharp. I think two things. The United States has been overly invested in the greater Middle East, and I do think it has been strategically distorting. The investments both in Iraq and in Afghanistan have been way too big, and our interests did not warrant it. The opportunities there, the dangers there, didn’t warrant it. I’m glad to see a slight dialing down or considerable dialing down of the American military presence in the greater Middle East. We’ll see what happens with Iran. That could be a temporary exception. All things being equal, the era of a large American footprint in the greater Middle East is over and should be over.

The idea that there will be some dialing up of some U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific, particularly air and naval, is healthy. It’s an enormous theater, and it’s the part of the
world where a lot more 21st-century history is going to be written. It is the Asia-Pacific that brings together the great powers of this era and vital U.S. interests. This is not reactive; in some way this is more preventive. We ought to be there. I welcome that. I welcome a slight shift in investment toward the Air Force and Navy. The end strength of the Army and Marines will probably go back somewhere close to where they were 10 years ago. We are going to move to a “lighter footprint” in dealing with terrorism and state-building.

The one large exception in the Asia-Pacific is North Korea. That’s one area where I can imagine a large land war. Needless to say, I hope it never happens, but it’s obviously conceivable. So we need to think about it in that context. All things being equal, do I think a slight “rebalancing”—a word I prefer rather than pivot—away from the Middle East toward the Asia-Pacific is healthy? Yes. We have been rebalancing away from Europe for 20-odd years. We probably have one-quarter the American presence we had 25 years ago. That makes sense. We have virtually no fixed presence in Africa and Latin America. That makes sense.

This is a world of great dynamism, where we don’t have any set or predictable foe as we did during the 20th century. In a funny sort of way, we ought to go back to lots of mobility, perhaps some kind of CONUS [contiguous or continental United States]-based pool of forces that could be dispatched to different places and trained. When the rapid deployment force was first developed, I was in the Pentagon. This is the late 70s, circa 1979–1980. It was a CONUS-based force and it had a global mission. Only when the greater Middle East became this new theater of great concern did the rapid deployment force essentially go from being a global force to essentially a regional force, which ultimately morphed into U.S. Central Command. I think the time has come to some extent to undo some of that and to make it more what it was, more of a global contingency reserve. We have more air and naval presence in Asia, but essentially if we are concerned about global efforts against terrorism, we ought to be highly flexible. We’re not quite sure what the next scenario is going to look like. In some ways, we need to add flexibility into our ability to deploy.

*So in the current debate between those who advocate for retaining this terrorism-counterterrorism expeditionary capacity and those who argue for antiaccess/area denial, you would say you can’t choose one or the other?*

*Haass:* They’re both right. If we were to choose, we would almost certainly be wrong. History suggests you never want to overload your eggs in a basket, particularly now when there’s so much fluidity in international relations. There’s so much fluidity in history. None of us can sit here and say this is exactly the trajectory of Russia or China or India or Europe or Japan, or whether there will be regime change in Iran or Korea in 5 or 10 years. None of us knows the answers to these questions. We need to build into our forces and into our national security policy in general tremendous adaptability. This is not unlike investment. You wouldn’t want to have a portfolio of all equities or all bonds or all anything else. You want to protect yourself against all sorts of unknowns and uncertainties. The same thing applies to strategy. This is one of the most fluid moments in international relations, so we need to have
tremendous flexibility for strategic reasons and given technological innovation. This is also not a time that you want to make decades-long investments or bets because something may come along in 2 or 3 years that may be really transformative. You want to build in flexibility at this moment in history.

**Can you comment on the process for formulating U.S. national security strategy?**

**Haass:** The government has its own formal process because of Goldwater-Nichols [Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986], and that’s of some limited utility. But by and large, governments aren’t good, or groups aren’t good, at “big think.” That’s actually a role for outsiders to government. That’s what think tanks, people who think strategically, ought to be doing. It’s what people do in war colleges. It’s what people do on planning staffs. The idea that an interagency committee is going to think of a grand strategy—no, that’s not going to happen. Containment didn’t come out of a committee. Containment came out of an individual, an extraordinarily talented individual. Ultimately, ideas have to be vetted by governments and internalized by governments. Policies have to be designed and then implemented by governments. But ideas don’t by and large come out of governments. Ideas come to governments. That is, from individuals. It could be an individual in government, but more likely an individual outside of government. That’s a much more realistic creative process. **PRISM**
An Interview with Maria Otero

As the senior State Department executive responsible for civilian security and human rights, what are the biggest challenges you face?

Otero: We face a variety of challenges. Some are external to the State Department, while some are internal. Before I describe some of these, though, let me put them in context. Essentially, part of Secretary Clinton’s vision for 21st century statecraft consists of bringing together all of the bureaus in the State Department that in one way or another address the question of civilian security, or how we help governments and other elements of a democratic society strengthen institutions and legal frameworks that ultimately protect citizens from a range of modern threats. This includes bureaus that address the hard security issues of counterterrorism and war crimes, to those that handle what are considered soft security issues: human rights, democracy, rule of law, and humanitarian assistance. If we look at the Department as a whole, there are five bureaus and three offices that in some way respond to civilian security. These eight bureaus and offices handle a total of about 4.5 billion dollars in resources, and manage hundreds of employees around the world.

So the vision that Secretary Clinton had for creating a balance between civilian security and military security and for designing a civilian response to situations of conflict is expansive. It therefore brought with it several challenges. One internal challenge is to ensure that all of these diverse bureaus and offices that have previously worked independently now see that what they’re doing is part of the larger whole with a coherent purpose and a set of objectives that extend beyond their respective mandates. This means getting these bureaus to collaborate, to join forces and to proceed with a collective response to a situation or country, be it Burma, Syria, Kenya, or Honduras. This

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challenge is typical in any bureaucracy where bureaus or offices operate in a vertical rather than horizontal fashion.

Perhaps the biggest external challenge is to ensure that we communicate effectively with other U.S. government agencies to show them the advantages and benefits of coordinating and collaborating with the newly established “J family” of bureaus and offices. This challenge extends from one of the key directives of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) which calls for a whole of government response to preventing and responding to crisis, conflict and instability. And then, of course, we face the challenge of how to most effectively draw on the varied toolkits available within our range of bureaus and offices to design and define the most robust policy response suited to each crisis situation we encounter. And when I say we, I mean the Bureaus of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) led by Assistant Secretary Frederick “Rick” Barton; Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) led by Assistant Secretary Michael Posner; International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) headed by Assistant Secretary William Brownfield; Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) led by Assistant Secretary Anne Richard; and Counterterrorism (CT) led by Coordinator Daniel Benjamin; as well as the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP) headed by Ambassador Luis CdeBaca; the Office of Global Criminal Justice (GCJ) led by Ambassador-at-Large Stephen Rapp; and the Office of Global Youth Issues (GYI) headed by the Secretary’s Special Adviser for Global Youth Issues, Zeenat Rahman.

If we might parse some of those challenges a bit further, let’s talk first about the internal challenges within the State Department. You have within the “J family” five bureaus and three offices each with a different lineage. Are there mechanisms in place for coordination and collaboration within the “J family?”

Otero: We have done a few things in that regard, because you are absolutely right, that is the first and most important challenge. Some of the things that I’ve put in place to increase coordination have been, from the very beginning, to develop a broader strategic mission statement with the assistant secretaries of the J bureaus so they can see what they are each doing as part of a larger whole. Second, I meet with my assistant secretaries once a week and give them an opportunity to talk about the things they are focusing on, but also give them the opportunity to interact with each other on various issues that emerge where they might not otherwise see connections immediately. Sometimes at these meetings we focus on a specific country or a given issue so we can discuss what each bureau is doing in those areas. A third element of this coordination takes place at the staff level. My staff regularly convenes all bureaus at various working levels to discuss and better understand how each element of the “J family” is playing out in a given country or crisis situation. For example, yesterday we held one such meeting on the transition in Afghanistan. I want all of the “J” bureaus to understand what the others are doing to ensure that they plan accordingly and eventually develop a more coherent policy. One other way in which we’re trying to improve bureau collaboration is by developing an inter-bureau detailee mechanism within the “J family,” enabling mid-level staff from each bureau or office to move to another bureau for six months. By fostering inter-bureau collaboration, we are strengthening our approaches and developing strong linkages that can only help enhance the “J family” performance on the ground.
Otero: That’s right, and certainly the Department of Defense (DoD) has done some very interesting things in their efforts to change structure in support of improving process. This is what these bureaus and offices – collectively known as J – have been doing since J’s formation earlier this year. Working closely with the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), we created a three-day course on “civilian security tradecraft” – the first of its kind for the Department. It was J bureaus and offices that provided content and case studies for the course, and J acted as convener and facilitator of the collaborative effort. Our “J family” team has done a terrific job, and FSI has commended us for it. The 3-day training was developed and conducted in mid-October this year. Many attendees came from the J bureaus and offices and most of them echoed the sentiments of one colleague who declared every member of a J bureau/office should take the course. The next step, of course, is to engage the regional bureaus and assist them in discovering the benefits of better understanding the work of their J colleagues. This effort of collaboration is not an end in itself; it is a means by which this family of diverse bureaus and offices can support the regional bureaus and the Department, broadly, more effectively, and hand-in-hand to achieve the Secretary’s goals for U.S. foreign policy.

Do you have additional mechanisms in place to improve coordination between the “J family” bureaus and offices and the regional bureaus?

Otero: Yes. Perhaps the most obvious is that, as we increase our collaboration among the “J family” and with the regional bureaus, the regional bureaus see more clearly the benefits to them of working with us. In this way, a regional bureau experiences the efficiencies resulting from well-sequenced and leveraged functions of the “J family” bureaus and offices. To use Syria as an example, J bureaus and offices have worked closely with the regional bureau and Syria desk. DRL (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor), CSO (Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations), and PRM (Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration), as well as the Office of War Crimes, have all brought their specialized expertise to bear in Syria. From humanitarian issues, to human rights and accountability efforts, to support for the opposition, “J family” bureaus and offices support the efforts of the regional bureaus at State. Our colleagues from the Near Eastern Affairs regional bureau recently praised the critically important work of the “J family” in Syria by saying our contribution makes it easier for them to do their work. Of course, this does not mean that everything is perfect, and that everybody always works together in a coordinated way. But that is why we now have a full range of bureaus and offices reporting to an Under Secretary who has the wherewithal to make sure she can help set everyone on the proper path when inter-bureau/office problems arise. I can also provide similar support and guidance as our bureaus and offices engage other agencies (such as USAID or DoD), international partners or foreign governments. The fact that we have these functional bureaus and offices working together strengthens our own voice and our overall effect.

Let’s go back to one of the individual bureaus, in particular what used to be the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization; does the realignment of that office, now reporting to an Undersecretary—you—as opposed to directly to the Secretary, indicate a reevaluation within the State Department of the importance of reconstruction and stabilization?
**Otero:** The answer to that is yes, and the major difference is the greater emphasis on stabilization and preventing conflict rather than reconstruction. You will note that reconstruction is no longer in the bureau’s name; it is the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO). The fact that the organization is now an independent bureau rather than an office is a statement of how central conflict prevention is to the Department. It demonstrates the Department’s understanding that mitigating conflicts, addressing them before they hit us between the eyes, has become a core objective of the State Department. More and more we see countries affected by crises that span all sectors, as in Syria, and nothing could be more serious or difficult to deal with than that type of situation. Kenya, for example, recently experienced violent ethnic conflict following a disputed election. A possible role for the “J family” might be to engage in such a situation well in advance of the vote to help mitigate some of the potential and emerging conflict, using a range of local-level resources and tools. The “J family” provides the ground support that backs up the Chief of Mission and helps create a new way of doing what’s needed. The new CSO bureau smartly identified a relatively small group of priority countries – Syria, Kenya, Burma and Honduras – in which to do this initially to establish its credibility, if you will, as a key resource for the regional bureaus. As a result, we’re seeing CSO’s re-conceptualization receive many positive receptions, including from Secretary Clinton, who has recognized its work publicly and ensured its importance.

There seems to have been a very substantial reevaluation of the value of what we five years ago called the civilian response capability; the civilian reserve corps has been abandoned, and the active and stand-by response corps seem to be refocused. What can you tell us about that?

**Otero:** The first thing I must refer to is resources. As you know, the resources made available for this bureau now are more limited than we would have liked; but that’s just the reality of the world in which we’re operating. The second thing is that in creating the bureau, we really had to evaluate everything that was being done to determine whether there was a more effective and cost efficient way to achieve it. The reduction in size of the Civilian Response Corps is not a decrease in the bureau’s ability to do its work, but a redirection of resources to enable doing it in a more agile way. I think that is really the key issue. Because the question of civilian response is not only important but very central to what the State Department does, we took resources devoted to Washington activities and pushed them into the field.

*But you believe you have within the “J family” of bureaus sufficient civilian resources to meet those needs?*

**Otero:** Remember, some of the resources come from the “J family” of bureaus and offices but we can draw from other parts of the government as well. The more important reality is that even if you you had a civilian response capacity that could focus on many countries at once, you would still require a comprehensive and strategic approach. If you look right now how many countries have some kind of crisis or conflict in them, you’re easily looking at 50 – 55 countries around the world. We certainly lack the resources to reach all of them. In truth, we would not want to spread our diplomatic resources so thinly. And so we have made decisions that, with the resources we do have in the “J family,” we will ensure we are linked to and supporting some of the key priorities of the Department and the Administration.
One of the things that DoD does well is identify, articulate and disseminate the lessons learned through experience. Are there any formal procedures or plans in the State Department for identifying, articulating, disseminating, and institutionalizing the lessons its people have learned from the diplomatic element of national power over the last ten years that would be equivalent to the Chairman Martin Dempsey’s Decade of War project?

Otero: Knowledge management, lessons learned, is a most crucial component of the “J family” collaboration on civilian security. Formalizing and institutionalizing this is a process that has begun and is under consideration. We will put in place a mechanism to achieve this. It will necessitate a Department-wide knowledge management effort to accomplish what you’re suggesting. The new CSO bureau documents and shares input and lessons from work being done throughout the Department on conflict and this work is already sharpening the way we engage, for example through interagency exercises that help test our capacities.

Wouldn’t there be some value to creating such a learning and dissemination capacity within the “J family” of bureaus all dedicated to civilian security?

Otero: Yes indeed, that’s in the works but that’s all I’m going to tell you. You’re hitting on something we believe is very important and we are developing something that will help us achieve this. We have taken the important steps of consolidating these bureaus, of facilitating their ability to collaborate and we are developing a new way of interacting among them that is not fully mature, but it’s quite advanced. In Syria, we have really collaborated very well; learning from past experience, for example, we’ve worked well with USAID. The ability to capture these lessons, to understand how things happened, to understand whether we have the right mechanisms in place to succeed in the future and to share it among “J family” bureaus and offices and the Department, that piece is part of the process which we’re trying to create.

In this process, are you trying to develop skill sets that are appropriate for preventing and responding to conflict, as opposed to the more traditional State Department skills sets like observing, reporting, negotiating?

Otero: Absolutely, and the toolkit available for conflict prevention is fairly large and well developed. We do, of course, expect to develop additional skills and tools, especially given the new technologies available to us now. For the most part, though, if we decide to address a given crisis situation, we already have an array of methodologies we can choose from to carry out our work. These include engaging religious actors to encourage them to be proactive in preventing conflict, working with local organizations to strengthen community relationships, and many others. For example, we’re working to expand government capacity in Honduras, where investigation of crimes, identification of suspects, and carrying through with prosecutions are weak, resulting in a big gap in civilian security. To help close this gap, J bureaus and offices are drawing on the skills of experienced law enforcement officials from places like Philadelphia and Houston to mentor local Honduran police. We are tapping into the expertise of local-level, Spanish-speaking officials to provide the kind of agile response I mentioned earlier. Burma is another interesting case. In Burma, the “J family” of bureaus and offices is collaborating with our regional bureau to implement de-mining
programs as a basis for encouraging local efforts at reconciliation and advancing peace.

_Otero_: Syria poses a very challenging situation because it’s hard to get resources into the country. One thing is clear, however – we have made a concrete commitment to support Syrians’ aspirations for a free and democratic Syria that protects the rights, the dignity, and the aspirations of all Syrians and all communities. One way the “J family” contributes to that is by providing non-lethal aid to the opposition and training them to use it through a variety of means. We’ve found that communication technologies are extremely helpful, especially as the opposition is working to create a protective environment. Along with our humanitarian assistance to those affected by the crisis provided through PRM – which reached 72 million dollars over the past 15 months – we are also providing medical assistance to those in need and are working to get that into areas that are under the control of the opposition. In total, PRM and USAID, working together, have put almost 210 million dollars towards humanitarian assistance for Syrian refugees. This is an excellent example of two U.S. government organizations working together in a crisis situation. In addition, we are providing robust support to the opposition’s efforts to document and investigate atrocities so that, in the future, they can make sound decisions concerning accountability and reconciliation. We are also conducting “Planning and Civil Administration Training” with local civilian leaders from inside Syria so that they can better provide local government, particularly in areas where the Assad regime now has only limited influence. We will continue to carry out this kind of work, but our limited access to the country constrains our ability to expand the scope of our efforts.

_How does the State Department plan with other agencies to prevent conflict? I’m always troubled by the “proving a negative” paradox._

_Otero_: You’re right, it often seems that no one recognizes when a conflict has been prevented. I like to use the example of elections. The only time you hear about elections is when people have been killed, when riots and fires break out, when things are an absolute mess. Few, on the other hand, hear about elections when they go well. Take the last elections in Nigeria, for example. Not much has been said about them because they were credible, transparent, and recognized as being far better than previous elections. It took an enormous amount of work for all involved to achieve that, though, and it took conflict prevention work. It’s been very difficult to claim the recognition of that success, however, and to acknowledge it publicly. As for us, the “J family” – especially CSO – works on conflict prevention directly with the regional bureaus helping to identify potential indicators of conflict and deciding which crisis situations we should address and what responses are most appropriate.

_In your opinion, is interagency planning for conflict stabilization and prevention, sufficient or do we need to improve interagency planning and if so, how?_

_Otero_: Part of the QDDR vision involves a strong focus on whole-of-government responses to challenges around the world and so this concept
of interagency collaboration is a very important one. Clearly, we have the interagency mechanisms in place to assess difficult situations and to address them together. In some cases, though, we may need additional mechanisms to be able to provide the quality of coordination required. In these cases, a lot of different government agencies may be involved. We tend to coordinate most often with USAID, Defense, and, Justice. I think we’ve come a long way towards enhancing our coordination. For example, I just came back from visiting two Combatant Commands. I have met with almost all of the Combatant Commands in order to help them understand what we’re doing in the “J family,” and to understand where there are potential synergies so that we can develop a robust relationship. In addition, I have a Colonel on my staff who maintains and enhances those connections. With USAID, I hold a monthly meeting with Deputy Administrator Donald Steinberg to review the areas in which we’re collaborating, where we’re working together well, and where we are not working together as well. This allows us to intentionally strengthen or shift our emphasis.

A lot of the world’s contemporary conflict is spurred by actions of transnational illicit organizations and networks. Some people talk about the convergence of transnational organized crime, terrorism, insurgencies, etc. How can the diplomatic element of U.S. national power best be deployed against that particular national security threat?

Otero: That’s a tough one, especially when you start combining transnational criminal organizations with terrorism. We need to recognize the enormous importance of being able to apply resources to address this challenge. When it comes to countering narco-trafficking, we have a strong record and we’ve already achieved some success in Colombia, for example. We are also addressing these issues in Central America and Mexico, where we still need to do a lot more. A major part of our effort is enhancing the capacity of governments and civil society in these countries to address these issues themselves. We do this by providing resources and training. This is essential.

One other piece that is essential – and this comes in to play more with trafficking in persons, for example – is to demand from countries a more affirmative and resolved response. We do that through our annual trafficking in persons report, our ranking of countries in tiers, and by providing assistance in developing national plans of action to address trafficking. We’ve made quite a bit of progress on that front. In fact, you hear about the issue a lot more than you did two years ago. Part of this is due to the enormous effort Secretary Clinton has personally made to highlight the issue, including raising awareness through the participation of high-profile figures and celebrities. You know that when you run into someone like Will Smith at an event on foreign affairs and trafficking that the Secretary’s efforts are having an effect. That said, we still have a great deal of work to do on combating this scourge.

The Secretary created the new Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) recognizing that fighting terrorism, especially in some parts of the world, is a primary objective of the U.S. government. CT is also part of the “J family.” A lot of our work on counterterrorism involves helping countries develop their own capacity to combat terrorism, allocate their own resources toward it and collaborate with each other more effectively. We have created the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), which brings more than 30 countries together, precisely to do this. And we’ve created, or are in the process of creating, several other robust institutions to help certain countries fight terrorism on their soil.
One of the regions of the world most troubled by the challenges you just described is Latin America. In January the President released, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” which describes a pivot, a geographical pivot towards Asia, and the Far East. Do you detect anything similar taking place within the State Department?

Otero: Absolutely. Secretary Clinton gave a major speech late last fall – “America’s Pacific Century” speech–on the importance of our presence and interaction with the countries of the Pacific, published an article in Foreign Policy and subsequently discussed it with key interlocutors in many countries she visited thereafter. I specify the Pacific because it’s not just Asia. You have many countries that border the Pacific as does the U.S. So it includes Peru, Chile, and other countries that make it a broader effort. Clearly, these countries are of enormous importance in the work that we’re doing, and harnessing the growth and dynamism in the Asia-Pacific region stands central to U.S. economic and strategic interests. Indeed, our strategic “rebalance” reflects a desire to strengthen long-standing security, economic, and people-to-people ties. That said, the pivot to Asia will not come at the expense of U.S. national security interests in other regions. Other regions remain vitally important, and we will continue to coordinate closely with like-minded countries and institutions from all regions to welcome an Asia capable of upholding a rules-based international order and helping to solve global challenges that impact U.S. national interests.

You’ve mentioned “whole-of-government approaches” several times. Others refer to this as the comprehensive approach and the Secretary called it the 3D approach (Diplomacy, Defense, Development). Is there any prospect for a QDDDR (Quadrennial Diplomacy, Defense, and Development Review) in the future?

Otero: It’s conceivable that such collaboration might be possible, but it would have to stem from the QDR and QDDR. It is imperative to be able to ensure collaboration across the government with a larger number of agencies/departments, and that is clearly the objective of the National Security Council. These components of government, though, are complex and any effort to bring them closer together would be challenging. For its part, the QDDR provides a vision of the U.S. government, with its many agencies, operating as a unit around the world. The presence of our government in other countries is concentrated in our embassies, which function under the President’s representatives – i.e., the Chiefs of Mission, our Ambassadors. Our Ambassadors are responsible for carrying out all of our combined initiatives in countries around the world, and are the sole representative of the President in a given country. It is the Ambassador’s responsibility to ensure that all the pieces of the U.S. government operating in a given country are collaborating and coordinating under her oversight. This is something that Secretary Clinton has made very clear, something that the President also has made very clear. But it increasingly is an enormous task. In big embassies, there are sometimes 30 different agencies in a country that are all reporting to the Ambassador. Therefore, the effort you’re suggesting, of whole-of-government, is something that has to happen at the embassy level first and foremost. PRISM
An Interview with Dennis Blair

What lessons have you personally drawn from the decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Blair: The decade of war is really two decades of war—from the time the Cold War ended in about 1989 through the disappearance of the Soviet threat and the involvement of the United States in a series of individual military actions. What I’ve learned is that we need to do a better job thinking these conflicts all the way through before we engage in them. Because it turns out that we are relearning an old lesson, which is the use of military force is only a part of improving a situation and protecting American interests in a particular country or region. Too often, we think that a military victory itself will cause the desired result. In fact many other factors come in to play; economic development, social development, government improvement. These are not accomplished by the U.S. alone, and certainly not by American military force alone, but often with allies and other partners, and with other civilian capabilities. I think we have not thought them through carefully as to the end state that we are trying to achieve. Next we need to be realistic about the resources that are required; military, civil, and other. I’m afraid these are old lessons that need to be relearned, not new lessons, but they certainly have been borne out as some of the shortcomings of the interventions we have made in recent years. I would add, by the way, that I am not one who says our military interventions since 1989 have all been disasters. I think on the whole they have made the world a better place; bad people who were around then aren’t around now, from Manuel Noriega to Saddam Hussein through Slobodan Milosevic and others; so it is not that our military interventions have been wasted. On the contrary—but we need to make sure that we get the maximum possible benefit from them and intervene in a smart way.

You have just published an impressive book on the role of the armed forces in democratic transitions.1 What inspired you in that effort?

Blair: It was my personal experiences. I served in the Pacific in 1998 through 2002 and watched Indonesia in particular go through a transition from an autocratic government to a

Dennis Cutler Blair is the former United States Director of National Intelligence and is a retired United States Navy admiral.
democratic system of government; and watching the Indonesian armed forces both partially lead that effort and partially be dragged along with it. I realized that I could have done a better job when I was Commander in Chief of U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC); that I could have been better informed about civil-military dynamics in that country. I could have played a stronger role in my interaction with the Indonesian armed forces. The Philippines were also going through troubles at that time – there was the so-called EDSA II Movement, similar to the one that ousted Ferdinand Marcos years earlier, and I realized thinking back over it that senior military officers – in fact all military leaders, can contribute to helping other countries move towards democracy. At a minimum they can keep from gumming it up in our military relations.

Often our military relations are one of the more powerful bonds we have with other countries yet we do not use them as effectively as we should for this purpose. In addition I guess finally that promoting democratic development is probably the single most important long-term thing that the U.S. can do to make the world the kind of place that we, the U.S. and our friends, would like to live in. So that was the impetus for the book.

Now that you have surveyed historically a lot of other transitions in addition to those in the Pacific, is there any common trend or were there decision points that you found amongst those various examples that can tilt the quality of the armed forces engagement in one direction, say towards democratization or the other direction toward military autocracy?

Blair: I found there were several keys. I should say first that the role of outsiders – and military officers who work with other countries are definitely outsiders – is secondary to what is going on within the country itself when big movements are under way in countries that are experiencing a change in governance. So we shouldn’t delude ourselves that we can sit there like a master puppeteer and manipulate what is going on in these countries. However, what we can do is understand what is going on in the countries and have a much finer understanding of the role that the armed forces are playing within these countries; which generals and admirals are playing positive roles moving their countries towards democracy, and which are really playing negative roles and supporting dictators that are oppressing their people. We can cooperate better with other countries that have military contact with them. The U.S. has the most extensive engagement program worldwide, but other countries have historical ties that can be very important for individual countries. I think we also have to understand the roles that the armed forces play within their societies in these countries, which are quite different from what they are in established democracies. Understanding all of this – basically trying to help a country move to a more democratic system using the military to military bond that we all have who serve in uniform. I think our armed forces can play, if not a decisive, certainly a positive role. The one bar that you hear about is the notion that somehow we need these other countries for strategic military purposes and therefore we should not push them too hard on what kind of government they ought to have. This was certainly true in the Cold War; anybody who was a friend of ours against the Soviet Union was not looked at too hard in terms of its government. The modern equivalent of that situation are oil oil-producing countries or countries that are supporting the U.S. against terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda. What I found is that this is an over-simplistic contradiction. In fact, we can do both; we can work for gradual transition to democracy at the same time that we cooperate with these countries on common objectives, which are their objectives as well as ours.

Can I ask you to parse one part of the statement that you just made? You said that we should be sensitive to the different roles that militaries play in other countries vice
our own country. Could you elaborate that a little bit? What are some of the different roles played by militaries in our partner countries?

**Blair:** To an extent that we no longer grasp – since our independence history is 250 years in the past now – many of these countries won their independence in recent years through military force, and their armed forces feel they have a responsibility for how their country moves. It was true in virtually all the countries in Latin America for example. They obtained their freedom by military revolutions. In addition in many cases the armed forces are the best functioning, most organized, most advanced organizations within a country and therefore have both power and prestige. They feel a sense of responsibility for what goes on in their country, and have independent sources of power and prestige. These armed forces are in a much more powerful position in their countries than we are in ours. It is no good to simply say to them, “Subordinate yourselves to civilian control and give away power. Establish a ministry of defense. Give up all of your factories and other forms of economic enterprises that you run.” That advice will fall on deaf ears. You have to appeal to the military leaders’ sense of patriotism, the good side of their sense of responsibility for where their country goes, and convince them. And it’s not a difficult sell that both their armed forces, they personally, and their countries are better off under a more representative democratic system.

In your forthcoming book you refer to, and I quote, “Influencing the guys with the guns.” What kinds of skills should our armed forces try to develop and convey to foreign counterparts to influence the guys with the guns?

**Blair:** I think we have the skills on the influencing side. When you are with a military counterpart from any other country you have a lot in common. You probably joined your armed forces for roughly the same sorts of reasons. If you are navy officers, you have bonds, if you are an army officer you have bonds with an army officer. There is a certain sympathetic understanding just by the nature of being in the same profession. The key is to turn that influence and sometimes even friendship into convincing the other person that in the long run for himself, his service, and his country, a democratic system of government is the best. The underlying advantage that democracy has over a dictatorship from a military officer’s point of view is that democracy will not order you as a military officer out into the streets to gun down your fellow citizens, to support a government that is disliked by most of its citizens; and that is something that military officers just don’t want to do, as it goes against their basic ethic. On top of that, there is a series of ways that have been worked out for armed forces in democratic governments to play a respected, honored, and personally satisfying role without being in charge. We can point around the world to the waves of democratic development which have moved most of the world in that direction and talk to our counterparts in other countries and say, “Get on the tide of history, do the right thing for your country in the right way.”

How can we avoid the kinds of mistakes that have been made in the past, where for example the U.S. supported military leaders that became dictators?

**Blair:** I don’t think we are going to ever hit 100% in that category, or that every single military leader in a dictatorship will become a democracy advocate. However, I think we can be smarter if we look at it as a question, do our intelligence work, compare notes and know who these people are. In my own experience in Indonesia it was pretty clear that there were two factions within the Indonesian armed forces; one led by General Wiranto that was committed to democratic reforms; and one led by General Prabowo that was not. It turned out we had a lot more contact with General Prabowo.
than we did with General Wiranto, but what was needed was a recognition of which leader was better for the long-term goals that we thought were right in Indonesia, and to back that one and not the other. It is also a case of doing both things at one time. For example take the recent experience in Mali – although I don’t know all of the inside details. Apparently we trained a lieutenant colonel battalion commander and a very confident counter terrorism force and it turned out that he and most of his battalion conducted a coup against the government. We did the tactical training fine but either we didn’t evaluate, educate, or talk with him about these larger questions which I think should be carried along with all of the activities that we do. I think we need to be smart about identifying and then backing the people that we think are going to be good for their country in the long-term and certainly not support or even block those who are not.

In your book you point out and describe quite a few different mechanisms of military to military relations and tools available for promoting democratization of armed forces; confidence building visits, exchange programs, training and education, joint exercises, just to name a few. In your experience and in your analysis are there any that have worked more effectively than others or any that we should focus on as opposed to others?

Blair: I think the one that has had the best long-term payoff has been the presence of international students in our higher military education institutions, whether they are here at the National Defense University, the service war colleges, or at the staff colleges. The experiences of officers who come over and actually live in this country are an extremely important way to maximize influence. In the book I point out some ways that we can improve these experiences, but the basic idea is good. At the other end of the spectrum, [we need to influence] the actions of the armed forces during a government crisis in another country – Egypt was a recent example when it was pretty clear that President Mubarak was leaving and that the Egyptian armed forces were going to allow him to go. At that time there happened to be a high-ranking Egyptian military delegation here in Washington for meetings. So naturally the meetings with their counterparts included advice from American officers that they [Egyptian military leaders] needed to take the side of their own people, not the side of the dictator, and so on. However, my experience is that when you get to one of these crises it is rare that you have the right people with the right contacts in the right jobs to talk with counterparts. For instance, in my own case, as the Indonesian crisis was well underway when I became the Commander for PACOM, I didn’t yet have a personal bond with General Wiranto, General Prabowo, or with any of the others. I was trying to get to know them at the same time that I was trying to work with them. However, in the armed forces of the United States, there are many people who have friends in these countries and they maintain friendships over the years. I think we should form virtual joint task forces at the time of a crisis to bring in officers who know counterparts now in key jobs where the crisis is. My recommendation is – and I was able to do a little of this when I was on active duty, but much more can be done – to find the people who do have the contacts, the knowledge of the country but are often in other jobs at the time. Bring them on board. The task force can be headed by a Combatant Commander or by a team here in Washington or whichever way we want to do it, and use those contacts both for information and for influence. On both ends of the spectrum, I think we can up our game, if we realize that this is important and think about how to do it.

Going back to the role of the war colleges and National Defense University for example, is there anything that the joint professional military education system should be doing and anything that it should be developing to...
Blair: I think there are several things. One of them is that for all the international fellows – and this is true in the UK, France, and Australia as well as in the United States – we teach civil-military relations and the history of civil-military relations in our own country context; the American constitution, the American separation of powers, etc. These may not be the most relevant models to many other countries. In fact, I would say it is probably less relevant in the experiences of countries that have achieved their independence more recently. Instead they will have different structures to get to the same point, which is the right role of the armed forces in a democracy. In our seminars with international students we should teach and talk more generally about the principles of democracy. In the handbook, I lay out seven principles that are characteristic of the role of the armed forces within a democratic country; we should talk about those in general with many examples that are not American or Anglo-Saxon; places like Korea, Japan, Senegal, South Africa, and so on rather than what we have here. That’s number one. Number two is that officers from authoritarian countries don’t trust what they hear in the classroom; in their own classrooms they are given a lot of propaganda and what comes from the podium is pretty slanted to reflect the current regime’s views. When they sit in a classroom in one of our institutions they have this same sort of mistrust. What surveys have found they are impressed by and do pay attention to is what happens outside the wire. Many of them have host-families they are paired up with while they are here; they travel within the U.S.; and what we have learned from many surveys is what really makes an impression on them is how democracy actually works. We should emphasize this for the international students and have them meet successful ex-military officers now in business or working at non-profits, and show them this continuum of service to country that can transcend their time in uniform. Have them talk to defense reporters who in many cases make the military uncomfortable because they write about leaks and they break stories that we would just assume not be publicized. They are a part of this role of a democratic country controlling and using its armed forces. Have them talk to members of Congress and their staffs who are on authorization or appropriations committees. I think we need to widen and deepen this understanding of the essentials of the armed forces in a democratic society in a much more structured way with our international students than we do currently.

You mentioned several attributes of a military or armed forces within a democratic society; can you elaborate on those you feel are the most important attributes?

Blair: Sure, let me talk about them; they will take different forms in different countries, but these seem to be the primary attributes of organizational relationships with authorities that cement the armed forces into their role in the democratic society. Let me start with the human dimension; in democracies the armed forces have adequate pay, they have the respect of their citizens, they have a fair system for promotion. It seems obvious, but you find in dictatorships this is often not the case; and it matters to military officers. Another important attribute is that the mission of the armed forces is external defense; it is not internal suppression. If you look at the classic example of armies in communist countries, they were explicitly tools of a political party, not of the national government. To this day the People’s Liberation Army (in China) answers to the Central Committee (of the Communist Party), which is a party organization, not a national organization in China. Whenever the armed forces are used in democracies for internal missions, everything from humanitarian assistance to suppressing insurgencies, they must be under extremely careful legal and oversight constraints. They have a relatively free
hand in external missions – to attack the enemy and so on – but when they are used internally they are under a different, more careful and temporary set of measures and this is very important. In democratic countries there is a civilian Ministry of Defense that acts as a connective tissue between the high politics of a country and the actual military leaders. This is so that the armed forces are not reporting directly to the president and are not grading their own papers when it comes to budget requests and legal actions. There is a Minister of Defense appointed and confirmed in some fashion in his country that turns over all political direction into military orders and takes the military advice provided by the armed forces and makes sure it is injected into the political system. Building a competent Ministry of Defense turns out to be a more difficult task than you would think, especially in many newly independent countries that are created from scratch, but it is important to have that nonetheless. An open press that comments freely on the armed forces is really a backstop on other processes within the government. If you have a press that has experts on military affairs who are constantly running stories about it, you find that if bad things are going on within the military and are quickly exposed, things are brought to light that might not normally see the light, and that’s a good thing. The role of the legislature in overseeing the military is also very important in a democracy. A legislature should not only approve a defense budget, but it should have some expertise and the time and skill to look at the military pieces (of legislation). In many dictatorships there are rubberstamps parliamentary organizations that simply approve what the government puts in; in a democracy the legislature knows what it is doing when it passes the budget and has oversight responsibilities. In addition, the legislature should at a minimum approve senior officers; they should be proposed by the executive branch, but they should have to be confirmed by some form of a legislative branch. Finally, there must be a military justice system, which is integrated into the overall justice system for the country. You find in many autocratic countries, the military justice system is completely self-sustained and is run by the armed forces. It is not connected to the overall justice system of the country. In a democratic system the military legal system cannot be a self-contained, but must be governed by laws passed by the legislature, and have an appeal system outside the armed forces. Those are some of the major elements, and as you can tell just by my description of them, these are not things you can just snap your fingers and whistle up if you have been under a dictatorship for years or decades. In fact many of these things are the hardest to establish in a newly democratizing country, and the lack of them is often what will allow a country to slip back into a more repressive form of government for a period of time. In many cases of military democratic development there are bumps and starts for a period of years; it doesn’t happen miraculously after one demonstration in the town square.

Some of the developments you are describing are cultural and social and very definitely long-term which raises the question, is this kind of effort we are discussing – military to military relations to help armed services of partner countries contribute to democratization in their own country – is that a form of state-building?

Blair: I think it is in the long run. It is a good form of state building. I’m not one who subscribes to the McDonalds theory of democracy; that no two countries that have a McDonalds have ever fought a major war. We have tremendous differences of viewpoint and good strong debates with other democracies around the world. By encouraging democracy around the world, I’m not thinking that this is going to make the role of the U.S. easy in the world, but I think we find over time that those countries that are democratic in their form of government are ones that the U.S. can work with and help us form the kind of world where all of our citizens achieve the things that are important
to them. The needs [of people] to rise according to their merits, the freedoms an individual has, the respect that minorities have, these are the things that we should be working for. I think that military relations can contribute to that long-term goal.

As you said, in many countries the military is the most powerful, best-established, most functional organization in the country. What would you think about the militaries of our partner countries engaging in other internal roles, not internal suppression, but infrastructure development, public education, public health, and those kinds of activities?

Blair: I think that when you look at the development of countries around the world, the armed forces have often played a very important role. One of the ones that I wasn’t aware of until I did the research for this book was Senegal, which has a very impressive team. The general in charge of the armed forces and the president [at independence] realized that the armed forces had capabilities in construction, health, and education, and they explicitly turned them (the armed forces) to the task of improving the country. The Senegalese armed forces built bridges in remote areas where no private contractor could go. They established hospitals in areas in which the civilian universities were not educating doctors. I think when it is done as an explicit task under controls, funded by the legislature and openly done; I think it is an important consideration.

We have also seen areas in which it has boomeranged and one of those has been the Philippines. For example, the armed forces were thrown into the fight against insurgent forces around the Philippine islands and found that in many cases they were the only ones fighting the insurgencies, that local government officials were corrupt or didn’t care. And this made the officers very cynical—indeed it fueled their feeling that they needed to mount coups and change the government. It is important that when you turn the armed forces to the task of helping the country that they are not the only ones doing it and it is not done as a substitute for these other parts that the government needs to be doing. So it is important, but it needs to be done right.

Since we are talking about a form of state-building, and a range of internal engagements, when the U.S. military is engaging with their counterparts how should they divide the labor between U.S. military and the civilian agencies that have been more traditionally engaged in development and state-building such as the State Department and USAID.

Blair: That question has been a big one ever since the end of the Cold War, in these 20 years that we have been involved in combat operations, and then rebuilding operations in other countries. We have plenty of very good examples and we have plenty of pretty bad examples. I think that what we’ve learned is that the use of actual military forces to accomplish a particular civilian civil task should be quite limited. If you need a bridge to get to an area where food has to be distributed, that is something that the Seabees or their equivalents in other services could do. If you need to get grain to a starving part of a country, then put it on C-130s and get it there. It is pretty limited and short term compared to the development needs of even the smallest country. In fact, if you look at what can actually be done by outside groups in these areas, again the inherent capacity of outsiders to come in and actually do things is pretty limited compared to the needs of people. The real key is to build the capacity of a country to undertake these activities themselves. In addition, if outsiders do these things [initially] at some point there needs to be a transition to the people in that country doing it, and the more that is done by the outsiders the more difficult it is to make that transition. In general, you should be limited in the number of things done either by the foreign military forces or by other outside forces in a country. You should
push very hard trying to help the local sector, both government and private, to do it. What this means is that you need to have a longer time horizon. Many international efforts to put countries back on their feet are driven by getting this done in a few months or years and then moving on to other ones. It is just very difficult to build the kind of sustainable capacity for these things in that short a time. I think we need to, back to my answer in your first question, be realistic about time frames, capabilities, and their importance as we go into these situations. The armed forces can play a role, but I think their primary roles in most of these situations we have been talking about are to provide security and then to help security forces in that country provide security. These are essential so that non-military functions can resume.

Admiral Blair I want to thank you for this conversation, but before we conclude I would like to ask you if you would like to share any additional insights or any other alibies from your forthcoming book?

Blair: The single most important thing we can do in this regard is to place the support to a democratic transition up as a high priority for our military relations. If we give that direction to our Combatant Commands, to our military colleges, to our commanders who are going out visiting countries or doing exercises, to our sergeants and non-commissioned officers who are working in many countries around the world, and if we work with the other democracies as partners in this venture, then the great officers and non-commissioned officers and troops in our armed forces and those of the other democracies will go to town on it and really do it well. I think it is really a case of not being seduced by this idea that you can either have oil or you can have democracy, you can either have a good counter terrorist program or you can have democracy, but to place democratic development as a high priority is the key and then good things will follow after that. PRISM

Notes

In 2010 you co-authored an article “Fixing Intel;” what was wrong with intel when you wrote that article?

Flynn: When I looked at the intelligence system, as the Chief Intelligence Officer for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces Afghanistan in 2009, I realized that for us to be successful with President Obama’s new population-centric strategy we had to refocus on the right aspects of the environment. We were focused to a large degree – I would say 95 percent – on the enemy networks (e.g. Taliban, the Haqqani Network, etc.). We had tremendous fidelity on those issues because we had been studying them for years. What we quickly realized was that we had no knowledge, no real understanding of the various tribal elements within Afghanistan. We had to understand the cultures that existed, the dynamics of the type of government that we were trying to support and the population centers in which we were actually operating. We honestly did not have any deep understanding of any of that. We were trying to figure out who was who, from the local governments on up to the national government, and we did not have any captured data, information or knowledge. We did not have that real depth of understanding that we had in other places – in Iraq it took us a while to get there. Those conditions led me and two colleagues to sit down and put our thoughts together to say we needed to do something different. We needed to completely realign our focus to the population and to the build out of the Afghan National Security Forces. We outlined the color system: the red, the white, the green, and the blue. The red was the enemy; white was the population; green was Afghan National Security Forces; and blue was us. We had a really good picture of the red and the blue, but we had no picture of the green or the white, and it was really stunning. So, we decided to put our thoughts down on paper.
That article had fifty thousand downloads within a fairly short time. Would you consider, three years later, that intel is now “fixed?”

Flynn: No. In fact, just the phrase “intel fix” is flawed. Intel is constantly changing because the environment is constantly changing. Because of the new initiatives that were put in place in CONUS and in Afghanistan and changes at various training centers (such as the Army’s Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana; the Army Training Center; the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California; the Marine Corps training Centers, both at Pendleton and Lejeune), when units arrived in Afghanistan they were able to adjust to understanding the local population, the Afghan National Security Forces, and the governance that we were trying to help support. We also sought to continue to understand the enemy that we were facing, and the Civilian Operations Intel Centers (COIC) that we created were very helpful for the ISAF Joint Command (IJC). But ultimately, intel is not yet fixed. We are better at it, but it is a constantly changing environment.

What are the obstacles to fixing it? To fixing the flawed processes?

Flynn: The number one obstacle is culture; our challenge is changing the mindset of our military forces. Our military forces — Marines and our Soldiers, principally — know that they are coming into a combat environment and that it is a dangerous environment, so they have to focus on the enemy. But in order to be successful and in order to actually shift the environment back to the Afghans, we have to understand the population in which we are operating. We also have to understand the Afghan National Security Forces that we were building and then incorporating into that environment. That task was really a difficult thing for many of our forces to come to grips with. Culture was probably the most difficult thing for us, specifically our culture and getting us to think differently about how we operate within the environment. If there is a lesson learned from this whole decade of war, it is that our failure to understand the operational environment actually led to a mismatch in resources and capabilities on the battlefield and how we applied them. Once we got over the hurdle of culture and asked – “Why do we have to do this?” – people who actually understood the problem realized this mismatch. In some cases, commanders made the change because commanders can change the training, and they can change how the military trains forces to prepare, advise, and assist. So instead of combat forces, which are what we had in the 2009-2010 timeframe, we shifted to advising and assisting forces. These require much more knowledge of the white and the green, which has been our whole focus in these last couple of years.

Our conversation has focused on Afghanistan and by implication, Iraq. Would you say that these problems you identified in 2010 and the solutions you are discussing now are globally applicable?

Flynn: Absolutely. “Fixing Intel” has been translated into a couple of different languages, one of which is Russian. Since the article was published, I have spoken and worked with partner nations on this issue, and now other nations are incorporating those ideas into their own country and regional contexts. We all have to understand the human environment
inside the boundaries of individual countries and inside this seemingly boundary-less world we now find ourselves. There is another application of “Fixing Intel,” which is integration of intelligence operations and law enforcement operations. We have spoken to law enforcement agencies about how they work with intelligence and they actually are, in many cases, applying the principals found in “Fixing Intel.” The article has had a broad impact.

One of your priorities coming to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was the institutionalization of intercultural analysis. What motivated you to make that a priority? And how have you approached integrating those capabilities within the DIA and the broader intelligence enterprise?

Flynn: This is a really interesting field because it has come out within the last 10 years, and for me personally intercultural analysis has had an impact, which is why I am making such a big deal about this. Over the last 30 or 40 years, there have been serious changes and the shifts in the societies and the demographics of some of the most difficult places where we operate, including Central Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and Southeast Asia. Specifically, I think about the regions of Africa, North Africa, the Sahel, and the central African states. In some of these places there are challenges with governance, challenges with lack of governance, challenges with under-governed sanctuaries where militias exist, challenges where insurgents exist, and challenges from terrorists who can protect themselves – all compounded by the huge growth in populations over the last 30 to 40 years. So we have under-governed nations with large segments of populations – populations comprised of a lot of young men, but with not-so-huge economies – that are going to turn to things such as transnational crime, narcotics, human smuggling, weapons smuggling, the kinds of negative trends that converge, that we then have to understand and then deal with. So the convergence of terrorism, the convergence of insurgent groups, the convergence of militia groups that are all coming together, as well as these transnational, organized, well-funded criminal activities, have not just regional impacts but global aspects that we have to confront. So the advent of socio-cultural analysis, the understanding of the human domain and the human environment is critical to our ability to be able to operate, support, engage and partner with some of these countries. Also, when we look back at ourselves, we have to consider how we design the force, how we structure our forces and the capabilities that we need to operate in this new, rapidly changing environment. I will tell you that intelligence, special operations forces, and cyber are three components that we want to apply in very different ways in this “Phase Zero” or pre-conflict environment. There are aspects of all three of these capabilities that I think, if blended together, can help us stay out of conflict and help other nations protect themselves.

Are we now systematically collecting intel on populations and local socio-political dynamics in regions of interest?

Flynn: I would not use the word systematically, but I would say that we are prioritizing the kinds of collection that we need in order to understand the environment. We are also working with new, and expanding our existing coalitions or allied partnerships in different
ways. We are definitely sharing information with many more new partners these days than we ever did in the past. This is information that is readily available to us, and our intelligence capabilities have matured to a point where we are very capable of gathering this kind of information and then working with our close partners, analyzing and assessing an environment, so we can help some of these partner countries do different things with that information. For example, we now understand the best places to begin health projects, the best places to build schools, and the best places to conduct irrigation projects where segments of populations exist without tribal boundaries. We have to be careful, because we, in our culture, think that if we want to get two tribes to work together, we should build a well right in the middle – but that is not necessarily what we should do. Instead, we should give them the shovels and give them the wherewithal to be able to build their own wells. They know how to dig. So in fact, the answer to your question is yes, and I think it is going to help us out quite a bit in the future.

What is the relationship between intel and open-source information? And how can the two be seamed together to give national security policy-makers a better, more holistic understanding?

Flynn: Open-source information is one of the misunderstood capabilities. Intelligence is analyzed information: it can be information reported by sensitive human intelligence, sensitive signals intelligence, sensitive geospatial intelligence, or even open-source information—which there is a lot more of these days, far more than there is of all those other types of information that I just mentioned. To become actionable and useful, open-source information is then analyzed and turned into intelligence to provide the meaning of all this noise out there in the environment. Speaking from my own experiences, 10 years ago 80 percent to 90 percent of what I provided to my commanders when I was a division or army corps G-2 or JTFJ-2, of intelligence would come from sensitive intelligence sources. Approximately 10 percent, maybe even 20 percent would come from the open-source environment. But today, that has completely reversed. Today – and I am guessing a little bit, but I have seen some hard data on this – about 70 percent to 80 percent of what I am providing to decision-makers is actually coming from the open world. The sensitive information is really at about 20 percent to 30 percent. It has completely reversed in about a decade. Think about how social media sites like Facebook did not exist until about 2005; today there are more than a billion people using Facebook. Twitter was simply a sound in 2005; today it is how people are communicating. We have all these new media for information creating noise; I can follow Twitter on my personal iPad and see volumes of activity. Being in the intelligence field, I need to be able to incorporate those kinds of information feeds and turn the information into intelligence and give decision-makers meaning to what is happening in the environment. That is a huge change. I have grown up in a closed-loop system, and for 20 years of my career that was probably okay, but now we are in a completely open world, a far more open world than we have ever seen, and the intel community’s closed-loop system has to adjust. We have to adjust to this new open world. If we do not adjust, then we are missing what these new voices are telling us.
How does that particular change, the exponential increase in the number, the magnitude, the volume of information sources, complicate the intel community’s work?

Flynn: It is an immense complication; there is so much information. We create as much information in an hour today as we could download in all of 2004; that shows the magnitude of information that we are able to absorb. Now we really have to scope that information, to figure out what it all means, because most people will say, “How do you know what you’re doing? Is there too much of it out there?” The huge amount of information really does require us to do a lot more prioritizing and to be much more precise in whatever we are looking for. In the past we could get away with very imprecise Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR). We could get away with less-precise questions just 10 years ago, maybe even five years ago. Today, you cannot get away with imprecise questions. Our ability to get precision out of all the noise, out of this scale of information, is much better if our questions are more targeted and precise.

The other aspect of this complication is how technology helps the analyst in this new environment. We are currently developing our outreach primarily to private industry. We are developing technological tools that allow us to do much better triaging of information and information feeds that are coming in. We are now vastly better than we were as recently as three or four years ago. I was in Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010, and as we sit here today I see that that environment, as well as our technological abilities, have rapidly developed to help our analysts get and contextualize all of this information. How do we figure out what it all means? There is some technology that helps our analysts with that, but it still takes a uniquely-skilled, well-trained, intelligence profession to be able to decipher what it all means.

In this environment, is institutional stove-piping – or compartmentalization – still a problem?

Flynn: Stove-piping is less of a problem, but it is still a problem. We are better; we have made great progress in integrating our capabilities, in integrating our people. We still have some challenges in integrating our technologies, in integrating our communication systems. In the past there was some intention not to share; that is no longer the case. The intention is now to share instead of attempting to work in our own little system. There are still some hurdles because there are still some very sensitive things that need to stay sensitive. But the leadership, from the president on down, has every intention to increase the sharing of information and intelligence. We are working on building bridges to each other in our own systems, in our communications capabilities, and in how we put processes in place to ensure that we are sharing everything that we possibly can. Because I am asked sometimes, “What do you think are the biggest threats out there?” I believe that the biggest threat to the United States and our intelligence capabilities is our inability to work together. I think that everybody recognizes that if we do not work together, we are going to have failures in our systems. I would say 99.9 percent of people would say, “Absolutely. We want to work together. We want to integrate. We want to build the systems – to put the systems in place so we can work together better, and share information.” But there are going to be things
that are going to happen and we are going to find breakdowns or weaknesses in our system; but it is no longer intentional.

**Does that intention to share extend beyond the intelligence community to other agencies as well? Or is it restricted to the intelligence community?**

**Flynn:** Within the U.S. government, there are non-intel community partners with whom we have done a lot of great work. One thing that is not really well-known is our work with what we call the Non-Title 50 (NT50) crowd, which includes the Department of Commerce, Department of Agriculture, Federal Communications Commission, Social Security Administration, and Transportation Administration. One of the benefits of having the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) is that they have discovered this other segment of our government that has an enormous footprint globally. The Department Health and Human Services, for example, monitors health and disease worldwide and DIA’s National Center for Medical Intelligence is working much more closely with such organizations. On the operational side of our military forces, I would say that the fusion of intelligence and operations is probably one of the biggest lessons learned out of the last decade of war. We are trying to incorporate that lesson in our operational activities both in CONUS and around the world. We see this all the time in exercises, combat deployments and conflict deployments.

You spoke about the integration of socio-political, cultural intelligence within the intel community. To what extent are we collecting information and creating intelligence dealing with non-state actors, particularly transnational illicit networks?

**Flynn:** This is difficult for defense intelligence. Defense intelligence is about understanding nation-state militaries and their capabilities, their intentions, their doctrine, their organization, and their leadership. What you are asking about reflects a really different dynamic that we are facing in the world today. It is not that transnational, organized crime was not around in the past—the mafia in the early part of the last century was a transnational, criminal organization—but the growth of this threat (and not just in terms of the scale and the dimensions, but also how well-funded many of these organizations are) is a new dynamic. They are funding things like militia groups, terrorist organizations, and other aspects of the environment, such as the global flow of narcotics and weapons. Weapons smuggling is a huge gray and black market driven by large sums of money and very interdependent and interconnected criminal organizations that are creating real havoc in some regions of the world and challenging countries to stand up strong governments to deal with these organizations. Consequently, on the defense side of intelligence and for intelligence in general, we are going to have to make some decisions about how much we prioritize and how many resources we put against these kinds of organizations. These non-state actors are absolutely impacting the ability of nation-states to do their jobs, to govern and to provide security, and to provide the wherewithal for the people living in a contiguous country. It is really difficult.

What concerns me, particularly in times of austerity when we are emphasizing
partnership and building partner capacity, is how these illicit networks impact the security of our partners; countries like Mexico, like El Salvador, the Middle Eastern countries…

Flynn: And I would just add, not to identify one country over another, but even in our own country and in our big cities there are transnational, organized criminal groups. Narcotics and other illicit networks now flow through all parts of the world. In West Africa, for example, all of the countries from Nigeria to Morocco are engaged—and in Southeast Asia, too. I just came back from Jakarta, where I spent a week with all of my counterparts, essentially about 20 nations’ defense military intelligence officers, and we were not talking about big battles at sea, big air operations. We were talking about the kinds of issues we’ve are talking about right now. We were talking about how we can deal with these criminal enterprises because they are affecting us like a cancer inside of our system, and we have to deal with it. We have to put the right medical application against it; we have to use the right kinds of tools to be able to rip it out of the system or at least stamp it down so it does not spread. It can really make things worse for a particular country as it is trying to govern its own population because these networks can be truly devastating.

The conventional wisdom has it that venally-motivated, transnational criminal organizations would not work with ideologically-motivated, terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda. To what extent do you think that those two separate kinds of organizations; the criminal organizations versus the ideologically-driven, terrorist organizations and insurgency movements, are converging? Is convergence a reality?

Flynn: Yes, convergence is a reality. The statement you began with is completely false: there are plenty of facts out there, and you could do a really good open-source survey of a lot of data that exists, clearly linking terrorist organizations. I define terrorist organizations as non-state actors, regional militias that are definitely causing problems inside of a region and in some cases, taking over whole regions. It depends on where we want to talk about, but whether it is on the continent of Africa, in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, Central America or South America, terrorists are dealing with transnational, organized, extremely well-funded, criminal cartels who are helping them smuggle human beings, narcotics, and weapons. Anything that has a price on it, these groups are working together to traffic it. I think that the convergence you are describing is in fact happening faster than we are realizing it. I think that during the first half of this century we are going to see more and more of this. I see it certainly in our intelligence assessments. I think it is something that we are going to have to make some decisions about from a military perspective, concerning how we organize to protect and provide security for this nation in the next 50 years.

So do the changes that we have been talking about suggest to you that the nature of conflict, the nature of war, the nature of defense, the nature of national security is evolving?

Flynn: I would say that we are going to have to be incredibly agile if we continue to stay the way we are. It is important to always
have something in the tool bag—the military tool bag—to beat the existential threats that are out there. But how many tools do we need? Those are the issues being addressed by the Department of Defense. I believe that we are going to be more and more involved in these types of conflicts that we have seen over the last 40 years—from the early 1960s all the way through the last decade. So whether it will be just one way of war that the United States must prepare for, or whether it is the new way of war, I have a difficult time sitting here telling you precisely that that is going to be it. What I see, back to this idea of convergence, is our way of life being assaulted every single day, and it is not necessarily being assaulted by nation states. Actors who are gaining capability and learning the world of cyber – another converging activity in this non-nation-state world – are assaulting us. “Hacktivists” that in some cases work individually, and in other cases work collectively, are damaging our critical infrastructure. Cyber threats are another form of convergence because a hacktivist that steals money from the banking system and then funds threats in the physical world must be dealt with in a whole new way. From our little world here at DIA, we are actually looking at a completely new model for training our intelligence analysts. We are going to run a six-month pilot to learn how we can train analysts for the future. We have to start somewhere because it is no longer about order of battle (how many tanks, how many planes, the size of the air field, etc.); it is now about the sociocultural dynamics of an environment. For instance, how many militias are out there; how many tribes exist and what they are doing; what is the size; what is the scale of the tribes and how many countries are there within a region. They do not see themselves with borders. The borders created post-WWI or post-WWII do not exist for many people anymore.

How has our intel helped national leaders understand the current crises of the day, such as in Syria, Libya, and Mali?

Flynn: I think we have definitely helped our national security leadership understand what is happening, but I think we are still somewhat reactive. Figuratively speaking, after the punch has been thrown, we know what happened, or what is happening. As long as we are able to absorb that punch, which we have been able to do in the past, being in a reactive mode is doable. We can then provide better advice and assistance to help decision-makers make better decisions – to give them an advantage. What we are still really struggling with is preventing strategic surprise, which is part of DIA’s mission for the Defense Department. Years ago, we were able to measure activities and events in months, if not years in some cases, and over the last decade that measurement began to shift to days. Strategic surprise is now measured in days, possibly weeks, but we are still dealing with the advent of what is going on in Egypt and Syria. Egypt went through a change of government that took place in about 10 days. Trying to understand what was happening—judging it, assessing it, getting the community to figure out collectively whether we agree or disagree—proved our own processes may not be as agile as they need to be in this world where information bombards us. Our organization and our mindset still measures in the longer period of time, so we have to create a mindset and a culture that operates in a much more agile manner. We have to move to a decision, or at least
move to an assessment to enable a decision, much more quickly so decision-makers have more time. The less time they have, the fewer options they have.

So perhaps we could say, as you wrote in an article that PRISM published, “We haven’t yet gotten left of bang.” Another of your priorities when you came here was to create a defense clandestine service. Why is it important that the Department of Defense have its own clandestine service and has there been any pushback to that idea?

Flynn: The Defense Department has always had a human intelligence component in the department’s overall structure. One of the major lessons learned from certainly the last 10 years, if not the last 20 years, is that we need a “fingertip feel” of the environment. We absolutely need to have, well-trained, culturally-attuned, language-capable individuals out there in the operating environment who can help us better understand what is going on in these operating environments, not only as military forces but as partners. We stood up the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS), which is an outcome of our former defense HUMINT service. It is a mindset change that is far more integrated with our national partners at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and concentrated more overseas than in CONUS. We are shifting to a more overseas-oriented operation, and we are changing the cultural and the language requirements. DCS is a much more integrated force. I believe in the next couple of years it will be a much more effective force. We have encountered huge hurdles, but there is huge value in this capability, as we have done over this past year, and we have received support from many once-skeptical members of the U.S. Congress. I think we have won more and more of them over as we have begun to demonstrate that we are much more integrated; we have a much more disciplined system in place; we are getting more and more people trained at the right levels; and we are creating opportunities for ourselves in the future. When I say opportunities, I am not just referring to opportunities for the individuals, but also to opportunities for the security of this nation, for the Defense Department and for some of the new strategies that we have. We are dealing with a doctrine of anti-access area denial, and that kind of a doctrine requires that those people who are forward deployed understand the defense requirements we must acquire. The more value we demonstrate, the lower those hurdles become and the less we are challenged in building this capability. If we want to stay “left of the bang,” we absolutely need well-trained, culturally-attuned people in these environments to be able to understand what is happening out there and then feed that back into the system. We are doing this particularly on the defense side. We have a lot of defense partners in other countries with whom we have always worked, and so we absolutely want to further those relationships using this capability. The Defense Department can do that far better than many others in this business.
An Interview with
Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III

How do you interpret the President’s intention with respect to the strategic shift to Asia and the Pacific? What do you think he means by that?

Locklear: When we put out the new strategic guidance, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” in early 2012, there was a fair amount of deliberation among all aspects of the government including the Defense Department, the National Security Council, and the President. This discussion followed a decade or two of the type of operations we had been doing in the Middle East. We wanted to understand if we had the right prism to reshape our force, reshape our thinking, and reshape our planning. And I think we got it about right. I thought that before I was the PACOM commander, when I was in my last position in Europe and in NATO. So it’s not just about where I’m currently sitting. If you take a look at the next century, and where the interests of our children and our grandchildren will be most impacted, all the vectors point to Asia, the Indo-Asian Pacific region.

What do you think are the major threats to international security or to national security emanating from Asia and the Pacific?

Locklear: You’ve got to start the hierarchy of threats with those that directly threaten the homeland. From a military perspective, certainly the most pressing is the nuclearization of North Korea and their ability to develop delivery systems that would not only threaten the Korean peninsula, but the Asia-Pacific region, and even the United States. We can’t really underestimate the strategic importance or the danger of that scenario. That has to be solved. The question for our future security is how we see this playing out from this third generation of North Korean kings, and it’s not getting any better.
How would you assess the stability of North Korea in this third generation of kings?

Locklear: The North Korean regime and the country are a pretty dark space as far as being able to assess exactly what is happening there. That is probably a strength of the regime – to keep their own people in the dark and the rest of the world sequestered from what happens in there. My sense is that the new leader has been able to take a relatively good handle on the leadership role. He appears to be fully in power. I believe what will fundamentally undermine him in the long run is that he is out of touch with the rest of the world. His people are not well fed; they are not generally well-attuned to what is going on in the world. They are denied the types of liberties and freedoms that most of the world enjoys today, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. They are not integrated in the international marketplace. If you look at South Korea, it has a thriving economy and democracy. People are moving on in South Korea, but in North Korea, they are frozen in time. In terms of stability, there is always speculation that it is going to collapse. I do not see that happening anytime soon based on the way the regime manages the country. But, I think there are indicators that are very disconcerting. On average, half the population receives 800 calories a day, and the medical care is poor. But I don’t know if the problems are so grave as to cause a regime collapse anytime soon.

Middle East watchers might have said the same of Egypt, Libya and Syria ten years ago. If we can speculate say ten years down the line, can you envision a collapse of the North Korean regime, following which we would have U.S. troops on the ground?

Locklear: I think that we need to plan with our allies who would be impacted for a number of possibilities. One of those possibilities is a rapid regime change, or a collapse of regime, or a disaster in the country that causes the regime to lose control. First, humanitarian issues will need to be addressed. Weapons of mass destruction would need to be managed and controlled, otherwise they would be subject to proliferation or loss of control. This would not be the sole responsibility or role of U.S. forces, but an international community approach in which the U.S. would certainly play a role, and U.S. forces would possibly play a role.

The defense strategic guidance of 2012 that you referred to directs us to expand our network of cooperation with emerging partners throughout the Asia-Pacific region to ensure collective capabilities and capacity for securing common interests. What kind of progress has PACOM made towards that goal?

Locklear: We are making good progress, but it’s a complex environment. The region includes 52 percent of the world, 36 countries, and the largest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia. There isn’t a central security mechanism that manages the flow of bilateral-historical relationships, bilateral emerging relationships, or multilateral forums within the region.

Taking a look at the shared challenges, this is where the U.S. has an opportunity to build partnership capacity. In 2012, the President provided guidance that focused on refreshing and renewing alliances for this century. Because of this, there is a concerted effort across all parts of government and the DOD, including through our military-to-military
partnerships, to see those alliances and how they fit into the security architecture in the next 30, 40, or 50 years. To some degree that in itself is building partnership capacity.

Take a look at our five formal alliance partners: Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines, and Thailand. In one way or another we are at different stages with each, of improving our ability to work together, working together on command-and-control, promoting shared interests in the security environment, forming access agreements, improving exercises, etc.

So with our allies I think we have a good plan. We are planning together, and we do that very deliberately. As it relates to other partners in the region, we are at various levels depending on the history or the background/relationships the U.S. has with them. We have some strategic partnerships such as with Singapore, who we have a very good partnership and friendship with, and partnership capacity building is already built into that relationship. In other areas, Indonesia, Malaysia, Oceana, China, all the ASEAN countries, depending on our mutually shared interests, we are pursuing capacity building in both directions.

**Are there any U.S. partners in the region that require significant or more help than others to shore them up and to help them to help us?**

**Locklear:** They all have their own individual security concerns. We are working to renew our relationship with the Philippines by better understanding what more we can do to help them develop a minimal credible defense. In developing this partnership, we are trying to develop our parameters of responsibility and resources within their plan. To be clear, the Philippines have a good plan. They understand what they need. We understand where it is that we can help them and we are just working through some issues of how to go forward. In the Philippines there is always a concern of going back to the past, and we don’t want to go back to the past. We want to move the relationship into the future. And that means that we need to build the type of access and relationships that allow us to help them with their defense, not detract from it.

**What about Indonesia? As you mentioned, it’s the largest Muslim country and recently transitioned from the Suharto regime to a democratic regime. What kind of relationship are we building with them on the military side?**

**Locklear:** We are building a good relationship. There was a period of time when it wasn’t as productive as it could have been. However, I believe the Indonesians have made very good progress in areas of concern such as human rights practices within their military and special operations community. I have recommended that we continue to step up our military-to-military engagement. The Indonesians will have a big role to play not only in Southeast Asia, but all of Asia as they grow economically and in influence. They, like all Asian countries in this last half of this past century and the early part of this century, are beginning to focus more on external security than internal security.

**Do you think that Indonesia has the capacity in the near future to become a security exporter?**
Locklear: Well, it depends on how far you talk about exporting it. I think they have a potential to be a real net provider of security in their sphere.

Many developing regions are confronting a lack of capacity across the board, not just military, but in their planning ministries, economic ministries, and generally throughout their civilian services. Some countries are finding that their militaries are the most functional institutions they have, which leads to the suggestion by some that they should be using their military to bolster their national economic development, education and public health systems, and even build infrastructure. Would you support those kinds of internal roles for the Indonesian military or the Philippine military?

Locklear: It’s really up to each country how they structure their government organizations to provide public services. I believe that the model we use in our country is a good model. We rely heavily on other elements of government power to provide internal security and internal support. Mixing that with military, other than in cases of real emergency, I think adds complications to the way you manage your military. The system of civilian and military separation that works for us could probably work for them.

South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan had prolonged periods of military autocracy in the 20th century, and yet emerged as economic superpowers and very robust democracies. Do you think that there are any lessons we should derive from those earlier periods of military autocracy as we look at other countries in transition like Burma or Indonesia?

Locklear: In general, military autocracies don’t have good luck historically. The military should have a limited role in the way the affairs of a nation are conducted. It should be in my view, confined to providing the overall security that allows the other elements of government power to work. In our own country, if you affirm the oath that we all take, it is to the constitution. It’s not to a party, a king, or anything else. It’s to the constitution. The constitution I would argue is not a perfect document and never has been; but it is the fabric that defines the checks and balances in our government. What the military provides to some degree is a defensive security network that allows that democratic architecture to work. So we encourage our partners, who are trying to shape their militaries and the roles and responsibilities of their militaries, to put it in the context of the “enabler” for security. It shouldn’t be the thing that runs your government.

When PACOM engages with other countries in what we might call security sector reform, do you work closely with civilian agencies, U.S. agencies, like the State Department or USAID on those kinds of projects?

Locklear: Yes, absolutely. In the theater most of the nations in my area of responsibility already have mature forms of government and most are functioning adequately. In fact some of them are functioning very well, with the exceptions of outliers like North Korea and a few that are smaller that may be struggling.

To strengthen U.S. influence in this part of the world, we have to come at it with an inter-agency plan, even though we may talk about U.S. military power and moving more military
assets into the theater. The rebalance strategy that the President proposed is much, much more than just military. Our success will depend on the ability to understand how and when military power most effectively influences the other aspects of government and national power, particularly in the Asia-Pacific where they all have to work together.

Are you getting the kind of collaboration with the U.S. civilian agencies in your AOR that you were hoping for?

Locklear: Yes. Because of the size of the U.S. military, and our ability to plan, organize and execute (that’s what militaries do well) we can be supportive. Not that the civilian organizations don’t do those things well, but a large part of what we do is planning and we have the resources to dedicate to planning. The relationships with the interagency developed by bringing civilian agencies into those planning constructs are important; and it is important for the military to lead that process when necessary to ensure that the dialogue happens within a planning construct. The military has the broadest planning construct, particularly in the PACOM AOR. We have a theater campaign plan that goes out about five years that looks at how we interact with each country in the AOR and what the goals and objections are, not only from a U.S. perspective, but a regional perspective, an alliance perspective, and a multilateral perspective. It looks at each of the countries in the AOR and how they fit together through a variety of different lenses. There are inputs from State and our Embassy teams. I view the 27 or so ambassadors in my AOR as my customers. The defense attaches that work for them, work for me as well. I place them in the embassies and resource them to provide insight from the embassy teams on how to use the elements of military power to synchronize with the other elements of national power. USAID, the State Department, Interior, Homeland Security, FBI, CIA… They all have a role in this plan.

Some argue that civilian agencies should be included on the COCOM staffs and that they add the necessary perspectives for successful foreign policy initiatives in the region. Do you have civilian agency personnel on your staff? And are there any problems integrating them in?

Locklear: I do have some on my staff. My command team consists of me, my Deputy, and my foreign policy advisor who is from the State Department, and is either a former ambassador or future ambassador. That position is vital to me because it provides me with a personal link to what Secretary Kerry and the State Department are doing. And that is the first and most important position. The next important position on my staff is my J-9; and embedded in that organization are my outreach or in-reach embeds from various agencies, such as the Department of Energy, Department of Agriculture. I also have representatives from the CIA, FBI, DIA, and Coast Guard. And in the development of this theater cooperation plan, they have a huge role.

To what extent have you developed the concept of Phase Zero planning in your theater plan?

Locklear: I am beginning to think that the world has moved beyond the Phase Zero, Phase One, Phase Two, and Phase Three planning mentality. That construct isn’t flexible
enough for the theater that I am in. Phase Zero would indicate stability, but Phase One would indicate deterrence. So we are in Phase One in some places and Phase Zero in other parts of the AOR, and it could change at any minute. To think of your plan as just maintaining day-to-day stability misses the point.

We go deterrence phase with North Korea about every six months. I am walking away from the term Phase Zero although the rest of the joint community teaches and uses it. What I look at is how you manage a complex theater across multiple phases that aren’t clear at any particular time, particularly concerning where you are in those various phases. The bottom line is to look at your theater cooperation plan, at all the things you do and invest in. We have aligned that plan to look at all these countries, and then break them up by sub-region and issue. Then we consider resources. We look out five years and give that as a planning factor for the services and components to actually fund the exercises, activities and billets.

In the year of execution, I put out a theater TCO or a theater command order that tells the services what are the highest priorities. Then I modify that command with fragmentary orders as I would in the other planning scenarios, and modify what the components do in order to ensure that we are being efficient with our allocated resources. So a big part of what we do at PACOM falls into Phase Zero, even though I think the Phase Zero terminology needs to be rethought.

**You just think basically that the phasing concept is too...**

**Locklear**: Rigid. It’s too rigid. And that’s one of the things that we always tend to do, put things into neat columns so that they fit easily. But the issues are in a continuous state of flux across phases, even in peacetime.

*One thing that is emerging in other regions is evidence of the collusion, collaboration, and even convergence of illicit networks of various kinds, such as transnational terrorists, criminal organizations, etc., are you seeing any of that in your AOR?*

**Locklear**: We’ve got 59 percent of the world’s population in our AOR. Over 100 improvised explosive devices a month explode in our AOR, but as a country we have been focused on the Middle East, and we have assumed that the Pacific countries can manage their own environment. And to their credit, most of the governments are mature enough. Most of the security organizations in these countries are mature. A large percentage of them are working against the terrorist threat. Information sharing is rapidly increasing among all the players including India and China, in terms of how we look at terrorist threats. There are different definitions of terrorism depending on where you sit. We have a tendency to look at global networks; some of these countries look internally at what they would consider disruptive factors in their own countries that they categorize as terrorists. But none of us can afford a dangerous security environment in the Asia-Pacific, a region with four billion people, which will increase to six to seven billion in this century; a region that is very diverse ethnically, socially, and economically. We can’t allow security features that permit organized terrorists organizations to come in and camp out without us knowing it, without taking action. What we want to do is stay
ahead of the problem in the Asia-Pacific region rather than lag behind it, which I think we do in other parts of the world.

**How do we stay ahead of it?**

**Locklear:** The biggest enemy that the terrorists have is information. If you know about them and what they are doing, they have less of an impact and you can manage them better. I think we have to share information better. And this is not just military-to-military; this is CIA, FBI, State Department, and other elements of government. We have to ensure that we have the right communication mechanisms to allow us to alert each other when things change. Certainly in the area of proliferation and weapons of mass destruction, we need to be very careful about first of all where they are, then where they are proliferating, and how they are moving around. And we have to work together. We have our proliferation security initiative, so we are increasing the number of people we bring into that initiative. We do multinational training, in-the-air training, special operations training between these nations to be able to do interdiction, consequence management, and all the things that have to do with weapons of mass destruction. And that portfolio is growing as we try and manage it in the PACOM AOR.

**Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, used to speak about “Asian Values.” Do you give any credence to the notion that our concepts of democracy and human rights are if not parochial at least not universal in the sense that Asian countries might perceive democracy and human rights in a different way?**

**Locklear:** I have read his writings, and I respect him very much. I disagree based on my own personal perspectives. I tend to disagree that you can put a spin on liberty. Liberty is in the eyes of the individual, not in the eyes of the government in my view. We have to be careful how we define individual liberties; they are not necessarily for the good of the government. I’m not saying that he was doing that; Singapore is a great partner, and I think they do a very, very good job of managing their country. But, I would generally think that the U.S. position globally on human rights is the right thing for us to continue to pursue in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

**Some people would argue that because of our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan in the last decade that we have been somewhat discredited as a global agent of democracy and democratization. Do you think that has extended to Asia, that our currency there has been diluted somewhat?**

**Locklear:** I would say that our currency has not been diluted. First of all, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, we have been primarily the only superpower in the world and a lot of responsibility for the global security environment fell on us. In this century, other people in the world will step up and be contributors to that security environment in ways that will be beneficial to the United States as well. I won’t say that we didn’t make mistakes, but we tried at the time to deal with things in a way that would generally provide for a global, peaceful, security environment.

In Asia it worked, there hasn’t been a big war here in a long time. And the region is prospering from a peaceful security environment that has been underwritten by U.S. global
security efforts. So I do not think that the U.S. position has been discredited. I think they are interested and anxious to see if the rebalance does actually occur. I think they do recognize that we as a government, as a country, have been pulled to the Middle East. They recognize that our interests and theirs are inextricably tied together. And I think the Chinese and Indians recognize that as well. So I get no sense from any country that they want the U.S. to withdraw or to retreat from the Pacific or to pay less attention to it than we should based on its importance to us.

In the late 1990s two Chinese Air Force Colonels wrote a monograph called "Unrestricted Warfare," in which they describe a kind of perennial and comprehensive state of conflict with the United States as the only way to overcome their technological disadvantages. Do you think they pose that kind of threat over the long-term and they view us as an inevitable adversary?

Locklear: I think inherently in all military planning and resourcing you ultimately need an adversary to plan against. Going back in history, it has been a central human phenomenon. Let me say first of all that we shouldn’t draw parallels between the Chinese today and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The world then was much more isolated, countries more isolated, blocs more isolated, and now that is no longer the case.

Today, the world is interconnected from information and economics to energy. It is not just about China. It’s about the whole world and that trend – that inter-connectedness – is escalating at an exponential rate. That interconnectedness requires us to think through what that will demand of the security environment. So, to some degree for the Chinese, after they came out of their Cultural Revolution and decided that they needed something more than a land army, and got their economy going, they became the second largest economy pretty quickly. And with that comes security interests that any nation would need to consider.

They have resource needs that require global access: fuel, energy, natural resources, minerals, food, water, etc. And so it is not unusual for them to say, "We need to build a military that can protect our interests wherever they are. That's why we have a military." So I think we should give them credit for how far they came in a short period of time. But I think they got misguided at some point in time because of their fixation on U.S. dominance in the region since the end of WWII, and their fixation on Taiwan. Those fixations have misshaped their military. It is misshapen for where they want to go in the future.

It's basically a military that they built for counter-intervention, which would try to keep the U.S. or others out of their local affairs. Their local affairs happen to be many of our allies' and local partners’ affairs as well. But what happened is that they have a military that isn’t effective in supporting their other global interests. And I think that will change, so you’ll see them start to build nuclear submarines: that’s because they want to go further. I think they need to go further. They are building aircraft carriers. Aircraft carriers are an instrument of stability, not necessarily an instrument of war as many people view them. They are big stabilizers. And the Chinese recognize that. They are conducting more operations in the Middle East, where their energy supplies come from. So, even today, they have much more interest in energy from the Persian Gulf than
we do as a country. You can see them start to be concerned about it, rightly so. Will they challenge the U.S. on a global military scale? No, not in the foreseeable future. It’s just not possible for them to, not militarily. But why would they? Why would they want to? And then why would we create an environment that makes them have to?

So it’s for both of our interests?

Locklear: Right. It’s in both of our interests. There is a fine line to walk as they come forward and move in the future. I have said this in other forums. How do we help them or help ensure that they become a net provider of security and not a net user of it? And there are some challenges, because there are areas, where not only China and its neighbors disagree, which causes friction, but there are areas that the U.S. and China don’t agree. But this is the way the world is; countries disagree. The future for the Asia-Pacific region and the world is to have a security environment where those disagreements can occur. But the security regime is strong enough that it doesn’t break up during those disagreements. That may be Pollyanna-ish, but I think that is the way you have to approach it.

It’s a goal.

Locklear: It’s a goal. And I think that there are things you can do to reach that goal. We always prepare for the worst case. Militaries do that in every country, we prepare for the worst case, but we don’t expect the worst case. And we should put an equal amount of energy into what we have to do to get to the good case rather than focusing only on the worst case.

What is the end game for Taiwan?

Locklear: Peace and prosperity is the end game for Taiwan. And I think it is also the end game for all of China. I keep getting asked about the U.S. policy on Taiwan and I say it’s been clear—just read the Taiwan Relations Act. I don’t think there has been any ambiguity about what the U.S. position is. We want peaceful, stable, cross-strait relationships. And we want the peoples of China to be able to be prosperous and we want them to be able to work it out. We want them to have dialogue, and we don’t want that dialogue to be done under a condition of coercion. We provide them defense articles, we provide them basically with Taiwanese confidence, to be able to move forward and ultimately determine what this relationship will look like between China and Taiwan.

Do you think that relationship might change under your watch?

Locklear: It could change and I think it is changing. I think there has been productive change the last few years. We would like to see that change continue productively. But, what we don’t want to see is either side do something that disrupts the peaceful progression that they have in place now. We are very appreciative of that. In the long run, the Taiwan issue is an issue of time. Such issues history will deal with to ensure the stability in the Asia-Pacific. PRISM
An Interview with

Stephen Hadley

Did the first George W. Bush Administration have the correct organization, structure, and functions for the National Security Staff? Did the NSC system exercise effective management our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq?

Hadley: To this day the Tower Commission report of 1987 contains the best thing written on the proper role of the National Security Advisor. There is only one thing I would quibble with, and we saw it in the Afghanistan and Iraq situations. Because of Oliver North (and Iran-Contra), the Tower Commission emphasized that the NSC and the National Security Advisor should not get involved in operations, which is absolutely true. But I think one thing we’ve learned since the Tower Commission report is that implementation management is a task for the NSC – not to do the implementation, but to see that it is being done by the appropriate agencies of the government.

The NSC system has served our country well in developing a process for raising issues for decision by the President. But once you get a policy decision by the President, the issue is implementation and execution. I think that is a new frontier for the interagency process; not that the NSC is going to run operations, but the NSC has the responsibility to ensure that the policy decisions coming from the President are actually implemented and executed effectively. We spent a lot of time doing that in the Bush 43 administration.

We tried a number of ways of doing this. In terms of Afghanistan, the first step was what we called the Afghan Operations Group (AOG). The AOG was an interagency team that met at least once a week or even more often in their office at the State Department. They were supposed to develop plans, to assign responsibility, task due dates, and really move the implementation and execution of our policy in Afghanistan. I always said that I would give the NSC policy development process a “B,” but the interagency implementation and execution process only a “D,” not
just for the Bush administration, but for any administration. I think the AOG was a “B minus” in terms of what it did. It was a first step to having interagency coordination and oversight over the implementation and execution, a good first step.

When Zalmay Khalizad was Ambassador to Afghanistan we developed an implementation strategy called, “Accelerating Success in Afghanistan.” When I was Deputy National Security Advisor, we did this in the Deputy’s Committee. We developed a series of initiatives to try to address political, economic, and social issues. We not only developed the programs, but in a parallel process in the Office of Management and Budget, Robin Cleveland ran an interagency process to find the funding for it so that when we presented it to the Principals and then to the President for approval, it was an implementation plan that had funding associated with it. I think it’s the only time we did that, but it should be a prototype for how we do implementation. When you get a policy decision, you ought to have an interagency process in which people divide up the tasks, take responsibility, indicate who is going to be in charge, what the due dates are, and have a parallel OMB-led budget process that makes sure you’ve got the funding for all of it. Indeed, we made sure that whenever there was an initiative that came up on the policy end, in the paper that would go to the Principals, there would be a fiscal annex which indicated whether there was a money requirement, and if so, how much was funded from where, how much wasn’t funded, and where we were going to get it. Again, it probably in the end was honored more in the breach, but it was one of several efforts to focus on the implementation and execution piece.

**Did the second term arrangements work better?**

Hadley: The next incarnation of implementation management was after the “surge decision.” We needed somebody full-time to oversee implementation and execution. I just couldn’t do it full-time due to the other things I was responsible for. That’s when we brought in Lieutenant General (LTG) Douglas Lute. I resisted efforts from Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates to put him directly under the National Security Advisor. I told them he would have to have a direct line to the President, but the way we did it was while he had direct line to the President, we always went in to the President together, so he was not a separate voice. I thought it would empower him so that he could call up the Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense and say, “You are falling down on the implementation and execution.” And so LTG Lute did exactly that. He had an interagency group to develop implementation plans that would assign agencies responsibilities and due dates. He would particularly, for example, get civilians tasked to go to Iraq, an area where the State Department was very slow. LTG Lute would have a weekly meeting, and he would say to the State Department, “Alright, your number was 15 people by today, where are you, how far behind are you, when are you going to get it done?”

Complex operations require that you integrate political, economic, civilian, social, and developmental objectives involving many agencies. You have to coordinate it in the interagency. And that’s what we tried to do with LTG Lute. This was basically a recognition that you could not make the Iraq strategy succeed if it was left to the bureaucracy to be executed
in a routine manner, because in the ordinary routine course it would not get done in time. We tried to get LTG Lute to inject a sense of urgency and accountability into the process.

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, should we have brought our allies in on the initial planning? Should the advantages of securing a broad range of international support have weighed more heavily in our strategy and plans, especially for Iraq?

Hadley: One of the things I think I have to talk about is this notion that there wasn’t a plan for post-Saddam Iraq, which is just not true. The dilemma was the following: the President wanted coercive diplomacy; he wanted to prepare a war plan, and to be seen preparing forces in order to give strength to the diplomacy. But he was hopeful that Iraq could be resolved diplomatically, and that Saddam could be convinced either to change his policies or to leave. There were a lot of people who, of course, didn’t believe that. They thought that Bush came in with the settled intention to go to war, and that diplomacy was just a cover. They thought the diplomacy was designed to fail in order for the President to have a pretext to go to war, which was not the case. Indeed, the President never really decided to go to war until late in the process. But the dilemma was, if we started, and it became known publicly that we were planning for a post-conflict, post-Saddam Iraq, everybody would say, “See, we told you, the diplomatic effort is not real, they’re already preparing for war.” And we would undermine our own diplomacy. So we had a dilemma, you had to delay the post-war planning as much as you could because you didn’t want to jeopardize the diplomacy, but you still want enough time to develop the post-war plan. We did the post-war planning in the Deputy’s Committee. I think the problem, systemically on that, turned out to be something that was identified in a study that James McCarthy did for Donald Rumsfeld and that he briefed me about in 2005. And what he said was, “the charge that you guys didn’t do post-war planning is wrong. I’ve seen the planning; it wasn’t bad. But what you didn’t understand was that while military plans were being developed by CENTCOM, there was a system for translating those military plans into operational orders all the way down to the squadron level. There wasn’t an established way of taking that post-war planning and putting it into the process, with implementing orders all the way down to the squadron level. So, you did all the planning, but it had no legs.”

I assumed Jay Garner (head of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance - ORHA) was briefed on all these plans. He says he was not, and I can’t understand why he wasn’t; we certainly had him in some of the meetings where plans were being devised at the end. But I know from people who were then lieutenants and captains, they didn’t have any instructions on how to handle the post-war problems. So, there’s a systemic problem: when you do these integrated operations and you have a post-war situation, and you’re going to have to do integrated execution, we don’t have a way of taking the post-combat plan and turning it into interagency guidance that goes down to the field. And that of course was one of the things we tried to fix, post-surge, by having LTG Lute run the inter-agency process.

The last piece we got in place was the political dimension. Paul Wolfowitz said we should have gone very quickly to an interim
government and passed authority to the Iraqis as early as possible. That’s exactly what the plan was. It’s ironic. The problem was the Iraqi Governing Council, which was a step to move in that direction, did not work because the Iraqi elite were not ready to participate.

And one other thing: you know the military piece of this post-war planning was of course Phase IV. The actual military piece that was developed by CENTCOM called Phase IV was briefed a couple of times to the President and to the NSC Principals. It was separate from, but in parallel with what we were doing with the Deputies, which was all the other post-war planning. I was told by someone who participated in the planning at CENTCOM at the time those Phase IV plans were done that, “You know, you need to understand that the military did not think that Phase IV was their responsibility.”

The view was, “When we get rid of this guy (Saddam), we are going home.” It’s interesting that General Tommy Franks resigned shortly after Saddam was toppled. Now you can understand General Franks had been in two wars, he was exhausted; but the military apparently never embraced the Phase IV mission, and the best lesson from that is something that General John Allen said at a review of the Iraq War about two, two and a half years ago. Allen said, “The thing I’ve learned from Iraq and Afghanistan is, that when you do your planning, you need to begin with Phase IV and what you want it to look like; how you are going to get it to look like that? And then work backwards.” So, where you want to end up informs your Phase III, II and I planning about how you are going to get there. This was a new idea to me; we didn’t do it that way. I don’t think the United States has ever done it that way. And that’s exactly the right way to do it, and the reasons why all these lessons learned studies are so important.

After the past three years, we’ve now decided that the Middle East is still important to us. It’s a threat to the homeland, and we need to get more engaged. We’ve got a reasonable strategy, and it may work after a year or two. First in Iraq, and then if we’ve succeeded in Iraq, and we’ve bought some time in Syria to build forces, maybe we will succeed in Syria. But, if we’re not going to have to “mow the grass” every five or ten years dealing with a terrorist threat in the Middle East, we are going to have to get active and try to transform those societies: to help them provide effective governance to their people, give them reasonable economies that provide jobs, give them some participation in their governments, some sense of dignity and worth, or we’re just going to have to be doing this again. And so the lessons from our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq are terribly important because somebody’s going to have to develop a plan for how we are going to strengthen these societies so they can deliver for their people, and so they do not become again such congenial places for terrorist recruitment.

And it’s so hard. In Libya, we did just the opposite. We had “no footprint” after the kinetic phase. We delivered the Libyans from a dictatorship and into chaos.

Hadley: And you would have thought we would have learned from Afghanistan 1990, right? We walked away. Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003, we learned that lesson. We weren’t going to walk away, and that’s why we had a post-conflict strategy, even if we didn’t do it very well. The basic problem is, we spent nearly 50 years, post-Vietnam on an enormous...
effort to learn how to recruit, train, fight, and improve our military, so we have the best military in the world. We have not made a similar effort to develop the capabilities we need to do post-conflict operations. They are largely civilian capabilities. They’re in the U.S. government and private sector, and we have not developed a systematic way to identify, train, exercise, deploy, do lessons learned, and improve. We just haven’t done it. And so every time we have one of these, whether it’s Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, or the 2011 Arab Awakening, we are starting from scratch. In Bosnia we tried relying on international organizations but it didn’t work. We tried it in Afghanistan, dividing up responsibilities among countries: the Germans had the police, Italy had the justice sector, the UK had narcotics. We divided it all up, everybody had a piece. This was an effort not to be unilateral. To be multilateral, but everybody’s piece was small enough that it was everybody’s second or third priority, and it never got done! So we gave it to the military, not exclusively, but we gave the military the lead, supported by all U.S. government agencies, in Iraq in 2003. And it turned out, the military didn’t have the total skill set either! So, you know, this is a systemic problem. It is not an NSC process problem per se, but it is an implementation and execution problem. We have not developed the kinds of capabilities that we need. And I think we’re going to come at it once again, when, after the kinetic phase against ISIS, there’s going to have to be some work done. How are we going to do that?

The other view is that of General Daniel Bolger in his new book: he basically says we won the war in Iraq and Afghanistan after we captured the capital cities and got the government in place. He thinks we should have left in a few months.

Hadley: We had that conversation. We had that conversation when it was clear we were going to war, and the President had that conversation with his NSC Principals. He asked, “So, if we get rid of Saddam, what is our obligation to Iraqi people? Is it Saddamism without Saddam, or, putting it another way, a strong military leader within the existing system that simply agrees that he will not support terror, and will not develop WMD, will not invade his neighbors, and will be not quite as brutal to his own people as Saddam was. Is that okay?” The President’s view was we would get rid of Saddam Hussein for national security reasons, not because we were promoting democracy out of the barrel of a gun. We were going to have to remove him for hard national security reasons, but then what was our obligation to the Iraqi people? He said, “We stand for freedom and democracy. We ought to give the Iraqi people a chance, a chance with our help, to build a democratic system.” And that’s how the democracy piece got in, not that it had to be a Jeffersonian democracy, not that it had to be in our image, not that we wouldn’t leave until the job is done, but we would give them a chance. And once we got into it, we realized that there had to be a democratic outcome because that was the only way you would keep the country together: Sunni, Shia, and Kurds working together in a common democratic framework. Otherwise, the country was going to fall apart. As we thought about it and got well into it, it was also clear that there was the potential that Iraq could be a model for the Middle East because in the Middle East it was either Sunnis oppress Shia, or Shia oppress Sunnis, and both of them beat up the Kurds.
We wanted to show that Sunni, Shia, and Kurds could work together in a democratic framework and develop a common future, where the majority ruled but the minority participated and had protections.

The issue now will be the future of Sykes-Picot: is it dead, do we have to redraw the borders? The people I’ve talked to about that say, “If you start trying to redraw the borders, it will never end.” Because there are no clean borders and people will make historical claims that will be overlapping; it’s a prescription for turmoil and bloodshed. The issue is not redrawing the borders, the issue is changing the quality and nature of governance within those borders. That’s what we tried to do in Iraq.

The other thing we did, that worked extremely well, was the Tuesday afternoon meetings of the Principals in the National Security Advisor’s office, principals only: Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman Joint Chiefs, CIA Director, the DNI. The only plus one was my deputy, who was the note-taker. We started this in 2006 before Donald Rumsfeld left. All the tough operational issues and strategy issues got vetted in that meeting, at the Principals level with no leaks, in a very candid exchange. They were the most useful sessions because we would hash things out, and all the issues were on the table. And it was invariably the Vice President, who would say, “Steve, this has been a very good discussion, now how are we going to get this before the President so he can make a decision?” That was an innovation in the second term that worked extremely well.

There was a Deputy’s level working group that worked the details with some guidance from the Principals. So that way you make sure you’re addressing the strategic, operational, tactical issues, and that’s why you have levels that are organized, addressing issues at their appropriate level. The question is: can you keep it all knit together? That’s what the National Security Advisor is supposed to do.

On Afghanistan, early in the process, we settled on a “light footprint approach.” Some in DoD also favored that approach in postwar Iraq. In retrospect, did we get this right or not? Any lessons here for the future?

Hadley: The light footprint approach. Everybody says the experience of the Russians and the British in Afghanistan needed to be taken to heart. People forget that the Taliban were overthrown with no more than 500 CIA and military Special Forces on the ground linked up with the tribes; Special Forces on wooden saddles calling in airstrikes with GPS and cellphones. And that was powerful: for the Afghans, we did not look like the occupiers that the Russians and the British had been; we looked like liberators because we were the enabler of the Afghan people to throw off the Taliban. And that fact is why, even today, after all they’ve been through, 13 years later, most of the country still wants us to stay. So the light footprint was a brilliant strategy, and one of the reasons some of us were loathe to ramp up the U.S. force presence. It was precisely because we did not want to lose the mantle of being liberators and enablers and become occupiers.

And similarly, everyone says we under-resourced Afghanistan. When we did what I talked about earlier, “Accelerating Success in Afghanistan,” one of the things we looked at was – this is the fourth poorest country in the world. It has limited human infrastructure. You don’t want to overwhelm that economy because what you get is corruption and
inflation. Well, guess what we got when we started throwing money into that economy: corruption and inflation. That was a reason for the light footprint approach in Afghanistan that made sense at the time.

We would have liked to have done the same process in Iraq, but there weren’t any ground troops in Iraq that were going to dispose of Saddam. You remember the efforts we made: we had an overt training program and a covert training program, neither amounted to a hill of beans. Ahmed Chalabi was telling DoD he would give us thousands of people; he ended up with about 100.

The lesson for what we are doing today in Iraq is that a light footprint approach is exactly right. If you talk to Sunnis, if you talk to Shia, if you talk to Kurds, they are not asking for U.S. combat forces on the ground. What they are asking for are enablers: intelligence, training, weaponry, and embedded Special Forces to give them tactical support. And that’s exactly what we should do. I spoke with Secretary Kerry about Iraq several months ago. He was thinking about Iraq in 2006 and 2007. I said to him, “It isn’t Iraq in 2006 or 2007 that is the prototype for Iraq (and ISIS) today. It is Afghanistan in 2001, where we were enablers with somebody else’s capabilities on the ground.”

Another vexing set of problems was our attempt to build-up the Army and police forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both countries, we struggled to start the process and had to endure many programmatic changes along the way. How did the NSC system work on these critical missions? Did the NSC system guide the process effectively, or was it also caught up in complex events and cross-cutting legal authorities? This question is a tough one, and it involves the allies as well. The training of army and police in the future is going to be much more important, where indigenous people are in combat, and we are going to be in a training mode.

Hadley: My sense was the military did the military training, and we went through a learning process. Initially we tried to train to American standards. My impression is we finally got the training right in Afghanistan under LTG William Caldwell, in terms of the military side. In terms of police training, State had that (until NATO training mission took it over, around 2009-2010).

Eventually we learned that we need to train to “good enough” standards, which are not necessarily American standards. On the military side we finally got the training right, this last time around in Afghanistan in 2010 and 2011. In terms of police training, State had that until the NATO training mission took it over, around 2009-2010.

The State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) did not inspire confidence. It was all about turf, it was neuralgic. They never got it done, and at the end of the day we pulled the police training mission away and gave it to the military. Turns out the military is not the best police trainer, and so again it was a classic case where we gave it to the military by default because we don’t have the kind of civilian capacity in place to do it right. So, I’m still not sure if we know how to do police training.

One of the things we decided is that Afghanistan needed something between a military force and police, they need a gendarmerie. So we tried to get the Italians, and others with these kind of forces, to do some training. We were probably slow to do that,
that’s actually an area where international participation would’ve enhanced us. I’m not sure we now have a plan for how we are going to do police training. We need to start developing those plans and capabilities now! Or we won’t have them, and we will screw it up again! It’s very hard to do. We were more confident than we should have been that we could do it, and we had to learn a lot. The military also had to re-learn how to fight the war in Iraq, in 2005, 2006, and 2007, so we could actually do the Surge. That is really an issue: how does the military re-learn how to fight a different type of war, and do it in a timely way, so the war isn’t lost! But the Armed Forces actually learned it, and implemented it, and turned the war in Iraq around. And that of course is the great story of Iraq. It was a war that was lost, then was won – our coalition forces working with Iraqi forces defeated al-Qaeda in Iraq. And if not for Syria and Maliki, we wouldn’t be where we are today.

**Did Iraqi exiles play too strong a role?**

*Intelligence was a big problem from the very beginning, and if you follow the memoirs of the people who were in DoD, the reason why Iraq gets off the track initially is because of bad intelligence on WMD, bad intelligence on the Iraqi infrastructure, bad intelligence on the Iraqi police, etc. There we were in Iraq and Afghanistan trying to protect the people, and we didn’t know the first thing about them.*

**Hadley:** You also have that in Syria today. Why were we surprised by the turn of events there? We were surprised by it because we aren’t there! With the Surge, we had a pretty good idea of what was going on in Iraq. General Stanley McCrystal had this incredible synthesis of operations and intelligence that created a killing machine like we’ve never seen. But it was because he had lots of military assets and lots of intelligence assets to cover his back that he was able to do what he did. In Syria, we are surprised about the events because we aren’t in Syria; we don’t have intelligence assets there. We’re relying on the Free Syrian Army and a few other people.

Iraq in 2003 was much the same thing. We hadn’t been in Iraq for a decade. It was hard to have good intelligence about it. I think that one of the questions for the intelligence people is: did we do enough to pull together non-governmental experts?

The intelligence community still had the notion that, if you haven’t stolen it, it isn’t intelligence! In the past all they did was intelligence, rather than seeing themselves as an information aggregator. Going after non-traditional sources of information, and that’s of course the promise of this explosion of cell-phones and social media, we have information that we can mine in a way that we never could before; we can aggregate it, we can map it, etc. So one of the questions you can pose: are we working now to develop information about these conflict-prone societies and the various actors so we can design reasonable strategies to bring some stability to these countries once (and if) we get through the kinetic phase? Let’s design now an information gathering strategy, so we won’t be caught again without the information we need.

On the subject of exiles, I don’t think they played too strong a role. I mean, certainly some in DoD fell in love with Ahmed Chalabi, but the State Department hated him and the CIA hated him, and I basically as the Deputy National Security Advisor had to broker the peace to keep them all on the same page.
Chalabi may have affected DoD, but he didn’t really affect us.

Some members of the Administration have said since they left office that even without the WMD issue, the United States should still have invaded Iraq? Was the WMD factor, the most important one, or just one of many?

Hadley: If you look at the UN resolutions in Iraq, there are four things that Iraq was in the dock for: WMD, invading its neighbors, supporting terrorism, and oppressing its people. And our view at the NSC was that they should be the grounds for going to war; they should be in the UN Security Council resolutions, and they should be in U.S. presentations to the United Nations. State resisted that, and they may have been right. Secretary Powell said, “Look, you have got to go with your best argument, and in this case, less is more,” and the best argument was WMD. We at the NSC wrote an initial draft of the UN Security Council resolution that included all four elements, but Powell didn’t want to use it. He wanted a resolution that was predicated on WMD, and then we could get a second resolution that would deal with the other things. Of course, the second resolution never came. Powell’s speech was supposed to have all four pillars, and in the end it was a WMD piece, with a small and controversial portion on terror, and an even smaller portion on human and civil rights. It was a one legged stool, and if someone kicks out the leg of a one-legged stool, the stool falls over.

Should we have gone to war if there wasn’t WMD? This is a tough question. The Deulfer Report says that Saddam would have gotten back into the WMD business. He had the capability to do it; he had the intention to do it. Once he got out from under sanctions, he would have been back to WMD. I will remind you that once in 2005, 2006, and 2007, but particularly in 2005, once the Iranians get active in their nuclear program, you can bet Saddam Hussein would have been back in the nuclear business. So you can argue that maybe we should have gone into Iraq, even if we did not have solid evidence of the WMD.

I think as a practical manner, however, that the country wouldn’t have. Just think of the practicalities of it. I say to people, “It was not so much an intelligence failure, it was a failure of imagination.” Nobody ever came to me, the President of the United States, or anybody else I know of, and said, “You know I’ve got an interesting thought, maybe Saddam actually got rid of his WMD, but he doesn’t want to tell anyone about it because he doesn’t want the Iranians to know because he doesn’t want the Iranians to take advantage of him.” If you look at the reports I’ve heard about of the FBI debriefs of Saddam Hussein, that’s what he says. But if you had had a red cell coming in to the Oval office, one of these outside the box, non-consensus intelligence pieces, that would have been a very interesting piece to put before the President of the United States, and would have provoked a very interesting conversation. So I think the problem wasn’t really a failure of intelligence, I think it was a failure of imagination to think outside the conventional intelligence construct. We failed. We are guilty of that. I didn’t think of it; the President never thought of it; nobody else thought of it. But one of the things we need to be able to do better is entertaining these kinds of out-of-the-box explanations.

I think that actually in the Surge, bringing outside people is one thing that helped the President get to where he needed to be, and it
is one thing that I am pleased that we did. He was talking to everybody about it. There are these two metaphors on the Surge that sort of clarify. One is Donald Rumsfeld. He kept saying “You know, teaching someone to ride a bicycle, at some point you have to take your hand off the seat of the bicycle.” He must have said that 10 times, and finally on the 11th time the President said, “Yeah, Don, but we cannot afford to have the bicycle fall over.” If you look at it from that standpoint, it is a wholly different construct. Second, the President said: “Casey and Rumsfeld are right. Ultimately, the Iraqis have to win this and take over, but we can’t get from here to there, given where we are; we need a bridge to get the violence down and to allow people then to start the political process again.” And that’s what the Surge in Iraq was, it was a bridge. It was a bridge to basically enable what was the right strategy, but we weren’t executing it in a way that would get us there. And so it’s that sort of clarity of analysis and clarity of thinking that you can’t always get from the system. Outside-of-the-box intelligence is hard. There are too few truths.

In retrospect, did we have too few troops in Iraq after the shooting stopped in 2003? Could we have had a lean attack force and quickly transitioned to a fuller force for stability operations? To what extent did the Principals all understand the war plan? How did the military plan for “Phase IV” mesh with the civil plans for the new Iraq?

*Hadley:* We talked about the problems of Phase IV. The plan was that after the fighting stopped, there would be Iraqi units that would surrender. We would vet those units, and take some of them and put them to work in some post-conflict reconstruction, cleaning up activity. And when we were comfortable with their leadership, effectiveness, and loyalty, we would then give them security responsibilities. We thought that was going to be about 150,000 people, so we would have our forces, and our allies, and we would have 150,000 Iraqis. We thought this was going to work because in the latter days of the war, we heard from units in the north, whole divisions were negotiating to surrender with their equipment. But the war ended, and to this day, I don’t know what happened to those units and what happened to their equipment; nobody surrendered as a unit. They all melted away with their equipment. So we found ourselves, if you think about our post-war plan, 150,000 people short. So initially, Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Powell agreed we have to try and get the allies. Powell went out, and said to all our allies, “We need troops, post-conflict stabilization troops, how about it?” Zero, zero. And there is a lesson there for what we are now doing in Syria. The coalition that we are putting together needs to have a comprehensive agreement on what they’ve signed up for, and what they are going to contribute. It’s not just the initial operational campaign, the allies need to agree to stop some of the things they are doing, vet jihadists, and counter the propaganda. They’ve also got to agree to be supportive in post-conflict reconstruction, and they have to agree to put up some people for security.

So, the problem was we were 150,000 short; we went to the Arab states and asked, “Can you give us some people?” And they said, “No.” And I think it’s a failing on my part, I don’t remember anybody in the NSC meetings saying, “You know Mr. President, you know why the violence is going up? We thought we were going to have 150,000 more troops, and
we don’t have them. What are we going to do to fill that gap?” I don’t remember doing it, because the answer would have had to be, we need more people, and that of course was something the Pentagon did not want to hear. But, we should have had that conversation.

*The Iraq surge decision was a very creative decision. It was the President, essentially, looking at all his military people and saying “You’re wrong, I’m not taking your advice on this.”*

Hadley: I don’t think that’s a fair statement. The President had an instinct on where he wanted to go in terms of the Surge. In October of 2006 I received a back-of-the-envelope estimate on what a Surge would look like, and it had the magic number five brigades, which gave me confidence that a surge was viable. The NSC staff were all proponents of the Surge. I was not reluctant, but I had a view that this was our last chance to get Iraq right, and we had to be sure. So I pushed back at them, saying, “Do the analysis again, run it again.” The only finger I put on the scale was saying, “There will be a surge option coming to the President in this packet. You can put anything else you want, and you can say anything you want about it, but there will be a Surge option. Otherwise we will not be giving the President all the options.”

So the President knew this was coming, but he wanted his team to be onboard. Initially Secretary Rice was not on board. The Vice President was not on board. Rice and State Department Counselor Phillip Zelikow were pushing, “Don’t get involved in sectarian war, step back, preserve the institutions, and let it die out.” One of the most interesting sets of meetings was in the first week of December 2006, when the President was dealing with his NSC Principals, asking all kinds of probing questions, but really trying to bring everybody onboard to what he thought he would ultimately decide on, which was the Surge option, and he did it. Rice finally said, “I’ll agree to more troops, but you can’t have troops doing the same thing they’ve been doing, they have to be doing something different.” And that of course says, it’s not just about the troops, it’s about a new strategy. The Vice President was conflicted because he wanted to be loyal to Secretary Rumsfeld who was not a Surge proponent. But the Vice President was also hearing from others, and while Cheney was not an overt champion of the surge, he played a very interesting role. I think part of it was the he was comfortable with the process I was running, and he realized he did not have to be out there pushing the Surge; it was going to happen. So by the first week of December, the President had brought his team of NSC Principals on board – but he still had a problem with the military. He also had a new Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates.

We were ready to announce the new strategy in December, but the President said, “I don’t want to give the speech now; I want Gates to have an opportunity to go to Iraq, and come back, and make a recommendation to me.” So Secretary of Defense Gates went to Iraq and was persuaded by General George Casey that we did not need a Surge. At most, one brigade or two brigades would do. Gates later said, “I got suckered by the military, and I made a mistake.” Then we had the meeting in the “tank” (at the Pentagon with the Joint Chiefs of Staff), which was the President’s attempt to win over the military. The President understood that if there were a split between him and the military in wartime, when he’s
changing the strategy, at a time when the country has largely given up on Iraq, and the Congress is going to oppose his strategy, a split between him and the military under those circumstances would be a constitutional crisis and would doom his strategy. A split within the military, between General Petraeus and the people who want the new strategy, and Generals Casey and Abizaid (the field commanders at the time), would also doom the strategy because Congress in hearings would exploit this. The objective was to have everybody in the senior military ranks in the same boat. It’s okay if some lean right, and it’s okay if some lean left, but they all need to be in the same boat. The meeting in the “tank” was the vehicle for doing that. The President and Vice President choreographed it in the car ride over. Cheney was going to smoke out the military Chiefs, but Bush was going to have to do the heavy lifting.

The Chiefs are not the operators; they are not fighting the war; they have to raise and train the troops, and they were worried about breaking the force. They made all these arguments about strain on the military, indefinite prospect of rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan, and what that would do to the force in the future. And they were right. But the President said, “The best way to break an army is to have it defeated.” Then the Chiefs said the American people won’t support a Surge, to which the President replied, “I’m the President, my job is to persuade the American people, you let me worry about that, you let me worry about the politics.” They came back and said, “It will break the force, we don’t have enough people,” and the President replied, “I will get you more people.” At that point, the Chiefs came out and supported the Surge. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace has already worked out that, “It won’t be just a military surge, but a State Department surge, and an Iraqi surge. They will all participate.” This was something arranged in the lead up to that December meeting.

The military objected to this being just a military surge; it should also surge civilians; it shouldn’t be just Americans, but needed to include Iraqis. The President had gotten Maliki to agree to provide divisions, to provide brigades, to let it go on in a non-sectarian way, and to agree the insurgents could not have a safe-haven within Sadr city. In the end the President came out of the meeting with a rough consensus. The chiefs were grudgingly onboard, Secretary Gates had come onboard, and the President brought Secretary Rice onboard. Cheney was now freed to support it fulsomely. While they didn’t think it was necessary, even Generals Casey and Abizaid in the field were willing to support it. The final issue was, do you give the new commander the option for five brigades, or do you commit the five brigades and say to him, “If you don’t need them, you can send them home.” Petraeus said, “I want the brigades,” and the President resolved it.

How did the interagency system perform? The participants argued strongly their views, they interacted directly with the President, their needs were addressed, and at the end of the day they came on board. Efforts by the Congress to poke holes in the strategy largely failed. And so I think it was a good process, even if it wasn’t one of the academic models that are out there in the literature. It wasn’t a case of the President making a decision, and the military unhappily salutes, nor was it the Commander in Chief deferring to his military. It was the President actually bringing his military along, taking into the account the best
military thoughts, but making his own judgment about the politics and about the strategy, and about where we needed to be. The President got his military advice from his military, he heard them out, but in the end he made his own decisions. He worked to bring them along where he wanted to go. So, at the end of the day when he announced his strategy, the military was in the same boat. Some leaned right, some leaned left; it wasn’t without grumbling, but at the end of the day, we avoided a constitutional crisis, we avoided a split in the military. And we had a strategy which, when he announced it, the world was stunned and couldn’t believe he was going to do it. He sustained it, and fought for it, and we sustained it with the Congress because we had 40 plus votes in the Senate, controlled by the Republicans -- the Congress was unable to block the strategy, and it was implemented. Petraeus and Crocker made it happen on the ground, it succeeded, to the point that Senator Carl Levin at one point, a year or so later said “Bush was right about the surge, and I was wrong.”
At a recent meeting of the Organization of the American States, Secretary of State Kerry stated, “The era of the Monroe Doctrine is over.” What’s the replacement?

Gen. Kelly: The first thing is that the Latin Americans have put the Monroe Doctrine so far behind them they think it’s unusual when we bring it up. The replacement is partnership. In the two years I have been in this job, the buzzwords or buzzphrase that I use that gets a very positive reception is not only “partners,” but “equal partners.” Our partnership with these countries is not just in the military realm, I have very close relationships with many of the Ministers of Defense, but with the Presidents as well. We don’t lecture them, we don’t tell them what to do; by example they see what equal partnership is all about. So I would say that it’s partnership that has replaced the previous doctrine.

Are our declining resources directed towards South America reducing our influence there and making the partnership less important to them than it is to us?

Gen. Kelly: I wouldn’t say it’s declining; we haven’t paid much security attention to the region for 15 years. So we’re at a normal steady state; almost no resources, with the exception of Colombia – and that’s a minimal investment really – but almost no real resources for 15 years. They want to partner with us, they like the partnership, they want to be our friends for the most part. There are some countries that are not interested in a U.S. partnership and that is their loss. But others are confused because we don’t really seem to care about them very much, while the Chinese are heavily investing in the region, albeit primarily economically. Our trade is very robust with this part of the world, and so is the Chinese. The Chinese tend to “invest and take.” the Latin Americans resent that to some extent. The Chinese will come in and invest in a copper mine and mine it dry. There’s trade and there’s mutual benefit, but they wish the Chinese were a little bit

This interview was conducted by Mr. Michael Miklaucic, the editor of PRISM, and took place October 31, 2014.
What do you see as the most threatening possibilities that we face in the Western Hemisphere?

Gen. Kelly: The least likely, but most concerning to me is the threat to the U.S. coming through the illicit networks in this part of the world, that are so firmly established. For two years now I’ve been asked in hearings about what gets into the United States through this illicit network. These are international criminal networks – everything gets in. Hundreds and hundreds of tons of illicit narcotics. Relatively small amounts are taken out of the flow by our border controls. Tens of thousands of sex workers, in many cases adolescents, come into the United States every year through these networks to serve the sex industry. I spoke at a human rights conference at the University of South Florida, in Tampa. The audience was shocked when I talked about sex workers, but they were even more shocked to learn of the thousands of forced laborers that are brought in and are working in Florida in the agricultural industry. Anything can travel on this network; I’ve been asked two years in a row now, “Could someone come in with a weapon of mass destruction, biological weapon travel on this network?” Of course! Last year, this network carried 68,000 children into the United States. We are dealing with a very efficient network, which worries me. It is unlikely that a dirty bomb, right now, could travel into the U.S. through this network because Special Operations Command, the CIA, the FBI and others are deployed around the world preventing these things from happening. Over time, however, we need to be wary of the fact that this is an incredibly efficient network, it has starting points around the world and comes here, everything travels on it.
Do you see any possibility of some of these states actually failing? We talk about failed states and we are often thinking about Africa or Central Asia or places like that; is there any possibility of state failure in the Western Hemisphere?

Gen. Kelly: Any country that is curtailing democracy, free press, and other civil liberties, in my mind, is by definition failing, and is on a road to destruction or total failure. However, there are other states, and I applaud places like Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, that are suffering terribly from the effects of drug trafficking networks fueled by drug demand from the United States. They are imperfect democracies, but they are also trying to address some of the long-standing obstacles to economic and political progress. Virtually all of the cocaine that comes to the United States originates in Latin America. The countries I just mentioned in Central America are doing their best to stem the flow. Virtually all the heroin consumed in the United States is now grown and produced in Mexico or Colombia. Roughly 87 percent now of the methamphetamines consumed in the United States are produced in Central America or Mexico. All of this drug production feeds the American drug habit, and the massive, illicit drug revenues are then used by criminal networks to buy off or murder police and judges, and allow for million dollar bounties to be put on a number of national leaders in Central America. These small countries are suffering terribly because of U.S. drug consumption. The risk of failure is not the result of anti-democratic behavior, on the contrary, these countries are committed to addressing past human rights violations; but they might fail because of the massive

On that specific point, how would you assess the threat to the U.S. posed by the emergence of what seems to be an alignment of anti-American states that some refer to as the Bolivarian Alliance?

Gen. Kelly: My view is that if they are all functioning democracies – as we understand it with a functioning free press, with functioning human rights protections, with militaries subordinate to civilian control – they have every right to go in any direction they want and choose their alliances. I certainly would like to be their partners, but if they choose to go in another direction that’s their business. However, I fear that many of these countries’ political elites are turning their backs on democracy and adjusting constitutions so they can do what they’re not supposed to do. My concern is not for our security interests necessarily, but for the interests of the people who live in those countries—all of whom have shown a strong interest in democracy. Another threat comes from the massive corruption in many of these countries that you’ve mentioned. They’re stealing the people blind, taking their democracy away, taking their free press away, and taking their human rights away; it’s very disturbing.

and all you have to do is be able to pay the fare.

The other issue in this part of the world is an increasing tendency in some countries away from democracy. It’s fascinating that there are strong democratic institutions in many countries, such as Brazil and Chile, while others are going in the other direction, moving away from human rights, moving away from a free press, moving away from gender rights, and certainly moving away from democracy.
improve the police forces of nearly every country in the region. Ask yourself, “do we have programs, in the sense of what they’re trying to accomplish?” The answer is “yes.” But you have to ask yourself, “have the police gotten better, are they the same, or are they worse?” And in every case you have to say “They’re worse.” In my culture you don’t wait 10 years to say “Boy, it hasn’t worked out very well.” You step back from that, and if you’re not reaching your metrics for success, then you change or adjust your program. There are a lot of programs out there, but none of them really reinforce or touch each other.

Is that a result of lack of coordination among agencies providing that support or is it lack of coordination among the host country nationals?

Gen. Kelly: It’s a lack of coordination among the agencies, as well as within the agencies. One of the presidents of a Central American country vented his frustration to me one day saying “You know, I just read that America ‘has put X millions of dollars into my country in 10 years,’ and all of that money is wasted because the economy is worse than it ever was, the security is down, the violence is up, I’m being blamed for wasting that money, my country is being blamed for wasting the money; but they never asked us what programs we thought should be funded, nor did they ever give me the money to spend.” At the end of 10 years of spending on programs, the police are worse, the economy is worse, their legal/justice system doesn’t function well, leading some people to say “well, this country wasted the money.” I was in a human rights roundtable in El Salvador five weeks ago where I was told “we appreciate all the things you amounts of crime and violence generated, to a large degree, by U.S. drug consumption.

What can they do to counter that and how can we help them?

Gen. Kelly: We have to build partnerships with these countries, and continue helping them consolidate their democratic gains. Many of them have very bad human rights records from 20-25 years ago. Nearly every time I travel to a country, I meet with local human rights groups; in virtually every country I visit, they give the military the highest marks. As a rule, after the Catholic Church, the military is the most admired, respected institution in the country. The police are often at the bottom of the pile. In most cases, these countries have no options but to use their military on the streets; it’s worth noting that generally, the people like to see the military on the streets because the police are so ineffective or corrupt. In the United States we have a tradition of not using the military on the streets, though we’ve done it in the past. I’ve done it twice in my career. We’ve done it when we think we need it, when we’re in extremis. I experienced it in Washington, D.C. in 1971 as a young enlisted Marine, and in Los Angeles when I was a battalion commander in the 1990s, during the Rodney King Riots.

But the United States in general doesn’t like to use the military on the streets and since we don’t like it, we tend to criticize others for doing it. To answer your question, we need to help them improve their police. We spend a lot of money and have a lot of good programs, but they don’t touch, they don’t reinforce each other; consequently, an awful lot of money is spent without the intended results. Over the past ten years, we’ve spent money trying to
Americans do for us, but they’re all ‘make you feel good projects;’ you don’t ask us what we think we need.” We were talking at the time about children at risk. We have a children at risk program that we’ve been funding for 10 years; by its nature it is a good program. The goal is to not have kids joining the gangs, which is a horrific problem in all of the countries in Central America, but particularly El Salvador. Still, this program ended when the kids were 12, 13, 14 years old. Unfortunately, that’s the point at which kids go into the gangs; they don’t go into the gangs at 5, 6, 10, 11, 12 years old. You have this great at risk program that isn’t effective because the age-group that you’re focusing on with this particular program doesn’t go into gangs; but as soon as they hit 13 or 14, they’re at risk of joining gangs.

**And that’s when the program ends?**

**Gen. Kelly:** And that’s when the program ends. The point was that there ought to be another program to get the kids into vocational school so they learn how to be electricians, or brick masons, or beauticians. You have to have programs that reinforce each other and “touch,” as I say. We have this great program, which makes us feel good because it addresses children at risk, but it’s really a waste of time because kids that age don’t go into gangs.

**One of the flagship programs that we have in Central America is the CARSI (Central America Regional Security Initiative) Program, but there’s growing frustration with its results. How would you assess the CARSI Program at this point?**

**Gen. Kelly:** How long have we had the CARSI Program? Six years? And what was it supposed to accomplish? Reduce violence? With regards to all of the things CARSI was designed to do, as I understand CARSI, things are not only worse, but they’re geometrically worse. I think you go back to evaluating every program every step along the way; and within the program everything has got to touch. With a program like CARSI you have to ask yourself, not six years later, but six months after you put it in place, “what are the indicators of success or failure?” If CARSI was supposed to get at violence and rule of law and safe streets and citizen security, ask yourself, “has that gotten any better in Central America?” And the answer is that things are geometrically worse. In my opinion, CARSI has to be adjusted, which is what the U.S. is doing with the new Strategy for Central America. The administration has asked for a billion dollars to promote better governance and promote economic development. Without progress in these areas, it will be impossible to make sustained progress on the security front.

**One of the successes in your region, Colombia, is now considered widely a great success, but here’s another side to it. A European politician asked me “Why is it you Americans consider Colombia such a great success when there’s still the same amount of cocaine coming into the United States, you still have very profound Colombian involvement in narcotics trafficking… What’s the big success?” How should I have answered that question?**

**Gen. Kelly:** You start with, “cocaine is our problem.” If Americans didn’t want to do a little blow on weekends, then Colombia
wouldn’t be suffering and Central America wouldn’t be suffering the way they are. Cocaine is our problem. But if you look at everything in Colombia from rule of law, to freedom of the press, professionalization of the military, human-rights protections, and civilian oversight of the military, then Colombia is a success. If you want to focus on cocaine, then you need to acknowledge that in 2014 Colombians affected 68,000 hectares of coca before it was harvested: that is cocaine not produced. That same year they intercepted 166 tons of finished cocaine before it left Colombia: that is cocaine that didn’t get to America. The Colombian military destroyed 2600 jungle labs that turn coca into cocaine: that’s cocaine that was never produced. The FARC, whom they’ve been fighting for 50 years, have an acceptance level inside Colombia near two percent, and they’ve been pushed to the outer parts of Colombia. I travel in Colombia quite a bit, and I visited one of the reintegration sites that the Colombian government runs. It was full of young people, all of whom have been in the FARC. The FARC would claim they are recruits into the FARC, but they weren’t; they were kidnapped from the villages into the FARC when they were young – 11, 12, or 13 years old. Now, they’re being reintegrated back into society and doing a great job. We spent the day there listening to their stories. Some had just come out of the jungle. I would answer the European politician by saying “cocaine is our problem. If we weren’t consuming it, the Colombians wouldn’t be producing it.” The Colombians used to be the number one producer of cocaine in the world; now it’s the number three, behind Peru (number one), and Bolivia (number two). That’s how I would answer the question. The country is strong, it’s democratic, it has a free press, it is dealing with some of the past human rights problems, the military has been transformed, and the tax system has been transformed. They want to be our best partners in the region, they’re thinking beyond FARC now, and we’re working with them to envision what their military should look like after the FARC. Not a small, but a modest military. Because of what they’ve been through they want to share those experiences and help other people. With the Colombia Action Plan, they’re in a number of Latin American and Caribbean countries teaching that everything begins and ends with human rights. That is one demand I always put down; it’s what we do here in SOUTHCOM: every conversation begins and ends with human rights, so the Colombians carry that with them. They’re also teaching others how to conduct counter drug operations, legally and effectively. They’re in a lot of places, they play by the same rules as if they were U.S. forces, and they’re doing a great job. That is the success of Colombia.

Sounds like a paradigm for the partnership approach that you were describing as the replacement for the Monroe Doctrine. Going back to the question of illicit networks, there has been discussion about the convergence of different kinds of illicit networks: terrorists, insurgents, and traffickers of various kinds. Do you see any evidence of that in your area of responsibility?

Gen. Kelly: I do though much of it is classified. There are two ways to look at it. When the narcotics traffickers touch worldwide terrorism, to me that’s a convergence or a nexus. We know that there are international terrorist organizations making vast amounts of money...
laundering drug proceeds that come out of the United States. The traffickers and cartels’ problem is not getting drugs into the United States, their biggest problem is laundering the $85 billion or so that comes from global cocaine sales every year. That’s their problem: laundering money. There are terrorist organizations and other organizations that have close ties to terrorist organizations that do a lot of the money laundering. This isn’t just in the Tri-Border region where Paraguay meets Argentina and Brazil. A fair number of Middle Easterners that live there have direct links to banks overseas and there’s a lot of money laundering that goes on there. In fact, the President of Paraguay is most interested in help to addressing money laundering. Since that’s the work of the FBI and Treasury, we alerted them; the President of Paraguay wants to get his arms around money laundering because he knows that it’s not only detrimental to his country, but that it goes into the coffers of terrorist organizations. That’s a convergence or a nexus. There are people that push back on that and say “when you tell me that the Sinaloa Cartel is funding the transportation costs of five guys from ISIS to get into the region then smuggle them up into the United States, hand them a dirty bomb, and let them set off the dirty bomb in an American city, detonate the bomb and then run for it, I’ll believe there’s a connection.” But my belief is if they’re “touching,” this is convergence. Some people will say, the cartels will never allow that to happen because so much pressure would be brought to bear if they allowed a terrorist organization to get in. And maybe that’s true. But many of these network people don’t check IDs, they don’t check passports, and they don’t check what’s in your bag. They’re paid to move products, not ask questions. It’s very easy to move along this network. I was in Costa Rica at a conference when a member of the country team saw four, five, or six black gentlemen that were speaking English, but were obviously not Costa Rican, on their way through to the border position in Nicaragua. A member of the American Embassy went over and asked “Who are you guys?” They responded, “We’re from Liberia. We were there a week ago and we’re on our way to New York City.” I’m sure they were great guys going up to start a new life for themselves. But remember, they were in Liberia a week ago, where Ebola is a big problem, so it’s still only two weeks… There’s a lot of potential for things to move along these networks. I shouldn’t have to work hard to convince someone that there is an attack being planned by a terrorist organization and supported logistically and philosophically by the cartels. I’m paid to worry about things like that. In Martinique a few months ago, I was talking to the French regional coordinator of the French version of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). They see a huge amount of cocaine going to the west coast and they know that the al-Qaeda affiliates make a great deal of money letting that cocaine flow up through Mali, and the Maghreb and into western Europe. Is that a convergence or nexus of terrorism and drugs? I would argue it is, and the French certainly see it that way.

Is there anything that you in your position can do to counter that phenomenon, the phenomenon of the convergence and the connectivity between Latin American and Africa and Europe?

Gen. Kelly: I think the first step is to be vocal about it and we’ve done that. I, Chuck
Jacoby, of Northern Command, and Bill McRaven from SOCOM have been very vocal about this and people have begun to recognize it as a threat. And again, I’m not suggesting that there are now conspiracies to move terrorists along the cartel networks into the United States, but the potential is there. If you’re looking for terrorism and narcoterrorism or drug trafficking, we see it right now in money laundering that is funding a great deal of international terrorism.

Finally, what do you think the future holds for U.S. defense cooperation with the region?

Gen Kelly: While our focus right now is on Central America, we can’t lose sight of the opportunities and challenges in the region as a whole. Many countries are understandably concerned about the second and third order effects that will inevitably come with improvements in security in places like Honduras and Guatemala. We need to make sure that the successes we have in the Northern Triangle don’t come at the expense of the rest of Central America…or the Caribbean and South America.

There are tremendous opportunities to partner on issues like cyber security, disaster response, mass migration, and of course on persistent challenges like violent extremism and illicit trafficking. In the majority of these missions, the U.S. military will be working side by side with our interagency partners, especially the courageous men and women of DHS, DEA, the FBI, the Treasury Department, and the CIA.

I also believe our cooperation won’t just be in Latin America, but beyond… Brazil, along with Colombia, El Salvador, Uruguay, and others are doing outstanding work in supporting international peacekeeping and stabilization missions around the world. For one terrific example: Colombia is exporting its security expertise, providing training in Central America and Mexico, and its navy is exploring the possibility of supporting anti-piracy efforts off the coast of Africa.

Finally, I think it’s worth noting that if we want to maintain our partnerships in this hemisphere, we must remain engaged with this hemisphere. We’re managing to keep the “pilot light” of regional engagement on—but just barely, and sequestration will completely extinguish that light. Why should we make such an effort to remain engaged, especially given the growing list of global challenges facing the United States? For the simple reason that a strong, secure, and prosperous Latin America is in all our interests. After all, the United States and our partners worked hard to ensure the Western Hemisphere is a beacon of freedom, democracy, and peace. In the face of the corrosive spread of criminal networks and other challenges, we must all work even harder to ensure it remains that way. This, in my view, is what the future of U.S. defense cooperation is all about. PRISM