PRISM is published by the National Defense University Press for the Center for Complex Operations. PRISM is a security studies journal chartered to inform members of U.S. Federal agencies, allies, and other partners on complex and integrated national security operations; reconstruction and nation-building; relevant policy and strategy; lessons learned; and developments in training and education to transform America’s security and development apparatus to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while promoting freedom today.

CONTRIBUTIONS

PRISM welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from security policymakers and shapers, security analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address above or by email to prism@ndu.edu with “Attention Submissions Editor” in the subject line. For further information, see the guidelines on the NDU Press Web site at ndupress.ndu.edu.

NDU Press is the National Defense University’s cross-component, professional military and academic publishing house. It publishes books, policy briefs, occasional papers, monographs, and special reports on national security strategy, defense policy, national military strategy, regional security affairs, and global strategic problems.

This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department of Defense edition of PRISM. Any copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted without permission of the copyright proprietors. PRISM should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted from or based on its content.

Please visit NDU Press and PRISM online at ndupress.ndu.edu for more on upcoming issues, an electronic archive of PRISM articles, and access to other publications.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government.
CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS (CCO)

Enhancing the U.S. Government’s Ability to Prepare for Complex Operations

CCO, a center within the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, links U.S. Government education and training institutions, including related centers of excellence, lessons learned programs, and academia, to foster unity of effort in reconstruction and stability operations, counterinsurgency, and irregular warfare—collectively called “complex operations.” The Department of Defense, with support from the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development, established CCO as an innovative interagency partnership.

CCO WAS ESTABLISHED TO:

- Serve as an information clearinghouse and knowledge manager for complex operations training and education, acting as a central repository for information on areas such as training and curricula, training and education provider institutions, complex operations events, and subject matter experts
- Develop a complex operations training and education community of practice to catalyze innovation and development of new knowledge, connect members for networking, share existing knowledge, and cultivate foundations of trust and habits of collaboration across the community
- Serve as a feedback and information conduit to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and broader U.S. Government policy leadership to support guidance and problem-solving across the community of practice
- Enable more effective networking, coordination, and synchronization to support the preparation of Department of Defense and other U.S. Government personnel for complex operations
- Support lessons learned processes and best practices compilation in the area of complex operations
- Identify education and training gaps in the Department of Defense and other Federal departments and agencies and facilitate efforts to fill those gaps.

Visit the CCO Web site at: http://ccoportal.org

Subscriptions for individuals: http://bookstore.gpo.gov
FEATURES

3 The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening
   by Najim Abed Al-Jabouri and Sterling Jensen

19 From Idea to Implementation: Standing Up the Civilian Response Corps
   by Samuel S. Farr

27 Third-generation Civil-military Relations: Moving Beyond the Security-Development Nexus
   by Frederik Rosén

43 Supporting Peace: The End
   by William J. Durch

57 Nonstate Security Threats in Africa: Challenges for U.S. Engagement
   by Andre Le Sage

79 Shock and Awe a Decade and a Half Later: Still Relevant, Still Misunderstood
   by Harlan K. Ullman

87 A Tale of Two Manuals
   by Raphael S. Cohen

   by Corri Zoli and Nicholas J. Armstrong

FROM THE FIELD

121 Building Police Capacity in Afghanistan: The Challenges of a Multilateral Approach
   by William B. Caldwell IV and Nathan K. Finney

LESSONS LEARNED

131 Pakistan Earthquake Relief Operations: Leveraging Humanitarian Missions for Strategic Success
   by William J. Bowers

INTERVIEWS

145 An Interview with Jim Webb

151 An Interview with Martin E. Dempsey
BOOK REVIEWS

156 The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era
   Reviewed by John Coffey

161 Why Vietnam Matters: An Eyewitness Account of Lessons Not Learned
   Reviewed by R. Scott Moore

   Reviewed by Samuel A. Worthington
After the coalition forces invaded Iraq in 2003, Sunnis revolted against the idea of de-Sunnifying Iraq. Partnering with the United States in 2006 was mainly an attempt to recoup Sunni losses once the United States had seemingly changed its position in their regard. This happened as the Sunni community increasingly saw al Qaeda and Iran as bigger threats than the U.S. occupation. The Sunni Awakening had two main parts: the Anbar Awakening and the Awakening councils, or the Sons of Iraq program. The Anbar Awakening was an Iraqi grassroots initiative supported by the United States and paid for by the Iraqi government. The Sons of Iraq program was a U.S.-led and -funded initiative to spread the success of the Anbar Awakening into other Sunni areas, particularly heterogeneous areas, and was not fully supported by the Iraqi government. If not for al Qaeda’s murder and intimidation campaign on Sunnis, and its tactic of creating a sectarian war, the Anbar Awakening—a fundamental factor in the success of the 2007 surge—most probably would not have occurred, and it would have been difficult for the United States in 2006 to convince Sunnis to partner with them in a fight against al Qaeda.

**Anbar Awakening and Sons of Iraq Program: What’s the Difference?**

The Sunni Awakening is the Iraqi revolt against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in which Sunni Arabs partnered with U.S. forces to fight a common enemy. American accounts generally have the Sunni Awakening starting unofficially in February 2005 when men from the Albu Mahal tribe in al-Qaim fought against al Qaeda and solicited U.S. help to do so. However, this attempt and others
quickly lost steam through al Qaeda’s murder and intimidation campaign against tribal leaders and anyone, regardless of sect, associated with receiving U.S. help. The Sunni Awakening then officially started in September 2006 with the announcement of the Anbar Awakening in Ramadi under the leadership of Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha. American accounts then morph the Anbar Awakening into the Sons of Iraq program where Sunni tribesmen and former resistance fighters were paid by the United States to man security checkpoints in areas infested by al Qaeda and other militant jihadist groups opposed to the Iraqi government. This is important to make this distinction because there were different factors involved in the Iraqi roles before and after the surge. However, to understand the Iraqi and AQI roles in the Awakening, it is important to first put Sunni thinking after the invasion in the right context.

**Reasons for the Sunni Insurgency**

Misunderstanding between the United States and Iraqi Sunni Arabs fed the insurgency. When coalition forces invaded Iraq in March 2003, the predominantly Sunni provinces of Anbar, Ninevah, and Salah al-Din did not want to confront the invading forces militarily. As Sunnis in the north saw the destruction and looting taking place in the south as coalition troops entered, a number of tribal leaders who had been in contact with U.S. military and intelligence personnel prior to the invasion convinced the Iraqi military and Ba’ath party leadership in Anbar, Ninevah, and Salah al-Din to meet with the Americans upon their arrival. The reigning U.S. assumption at the time was that the political vacuum created by the fall of the former regime would strengthen the position of the tribal leaders. Therefore, brokering with the tribes was a means to communicate with civil-military leaders and in turn to influence the populace. Meanwhile, Sunnis—in particular those without deep ties to the former regime—assumed that the United States would broker with them, since Sunnis had more government experience than any of the other ethnic or sectarian groups. Sunnis also assumed it was not in the U.S. interest to give the majority of the next government to Shia and Kurdish opposition groups, most of which were connected to Iran. Giving the Shia and Kurds responsibility for the government would increase Iranian influence in Iraq. With established U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
Turkey, Jordan, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (all Sunni countries), changing the regional balance of power would be a tectonic policy shift the Sunni establishment did not think the United States would make. Also, the tribes talking with the United States assumed the invading forces would work within the established sociopolitical system, as had been the case with British forces after World War I. Moreover, modern Iraqi history suggests an asymmetric relationship between the power of the state and the influence of the tribes. Tribal leaders saw an imminent U.S. invasion as an opportunity to increase their influence. Thus, the tribal elite gave the United States the impression that they could be relied upon in a political power vacuum.

In the early days of the post-invasion, the tribes convinced military and political leaders in Anbar, Ninevah, and Salah al-Din to negotiate an arrangement until the next government took shape. Military and Ba’ath party leaders were chosen as interim governors and police chiefs through temporary elections in Ninevah and through appointment by tribal leaders in Anbar and Salah al-Din. The Sunni leaders in these provinces thought that doing so would spare their cities and personal property and would put them in leadership positions for the next government.

While Sunni tribal leaders tried keeping the established civil-military leadership on the side of the Americans, jihadist groups were recruiting Sunnis both inside and outside of Iraq to join the fight against the invaders. This was a time when many foreign fighters entered Iraq. However, the majority of Iraqi Sunnis were still in a “wait and see” mode, thinking that the United States would reorganize the government through them. When Paul Bremer replaced Jay Garner, the Coalition Provisional Authority’s first two orders were the de-Ba’athification laws and disbanding the Iraqi security services. While many in the security services were not working after the invasion, these surprising mandates agitated the Sunni community and increased the momentum to organized insurgency. However, many of the tribal elite continued trying to convince the now-unemployed and de-Ba’athified Sunnis to wait and see the next U.S. move. While there were occasional attacks against U.S. forces in Sunni areas, such as the Fallujah killings of April 2003, these were limited and conducted by al Qaeda and small jihadist and resistance groups. The tribal elite and the Sunni moderate majority still expected the United States would give Sunnis a reasonable share of power in the next government, even though the Bremer laws were confusing to them.

Enter al Qaeda. After the United States started its war in Afghanistan in 2001, many al Qaeda and jihadist fighters fled the country, mainly to Pakistan, Iran, and Iraqi Kurdistan. Abu Musab Zarqawi was one of them. He went to Kurdistan through Iran and met with fellow fleeing jihadist fighters from Ansar al-Sunna, and after the U.S. invasion created his own organization called Tawheed wa Jihad. Zarqawi came to Iraq at a time when the United States was increasing its rhetoric over weapons of mass destruction and sending signals that it would invade Iraq. When the United States used Iraqi opposition groups from abroad to assess an invasion, Zarqawi and other religious extremists inside the country were making assessments of their post-invasion role. At the time, al Qaeda and jihadists from Afghanistan enjoyed international notoriety, and since Iraqis did not know much about al Qaeda, other than that it was given credit for successfully attacking the United States and
evading capture, Iraqi Sunnis did not initially dismiss the group, and some joined its ranks. However, al Qaeda did not have significant presence in Iraq until after the invasion. When it appeared that the United States would invade Iraq in early 2003, al Qaeda members and others such as Zarqawi prepared to exploit a possible vacuum of power after an attack. Foreign fighters
came to Iraq in increasing numbers and were recruited not only by the former regime, but also by al Qaeda and other jihadist groups.

After the invasion, uncertainty reigned in Iraq. The security institutions fell and the looting of government property immediately ensued. As crime rose, so did uncertainty about where to
turn for security. Al Qaeda and militant jihadist groups were among the few organizations on the ground that offered protection and guidance to Sunni communities. Leaders in al Qaeda, Tawheed wa Jihad, and other jihadists assured Sunnis that they were performing their religious duty by fighting the invaders. They also told Sunni Arabs that the Shia and Iran were working with the Americans to expel them from Iraq. Since there was uncertainty about U.S. intentions, people were vulnerable to these conspiracy theories. While the tribal leaders in Anbar, Ninevah, and Salah al-Din were trying to reassure the people, the military, and the Ba’athist leadership that the United States would rely on them to reestablish the government (giving the tribe the prestigious role of mediator), al Qaeda was working within the lower class outside the influence of the tribal or military elite. Religious-minded Sunnis were more inclined to join AQI and company. As conditions deteriorated and the Bremer laws were introduced, more national resistance groups formed and gained sympathy from people upset with U.S. mistakes. Despite this, the tribal leaders still did not think the United States would abandon the Sunni establishment. However, the announcement of the Interim Governing Council in July 2003, 5 months after the invasion, confirmed Sunni suspicions that the United States intended to de-Sunnify Iraq and tilt the regional balance of power toward Iran. Choosing Shia and Kurdish opposition groups close to Iran to form the next Iraqi government not only was a catalyst for national resistance, but it also created the conditions for the national resistance—now being led by once-skeptical former military and Ba’athist officials—to tolerate, trust, and in some instances embrace jihadists and al Qaeda as means to spoil American objectives.

After the interim government had formed, the majority of Sunnis, rather than just the margins, significantly distrusted U.S. intentions. Ideas circulated through the Sunni community that the United States was changing its alliances in the Middle East because it now considered Shia religious extremism less threatening to its long-term interests in the region than Sunni religious extremism, especially the Wahhabism coming from Saudi Arabia. Whether the United States intended to de-Sunnify Iraq and change the regional balance of power from Sunni to Shia leadership did not matter at this point. Sunnis were now convinced this was the case. This perceived shift in strategic alliances, along with U.S. violation of Iraqi customs, incidents of mistreating civilians, and not securing the civil areas of Iraq being overrun by criminal activity, fueled the Sunni insurgency. Not until perceptions of those strategic interests changed and Sunnis considered jihadist and insurgent crimes to be greater than U.S. crimes were the majority of Sunnis ready to openly work with the Americans against al Qaeda and the jihadists.

**Sunnis Accept U.S. Support**

By September 2006, there were four main reasons why Sunnis were receptive to U.S. support. First, security had greatly deteriorated, and Sunnis felt vulnerable to both AQI and sectarian attacks. Al Qaeda was waging a sectarian war, and it was using a murder and intimidation
campaign on Iraqis to achieve its objectives. Sunnis were disillusioned with the crimes that the insurgency and al Qaeda were committing. They seemed to be employing tactics without a purpose and targeting Iraqis rather than the American occupiers. The Iraqi Sunnis had heard about suicide bombings in Palestine and Lebanon prior to 2003, but they had not lived through them; they had never really lived with religious extremism. As AQI began living and operating in Sunni areas, the people gradually noticed their extreme behaviors and demands. Foreign Arabs would demand that Iraqi resistance groups follow their orders, claiming Islamic authority. They would force families to provide subsistence and shelter, compel families to marry their daughters to suicide bombers, force divorces for wives they desired, and forbid people from drinking alcohol or smoking cigarettes. In some areas AQI forbade people from selling or carrying cucumbers and tomatoes together because they resembled male and female sexual organs in contact with each other. Not only were their demands extreme, but they would also brutally kill anyone who did not support them or sympathize with their barbaric acts. This threatening environment was very difficult for the people to tolerate.

On another front, increasing sectarian violence in Baghdad was deeply disheartening, especially after the Samarra mosque bombing in February 2006. The Sunnis realized that they had lost Baghdad and were being expelled through sectarian cleansing—violence that went against fundamental Iraqi values. Also, AQI targeted symbols of Iraqi nationalism. They would decapitate tribal leaders or Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) recruits. They would also target families of anyone working with the government of Iraq or the Americans. People started saying secretly that AQI came to liberate Iraq from Iraqis, not the Americans. This comment reflected their disillusionment and disgust with al Qaeda. It was bad enough that Iraq was being occupied by a non-Muslim nation’s military, but it was worse that it was being grossly mistreated by Muslims who claimed they were defending Islam. This environment of hypocrisy and fear discredited AQI claims.

Second, people noticed a change in the U.S. attitude toward the Sunnis. The Western news increasingly reported how the United States had made many mistakes at the beginning of the invasion. Some American officials regretted disbanding the former army and supporting the de-Ba’athification laws, and some

when senior American officers witnessed the hardships faced by former Iraqi army officers, they worked to help alleviate their suffering

U.S. commanders apologized for these mistakes. When senior American officers witnessed the hardships faced by former Iraqi army officers, they worked to help alleviate their suffering. For example, General Petraeus, commander of the 101st Airborne Division, responsible for Ninevah Province, often met Sunni officers from the former Iraqi army and empathized with their anguish. He appeared sympathetic to their problems and ordered that they receive a monthly salary of about $100 to work in factories and offices in his area of operation. At the time, this was a decent amount of money and helped the former officers provide for their families; it gave these officers hope. General Petraeus also organized conferences and meetings in Mosul for all the members of the Ba’ath party, both civilian and military. In return for their pledge to not work with the Ba’ath party...
or to work against the peace, he would help them return to their respective jobs.

American officers who shared Petraeus’s view of the former officers were more empathetic and effective with this significant yet marginalized part of the community. In fact, there are instances when American officers refused to obey orders from the de-Ba’athification committee, Ministry of the Interior, and Ministry of Defense to retire Sunni officers. U.S. military officers argued that the new Iraqi army and police force needed these officers for their experience and skills. American commanders would listen to former officers in their first tours, and then during their second and third tours they would be more sympathetic to Sunni needs since they better understood the ground realities. This type of American behavior was a signal to the Sunni community that U.S. intentions had changed and they were no longer trying to de-Sunnify Iraq.

In 2006, the Democrats were campaigning for the midterm congressional elections on a platform that claimed going to Iraq was a mistake and that the United States needed to change course and prepare to withdraw its troops from Iraq. One of the main justifications for the insurgency was that Sunnis thought the United States intended to indefinitely occupy Iraq and install a government friendly to Iran. On the one hand, Sunni resistance groups were satisfied that they had changed U.S. goals in Iraq. But on the other hand, the idea of a U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq would leave them without an ally to fight al Qaeda and Iranian-backed militias supported by the Iraqi government. Meanwhile, Sunni resistance fighters started noticing that some of the weapons and explosives they used came from Iran. There were reports about how Iran was supporting al Qaeda and the Sunni insurgency against the U.S. occupation. Iran’s desire to drive out the Americans was a red flag to Sunni resistance groups about Sunni prospects in a future Iraq. Resistance groups increasingly questioned the long-term effects of their efforts. This was also a time when Washington blamed Tehran for supporting sectarian militias and called for more sanctions against Iran for its nuclear program. The United States seemed more willing to work with the Sunni community as Iraqis increasingly felt the impact of Iranian-backed militias.

Zarqawi’s death in June 2006 also had an impact on Sunni willingness to work with the Americans. AQI’s strategy was largely based on Zarqawi’s personality, and the group became disoriented after he was killed. After Zarqawi’s death, Iraqi vigilante groups such as the Anbar Revolutionaries increased their attacks on AQI fighters, and this gave Sunnis hope that AQI was beatable.5

The third reason why Sunnis were receptive of U.S. support in 2006 was because they saw that Sheikh Abdul Sattar was successfully working with the Americans. The 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division (1–1 AD), deployed to Ramadi from Tal Afar in May 2006, seemed to be listening to what Abdul Sattar was saying and actually doing something about it. This was a new development. When Sunni resistance groups and tribal leaders had approached the United States about starting anti-AQI campaigns in the past, Washington would initially sound receptive but in the end would
not act. There had been many attempts to talk with the Americans about ways to fight al Qaeda since 2004, but the Americans did not seem to trust the local leaders enough to support their initiatives.6

In July 2006, the U.S. Army brigade in Ramadi seemed serious about police recruitment, saying the Iraqi police (IP) could work in their areas of residence to ensure the safety of their families. The Anbar Revolutionaries and other vigilantes answered the call and joined the Ramadi IP. They did this to make their fight against al Qaeda official, to get paid by the Ministry of the Interior, and to avoid targeting by the Americans. In August 2006, when Sheikh Abdul Sattar was building police stations in his tribal areas outside of Ramadi, the stigma of working with the Americans was lessened. The people were hoping for someone to take a stand against AQI. Abdul Sattar started stating openly what people were thinking (but did not dare to say publicly): that al Qaeda and Iran were the real occupiers in Iraq, not the Americans. Then, on September 9, 2006, Abdul Sattar and Faisal Gaud—former governor of Anbar and representative of the tribal elite residing in Amman who had been soliciting U.S. support for an Awakening since 2004—announced the Anbar Awakening. In his guestroom, in the presence of the 1–1 AD commander as well as over a dozen of his tribal peers, Abdul Sattar boldly declared that the American troops were “friendly forces” and guests in Anbar.

Finally, Sunnis were receptive to U.S. support in September 2006 because the resistance groups had already been at war with al Qaeda. Tension started to rise as early as the spring of 2004. There was a rift between the ideology of AQI and resistance groups, with AQI using religious ideology and the resistance groups using more nationalistic ideology. Competition for financial resources was also a factor in this rift. AQI wanted to control the resistance groups’ funding and told them to swear allegiance to AQI or die. When the resistance groups started fighting AQI, they were on a path that eventually led them to view the U.S. troops as a means to fight a common enemy.

After Abdul Sattar had announced the Anbar Awakening, working with the Americans was a means of securing Sunni areas. Contrary to a growing U.S. narrative about the Sunni Awakening being mainly the fruit of U.S. counterinsurgency tactics, in Ramadi having the U.S. forces in the neighborhoods was not what made the people feel safe. They felt safe when their men could join the police force and secure their areas by themselves. Joining the police and working in their own local areas were also a way to avoid being targeted by the Americans. As policemen, they might have wanted U.S. support doing operations, but they did not want to support U.S. operations—as experienced by the Fallujah Brigade in 2004. Also, as policemen they received official pay and had better chances of winning reconstruction work in their areas.

For others, though, the Americans were still seen as occupiers, which trumped any justification for working with them. It was not only a religious taboo to support the occupier, but also a cultural duty to fight the occupier—which is why Abdul Sattar cast AQI and Iran as the true occupiers and the Americans as guests. Those refusing to work with the United States not only saw the Americans as occupiers, but they also were allowing the Iranians to occupy their country. They felt marginalized and could not reconcile with the new government of Iraq. The prevailing thought was that de-Ba’athification was de-Sunnification.
because they saw the incumbent parties employing Shia and Kurdish Ba’athists.

**Types of Support Wanted**

It is important to differentiate between the Anbar Awakening and Sons of Iraq when assessing the type of support that was most important to them. The Anbar Awakening was largely a grassroots Iraqi initiative to replace the provincial government with an emergency government led by the Awakening leadership. Police recruitment and partnering with the United States were means to that end.

The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) controlled the Anbar Provincial Council, and al Qaeda's murder and intimidation campaign and word of a U.S. armored brigade (1–1 AD) coming to Ramadi in spring 2006 to conduct a large, Fallujah-like military sweep of the city sent the provincial and municipal council into exile. The tribal leadership was also in exile, leaving mainly third-tier tribal leaders in the province. Anbaris increasingly blamed the IIP and the tribal leadership for neglecting their responsibilities and abandoning them. When 1–1 AD came to Ramadi and was looking to partner with local leadership in its counterinsurgency campaign, third-tier sheikhs such as Abdul Sattar used the vacuum of local tribal and political power to assert themselves as the new provincial and municipal leaders.

At that point, AQI had effectively gained considerable influence over provincial and municipal operations. Tribal leaders in Jordan had been trying since 2004 to start an anti-AQI campaign using local former military officers and Anbari tribesmen, but the United States did not seem interested. Abdul Sattar saw 1–1 AD interest in local outreach as an opportunity to gain the support that the exiled tribal leaders in Jordan had been working for, but remotely.

As Sheikh Sattar was successful in gaining U.S. support in police recruitment, his popularity and influence grew. And as the Anbar Awakening in Ramadi was successful and gained more U.S. support, his vision of the Awakening also grew. He started talking about expanding the Awakening beyond Anbar and even Iraq, envisioning it as a way of changing the Sunni world. Sheikh Sattar often said that if the United States helped him fight al Qaeda in Anbar, Iraqis would be able to expel al Qaeda from Iraq. Once they were expelled, he would help the United States fight them all the way to Afghanistan. This statement was more than an idle promise; it reflected a view that Sunni Arabs in Anbar were disillusioned with what al Qaeda had brought to them, and al Qaeda was ruining the name of Arabs, Sunnis, and Muslims in general. It was clear to these Sunni leaders that the United States was incapable of effectively fighting al Qaeda and making things worse when trying. It would bring great honor to the Anbari tribes to be the saviors of Iraq and Sunni Islam, and Sheikh Abdul Sattar aspired to be that standard bearer. Awakening leaders had seen how the Americans fought and knew that they did not know what they were doing against al Qaeda. In fact, since the United States was not effective in fighting al Qaeda and did not support local initiatives, many Sunnis thought that al Qaeda worked for U.S. forces. The Anbar Awakening changed that perception. Sunnis understood the Americans had a
lot of misused power. If the Awakening leadership were able to tap into that power and use it to expel al Qaeda from Anbar, they would be able to claim that they had conquered an enemy the strongest military in the world could not defeat—negating the argument that they were collaborating with the Americans.

In a planned visit to the United States before his death in September 2007, Sheikh Sattar wanted to tell President George W. Bush that the Awakening was Anbar’s gift of condolence to America for the September 11 acts committed by Arab terrorists. As the Anbar Awakening gained momentum at the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007, this vision drove Sheikh Sattar, his brother Ahmad, and other leaders of the Awakening. What they needed was access to American leverage in Baghdad to gain support for the ISF in Anbar, political support against the IIP, and U.S. support to open Awakening offices in other troubled Sunni areas in Baghdad and Salah al-Din. They also needed the Americans to coordinate their operations with the locals. Once areas were secured, reconstruction contracts were needed to show that security cooperation reactivated the economy.

The Americans put an M-1 tank in front of Abdul Sattar’s house after the Awakening had started, which he did not like. He asked the Americans to replace the American tank with an Iraqi one, which they did. However, when the Iraqi tank company left Anbar, the Americans replaced the Iraqi tank with an American one. Abdul Sattar still did not like having the American tank in front of his house. He wanted security walls around his compound and U.S. cooperation with those plans. However, as Abdul Sattar’s popularity grew and it became more socially acceptable to work with the Americans, and as Ramadi became more secure, the tank became a symbol of how he could influence the Americans.

Sheikh Sattar’s sense of security came from influence over the police in his area. He also had regular visits from the Americans at a time when other tribal leaders wanted to meet with them. His role as mediator increased his credibility with the other tribes, which in turn gave him more security. His increasing social status and access to his own personal security detail from the local police gave him more of a sense of security than any U.S. combat presence could offer.

However, support for the Sons of Iraq program is different from the Anbar Awakening. In early 2007, the popularity of the Anbar Awakening reached outside the province. Since tribes are cross-sectarian social organizations, news of the Anbari tribes defeating AQI traveled fast. Sunnis in other AQI-infested areas, such as in northern and western Baghdad, wanted the same type of access to the Americans as Sheikh Sattar. They would visit or contact him asking for help. Sheikh Sattar also had frequent visits from Southern Shia tribesmen asking for help to gain American assistance in fighting the Iranian-backed militias. Yet these visits were not fruitful because the American brigade in Ramadi had little influence outside its area of operation. Abdul Sattar’s Sunni visitors were generally from the mixed cities in Salah al-Din, Diyala, and Baghdad, where the Iraqi Police were already well established but were heavily sectarian. The Americans in these mixed areas were less likely to work with former insurgents or people who did not fully support the local ISF or government—Americans were inclined to only support local military and political leaders, even if those leaders lacked legitimacy or were seen as sectarian. In these heterogeneous areas, the Iraqi Police were often an instrument for
sectarian violence where Sunnis sought a means to defend themselves legally. They thought that Abdul Sattar might help them get American support in their areas.

U.S. support for the Awakening changed, though, in February 2007, when General Petraeus replaced General George Casey and first heard about tribal movement. In an effort to expand the influence of the Awakening, General Petraeus started the Sons of Iraq program for operations in Diyala and Baghdad, usually paying Sunni tribesmen in al Qaeda–infested areas to work as paramilitaries with the hope that someday they would be integrated into the Ministry of the Interior. Initially, the ethnosectarian parties in the government agreed to integrate the Anbar Awakening fighters into the ministry because they were from a homogeneous Sunni province that was a former al Qaeda sanctuary. In fact, from the beginning of the Anbar Awakening, all ISF recruitment was done through the interior and defense ministries. Technically, the Anbar Awakening was an official government of Iraq initiative because it funded and equipped ISF recruits coming from the Anbar Awakening. Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and interior and defense officials were regularly visited by Anbar Awakening leaders, and Maliki fully supported their fight against al Qaeda. Integrating these fighters into the ISF was not a political threat to the incumbent political parties in Baghdad, and Anbari fighters were seen as reducing the threat of AQI. However, the Sons of Iraq and Awakening councils outside of Anbar were being employed by the United States in mixed areas such as Diyala and Baghdad, where the Iraqi police and army units were mainly Shia.

In addition to demographic differences, the U.S.-paid Sunni paramilitary fighters in these areas were not as interested in reconciling with the Iraqi government as the Anbar Awakening leaders were, and they posed a political threat to the Shia parties in their areas. Sunnis in these areas falsely assumed that Sunnis in Anbar were being paid by the Americans to fight AQI, so they thought it socially acceptable to do the same under the U.S.-led Sons of Iraq program. Popularity of the Anbar Awakening grew outside of Anbar just as the Americans became proactive in recruiting Sunnis into the Sons of Iraq program. When the Americans were able to directly contact interested Sunni leaders in these areas to be a part of the Sons of Iraq program, the Sunnis did not feel obligated to swear allegiance to Sheikh Sattar in Anbar, but they would call themselves Awakening fighters and form Awakening councils even though they were not officially affiliated with Abdul Sattar. Their main goal was to get a paycheck, ammunition, and permission to use their weapons, not be targeted by the ISF or U.S. forces, secure their areas, and obtain reconstruction contracts. They were not organized under a political campaign as Sheikh Sattar was in Anbar. Since the Sons of Iraq were being paid by the Americans, they did not have to rely on the Iraqi government for assistance. The irony is that the Anbar Awakening was a local initiative organized and named by locals and funded by the Iraqi government, whereas the later self-described Awakening fighters and Awakening...
councils in Baghdad, Diyala, and Salah al-Din were recruited into a program that was organized, named, and funded by the Americans.

**Role of the Surge**

The surge did not have a role in the Anbar Awakening. Surge troops that came to Anbar in 2007 were not seen as useful, other than on the eastern border with Baghdad where the ISF acted as a sectarian militia. In fact, U.S. troops in general were not seen as useful even before the surge. When announcing the Anbar Awakening, Sheikh Sattar told the Americans that as long as the U.S. brigade helped locals become card-carrying security forces and be permitted to work in their areas, the U.S. forces could stay on their bases while the Anbaris fought, since they knew who the al Qaeda fighters were. When Anbaris had tried to give this information to the Americans in the past, the Americans rarely acted on it, so Anbaris thought it better that the locals be empowered to do it themselves. The Awakening leadership sought U.S. political leverage with the Iraqi government, coordination for ISF resources with the security ministries, and the use of U.S. forces as support for local ISF-led operations. In the Anbar Awakening, Sunnis did not see benefit in having the U.S. combat forces stationed in the cities taking the lead in security operations. Sunnis felt the best way to combat AQI was through local security force recruitment and permission to conduct their own operations with support from the American troops. This was because Anbar is largely a homogeneous province in which Sunnis saw a U.S. troop presence in the cities as a clear sign of occupation. All efforts were made by Awakening leaders to distance themselves from being seen as supporting a U.S. occupation. For them it was ideal if the Iraqis could take the lead, with the United States playing a supporting role. This way they could show the populace that the Americans were their guests helping them fight the real occupiers, al Qaeda and Iran.

However, this was not the case for Sunnis in ethnically and sectarian mixed areas where the ISF was politicized and acted as sectarian militias. In these areas, such as Baghdad, Diyala, and Salah al-Din, Sunnis saw the U.S. presence in the cities as an indispensable means for security. Sunnis who joined the Sons of Iraq program saw American troop deployments in the neighborhoods as a great benefit because they were a stabilizing force in what were otherwise potential grounds for increasing sectarian violence. This was the experience of Tal Afar, Ninevah, where Shia, Sunnis, Kurds, and Turkmen lived together but were torn apart due to the rise of sectarian violence and uneven sectarian representation in local government and security forces.

The surge troops supported the Sons of Iraq program, which was primarily focused in these mixed areas. AQI and other jihadists would use these Sunni pockets as safe havens as they tended to be the Sunnis’ only means for security against sectarian violence. When Sunnis heard there would be a surge of U.S. troops deployed in their areas, they assumed the troops would help protect them from the sectarian militias. They also thought

---

**Sunnis who joined the Sons of Iraq program saw American troop deployments as a great benefit because they were a stabilizing force in what were otherwise potential grounds for increasing sectarian violence**
that the popularity of the Awakening would warm the U.S. forces toward them, as many of these Sunnis were involved in resistance groups such as the Islamic Army and the 1920 Revolutionary Brigade that had previously fought U.S. forces. They thought that the good reputation of the Awakening would give them a better chance to get jobs, be allowed to carry weapons, and not be targeted by the United States and ISF.

**Summary**

A change in perceptions of U.S. intentions to de-Sunnify Iraq, the rise of sectarian violence, and al Qaeda’s extremist behavior were the main factors giving rise to the Sunni Awakening. In a way, the Awakening was the Sunnis’ sudden awareness of what they had gotten themselves into and the dark future facing them unless they changed course. They awoke to the fact that AQI was their real enemy, especially as word spread that Iran was helping AQI and resistance groups. AQI continued its murder and intimidation campaign to prevent the Awakening from gaining traction. They killed the families of police officers, assassinated tribal leaders involved in the Awakening, and bombed police recruitment sites.

Had AQI not been so strict with Sunnis and done more to assure them that they were working for their interests, they would have been more successful in Iraq. Had they been more Islamic, they could have had more influence over the people. Had AQI not interfered with the nationalist resistance and supported a nationalist ideology, they could have retained the support of the majority of Sunni fighters and had more visible support from Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Jordan. Had AQI acted more humanely with Sunnis, it would have been nearly impossible for the majority of Sunnis to turn against AQI or the armed resistance. But AQI relied on foreign ideas and foreign leaders who did not know how to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqis. While they spoke the same language and had the same religion and ethnicity as Iraqi Sunnis, they did not calculate the unintended consequences of their brutality. As AQI overstepped religious, cultural, social, and humanitarian boundaries and the stigma of Sunnis working with American forces was broken by the Anbar Awakening, the Sunni Awakening spread throughout all of Iraq.

It goes without saying that the Anbar Awakening would have failed had the United States not helped coordinate ISF recruitment in Ramadi in the fall of 2006. And the Anbar Awakening might not have been able to help Sunnis trapped in other AQI-infested areas in Diyala and Baghdad during a time when the government forces behaved as sectarian militias if General Petraeus had not recognized this change in Sunni feelings toward the U.S. forces and taken the initiative. But U.S. forces did not directly create the conditions for the Anbar Awakening; al Qaeda did. Accepting al Qaeda and other jihadists was a choice Iraqi Sunnis made at a time they were ignorant of AQI and perceived U.S. intentions as being to de-Sunnify Iraq. The Awakening occurred when Sunnis realized AQI was their greater enemy and the United States was their means to find their place in the new and changing Iraq.

The takeaway from understanding the difference between the Anbar Awakening and the Sons of Iraq program within the context of the Sunni Awakening is first to know the reason why people are fighting with you or against you. Sunnis first fought against the United States due to a misunderstanding about its intentions.
after the invasion. Yet Sunnis also joined the Sons of Iraq program partly due to a misunderstanding about the origin and patronage of the Anbar Awakening. Without a doubt, General Petraeus seized the initiative of the Anbar Awakening to create a successful and meaningful Sons of Iraq program. But the question for other insurgencies, such as in Afghanistan, is whether the United States can replicate the experience of the Anbar Awakening. Without it, the surge would not likely have given General Petraeus the momentum needed to start the Sons of Iraq program. With Al Qaeda’s mistakes probably being more responsible than U.S. counterinsurgency tactics for the Anbar Awakening, what are the implications for U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan? While different in geography, history, and culture, the lesson to take from understanding the Sunni Awakening for fighting terrorism and insurgency in Pakistan and Afghanistan is being able to answer the questions: Who is fighting against you, why, and are extremists making fateful mistakes similar to those Al Qaeda made in Iraq that inspired the Anbar Awakening?

This paper was commissioned for a January 2010 conference in Tampa, Florida, entitled “The Anbar Awakening: An After Action Review,” cosponsored by the Center for a New American Security and the College of William and Mary, under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Notes


2 Ghanem Basou was elected temporary governor of Nineveh, Hussein Jabara Jabouri was appointed governor of Salah al-Din, and Abdul Karim Burgis was appointed governor of Anbar. They were all former leaders in the Ba’ath party.

3 See Kathem Faris, “Reality and Ambition,” and Dr. Saleh Faraj, “History of the Anbar Awakening.” These studies are in Arabic. Available from Sterling Jensen at sterling.jensen@gmail.com.

4 Mullah Nadhem, “History of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.” Mullah Nadhem was a former leader in Al Qaeda in Iraq and has written a history of the organization; available from Sterling Jensen at sterling.jensen@gmail.com.

5 See Faris’s study. The Anbar Revolutionaries and Secret Police were vigilante groups that fought for self-preservation. They were usually former resistance fighters who had turned against Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2004 but were not working with the Americans. They would use AQI tactics such as laying improvised explosive devices and killing AQI fighters and leaving their bodies in the streets with signs warning anyone who worked with AQI that the same would happen to them.

6 In 2004, a number of resistance groups were communicating with the Americans in Amman, Jordan, through tribal leaders such as Talal Gaoud. One of their early efforts to fight al Qaeda with U.S. support was with the Fallujah Brigade in early 2004. This brigade was not successful largely because it could not fight AQI and other jihadists through their own initiatives, but had strict instructions to support only U.S. operations. The gap between the expectations of these fighters and U.S. military expectations of how to use them was so great that the Fallujah Brigade was highly compromised by the insurgency and ended in failure.
In late 2006 and early 2007, Prime Minister Maliki had strained relations with the Sunni bloc Tawafuq, and in particular with the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP)—the leading party of Tawafuq. The Anbar Awakening called for the removal of the IIP from Anbar and Maliki saw Sheikh Abdul Sattar as a potential Sunni partner to undermine the IIP.
On October 14, 1960, President John F. Kennedy laid out his vision for the Peace Corps in a speech at the University of Michigan. Less than 5 months later, on March 1, 1961, the President signed an Executive order creating the Peace Corps. Using funds from mutual security appropriations, Peace Corps programs moved quickly through the design phase and into implementation. It was an example of how nimble government can be when political will is married with idealism and a willingness to improvise and take action.

Congressman Samuel S. Farr has represented California’s 17th Congressional District for 17 years. His district is home to the Naval Postgraduate School and the Defense Language Institute, which he supports from his seat on the House Appropriations Committee.
On September 22, 1961, 11 months and 1 week after Kennedy’s speech, the 87th Congress passed Public Law 87–293, formally authorizing the Peace Corps.

A Tested Tool

I open with this history lesson because the Peace Corps did so much to define my life as a public servant, and I believe there are lessons to be learned that can be applied to reconstruction and stabilization efforts. But it is also a strong reminder of what the Federal Government can do when it sets its mind to a task, a lesson we must apply to our current foreign policy toolbox.

My experiences in the Peace Corps in Colombia remain some of my most vivid memories, and they have served to define how I have approached both domestic policy and foreign affairs during my time in Congress. It was my time living in a poor barrio in Medellin that taught me how to combat the culture of poverty, and those lessons linger today. I spent 2 years teaching Colombians to prioritize their needs and petition their government to fulfill them. I came to learn that change would only come to that poor country if the people were invested in the outcome.

Dollar for dollar, Peace Corps volunteers are the most effective diplomats that the United States sends abroad. We talk of winning hearts and minds, but Peace Corps volunteers live that mantra. I am not suggesting that we turn our foreign affairs over to the Peace Corps, but I do suggest that we learn lessons both from its approach and from how the executive and legislative branches address its maintenance.

Within 5 years of the launch of the Peace Corps, some 15,000 volunteers were in the field, the most ever. Since then, the numbers of volunteers have dwindled as funding has declined. Only in the past year have we seen a renewal of interest, with a 1-year funding increase of $60 million for 2010 bringing the total to $400 million. For 2011, the House Appropriations Committee supported the administration’s request for $446.2 million. That would be an increase of 24 percent in 2 years.

Historically, the executive branch has taken the lead on the Peace Corps, but Congress asserted itself last year because the Nation was at a crossroads. We could either reanimate the Peace Corps, one of America’s greatest global initiatives, or we could allow this tool to wither on the vine.

We are at a similar crossroads in our effort to build a civilian stabilization and reconstruction capability. The leadership displayed in reinvigorating the Peace Corps will have to be repeated if we are to successfully develop the recently authorized Civilian Response Corps (CRC), which is to failed and failing states what the Peace Corps is to local capacity-building. We must end the feuding between the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) regarding lead for this civilian capability and establish a unified budget for stabilization work.

Back in the 1960s, my service in the Peace Corps was motivated by altruistic values. Now, nearly five decades later, it is clear that we must pair our enduring and generous values with the clear self-interest of helping other countries to develop competent, responsive governments that provide security, respect universal human
rights, and offer a chance for a better life to all their citizens.

American security and prosperity require effective government at home and abroad. For the readers of this journal, there is no need to belabor the point that our country needs a robust capacity to help weak and failing states and those beset by humanitarian emergencies. Alarmingly, our capabilities, while slightly improved in the period since my legislation passed 2 years ago, remain woefully inadequate for the tasks at hand.

**A New Tool**

During my 17 years in Congress, I have worked tirelessly to enhance our government’s capability to deal with failed and failing states. The work culminated in July 2008 when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice officially unveiled the Civilian Response Corps, designed to help stabilize and rebuild parts of the world facing conflict and distress. Congress followed with official authorization in October 2008.

The creation of the CRC was modeled on my own legislation, the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008, which passed out of the House in March 2008. In that legislation (H.R. 1084), I laid out the creation of a Response Readiness Corps, including active and reserve components, which would later become the Civilian Response Corps.

During the process of drafting and improving that bill, I found that there is a great deal of support from both civilian and military stakeholders. While the bill was not created for current conflicts, the words General David Petraeus spoke in 2007 applied to my efforts to improve our civilian capacity: “There is no military solution to a problem like that in Iraq.”

I have stated time and again that our Armed Forces are supremely capable of their mission, but that mission is not diplomacy or development. We must have a strong counterpart to the military, and I believe that counterpart must be the Civilian Response Corps.

The CRC would be made up of 4,250 individuals, including 250 active members, a 2,000-member standby team, and a reserve component of an additional 2,000 volunteers from state and local governments. In short, the CRC must be a counterpart to the U.S. Armed Forces, capable of stabilizing countries in the transition from war to peace.

**Funding History**

The CRC, led by the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), does not have a long history. But much of that history involves leadership from the executive branch and reaction from Congress. It was the Bush administration that submitted the first-ever funding request to Congress for a “Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI)” budget line in the fiscal year (FY) 2009 budget request.

The President’s request was $248.6 million. However, when Congress ultimately appropriated funds for the CRC and S/CRS, it did so in the 2008 war supplemental. This $55 million appropriation was to support the initial development of the Civilian Response Corps, and those funds were divided. The State Department’s Diplomatic and Consular Affairs account received $30 million, with the remaining $25 million going to USAID’s Bilateral Economic Assistance account. The “Civilian Stabilization Initiative” budget line was not included.

The first regular (nonsupplemental) CSI appropriation was $75 million in FY09. It was again divided between State ($45 million) and USAID ($30 million). Following the same mold, FY10 CSI appropriation was $150 million ($120 million for State, $30 million for USAID).
However, Congress rescinded $70 million ($40 million from State and $30 million from USAID). The final appropriated funding level is now $80 million ($80 million for State, zero for USAID).

For FY11, the picture is even dimmer, with the Senate Appropriations Committee providing only $50 million for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative. The House State and Foreign Operations Appropriation Subcommittee markup is somewhat better with $85 million. However, when compared to the President’s request of $184 million, neither is fully supportive and the Senate cuts funding for this critical civilian capability by $99 million, or 73 percent less than requested or required to maintain the capacity.

**Executive Inaction**

Congress provided the administration with powerful new authorities and substantial resources to create and use the new Civilian Response Corps. I may support the current administration, but its accomplishments have been far below my expectations. By now, the administration should be much further along. The goal was to have the CRC close to fully established by now, including a 250-member active component, 2,000 standby component members, and a reserve component of 2,000 onboard and ready to deploy. Instead, the active component has barely reached 130 members, and only 967 members of the standby component have been identified. Congress did not fund the reserve component in FY09 and FY10, and the administration did not ask for funding in FY11, so that component is at zero. Nearly all of the active and standby members lack full training and preparedness for deployment.

Furthermore, the interagency decision and management processes for use of the CRC, approved in 2007, should be operating like a finely tuned machine. This has not yet happened. From my vantage point, the shortfalls have emerged from two key issues: insufficient attention from top-level leaders in the administration, and endless bickering within and between the departments and agencies about roles, missions, and expenses.

Given the multiple necessary priorities in many domains of government, it is understandable that the administration has been operating at maximum bandwidth and giving higher priority to other issues. But second shrift will not do. If we are serious about creating these capabilities (and we must be), then the executive branch must find within itself much greater energy, cooperation, and vision.

At the time of this writing (summer 2010), the administration continues to be slow in sorting itself out as it relates to the various roles among diplomacy, development, and defense. Any day now, we are told, a new approach to streamline interagency decisionmaking for the Civilian Response Corps will be announced as part of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. We in Congress believe that we have had to wait too long. It is ironic that as we struggle to make only the smallest changes in our own systems and institutions, we are asking other countries to radically transform their governmental norms and structures. Even more frustrating is that we have already won the debate on a wide set of necessary reforms; we do not lack for good ideas.
The pattern of appropriations described illustrates that while Congress showed an inclination to fund the CRC, the follow-through on the executive side was insufficient to gain momentum in Congress. Furthermore, the divided budgets and the inability to fully meet the President’s financial request demonstrate a lack of deep support to fund and build this new (and untested) response capability. The feedback loop of insufficient results in the executive branch leading to reduced support in Congress has been vicious. Only through sustained and focused attention from both branches will these capabilities be fully realized, and so far we have not seen either.

Let me return to the example of the Peace Corps. The simple adage “Where there is a will, there is a way” remains valid. Fifty years ago this October, Presidential candidate John F. Kennedy challenged students to give 2 years of their lives to improve America’s image by going abroad to work with poor communities around the world. This impromptu exhortation ultimately set the stage for the Peace Corps, redefining U.S. global engagement and elevating American moral standing at the height of the Cold War.

The idea ignited the public imagination, and with unimaginable agility the executive branch rapidly initiated the programs around the world. Losing no time, President Kennedy ordered Sargent Shriver to do a feasibility study. Capitalizing on the momentum and Presidential leadership, Shriver later recalled, “We received more letters from people offering to work in or to volunteer for the Peace Corps, which did not then exist, than for all other existing agencies.”

By the time Congress authorized the Peace Corps, volunteers were already in the field, changing the world and the American role in it. It is a powerful example we can learn from.

**Lessons Unlearned**

The vast majority of my colleagues in Congress agree that failing states pose a threat to America’s security and prosperity, and that our executive branch needs greater capabilities to prevent and respond to these situations. Moreover, the executive branch, starting in the second term of President George W. Bush and continuing under President Barack Obama, has espoused assertive policies regarding the need to enhance its capabilities. Nonetheless, in light of the baby-step accomplishments of the executive branch over the last few years and a general lack of cooperation with the legislative branch, interest among my colleagues to make the necessary investments and adjustments is painfully low. It is difficult to generate enthusiasm for policies that appear to be little more than great rhetoric with shallow follow-through.

As I have worked the aisles to generate support for the needed changes, most Members have responded that their constituents do not care about these issues or would simply prefer that they go away. If only I could wish away the problems of the world—but that is not reality.

It is true that I have been able to be attentive to these issues because the people who sent me to Congress care about them. California’s 17th District, surrounding the Monterey Peninsula and John Steinbeck’s Salinas Valley, is not only one of the most beautiful places on earth, but it is also a globally minded area. The
region I represent is a focal point for higher education. We have the Naval Postgraduate School, a graduate-level institution for the Federal Government and its partners around the world; the Defense Language Institute, the premiere language institute in the world; and the state and private entities of the University of California–Santa Cruz, Monterey Institute of International Studies, and California State University at Monterey Bay.

All of us who see the perils of walking away from the troubled parts of the world must help more of our fellow citizens understand the interconnectedness of the modern era and how impossible it is for us to simply erect a wall along our borders and ignore the world. There is a lot of rhetoric about lobbyists and special interests controlling Congress; the truth is that constituent voices, even among all other distractions, are the most powerful. If constituents remain largely silent on our country’s need for capacity, the few of us in Congress who are leading on this will only be able to seek out continued minor reforms. It will be impossible to achieve the necessary transformation. I urge every reader to express these concerns to their Federal legislators and to urge likeminded persons to do the same.

**Next Steps: Legislative**

We need citizen support to get on with remodeling and strengthening our own government so it can help other governments be effective. When other governments are effective and responsive to their people, our country is safer. Specifically, the 112th Congress needs to:

- Make it more difficult for executive branch agencies to waste time squabbling among themselves about roles, missions, and funding issues. We can accomplish this by being more prescriptive in our legislation about these specific issues. If the law specifies exactly who is responsible for what and how it should be paid for, those issues will in many ways be settled and the presumed need to bicker will vanish. The agencies, indeed the executive branch as a whole, will continue to re-argue roles rather than developing real capability unless we in Congress write more directive laws. As has been stated by Ambassador James Dobbins, bureaucracies see no reason to invest in lasting capabilities if they expect or hope to dodge the responsibility in the future. There are a variety of reasonable ways to consolidate and redistribute roles and missions. I tend to prefer the specific proposals under development in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs under the leadership of Congressman Howard Berman (D–CA).

- Restore funding to a level sufficient to support the ongoing growth and use of the Civilian Response Corps. Should the executive branch demonstrate good progress with these new capabilities, the funding level should be raised further to facilitate the recruitment, training, and deployment of the reserve component of the CRC.

- Provide funding as part of a consolidated or pooled fund, as Senator Richard Lugar has advocated. A unified budget for stabilization work is fundamental to the type of unity of purpose that Congress expects from the executive branch in this vital operation. A unified budget would consolidate authority within the executive branch, helping cut through even more of the bureaucratic competition. It would also enhance Congress’s ability to exercise oversight of the funding.
Finally, and more controversially, Congress should form select committees to oversee civilian-military operations. The challenges of these operations extend well beyond our government’s current shortfall in deployable civilian capability. Select committees would enhance our ability to cause effective integration among all the participants in these multifaceted operations.

**Next Steps: Executive**

The executive branch has much to do as well. Presumably, in the period between the writing of this article and its publication, the administration will culminate and announce its long-overdue Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, which will serve to establish policy and proposals to, inter alia, streamline and improve development of the CRC and interagency coordination for its use. Whatever is proposed, it will need to be reviewed and authorizations revised by the new Congress as discussed above.

Among the most important decisions the President or Secretary of State must make is who should lead these processes going forward. To date, the nascent S/CRS has been led by highly devoted, highly competent career staff. I have always been an advocate for the career professional foreign policy and development experts in our government. Gradually, however, I have come to believe that only somebody with those technical skills and substantial political influence and connections to the senior leaders of the administration will be able to achieve the type of transformation and acceptance of change that I know is needed. The Peace Corps got off the ground because it was a good idea led by a competent visionary who was married to the President’s sister. I am fairly sure people listened carefully when he had an idea to share.

The highest priority for the new leader should be to prove the concept of the Civilian Response Corps by immediately recruiting, educating, and using the new tool. The active corps must be recruited to the maximum authorized number of 250. All the ancillary components necessary to support the effective use of the corps must be developed with haste. For example, the corps will be more effective if its activities are based on a keen appreciation of past lessons learned. Fielded teams need a well-developed reachback capability to harness expertise resident throughout the United States and the world. CRC members need to see themselves in a career path with growth opportunities and appropriate professional development over time. They need to be confident that there is adequate community support for their families while they are deployed in insecure areas. There must be opportunities for them to get extensive, real-world seasoning through apprenticeships with other organizations such as the United Nations (UN) field missions, or nongovernmental relief or development agencies. They need the best education and training possible for the complex and urgent situations they will be sent to support.

Indeed, the education and training of the CRC are critical. I have been pleased to provide the direct congressional support needed for the executive branch to create and test an innovative educational institute devoted to
providing the best possible learning activities for people going to work in conflict-affected regions. The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) is a practitioner-oriented teaching institute at the Naval Postgraduate School. Its purpose is to provide short learning programs for the full spectrum of actors who are involved in the broad set of activities related to peace and humanitarian operations.

If one were to visit post-earthquake Haiti, the African Union–UN hybrid peacekeeping operation in Sudan, or the war zone in Afghanistan, one would encounter an interesting mix of organizations working to help the host country and people. The mix would include armed forces from a variety of countries, government civilian officials such as our Peace Corps and their counterparts from around the world, civilian representatives of nongovernmental organizations (relief groups, development groups, and civil society groups), and representatives of intergovernmental organizations (the UN family of organizations, International Organization for Migration, and various regional organizations). These communities each face extremely difficult challenges in their respective areas of expertise.

By necessity among these communities, there is terrific diversity of organizational models, worldviews, technical capabilities, and scalability. Nonetheless, they all regularly work in the same space alongside each other. But until the creation of CSRS, they did not have a training institute devoted to improving their collective efforts. The center has specialized in and made a significant contribution to cross-community education for practitioners. When I attend the center’s workshops, I am impressed by how well they use collective problem-solving and relationship-building to overcome stovepiping and other bureaucratic rigidities so as to enhance each participant’s important future work.

Ask any past participant, whether military officers, relief workers, or governmental or international civil servants, and you hear similar stories. I look forward to the day when the Department of Defense supports its own policy and provides regular budgetary support to this remarkable outfit. Encouragingly, the State Department has begun to sponsor some courses through the center as part of the preparedness of the Civilian Response Corps.

I have used the Peace Corps throughout this article to illustrate strategies both practical and process-oriented. So I will close with words made famous in President Kennedy’s inaugural address: “And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country.”

My sleeves are rolled up; I remain ready to champion these issues in the House of Representatives. And I am not much interested in tinkering at the margins. All of us who are involved must aim high and hit our targets. Great results will be the best proof of these concepts we have been struggling to demonstrate. The problems of the world are not waiting for us to get our act together. Our country needs these transformations. Let’s get with it.

Notes

1 James Dobbins, “Organizing for Victory,” PRISM 1, no. 1 (December 2009), 58.
The U.S. elevation of security assistance to a core military capability has divided the waters between those who believe the military should stick to preparing strike capability and fighting wars and those who believe the world needs much broader forms of military engagement. Recent developments in strategy indicate that the latter opinion will prevail. The commencement of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) in 2007 with its civilian command, interagency modalities, and soft power mandate reflects that an amalgamation of military and civilian capabilities is viewed at the highest levels as the way forward for realizing U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.

Many of the issues that define USAFRICOM’s strategic environment are usually seen as non-military in nature: illegal migration; human, drug, and small arms trafficking; corruption; endemic and pandemic health problems; poverty; oil bunkering; poaching of fisheries; lack of infrastructure; economic underdevelopment; and lack of state capacity. It is therefore believed that a new strategic landscape will mold the future of military work. Reconstruction and stabilization missions will involve an array of noncombat elements, from building and bolstering security institutions for watching over development projects, to humanitarian aid delivery, to disease management.

A similar integrative approach is found in the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) collaborative approach aiming at “integrating all instruments of national capability.” In more
acute theaters such as Iraq and in particular Afghanistan, the U.S. military’s counterinsurgency campaigns expand military work far into civil governance areas, creating intimate partnerships with nonmilitary agencies. This expansion raises fundamental questions about what military organizations could and should be used for, and how we should understand the emerging “amalgamated” forms of civil-military relations. It raises questions about the military’s role in the world and the very notion of “military” affairs.

By tradition, civil-military relations build on a relatively firm coding of what is military work and what is not. The military is a military organization because it is not the police, justice sector, religious community, or symphonic orchestra. While military organizations may include such elements, they are traditionally defined as subcomponents that help to fight and win wars. As military organizations expand their work into civil governance areas, it is not only the distinction between soldiers and civilians that blurs. It is also the social coding that military and nonmilitary agents use to describe the military organization and its particular ethos and rationality. As a result, it becomes unclear what kind of organization the military is and what it could and should be used for. It becomes difficult to communicate in an exact manner about military affairs. The semantics of military affairs become vague. Ambiguous organizational identities may also reduce cooperation because prospective allies may not know what to expect. This can be seen in Afghan reconstruction, where the U.S. military–led Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan has embarked on a broad range of civil police-building tasks, generating normative and conceptual problems to cooperation. Civilian agencies including the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan have simply been reluctant to enter a partnership with the American force because it is a military organization, and there is confusion over its actual role. Insofar as the U.S. military increasingly is counting on partnerships with nonmilitary organizations, this blurring of semantics may become an obstacle for pursuing whole-of-government approaches.

This article suggests the notion of “third-generation civil-military relations” to capture the conceptual challenges arising as the U.S. military broadens its missions. Third-generation civil-military relations appear less dramatic than “conventional” civil-military relations because they may not create the same attention-grabbing alignment between military and nonmilitary identities. In addition to the usual difficulties of international cooperation, third-generation civil-military relations involve new challenges in the form of norms, principles, and opinions about what the military should and should not do.

First, I flesh out the concepts of first- and second-generation civil-military relations. This provides a historical/conceptual context for, second, addressing the practice and concept of third-generation civil-military relations. My example of third-generation civil-military relations is the U.S. military–driven Focused District Development (FDD) police reform project in Afghanistan. Third, I discuss how today’s third-generation civil-military relations differ from two previous experiences with...
military organizations carrying out civil reform, the U.S. military’s Combined Action Program in Vietnam and its post–World War II intervention in Germany. Lastly, I reflect further on how we should understand third-generation civil-military relations and the alteration of the military code in the context of global security.

First- and Second-generation Civil-military Relations

Until the end of the Cold War, the dialogue on civil-military relations was primarily a domestic debate about the military and the soldier’s relation to the state. This discussion originally sprang from the paradox of the state setting up an organization that had the capacity to take over the state itself. The main reference texts are Samuel P. Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (1957) and Morris Janowitz’s *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (1960). The discussion is ongoing and deals with topics such as the military economy, military technology, military culture and organization, military-industrial complexes, militarization (of political culture), civilianization/the transfer of traditional military functions to civil service personnel, outsourcing, conscription, the military and the media, the relationships between military and civilian leadership, military transformation in postconflict countries, and others.

In due course, a comprehensive academic and political discourse has developed around the various ways in which military organizations interface and interact with other societal systems.
On the one hand, then, a fairly well-developed codification of the military system has been established. On the other hand, it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish the military system from society at large, according to the literature. Discussion of the relationship among the military, state, economy, and society, however, mostly focuses on the military organization’s domestic associations. As military organizations leave for missions, their identities as a distinct branch with a particular form of mission have until recently remained relatively stable in the political discourse.

During the 1990s, however, a new discussion on civil-military relations was kicked off by international peacekeeping operations. In the context of complex humanitarian emergencies, armed forces were assigned roles in which they worked close to or even directly alongside civilians, with the result that the line between the soldier and the civilian became “blurred.” The discussion surrounding the role of these “Blue Helmets” centered around three primary issues. First was the change to the military ethos that stemmed from allocating warriors to low-intensity peacekeeping missions under the umbrella of “some weak and confused international organization upholding abstract humanitarian values” rather than deploying soldiers in unambiguous missions to protect the motherland in heroic and spectacular battles. The formation of multinational peacekeeping forces created an inherent tension between national and transnational belonging among peacekeeping troops that fueled the discussion of the changing role of the military in global security. Second, the Blue Helmets discussion was (and still is) occupied with the vast tactical and operational problems involved in coordinating work between military and nonmilitary organizations in multinational, cross-agency peacekeeping setups. This was the context out of which the civil-military cooperation concept emerged in an attempt to institutionalize the interface between civil and military actors in peace support operations. In particular, communication and intelligence were (and remain) key issues in this connection along with how differing opinions on goals and means hamper communication and cooperation. However, the aspect of the Blue Helmets discussion that attracted the most political attention was the transformation of the humanitarian space that it involved and the impact of this development on the neutrality of civilians and aid workers. The distinction between participants and nonparticipants had already turned delicate owing to the fragmented nature of conflict in the post–Cold War era. Integrated peacekeeping missions only added to the confusion. Little by little, the neutrality of humanitarian organizations was eroded, and 10 years into the new millennium most humanitarian organizations and national and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) report severe difficulties with regard to work in conflict zones.

More recently, civil-military relations—along with discussion of them—entered a new stage as the international presence in Iraq and Afghanistan began to merge military and civil capabilities into the much-discussed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). These teams combine both civilian and military elements,
the former typically political advisors and development experts, and the latter mandated to provide security cover for reconstruction and local government. PRTs differ widely in terms of size, concept, policy, armament, and proximity to and acceptance by local populations and their political leaders. A major challenge for the PRT setup has been how to coordinate activities between the PRTs and other development actors and navigate in a conflict theater where even the slightest connection between coalition forces and civilians or NGOs may expose the latter to Taliban violence. This involves tactical and operational problems related to participation, neutrality, cooperation, and alignment of activities. However, it has also been widely discussed whether military forces should have any role at all in development work, and whether PRT development projects, aimed at winning hearts and minds, treat development as a means to another end. What the military should and should not do—in other words, the limits of military engagement—is a crucial question in the PRT debate. Commentators argue that a deeper merging of civil and military objectives and capabilities has taken place, yet evidence from the ground informs us that the sophisticated wordings of academics and policymakers (such as concerted action, integrated approach, “3D,” holistic approach, security-development nexus) seldom find their way into the concrete conduct of civil-military relations. Instead, we observe a number of military-led, military-supported, or in some instances joint military-NGO “quick impact” projects carried out in quite unrefined ways, where the military’s proximity to local communities or NGOs is often an unbalanced and highly sensitive issue. Despite the PRT concept’s tactical difficulties, it is believed to hold great promise if just nuts and bolts are adjusted.

The discussions of the friction between military and nonmilitary organizations and the difficulties of repeatedly aligning action refer to the difference between military and nonmilitary modes of operation as the root of the problem. The distinction between the military and nonmilitary remains the defining code for how each group of actors views the other.

The Blue Helmets and PRT concept can be classified, respectively, as first- and second-generation civil-military relations. Both types belong to the international domain and are thus not related to the domestic puzzle concerning the soldier and the state. Common to the two sets of civil-military relations, along with discussions of them, is the employment of an idea of a relatively strict separation between military and nonmilitary forms of organization and action, which nevertheless can be aligned closely in joint action. Both first- and second-generation civil-military relations and discussions of them are characterized by operating “civil” and “military” as conceptually distinct governance areas.

Another new feature of civil-military relations in peace support operations worth noting here is the militarization of law enforcement. Bosnia and Herzegovina provide a good example in this context, but the tendency can also be observed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Mostly it consists of a combination of direct support or training/supervision of law enforcement units, as well as foreign military personnel carrying out their own operations to address issues such as organized crime, smuggling and trafficking, terrorism, and potentially violent demonstrators. Some of this new “soldiering” is most properly understood as a product of a global security situation in which traditional distinctions between internal and external security and the police and the military have become obsolete.
On the other hand, the training and supervision aspects, as components of international relations, can be understood as a continuation of military aid and support for territorial control as those developed during the Cold War. However, even if the militarization of law enforcement has turned soldiers into police officers, such law enforcement has until recently mostly been conducted along a strict divide between military and nonmilitary actors, which is why I suggest classifying these activities under the heading of second-generation civil-military relations. On the other hand, military involvement in security sector reform has recently expanded far beyond the sorts of relations that are described as militarized law enforcement.

What's New in Civil-military Relations?

The era when military force was a distinct component in wars and peacekeeping is over, and it is now possible to observe newfangled forms of civil-military relations. The example I draw on, further unpacked below, is a U.S. military-driven civil police reform program in Afghanistan, the Focused District Development. This program not only provides the Afghan National Police training and mentoring along with new equipment and facilities, but also aims to reform the civil governance functions that nest the police, including the justice sector, Ministry of the Interior, and provincial and district governance. As the police reform program has progressed, the U.S. military's Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A), which is running the program, is building up capability with regard to reforming and governing civil governance branches. This includes increased know-how in relation to civil reform projects, improved capability to manage partnerships with civil state branches, and better contracting practices. Below, I outline some major tenets of the FDD used as an example in discussion of the concept of third-generation civil-military relations and how such relations differ from their first- and second-generation counterparts. I am primarily interested in the conceptual dimension of the FDD because I must admit that it is not entirely clear what kinds of successes it has accomplished on the ground.

Security Sector Reform and the Military in Afghanistan

The fundamental lesson learned in Afghanistan police reform is that a police force cannot exist on its own. It requires a bureaucratic capacity to manage payrolls, other financial matters, and political and economic affairs in general, just as it needs political-legal structures to guarantee accountability and due legal process in the investigation and prosecution of crime. Functional differentiation of the state—differentiation among governance sectors, including the tripartition of state powers into the legislative, judicial, and executive branches—is the condition that permits the coupling, intertwining, and formalizing of dependency relationships among state institutions. Conversely, the tripartition of powers can only work if the general bureaucracy is capable of putting into concrete governance practice the distinction among the branches. Many argue that we do not need a European constitutional state in Afghanistan, but some
elements have to be in place for a police force to function. The idea that security must be achieved before “the rest” of the state can grow, which until recently dominated security sector reform, misrepresents the concept of security by detaching it from the area of state bureaucracy. Today, there is general agreement that any successful reform of the Afghan National Police ultimately depends on reform of Afghanistan’s Ministry of the Interior. Yet the general donor commitment to police reform remains weak.

It was within this context, including a weak donor commitment to police reform, that the U.S. military initiated the FDD, which today is run out of Camp Eggers in Kabul. The original FDD concept paper fleshed out an ambitious program for the U.S. military’s engagement in civil governance affairs in Afghanistan. This document was explicit about the failure of previous approaches to police reform, and it accommodated a range of recommendations found in critical reports. For a military project, the FDD had a surprisingly holistic design that rethought ordinary security sector reform elements, such as the “police” and “justice sector,” seeking to intertwine these with broader development objectives as integrated parts rather than as separate areas for reform. The FDD extended the ambitions and functions of the military organization far beyond conventional military goals and professional capacity into all sorts of tasks essential for engineering civil governance.

Overall the FDD concept has four distinct and innovative features: its district focus, emphasis on mentoring and collective training, integrated approach, and “buy-in design.”

**District Focus.** The FDD breaks down the geographical reform areas to district levels and pursues a bottom-up approach in which reform is tailored individually for each district. This differs significantly from the Kabul-centered reform programs that had dominated governance reform at large in Afghanistan. Subnational governance reform was not seriously put on the agenda before 2005, and the FDD concept can perhaps be seen as a leg of that development. The novelty of turning to a bottom-up focus on the district—the place where central government and, not least, policing are (or at least should be) felt—should thus also be seen in the light of local governance being a surprisingly neglected area in the state-building literature.

The FDD targets the esprit de corps and ethos of police work to emancipate individual police officers from local patronage structures. In terms of civil-military relations, this approach broadens the military contact face to local governance structures and political authorities. A wide range of nonmilitary actors has been involved in the assessment of the districts, including Afghan deputies, United Nations (UN), and European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL).

**Mentoring and Collective Training.** The use of collective training and a view of the police more as cooperative units than as separate individuals constitute a new approach to police training in Afghanistan, marking a break from the previous approach under which thousands of individually trained police officers were fanned out by U.S.-led police training centers. The FDD is a military-driven police-mentoring program. It represents a move toward a greater focus on the reform of the informal social structures that govern local police cooperation. It targets the esprit de corps and ethos of police work to emancipate individual police officers...
from local patronage structures. It aims at shaping personalities. The FDD thus represents a move from a technocratic approach toward the social engineering of police culture and individual behavior. To create a structure for thinking about and organizing police ranks and career development within the police force, CSTC–A, in cooperation with Afghanistan’s Ministry of the Interior and EUPOL, develops social technologies in the form of matrices for rank reform, which will also support the development of identity and selfhood within police ranks.

**Integrated Approach.** The objective of the FDD is to create better internal organization at the district level by enhancing skills for police cooperation, and to facilitate cooperation among the district, regional, provincial, and national levels. The FDD aims to clarify authority structures and to improve reporting and communication between the district’s units and Ministry of the Interior. This includes the adjustment and legal regulation of authority lines at all levels in compliance with national legal templates for police work. To accomplish these goals, the FDD has pushed judicial reform and promoted development projects and public information campaigns at the district level to buttress police legitimacy. A key player is DynCorp International, which provides mentors and advisors, security, communication, and base life support to the FDD. The contractual relationship to DynCorp has shifted, but funding has come from the Department of Defense and the operational command responsibility of DynCorp has remained under CSTC–A. Conceptually challenging “civil-military relations” can be observed in the relations among CSTC–A, the U.S. State Department, DynCorp, the Afghan Ministry of the Interior, and the other actors engaged in police and justice
sector reform, including the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and EUPOL.

Furthermore, the FDD is promoting civil-military partnerships not only among the U.S. military and branches of Afghan governance, but also among the U.S. military and international community, EU, donors, and other actors with interests in security sector reform. The FDD program’s insistence on the importance of cooperation with civil agencies makes it possible to view the FDD as a military-driven platform for international cooperation on civil governance reform in Afghanistan. The pursuit of third-generation civil-military relations makes the FDD a new form for cooperation in Afghan reconstruction, where international cooperation so far has built on a distinct separation of military and nonmilitary affairs.

Buy-in Design. Competing donor visions and the reluctance of donors to intervene in each other’s business are a major problem in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. To avoid the “too many cooks” syndrome and ensure a comprehensive and broadly informed process that funnels the multiple national and international voices into a single approach before concrete action is taken, the FDD concept provides an outline of a long list of actors who are involved—or at least invited to participate—in the shaping of that concept. For instance, the District Assessment Reconstruction Teams, the units that evaluate districts and adjust the FDD in accordance with local needs, are in principle open to anyone, and donors, NGOs, and the UN have been invited to participate. To be sure, the FDD invited more than a dovetailing of action, as was the idea with the PRTs. It suggests setting up much more intimate partnerships in which ambitions, leadership, and activities of military and nonmilitary agencies merge. In fact, the buy-in concept of the FDD not only opens up the program to numerous actors, but also presents FDD success as depending on the buy-ins. Of course, the challenges are vast and the pitfalls numerous, but the FDD nonetheless moves ahead with an institutional legacy that is different from that of any other military project.

The FDD program has developed since the research for this article was carried out, yet the main conceptual tenets of the program as outlined above remain. As of winter 2008–2009, the Focused District Development Program was presented as “a Ministry of the Interior program to reform the Afghan Uniformed Police, a component of the [Afghan National Police], which simultaneously achieves improvements in local governance, public works, and elements of the Rule of Law.” To be sure, the rehatting of the FDD—which, owing to the extremely low capabilities of the Afghan government, must be considered somewhat pro forma—sets a new conceptual agenda for understanding the FDD in the reconstruction context. The close mentoring of Afghan Ministry of the Interior deputies and police officers makes it difficult to observe the difference between the U.S. military and the ministry, including in relation to policies flowing from the ministry. In addition, the close cooperation among CSTC–A, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, and donors and international agencies such as the UN and EUPOL makes it difficult to mark out authority and decisionmaking power. This setup could be discussed much further if viewed from the historical perspectives of foreign administrations and empires. Here, we shall make do with noting how the FDD program started a process that has led to a form of civil-military relations that has not been seen before, at least during the period in which the nature of civil-military relations has been discussed within academic and political circles.
What can be observed is a joining of military and civil ambitions and work areas that goes further than what was seen in the approaches of the Blue Helmets and PRTs. It goes further than the military simply providing security for civil development projects and local governance, the embedding of civil advisors in military units, the partly civil leadership of military units (the PRT concept), or building and managing partnerships between military organizations and civilian agents. Rather, the relations promoted by and through the FDD are not about alignment, cooperation, and proximity, but about amalgamation, merging, and overlapping organizational structures. Altogether, this suggests that the U.S. military’s development of civil capability and the cooperation of various civil agencies with the U.S. military—including the UN, EUPOL, donors, and the Afghan Ministry of the Interior—should be regarded as a new form of civil-military relations.

One might argue that it may be going too far to view the relatively small FDD project as an indicator of a major change in the U.S. military. On the other hand, the FDD is a spearhead component of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Any notion of victory is dependent on a stabilized Afghan security sector. As African security policy expert Sean McFate asserts about USAFRICOM, “Transition/stability operations may eclipse combat operations when it comes to determining ‘victory.’ The situation in Iraq and Afghanistan has made it patently clear that lethal force is no longer the decisive variable in military campaigns.”14 If this is true, kinetic force may become merely the shelter for the core military tasks of stabilization and development. In a 2008 Foreign Affairs article, Condoleezza Rice called the PRT “a model of civil-military relations for the future.”15 But it seems as if the FDD model may provide a better glimpse of the future of civil-military relations than the second-generation civil-military relations of the PRTs.

Third-generation Civil-military Relations

The FDD program merged civil and military affairs beyond the conventional military/nonmilitary distinction, which until now has provided the conceptual template for constructing the role of the military in world affairs. I suggest looking at these innovations in civil-military relations as third-generation civil-military relations. This concept aims to grasp the more deep-seated amalgamation of military and civilian capabilities that can be observed in the U.S. military’s stabilization ambitions and practices, not least USAFRICOM.

A defining feature of third-generation civil-military relations is that the difference between military and civil work areas has vanished. This could also be described as the vanishing of the functional differentiation between military and other tools of international politics. This differentiation contrasts with first- and second-generation civil-military relations, which generated perceptions of a clash between “military” and “nonmilitary” that sustained the conceptual distinction between the two areas of governance. Third-generation civil-military relations do not involve the same sort of directly observable harm to the humanitarian space as those of the first two generations. They appear less dramatic and therefore have not aroused the same attention.

Objections to the U.S. military’s expansion of work areas are mostly based on normative
claims about what the military should and should not do. This normative disagreement is also visible in the politics of cooperation on projects pursuing third-generation civil-military relations. The dilemma in respect of Afghanistan National Police reform is manifest because there really is only one option in that context, and that is the FDD. Development agencies, international organizations, and NGOs must decide whether they want to build partnerships with the U.S. military on civil governance issues. Decisions not to will inevitably have some negative impact on improving the functions of the police. To engage in cooperation involves serious practical problems due to the huge differences in organizational cultures, budgets, and manpower, and will also imply trespassing on time-honored distinctions between areas of governance. Hence cooperation between EUPOL and CSTC–A has been disadvantaged by indecisiveness in Brussels, as well as by differences in organizational ethos and rationalities. Personal aversions stemming from bad relationships between the German leadership of EUPOL and the U.S. military leadership apparently also played a role in the early FDD days. To be sure, the attitudes and sentiments of people in leadership positions are highly relevant to understanding the complexities of cooperation in missions such as those being conducted in Afghanistan. But the normative problem of the limitations on military engagement—that is, the question of what the military should and should not do—also hampers cooperation. In many European countries, a simple reference to American militarism can justify nonengagement in the FDD. Of course, the military can be trained and used for any kind of task. Limitations on military functions are based purely on normative assumptions about the military’s role in national, international, and global affairs. That said, there are many tasks for which current military organizations are really not suited because of a lack of organizational capability. This, however, is a practical matter, not one about norms.

**Similar Experiences from History**

An example that is often mentioned in connection with civil-military relationships in Iraq and Afghanistan is the U.S. Marine Corps Combined Action Program (CAP) in Vietnam in the period 1965–1971. The main tenet of this program was to send units into the South Vietnamese hinterlands to stay in villages. The CAP attempted to insulate the people of select villages from the ravages of the war by winning the hearts and minds of the occupants and training local militia groups. There was no attempt to establish a state bureaucracy, a judiciary, or criminal investigations. There was no idea of state police, nor was the CAP a joint international program. It was different from the FDD focus on police ethos and professionalism, although the seeds of embedded mentoring were present.

Another relevant program was the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program, which brought together advisors from the military and the civilian U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to work with their Vietnamese counterparts, somewhat resembling what can be observed in the PRTs. While in some ways reminiscent of the CAP and
CORDS, however, the FDD is a much more “modern” and institutionalized project. Also, while CORDS pursued what I call third-generation civil-military relations, the challenges posed by such relations to the broader international establishment had not materialized before the FDD in Afghanistan.

An example of the military moving into civil governance can be found in Germany after World War II, where the U.S. military reorganized the German political system with the objective of an “eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis.” This experience, however, should be thought of as military governance, similar to the Bremer period in Iraq or earlier U.S. experiences in Mexico in 1847–1848; in the Confederate states during and after the American Civil War; in the Philippines, Porto (Puerto) Rico, and Cuba after the Spanish-American War; and in the German Rhineland after World War I. In each instance, neither the army nor the government accepted civil governance as a legitimate military function. My conclusion is that even if elements of the FDD model can be found in other current and historical examples, the FDD and the Afghan context provide a genuine example for observing the conceptual challenge of third-generation civil-military relations.

Third-generation Civil-military Relations as a Second-order Problem

The challenges posed by third-generation civil-military relations are more abstract than those posed by their first- and second-generation counterparts. The challenges from third-generation civil-military relations are not only about changes in the social organization of people, organizations, institutions, or other materially observable social phenomena with institutional boundaries; they are also located on the level of communication, where the very notion of the military is produced, the level that makes it possible to conceptualize the military as a distinct social organization within the broader social organization we call society.

I suggest that the modern social code of the military system is the readiness to deliver adequate coercive force at the right place at the right time. This particular coding is constructed by three binary codes: adequate/inadequate, timely/untimely, and coercion/noncoercion. In just war theory, the first two codes are treated as the principles of proportionality and of necessity. The code of coercion is less philosophical and concerns the organized means of violent force, along with the state’s monopoly on such violence. The code of coercion/noncoercion is the semantic code that defines the military as a state branch that communicates about coercion: coercion/noncoercion is the general code that encases all forms of military activity. It transcends the military organization by giving every little part of the military machinery a certain spin toward delivering coercive force. Even military-driven “nonmilitary” activities such as children’s schools and health care, which are integrated parts of the U.S. military project, are all included in the military branch, because their purpose is to deliver adequate coercive force at the right place at the right time.

The military system is defined by and observed through its difference from, but attachment to, other core societal institutions, such as law, politics, economics, and religion.
Hence, with its particular semantic code, the military code defines the military organization’s virtual place in society. Its code is central both to the military’s self-description and society’s description of the military, as well as to the ways in which military identity and functions are conceptualized. It is the semantic code by and through which the military organization is observed from within and without. The academic literature speaks about a juridification of society, where communication about all kinds of matters increasingly invokes the legal code of lawful/unlawful rather than morality’s code of good and bad, or the political code of more or less power. Similarly, one can think of the currently much-debated militarization of society as a process of recoding societal communication. In fact, one can view militarization as the answer to securitization as the political practice of creating a societal ethos that is focused on a given society’s own survival.

Militarization is a turn in the semantic coding of societal activities that changes people’s understanding of what they are doing and why. Coding social activities along the military code funnels them into a certain social system where the ultimate reference of communication is delivering adequate coercive force at the right place at the right time. This is not the place to further unpack the interrelated social phenomena of securitization and militarization, which here shall serve merely as an example of what is at stake when we talk about the military code. My point is that the military organization creates and recreates itself by reference to this general code, which separates it from other societal organizations and thereby reduces complexity. The military becomes so simple an organization because it has one overall goal. At the same time, however, this functional differentiation and reduced complexity allow for the creation of new complexity within the organization.

The fact is that the modern state bureaucracy and market functions rely on a particular “modern” semantic coding that separates society’s different activities. It is an abstract “society’s society” that provides the template for building and managing institutions from the courthouse to the stock exchange. The modern welfare state’s highly complex organization would not be possible without the possibility of thinking in social systems. Except for the practical difficulties of cooperation, the challenges from third-generation civil-military relations are not only about the particular place of the military in society and global security at large, but also about how this place is constituted as a communicative system. The evolution of the military system as a social subsystem that presupposed the functions of other subsystems has been under way for centuries, being fine-tuned during the latter part of the 20th century.

As the military starts merging ambitions and functions with other organizations, the semantic codes become confused. Now the military is not only about strike capability, but also about policing, state-building, disaster management, health care, development, and diplomacy. The consequences of such mission expansion are the subject of intense debate. From the point of view of partner organizations, the expansion of military work areas means less clarity about what kind of organization one is cooperating with. In Afghanistan, this means that it is the same organization that both mentors civil servants in the Ministry of the Interior and carries out airstrikes. This uncertainty can be described as a semantic uncertainty about the coding of the military organization, which creates new complexity in questions of cooperation. One of the reasons concepts such as militarized law...
enforcement, military peacekeeping, militarized humanitarian aid delivery, and military governance have a certain iconoclastic ring is because they blend semantic codes that usually separate and organize societal activities within the society we identify as “the good society.” One is tempted to diagnose third-generation civil-military relations as a reversion of the modern Weberian state’s functional separation of bureaucratic domains.

When the International Crisis Group reports that “the U.S. decision to give a leading role in its police programs to the Department of Defense has further blurred the distinction between the military and police,” it demonstrates a certain coding of the military system that organizes communication and creates order. Academic and political discussions of civil-military relations largely take for granted the ability to communicate effectively on what is “truly” or “traditionally” military and what is not. They take for granted that there is such a thing as a genuine military task, and this perspective dominates our observations and analysis of civil-military relations. It would not be going too far to say that the literature on civil-military relations generally omits the question of what we are actually talking about with civil-military relations.

My point is that first- and second-generation civil-military relations, along with discussions of them, not only created the perception of a clash between military and nonmilitary agency but also sustained the semantic coding of the military organization. The discourse on alignment, cooperation, proximity, and “integrated approaches” relied on a conventional coding of the military: indeed, the literature on holistic or integrated approaches to peacekeeping and state-building very much relies on this distinction. There is a consensus about “what is getting blurred.” The attempts to make sense of the conceptual merging by calling them “hybrids”—the hybrid peacekeeping force, the hybrid soldier, or hybrid civil-military relations—suggest a hybrid between civil and military. It presupposes a separation. We can in that way view the general discussions of civil-military relations as communication about the interface or distinction between the civil and the military. And we can observe how this literature, by and large, functions as a sort of truth-producing machine that keeps bringing into being a certain semantic code or truth about the military. To understand how the challenges from third-generation civil-military relations also involve a semantic disorder vis-à-vis the modern state project, we have to turn our focus away from the organization or institution as the primary unit of analysis. We need instead to focus on communication and its semantics as a medium for societal organization. In the end, communication is the only social experience. The societal significance that is attributed to any situation will depend on how it is communicated.

My point is not that a second-order perspective on these issues will solve the problems. Nor do I think that merging civil and military agencies is necessarily preferable. My point is that the military’s whole-of-government approaches as we see in Afghanistan, USAFRICOM, and USSOUTHCOM and their pursuing of third-generation civil-military relations may lead to a more profound change in the military code that defines the function of the military organization in the world. This change may add to or augment more conventional problems of cooperation. A deeper understanding of the problems that stem from third-generation civil-military relations may enable the United States to grasp
some of the complexity involved and thus be more clear about what is at stake when military organizations embark on civil governance areas and create, together with their civil counterparts, higher level partnerships between military and civil agencies. I am sure that if a profound amalgamation of military and civilian capabilities continues to be viewed as the way forward for realizing U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives, the third-generation civil-military relations will become a critical concept. PRISM

Notes

9 Ibid., 679.
15 Condoleezza Rice, “Rethinking the National Interest: American Realism for a New World,” Foreign Affairs (July–August 2008).

18 James Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 21–38.


 Supporting Peace: The End

All good things must end. Bad things, on the other hand, seem to get a pass from nature. In the universe observed thus far, life on Earth is anomalous. Birth, growth, order, and building are difficult uphill struggles while death, decay, disorder, and destruction—the engines of entropy—roll on unless stopped. War is humanity’s entropy accelerator. The previous century witnessed war on an unprecedented scale, waged by industrialized states against one another, propelled by secular ideologies of the One Best Way or the one best variety of human. Today, most wars are fought on relatively smaller scales, within nominal state borders, by combinations of quasi-state forces, nonstate forces, and externally orchestrated, state-based interventions. Yet the implications of these smaller wars are global, as the pools of entropy they create are havens or way stations for disorder in the form of two-bit pirates and four-bit drug lords as well as this century’s dominant extremist ideologies, which claim not the mantle of history or superior genes but rather divine warrant to mete out infinite justice as they see fit.

With such forces operating in the background and with the broad array of personal, cultural, and institutional interests at play in any place trying to rise out of conflict, it is obvious that efforts to build peace will be difficult, lengthy, and contested. It should be equally obvious that failure to try to build peace, and the civil order that it implies, only guarantees that entropic pools will grow and connect—if not geographically, then commercially (where “commerce” includes all forms of interchange at a distance). The questions for international engagement, then, involve capacity (the ability to undertake a task), resources (the money, people, and time available to underwrite capacity), understanding (of what a specific environment needs to transition to peace and how applied capacity and resources are likely to affect that transition), goals (what applied capacity and resources are supposed to achieve, based on understanding), and exit strategies (plans for executing reduction or
disengagement that may be triggered by reaching transition thresholds for key mission goals or by failing to reach those thresholds within a specified time, specified expenditure ceiling, or the parameters of political tolerance of the host state or the engaging country, countries, or organizations).

This article focuses on exit strategies for peace support operations (PSOs) but addresses other elements of the engagement chain and other operations to illustrate how exit strategies are influenced and altered by those other elements. It is as much about how PSOs do end as about how they should end.

Defining Relevant Scope

The operations of greatest interest here are those that have some element of state-building in their mandates or that have contributed to state-building indirectly—for instance, by laying the groundwork for future state-building operations. Twenty-one states and territories have been host to twice as many relevant PSOs (a number of states have hosted operations sequentially and/or several simultaneous missions led by different entities), as indicated in table 1. Yet only 12 “completed” missions have seen security and governance transition to local hands.

Table 2 categorizes operations from a maximum to a minimum level of state-building authority or involvement. For each type of operation, the table sketches the essential characteristics and lists the main factors driving its exit strategy, divided into factors within and beyond that operational type’s direct control. The final column notes unique exit issues.

For the first three types of operations, I have borrowed and relabeled concepts from Jarat Chopra et al. Their work on the requirements of forceful international peace implementation predated and prefigured the United Nations (UN) missions in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, which are instances of international administration or interim law enforcement to fill a vacuum in local governance.

Directive state-building is the best way to describe the painful evolution of the international presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the 1995 Dayton Accords or the “twinning” of a new generation of Liberian officials with international mentor/monitors in the World Bank Government Economic Management Assistance Program, where the internationals had cosigning authority on government expenditures.

Collaborative state-building might best be exemplified by present UN operations in Haiti, as all mandated activities are undertaken in support of the elected government. Since the earthquake of January 2010, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti has doubled its armed police presence and helped to keep order in cooperation with the Haitian National Police.

Securing humanitarian relief has palliative rather than political objectives, although such action always affects political outcomes by feeding the besieged or the displaced or by putting off more decisive international action. UN operations in pre-Dayton Bosnia had such a focus on humanitarian relief, as did the U.S.-led relief force in Somalia in 1992–1993. Both relief efforts transitioned to directive state-building operations.
Creating political space means providing international support for a stable host-state security environment, as the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire has strived to do since 2004.

Providing fair witness, often labeled “traditional” peacekeeping or peace observation, does not directly engage the politics of peace-making or the resolution of national animus. As the price of that detachment, exit depends on actions and agreements in other venues. Fair witness operations serve the purposes of statebuilding by helping to reduce the probability of state damage or destruction associated with resumed conflict.

Exit Strategy for a Complex PSO

The operating environments of complex PSOs are like parties with ugly drunks in a variety of guises: disgruntled factions who do not like their cut of the peace deal, former combatants who cannot find work, arms and commodities smugglers and traffickers in human beings—all of whom thrive in a climate of anarchy; avaricious warlords; and corrupt government officials. Exit would be easy if peacekeepers could simply put down their tools and walk away at a moment’s notice, but there are always substantial constraints, from the reputations of those who constitute, authorize, or lead the operation, to concerns about host-state political and economic stability and the knock-on effects of exit for the surrounding region.

Exit strategies always entail elements of prediction. The wisdom of any given exit-related choice may only be demonstrable (or refutable) several years after the choice, as the exited territory either remains stable or dissolves into disorder again. Any transition or exit plan thus embodies projections about what is likely to happen after transition/exit. Milestones met relate to past and present action and do not necessarily indicate future performance, especially independent host-state performance. A positive trend may have been due to the presence of an operation or the interaction of that presence with local parties. Trends and projections from other operations may or may not be valid locally owing to just such strong interactions between international engagement and the specifics of the engagement environment. International election security and logistics may have been effective in one operation, for example, but the effect may have been magnified by terrain and infrastructure favorable to the operation (as with a smaller area of operations, lower mountains, more open terrain, less extreme temperatures, no seasonal flooding, good roads, or plentiful airstrips).

Exit strategies are also political constructs. Gideon Rose observed that the term exit strategy was not applied to foreign or military policy matters before the 1993 U.S. engagement in Somalia. Jeffrey Record argued similarly that, pre-9/11, the pressure for clear exit strategies was greatest “among those who believe that the military should not be exposed to the risks of peace enforcement and other small-scale contingencies,” making exit strategy a kind of barrier to entry for operations that politicians or military leaders preferred not to undertake.

America’s preferences for its own forces notwithstanding, as a member of the Security Council, the United States has voted frequently to establish new UN operations for which the lack of an exit strategy has not seemed to pose any barrier to council action. The United Nations and its member states have been invited repeatedly to send troops, police, and civilian personnel into semistable situations still aspiring to be postconflict without clear guidance on how to see their mandated tasks through to a successful outcome.
Table 1. Peace Support Operations with State-building Elements in Their Mandates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or Territory*</th>
<th>Mission(s)**</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>ISAF (2001+), UNAMA (2002+)</td>
<td>NATO control, ISAF 8/03+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>UNTAC (1992–1993)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>MINURCAT (2007–2010)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>UNFICYP I (1964–1974)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>ONUC (1960–1964)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>MINUSTAH (2004+)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Missions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>ECOMOG (1990–1997)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>UNTAG (1989–1990)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>AMISOM (2008+)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>UNMIS (2005+)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West New Guinea/Irian Jaya</td>
<td>UNTEA/UNSF (1962–1963)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>MINURSO (1991+)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Key: AMIB = African Mission in Burundi; AMISOM = African Union Mission in Somalia; DPA = UN Department of Political Affairs; DPKO = UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations; ECOMIC = ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire; ECOMIL = ECOWAS Mission in Liberia; ECOMOG = ECOWAS Monitoring Group; ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African States; EUFOR = European Force; EULEX = European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo; EUPOL = European Union Police; EUPOL RD Congo = European Union Police Mission for the Democratic Republic of the Congo; EUSEC = European Communications Security and Evaluation Agency of the Military Committee; INTERFET = International Force in East Timor; ISAF = International Security Assistance Force; KFOR = Kosovo Force; MINURCAT = UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad; MINURSO = UN Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in Western Sahara; MINUSTAH = UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti; MONUC = UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; MONUSCO = UN Mission for Stabilization of Democratic Republic of the Congo; ONUB = UN Operations in Burundi; ONUC = UN Operations in the Congo; ONUV = UN Observer Mission in El Salvador; SFOR = Stabilization Force; UNAMA = UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; UNAMSIL = UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone; UNAVEM = UN Angola Verification Mission; UNFICYP = UN Forces in Cyprus; UNIOSIL = UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone; UNIPSIL = UN Integrated Peacebuilding Mission in Sierra Leone; UNMII = UN Mission in Haiti; UNMIK = UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo; UNMIL = UN Mission in Liberia; UNMIS = UN Mission in Sudan; UNMISET = UN Mission of Support in East Timor; UNMIT = UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste; UNOCI = UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire; UNOSOM = UN Operation in Somalia; UNOTIL = UN Office in East Timor; UNTAC = UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia; UNTAES = UN Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium; UNTAET = UN Transitional Administration in East Timor; UNTAG = UN Transition Assistance Group; UNTEA/UNSF = UN Temporary Executive Authority/UN Security Force in West New Guinea |

* Shading = completed UN operations.
** Italics = completed companion missions.
Table 2. Factors Affecting Exit for Different Types of Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Operations</th>
<th>Factors Affecting Exit</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal (nominally under control of the Peace Support Operation)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Administration</strong>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under international mandate, interveners assume reins of government, issue laws, enforce compliance, and train replacements.</td>
<td>Ability to establish effective, transparent, and responsive, if not democratic, transitional government. Restructure local institutions and train local replacement personnel.</td>
<td>Local population and regional powers must support intervention. Institutions created to replace old regime must be recognized as legitimate: locally, regionally, and internationally. Public infrastructure and services must be restored and paid for, including salaries of public servants, until tax revenues rise, unless corruption and informal market dominate. Faster transition to local control is better for legitimacy but can be worse for stability. Creating or restoring effective, self-funded government may take a generation of effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Directive State-building</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International initiatives beget changes (political, institutional). Local capacities built up with authoritative outside support. Security functions shared. Outsiders have last word.</td>
<td>Use close supervision or veto power over local decisions to speed the rebuilding and/or reform of host state government.</td>
<td>May involve wide range of internationally imposed controls, from administrative to political.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collaborative State-building</strong>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with local parties. Either multi- or single-sector focus (for example, police or electoral system). Host government has last word.</td>
<td>Support for public order in partnership with local security during rebuilding and retraining. Mission needs ability to do same in other sectors of governance.</td>
<td>Mission may have deployed in conditions of political crisis but prior to outbreak of civil war.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Securing Humanitarian Relief With or without conflict suppression.</th>
<th>Size and competence of force versus local armed groups. Modalities of cooperation with aid-providing groups. Dilemmas of neutrality (justice, achievability, net good done).</th>
<th>External mediation of conflict. External support for various factions. Willingness of troop providers to risk troops.</th>
<th>Aid may inadvertently extend or deepen conflict, as all wartime aid has local political impact.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creating Political Space Fair witness functions plus: ❖ public security umbrella for local peace implementation ❖ ability to call in enforcement</td>
<td>Stabilize public security environment to facilitate local political settlement or settlement implementation. No wider peacebuilding functions.</td>
<td>Susceptibility of local leaders to outside pressure (advice, aid, sanctions).</td>
<td>Host state elites can &quot;play&quot; internationals against one another or against the standards of the peace process unless there are clear penalties for doing so.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing Fair Witness Traditional peace observation and peacekeeping.</td>
<td>Generate objective information, distributed widely and fairly. Undermine security dilemmas. Build confidence in peace.</td>
<td>Observed/separated parties settle the conflict-generating dispute. May happen only with outside pressure.</td>
<td>Fair witness missions sustain states by helping to prevent reversion to war but cannot resolve underlying conflicts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Through the mid-1990s, the dominant benchmark indicating fulfillment of a complex UN operation’s mandate was the conduct, supervision, or certification of host-state national elections for constituent assemblies (Namibia) or for national parliaments and executives (Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, and Bosnia). An election is a logistically and politically complex endeavor but, properly conducted, has an outcome that is objectively measureable, is technically achievable within an operation’s mandated means, occurs at a predictable time, and involves a time-limited activity. It is the easiest sort of benchmark to meet. Elections are visible symbols of apparent transition from wartime warlord politics to the transparency and public order that peacebuilders seek. But for elections to be effective, all
local parties must support them (as in Namibia), and those who waver must either be brought back into line (as was the Mozambican National Resistance) or decide not to interfere (as did the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia). Where irritable losers return to violence (as did Jonas Savimbi in Angola and Hun Sen in Cambodia), the consequences can weigh heavily on the population, in terms of not only lives but also lost credibility for democracy. Premature elections can also cement nationalist or extremist leaders’ hold on power: the September 1996 national elections in Bosnia confirmed nationalist parties’ power and helped ensure the continued need for the presence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 6

These negative experiences demonstrated that quick elections are not enough to generate lasting success for a complex PSO except in the easiest of political circumstances. Multiple analyses suggest, however, that complex PSOs tend to be sent into more difficult circumstances, where the first election is the starting block for democratic state-building, not the finish line. 7 Debate continues over how much democratic state-building is enough to reinforce post-peacekeeping political stability and even whether democracy itself is a feasible or desirable near-term peacebuilding goal. Jack Goldstone and company argue for fully institutionalized democracy as the most stable form of governance consistent with human rights,8 while Max Manwaring and Kimbra Fishel argue that locally defined “legitimate” and “competent” governance is the best that outsiders can reasonably expect to achieve.9 Roland Paris advocates a similar “in institutionalization before liberalization,” also known as IBL. 10 In order to work, however, IBL requires outside manipulation of internal politics: encouragement of “moderate” political parties, “lustration” (which is defined as “ceremonial purification” but which can be unceremonious in practice, as with de-Ba’athification in Iraq), and design of electoral systems that reward moderation. In short, IBL more or less requires an ironically authoritarian international trusteeship that continues “for as long as it takes” to produce free and open politics and markets. 11 Experiences in the Balkans confirm that reaching such goals takes time. The ethnic Albanian majority of Kosovo grew tired of waiting for the process to finish and just declared independence in 2008. But even if local parties everywhere exhibited great patience and cooperation, the international resources committed to building fully institutionalized democracy would need to grow far beyond present levels of investment (about $10 billion–$12 billion annually, outside of Afghanistan and Iraq) if more than a handful of places were to benefit. The debate also begs the question of when and to what degree international security providers, in particular, can disengage from the peacebuilding process.

Prioritizing a Path to the Exit

For some years, and especially since the establishment of interim international governance in Kosovo and East Timor, analysts have been grappling with the issue of priorities for complex PSOs. Three examples include
Graham Day’s policekeeping model, the Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building by James Dobbins et al., and the seven-step program of Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis.

Day assigned priority to stopping the war (a military task); then to providing public security and governance, including contract enforcement (policing and civilian tasks that resume as wartime violence ebbs); next, jump-starting the local economy (a financial donor/development agency task that requires public order and law enforcement to attract investment and allow business to generate jobs at a reasonable level of risk); and finally, reconciliation (a civil society task best undertaken when more people have work and are meeting basic needs other than through international relief). Each successive phase begins at some point after the preceding phase begins but before it is complete, in a pattern Day describes as a cascade. Appropriate starting points for each phase will vary with the mission, and all physical and institutional reconstruction efforts should be designed for local sustainability in operations, maintenance, and cost, from the capacities of hospitals to the usability of mission office space sans air conditioning, if it is intended for transfer to local use upon drawdown.

Dobbins et al. proposed the following priorities in the indicated order: public security and humanitarian assistance (including the return of refugees and internally displaced persons), governance (restoring public services and administration), economic stabilization (including a stable currency and a legal/regulatory framework for commerce), democratization (including an essential free press), and long-term development aid. Democracy is accorded a lower priority than standing up a government that can provide law enforcement, education, public health, power, and telecommunications (often regulated at the national level), plus water and sanitation (usually the job of local levels of government).

Doyle and Sambanis see the greatest prospects for success (and exit) in UN missions with “transformational” mandates and authority to use “discrete” enforcement measures against noncompliance in a steady international effort that may last 10 or more years. Step one is internal security, with a new “sovereign Leviathan,” either domestic or international, to enforce order. Step two is regional security, to get the neighbors on board the peace process. Step three is “quick wins to generate popular support and buy time”: food distribution, health clinics, reliable power, and cleaning up rubble. Step four implements “the rule of law and constitutional consent” as the “foundations of all that follow.” Step five involves attention to property rights, which “the poor need even more than the rich.” Step six is democracy or other “wider participation” that is “essential for the long run.” Step seven is moral and psychological reconciliation.

Past their step two, it is not clear that a complex peace operation with full security functions need be present to achieve their remaining peacebuilding goals. Whether it can draw down or depart completely depends in large part on the effectiveness of the operation and donor cooperation in training and equipping acceptable new armed forces and police services and, presumably, criminal justice
systems (prosecutors, judges, defense lawyers, recordkeeping, and corrections facilities). These have all been slow to reform in recent operations; if they are the responsibility of the operation, they may be the pacing factor for its exit. A nagging question for both the Doyle and Sambanis and the Dobbins/RAND models is that of oversight: if democracy appears late in the process, who or what legitimates and monitors the activities of the governing institutions built with outside support? What gives them the incentive to provide efficient public services or to buy into rule of law and constitutionality? Absent a role for voters, such oversight must come from other states or international institutions, which means that the effort to promote efficient, effective government is externally imposed rather than home grown, with implications for whether it will embed, politically or culturally. This is only one of many dilemmas inherent in peacebuilding.16

**Exit as Process (Transition) Rather Than Event**

Rose stressed that exit should be conceptualized as a process, not an event.17 As noted, for UN operations, exit was an event until the latter 1990s. Phased withdrawal from Somalia simply shrank the mission’s perimeter over the course of 15 months, ending with its final rapid evacuation from Mogadishu in March 1995 by a covering force of U.S. Marines. Some months later, UN forces in Bosnia were replaced by (and in many cases rehatted as) NATO forces. Somalia and Bosnia remind us, as if it were necessary, that transitions may result from mission failure as well as success. The textbox summarizes the array of potential outcomes.

It is a commonplace that operations—and transitions—should be milestone- rather than schedule-driven. But certain operations are most often designed to be schedule-driven. These include rapid-reaction interventions by coalitions of willing states (in Haiti, 1994 and 2004, and in East Timor, 1999) and military interventions to date by the European Union in Africa (in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for 3 months in 2003 and 6 months in 2006, and in Chad for 12 months in 2008–2009). All of these short-term interventions handed over or handed back responsibility to UN peace operations. Such schedule-driven transitions are successful for the originating organizations if they transition on time, but are perhaps less successful from the perspective of those local or international interests they supported temporarily or those who need to act rapidly to fill the security vacuum that might otherwise result from their withdrawal.

Lessons from the ragged U.S.-to-UN handover in Somalia were applied successfully to the 1995 handover in Haiti. A substantial U.S. contribution to the first 15 months of the UN operation was followed, however, by successive reductions in the size of the UN force, a narrow emphasis on training the Haitian National Police, and then dropping even that goal as the police themselves were reabsorbed into the country’s still-corrupt political and economic system. The UN’s Haiti operations in the 1990s ended with a sense of futility.

The United Nations began serious planning for drawdown of their complex operations in perhaps 2001 with the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and the UN Mission in Sierra Leone. UNTAET served for a little over 2 years as de facto sovereign, relinquishing political control to a newly elected government in May 2002. A smaller follow-on mission, the UN Mission of Support in East Timor, remained for 3 more years, handing off in turn to a largely political
advisory mission, the UN Office for Timor-Leste. The latter could not manage the tensions within and between the Timorese security forces and political leadership, leading to disorder that in turn caused the government to request outside help. An Australian-led multinational force responded quickly and remains in Timor-Leste at this writing—a major exception to the rule on rapid coalition withdrawals. The force did not revert to UN command, however, when a new policing mission, the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), began its work in August 2006. UNMIT’s 1,600 police were once again given law enforcement powers. Timor-Leste is thus the current best example of a premature transition.

### An Array of Outcomes Leading to Exit/Transition

**Success**, in which all stakeholders’ interests are met, all major mandate goals are met, and peace holds after peacekeepers leave.

**Partial success**, where many stakeholder interests are met, many mandate elements are met, and conflict does not resume immediately upon peacekeepers’ departure. Incomplete nature may be due to:

- mission fatigue among peacekeeping donor elites and/or publics
- partner fatigue, leading to reduced funds for host nation reconstruction
- situational constraints, such as unbridgeable ethno-religious divides, endemic corruption, illicit resource trafficking, or meddlesome neighboring states.

**Failure** includes situations where conflict resumes before or immediately after an operation leaves, or the operation meets few stakeholder interests or few mandated goals. Its failure may be:

- substantive, reflecting inability to meet goals despite full funds and staff, due to a poorly informed or executed mission strategy, or lack of high-level international political support for the mission
- process-related, reflecting inability to find the troops, police, or civilian expertise to fill mission ranks; restrictions on what state-contributed personnel may do; poorly trained personnel; and/or lack of coherence and coordination among international actors working in the mission area
- strategic, involving withdrawal of consent for the mission, which is invited out, or forced out under fire, by the host state or the host state’s opponents.
Sierra Leone held national elections in 2002 at about the same time as Timor-Leste. Judged free and fair, they marked the start of the gradual drawdown of UN forces from a peak of 17,500 in 2002 to none at the end of 2005. The follow-on UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone continued to work with the national police, a British military training team also remained in place, and the country enjoyed a peaceful change of party in power following national elections in 2007. Here, then, the United Nations seems to have judged the circumstances correctly, planned its exit carefully, and executed it over a period of years. Its ability to execute that strategy benefited from the early collapse of the government’s main adversary, the Revolutionary United Front, whose leader died in custody and whose forces were roughed up by the Guinean army and by British military intervention. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) indicted not only local militia leaders but also the sitting president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, who at this writing remains on trial in the SCSL’s chamber in The Hague, indicted for criminal support of the Revolutionary United Front.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) lacks everything that Sierra Leone enjoys in terms of the passing of its warlords, the free election of a new generation of leaders, regional support, an ethnically nonhostile social structure, and small size. DRC warlords were elected to high office in national elections, but most retained their provincial links. Many neighboring states are unstable and those that are not are actively exploiting DRC ethnic divisions and economic resources. The country is so large, with such a weak communications infrastructure, that it is difficult for the government, based in the far southwestern corner, to maintain much influence over its provinces bordering Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. The UN operation in the DRC has nearly 20,000 troops who are mostly deployed in the unstable east, where they are outnumbered by sundry militias and the ragtag Congolese national army. Still, the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) has helped tie the country together—physically with Air MONUC and electronically with Radio Okapi, which blankets the country with nationally and regionally based programs, uses Congolese reporters and announcers, and offers a mix of cultural programming, music, and objective news. An exit strategy for MONUC would be dauntingly complex, but the keys to its exit may be some combination of ridding DRC of the last Rwandan fighters (thus relieving Rwanda of an excuse to meddle in Congolese affairs) and gaining control of its own mineral resources. Congo’s leadership, however, remains in the hands of the same men who tore it apart and indirectly caused the displacement and death of more than 4 million of their fellow citizens. The government of President Joseph Kabila demanded that MONUC withdraw in time for the country’s 50th anniversary of independence in June 2010, but continued instability in the east led the Security Council to instead reconfigure a slightly reduced UN
presence as a stabilization force focused primarily on protection of civilians. The likelihood of a dignified exit, or any exit, remains low for the mission, rebranded as the UN Mission for Stabilization of Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

**Exit Strategy: Know It When You See It?**

This sample of the problems and prospects for exit strategies in the world of complex peace operations is necessarily nonscientific because the success of these operations is a matter of circumstance and art: the art of diplomacy, the art of (selective) war, the art of reconciliation, and the art of the law and politics. No definitive formula for a success-based exit is possible, although grounds for exit can be seen in the accomplishment of key elements of a mission’s mandate. Much, therefore, rides on the content of that mandate, the knowledge and wisdom that went into its preparation, and whether there are opportunities to refine it over time to better fit circumstances on the ground and to adapt to them as they change. This is one area in which UN mission mandates may hold an advantage over those of some other organizations: just a dozen states must be convinced of the need to change the way a mission does business, assuming that a veto-wielding permanent member does not object to the alteration.

Flexibility in the Security Council notwithstanding, it is perfectly possible for an operation to devise an exit strategy consistent with fulfillment of its mandate and then be utterly unable to implement it owing to circumstances on the ground, the recalcitrance of local leaders, or insufficient resources—the external factors noted in table 2. Recall, for example, that while MONUSCO has many troops by UN standards, it has built up to that number in trying to secure a land the size of Western Europe with less than half the number of troops that NATO initially deployed to secure Kosovo, a parcel that could be a large ranch in one of Congo’s central or eastern provinces. Rather than an exit strategy, an operation such as MONUSCO is more likely to have an influence strategy, a survival strategy, a retrenchment strategy, and the occasional attack strategy. It cannot succeed in any strategic sense, however, without major political cover of the sort that Doyle and Sambanis and many other analysts stress as necessary to promote regional good behavior. Without such continuous external support, a country like Congo and an operation like MONUSCO will be stuck in a perpetual “Groundhog Day” cycle of endlessly reliving the same militia gambits, dealing with the same greedy officials, and facing the same people formerly so full of hope that tomorrow might be a little better than today, but lately more likely to stone peacekeepers who have proven unable to keep them safe.

**Notes**


11 Ibid., 206.


15 Ibid.


17 Rose.


This article provides an overview of Africa’s irregular, nonstate threats, followed by an analysis of their strategic implications for regional peace and stability, as well as the national security interests of the United States. After reviewing the elements of the emerging international consensus on how best to address these threats, the conclusion highlights a number of new and innovative tools that can be used to build political will on the continent to confront these security challenges. This article is intended as a background analysis for those who are new to the African continent, as well as a source of detailed information on emerging threats that receive too little public or policy-level attention.

Criminal Warfare

Any survey of irregular, nonstate threats in Africa must confront the diverse and complex nature of armed conflict on the continent. Militias and nonstatutory forces are fielded by both insurgents and governments. Civil wars across the continent are waged most commonly by tribally based militias. Many governments have responded by fielding their own tribal militias as proxies (as with the Janjaweed in Darfur), deploying their own militaries (which are no less tribally based or predatory), or conducting brutal counterinsurgency operations to suppress rebels and their civilian support base. In this context, the 1998 Ethiopia-Eritrea border war is one of only a few recent instances of conventional interstate conflict on the continent.

Africa’s civil wars have become known for their brutality, as well as their complex organization around overlapping ethnic, regional, and religious lines and ever-splintering factions. Given the ethnic basis of militia mobilization, the targeting of civilians has sadly come to “make sense” in...
African conflicts.² Civilians are viewed as the support base of both governments and antigovernment rebellions. Moreover, they are also a source of enrichment by “primitive accumulation” through the stripping of assets.³ Rebels target pro-government civilians as a means of claiming wealth (in the form of property, land, cattle, and so forth) that the rebels deem to be the ill-gotten gains of a corrupt regime acting in an adversary ethnic group’s favor. Conversely, pro-government forces target civilians in a strategy of “collective punishment,” holding entire ethnic groups accountable for atrocities committed by rebel leaders who purport to represent that group. Ethnic cleansing is used to seize land presently occupied by other groups, to ensure access to valuable resources contained within that land, or to prevent civilians in that group from casting ballots in elections.

War economies emerge that sustain African conflicts for long durations and generate vested interests in continued instability.⁴ This is generally when warlordism emerges: “winning” a conflict is not essential when a local strongman can sufficiently benefit from the perpetuation of a crisis to finance his militia and remain the central political figure in his personal area of control. Militia factions that originally had a political program or coherent set of grievances may see those diminish as core motivations to continue fighting. In short, the goals of conflict shift from a process of political competition to one of plunder. Given the wide range of resources available to exploit—by stripping assets from civilian populations, trading in gemstones and strategic resources such as oil, tin, or coltan, and extorting “taxes” on aid and trade at key points in a country’s infrastructure (markets, airports, seaports, key road junctions)—African conflicts can become self-financing, and are unlikely to “burn themselves out” in the sense of a forest fire.

Insecurity and criminality tend to linger even when peace settlements are achieved. At the top levels of postwar governments, commanders and officials who were involved in criminal networks to sustain their militias continue to enrich themselves using the same practices in peacetime. For the rank and file, militia activity remains the primary source of livelihood for many former combatants. The failure to effectively disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia fighters can result in roving bands of highwaymen who prey on villagers and their transport networks, as has been the case from Cameroon to the Central African Republic. Fighters may also offer their services as mercenaries in other countries, or simply serve as a pool of armed talent for a future outbreak of conflict in their homeland.

Commodity smuggling, often involving forgery and low-quality products, is a lucrative market deeply tied to African civil wars. From the trade in “blood diamonds” to the smuggling of cigarettes and counterfeit pharmaceuticals, corruption and conflict have turned much of Africa into a “duty free” port for organized crime. In a recent study of transnational trafficking flows in West Africa, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) placed the annual value of the trade in fake and low-quality anti-malarial drugs at $438 million, while cigarette smuggling from the Gulf of Guinea to North Africa and Europe...
is worth approximately $775 million per year.\textsuperscript{5} Without considering other contraband items or other regions of the continent, those sums already match the value of West Africa's annual trade in cocaine.

Conflict is also linked to environmental crimes in Africa. Examples include plundering the forestry sector through illegal logging, forest encroachment via the illegal privatization of public lands, and charcoal-making for domestic and commercial fuel supplies.\textsuperscript{6} While these activities can sustain criminal organizations or militias, they can also drive internal displacement and communal antagonisms, resulting in future political crises.\textsuperscript{7}

Weapons proliferation has fueled Africa's civil wars and communal conflicts, and made armed criminality far more deadly. The trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW), often in violation of international embargoes, has replenished stocks from the Cold War, when weapons and ammunition flooded into Africa from the United States and Soviet Union. Today, the UN estimates that 100 million SALW illegally circulate in Africa—20 percent of the global total.\textsuperscript{8} While AK–47s have been dubbed the ultimate “weapons of mass destruction” on the continent, heavier assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades are an equal menace. Concerns have grown over the potential for terrorists to acquire sophisticated surface-to-air missiles in Africa, as well as mortars, landmines, grenades, and improvised explosive devices made from commercial components.

The arms trade in Africa has been fueled in many ways and by many groups. First, as part of cross-border proxy wars, African governments often covertly supply weapons and ammunition to rebel groups in nearby countries. Neighboring states with ethnic brethren or financial interests across their national borders intervene in each others' crises with stark regularity. Regional conflict systems emerge where neighboring states back each others’ rebels with arms transfers, rear bases, and occasional direct military support. As a result, conflicts spread, parties to the conflicts multiply, and the wars are far more difficult to mediate. Second, foreign arms dealers from Eastern Europe such as Victor Bout play an active role,\textsuperscript{9} but another more prosaic vector of proliferation is the simple diversion of weapons and ammunition from African government stockpiles for sale on the regional markets. High-level officials are often involved, employing fake bills of lading and end user certificates to disguise the eventual destination of military equipment.\textsuperscript{10} Finally, as a result of the accessibility and volume of foreign supplies, major internal markets have emerged where rebels, criminals, and terrorists can access weapons, ammunition, and explosives. This has led to a catastrophic rise in violent deaths in local communal conflicts over land and water, or the traditional practice of cattle rustling.\textsuperscript{11}

Terrorism

Africa is now a significant front in global efforts to combat terrorism.\textsuperscript{12} Sudan was Osama bin Laden’s base of operations from 1992 to 1996, during which time he first endeavored to bring African Islamists under a common banner of global jihad. While this effort did not succeed, bin Laden began operational planning there for the successful 1998 attacks on...
U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Operatives from those attacks fled to Somalia, but returned to Kenya in 2002 with a successful suicide vehicle bombing of the Paradise Hotel near Mombasa and a failed surface-to-air missile attack on an Israeli charter airliner departing that city’s airport.

From its leaders’ statements and publications, al Qaeda’s priorities in Africa are clear: they desire to “liberate” African Muslim populations from what al Qaeda deems to be “apostate” regimes; oppose international peacekeeping efforts in Muslim countries, notably Somalia and Sudan; destabilize oil-producing areas, particularly Nigeria, in order to harm the global economy; and target governments with close political ties to the West. To do so, al Qaeda has not based its primary leaders or principal training camps on the continent. Rather, it has built cooperative ties with African Islamist militants, including the al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) franchise based in Algeria and northern Mali, and the Harakat al-Shabab network based in southern Somalia.

In North and West Africa, AQIM is the primary terrorist threat. Emanating from Algeria’s decade-long conflict with Islamists in the 1990s, AQIM is the only significant militia force remaining from that struggle. It was created when the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) pledged allegiance to al Qaeda’s senior leadership in January 2007. In December of that year, the group conducted simultaneous bombings in Algiers of the UN office complex and the Constitutional Court—a symbol of AQIM’s new dual agenda of attacking both Algerian national and global jihadi targets. AQIM aspires to become a transnational movement across the Maghreb and Sahel areas, encompassing the militants and communities who were loyal to first-generation Islamist militant groups in the area, including the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Moroccan Islamic Combat Group, Tunisian Islamic Front, Mauritanian Group for Preaching and Jihad, and others. These groups were effectively suppressed by North African governments, but the roots of extremism in the region, including poverty, political marginalization, and social alienation, have never been fully addressed. As a result, new waves of recruitment for jihad are plausible.

AQIM does not pose an immediate threat to Algeria’s political stability, and successful counterinsurgency operations have left the group little choice but to conduct low-level hit-and-run and explosives attacks against government forces. Today, the Sahel is where AQIM poses the most immediate threat to African and Western interests. While parts of northern Mali were a long-time GSPC rear base, smuggling zone, and training area, AQIM’s leadership has turned the Sahel into an operational area. Southern Zone emirs leading AQIM battalions, including Mokhtar Belmokhtar and Abdel Hamid Abu Zaid, have ordered numerous kidnap operations against Western tourists, diplomats, and aid workers. One British hostage, Edwin Dyer, was executed in 2009, after the British government failed to respond to AQIM demands for the release of convicted terrorists from British jails. In addition, AQIM has launched a series of attacks in Mauritania, including several confrontations with local security forces, the murder of French tourists in December 2007, a failed assault on the Israeli embassy in February 2008, and the murder of a U.S. aid worker in the capital city in June 2009.
On the other side of the continent, Somalia has long been a rear base for the East Africa al Qaeda (EAAQ) cell responsible for the 1998 and 2002 attacks in Kenya and Tanzania, as well as subsequent failed efforts to attack the new U.S. Embassy in Nairobi and Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, where Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa is based. Immediately after September 11, 2001, the United States designated the Somali Islamist movement known as Al Itihad al Islamia (AIAI) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. That group has splintered since the late 1990s and been replaced by a variety of Islamist militia-factions. The original AIAI leaders, Hassan Dahir Aweis and Hassan al-Turki, joined their forces under the banner of Hizbul Islamia, seeking to establish an Islamist state in Somalia. However, this group is relatively small and
ideologically pragmatic by comparison with Harakat al-Shabab, another AIAI offshoot and the leading insurgent group fighting Somalia’s UN-backed Transitional Federal Government. Al-Shabab seeks to establish an Islamist emirate over much of the Horn of Africa, provides direct support for EAAQ, and has brought suicide bombing and improvised explosive device attacks to Somalia’s crisis. These cooperative relations have enabled al Qaeda to establish local training camps for foreign fighters and robust facilitation networks on the continent. In the case of al-Shabab, dozens of diaspora Somalis from the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and elsewhere have returned to their homeland for jihad, and may be used by al Qaeda to strike in the West.\(^{18}\)

Other regions of Africa have been less affected by the presence of operational terrorist cells, but some have become hubs for safe havens, transit, recruitment, and financing. In West Africa, there have been concerns that AQIM may link up with the militant Boko Haram group in Nigeria.\(^{19}\) Also known as the “Nigerian Taliban” or Jama’at Hijra wal Takfir, this group has been responsible for numerous attacks on local police stations and other religious groups in an effort to create a purified Islamist enclave in the northeast of the country. By contrast, in Southern Africa, numerous al Qaeda–linked militants have been captured or killed after transiting the region. This includes Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, who was involved in the 1998 Nairobi bombing and was ultimately captured in Pakistan, and Harun Rashid Aswat, who was implicated in the 2005 London bombings. More recently, the United States designated two members of the well-known Dockrat family in South Africa for financing al Qaeda. There were concerns that any of these groups might have attacked the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa as a means of generating publicity.\(^{20}\)

**Piracy and Oil Bunkering**

Pirate attacks emanating from Somalia into the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden are a major maritime security threat. Starting roughly in 2004, two networks of pirate militia emerged on the northern Somali coast (at the villages of Eyl and Garad in the Puntland area, and the villages of Harardere and Hobyo in the Mudug region). The pirate attacks are as low-tech as they are brazen. A dozen or so militia, armed with little more than AK–47s and rocket-propelled grenades, set off from the Somali coast in several 20- to 30-foot skiffs powered by outboard engines. Once they come across a mid-sized vessel such as a foreign fishing trawler, the pirates commandeer it for use as a “mother ship” that will allow them to venture farther out to sea for longer periods.\(^{21}\) Once a suitable target is found, the pirates swarm the vessel until it can be boarded. The ship is then hijacked back to the Somali coast and the crew is held until a ransom is paid.

The rate of pirate attacks has continued to rise: 214 ships were attacked in 2009, of which 47 were actually seized with 867 crewmembers taken hostage. International Maritime Bureau reporting indicates the rate of annual Somali piracy attacks has nearly doubled since 2008.\(^{22}\) As international shipping and fishing fleets began to steer clear of Somalia’s Indian Ocean coastline, the pirates shifted their operations north to the Gulf of Aden. Since UN-authorized patrols by U.S., European, and Asian navies have been deployed, however, the pirates compensated by launching attacks hundreds of nautical miles offshore—south toward the Mozambique Channel and east toward India.
Ransom payments to pirates were valued at a minimum of $30 million in 2008 alone—a figure that may have doubled in 2009, given both the increased number of ships hijacked and the growing value of individual ransom payments. This money does not go primarily to the individual pirate militia that seizes a vessel. It is shared among the piracy bosses or syndicate leaders who organized the attack, other investors who sponsor individual operations (including local political leaders or their family members), and local communities that provide security for pirate bases or supply food, water, and other services to the hijackers and crew during the hostage period. In short, piracy has become a cottage industry in Somalia—one that provides a significant income for thousands of people in a country with no functioning central government since the 1980s.23

In addition to the impact on the lives and families of sailors who are taken hostage, the ransoms generated by Somali piracy are liable to destabilize the relatively peaceful northern regions of Somalia and undermine its nascent authorities, fuel the rise of militias, impede the delivery of humanitarian relief (particularly food aid) to drought- and war-affected populations in the Horn of Africa, and increase the costs of global trade. Finally, there is a concern that terrorist groups operating from Somalia could either profit from piracy themselves in order to finance new adventures, or equip their skiffs with explosives for attacks that resemble those on the USS Cole or the French Limburg tanker off Yemen.

Maritime insecurity is a concern in West Africa as well, and involves several distinct but related threats. Gulf of Guinea countries are estimated to lose 55 million barrels of oil worth over $1 billion annually to “oil bunkering,” the local term for oil theft.24 This is significant, as West African oil supplies (mostly sweet crude) are expected to make up 25 percent of U.S. foreign oil imports by 2015,25 and militant attacks impacting West African oil already affect the price of oil on global stock markets. The role played by Nigerian militant groups, particularly the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), is well documented in kidnapping foreign oil workers for ransom, exploding oil pipelines when their demands have not been met, and simply siphoning off oil into their own barges for onward, illegal sales to tankers waiting in the Gulf of Guinea.26 By and large, these threats have taken place either on land or in “brown water” areas of the Delta.

Recently, however, these attacks have moved beyond the Niger Delta and become more daring. In June 2008, MEND attacked Shell’s Bonga oil platform 125 nautical miles offshore—a range previously considered untenable for Delta militants—resulting in a halt to 225,000 barrels per day of crude oil output. In September 2008, seaborne militants from Nigeria attacked the town of Limbe, Cameroon, from the sea. They barricaded roads into the town, repelled Cameroonian soldiers, shot up the local prefect’s office, and used explosives to blast their way into banks, seizing large sums of money. In July 2009, before the Nigerian government’s recent amnesty program for Delta militants, MEND launched its first ever attack in the capital city of Lagos to demonstrate the group’s potential to inflict serious harm if government promises are not kept. Rates of outright piracy—targeting foreign ships for looting or hijacking and ransom—have also increased, in a possible sign of the “contagion effect” of successful piracy operations off Somalia.27

**Drug Trafficking**

Drug trafficking has risen significantly in Africa over the past decade, and the continent...
has emerged as a major transit hub for narcotics from South America and South Asia to reach Europe and to a lesser extent the United States. In 2007, an estimated 48 metric tons of cocaine valued at $1.8 billion transited West Africa, comprising some 27 percent of Europe’s annual supply. In 2009, several stocks of precursor chemicals were discovered in West Africa, indicating that the region is becoming a hub for stockpiling and refining “base cocaine” into a finished product. On the other side of the continent, some 30–35 metric tons of heroin, as well as a much smaller volume of cocaine, were smuggled through East Africa in 2008. Meanwhile, Southern Africa has become a distribution hub where all forms of narcotics are present, as well as a destination for the synthetic amphetamine known as mandrax (methaqualone). In North Africa, Morocco alone accounted for up to 40 percent of European cannabis supplies in 2003, while that drug is widely produced (and consumed) across much of Africa.

Why does shipping through Africa make sense? The short answer, of course, is that money can be made. While direct routes for smuggling drugs to Western markets from South America or South Asia are well monitored and face high interdiction rates, the transshipment of drugs via Africa originally served to disguise the origins of cargo and avoid inspection. While Western security and border control officials now realize the new pattern of drug flows and have adjusted accordingly, weak law enforcement and high-level corruption (and in some cases direct complicity) make Africa a favorable base of operations. Drug traffickers are often supported by local government intermediaries with close ties to West African security officials and import/export...
businesses that can provide protection and logistical support.

Cocaine is imported to Africa from Latin America by aircraft at rural airstrips or dropped by ships for pickup by smaller motorboats. From there, bulk shipments are brought on land and are divided into smaller parcels. These can be sent overland and via coastal routes toward southern Europe, or “shot-gunned” on commercial aircraft using multiple parcels and human “swallowers” or mules. In one infamous operation, Dutch customs officials at Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam arrested 32 drug couriers off a single plane.\(^{33}\) Trafficking organizations have evolved sophisticated, multinational networks for wholesale supply to Europe. While a small number of Latin American nationals connected to known drug trafficking organizations in Colombia and Mexico control the import of cocaine to countries such as Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, they then sell the product to an array of middlemen who organize onward shipments. Within Europe, sales at the street level are coordinated through a range of diaspora, underworld contacts. The result is a multinational and multi-layered network with cutouts and redundancies built in to avoid any one failed shipment being linked back to its originators or disrupting the overall supply chain.\(^{34}\)

Other Organized Crime

Human smuggling and trafficking in persons is another ugly form of organized crime in Africa. In the former, individuals seeking to emigrate from Africa willingly pay costly sums to networks of recruiters, transporters, escorts, and suppliers of forged documents in order to be transported abroad, usually to Europe or the Arab Gulf states. In the latter, migrants are unwillingly exploited or sold by their transporters for forced prostitution, forced labor, or child soldiering. According to UNODC, which values the global trade at nearly $32 billion per year, Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, and Morocco are known as major generators of individuals to be smuggled and trafficked, while several countries in Eastern and Southern Africa have become transit hubs for human smuggling and trafficking operations that originate in Asia.\(^{35}\) The smuggling of young men and women, usually labor migrants, across the Gulf of Aden from Somalia to Yemen demonstrates the brutality of this trade. In exchange for $100 (not an easy sum for destitute Somalis to scrape together), smugglers overload fishing skiffs with dozens of individuals. Passengers are at times tied up, beaten, raped, or robbed. If the smugglers confront high seas or a Yemeni coast guard patrol, they will throw their human cargo overboard at the point of a gun. This allows the smugglers to escape, but leaves their passengers to drown if they are tied up or cannot swim to shore. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that some 100 passengers die each month attempting to illegally migrate along this route.\(^{36}\)

Kidnapping is a longstanding problem in much of Africa that is now taking on new dimensions.\(^{57}\) Beyond the obvious targeting of wealthy individuals, children make up a growing percentage of victims as parents are more likely to pay ransoms. Foreign businesses, tourists, and aid workers are other key targets for high ransom demands, but lower amounts are

---

**weak law enforcement and high-level corruption (and in some cases direct complicity) make Africa a favorable base of operations**
garnered more quickly and more frequently from working-class African victims. Kidnapping is an underreported crime with very low conviction rates because payments to secure the release of victims are often made without involving police. In South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya, there are reports that some organized syndicates now specialize in kidnapping, and that it has transformed from a “brutal crime to a smart crime.” Some speculate that declining rates of success in other lucrative forms of armed robbery—due to improved security at banks and increased use of digital means to make financial transfers—have led criminals to focus on kidnapping instead. At times, entire villages or communities are involved in the kidnapping industry, and share the burden of incarcerating and sustaining a hostage in return for a share of the final ransom payment. The crime, mostly undertaken for financial gain, has a political dimension in some prominent cases. Holding hostages for ransom is common practice for security concern. Global annual losses to IUU fishing are estimated at $10 to $23 billion, with estimates for sub-Saharan Africa totaling $1 billion per year. According to UN and British government reports, IUU fishing now represents approximately 15–20 percent of all catches along Africa’s Indian Ocean coast. This is a lucrative business: in Somalia, illegal fishing in tuna and shrimp can net $94 million per year. In Tanzania, a single long-line fishing operation by Taiwan vessels in 2001 reportedly took in $21 million in tuna. In South Africa, 500 metric tons of abalone worth $325 million are illegally caught and shipped to China each year, and involve Chinese triad syndicates. IUU fishing severely impacts food security and economic development in Africa. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that 200 million Africans rely on fish for nutrition, 10 million rely on fishing for income, and some coastal nations could increase GNP up to 5 percent with effective fisheries regulation. Instead, Africa’s fisheries resources are being unsustainably plundered by a combination of foreign trawlers, smuggling syndicates, and local fishermen. In addition to not paying taxes or fees, they fish out of season and over-catch quotas, target prohibited species, use outlawed methods such as long-lines, and at times employ poisons and explosives.

Poaching and the trade in endangered species threaten the hard-currency earner of tourism in East Africa. They are having a devastating impact on Africa’s environmental heritage and are even financing some militia in Central Africa’s civil wars. For instance, despite the signing of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora and an internationally agreed trade ban dating from 1989, rising demand for ivory in groups such as MEND in the Niger Delta and AQIM in the Sahel, particularly northern Mali. There, kidnappings serve as a source of income but also are used to highlight political grievances and demand concessions from governments. For instance, AQIM in northern Mali has successfully demanded that its jailed operatives be released from prison in exchange for kidnapped hostages.

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is a primary African maritime
East Asia has led to a spike in elephant poaching. In June 2002, Singapore seized 6.2 metric tons of ivory (worth nearly $1 million) coming from Malawi via South Africa, demonstrating the scale and sophistication of the illegal trade.42

Toxic waste dumping has emerged as an additional problem. One notorious case involved the dumping of a deadly cocktail of industrial sludge in an urban area of Côte d’Ivoire, killing some 15 people and sickening over 100,000 with blistering, headaches, nausea, and abdominal pains. Following litigation, the Trafigura oil trading company settled the case with a payment of $200 million to the government and another $45 million to 30,000 victims.43 More recently, in December 2009, the Uranium Mining Company of Franceville came under scrutiny for dumping 2 million tons of radioactive waste in southeast Gabon, which leached into local rivers and showed up in materials used for home construction.44 Villagers building houses from radioactive rocks reported mild illnesses at that point, but there are fears that exposure will lead to high cancer rates over the long term. The problem of toxic dumping is not confined to Africa’s west coast. In East Africa, the fight against toxic dumping has also become a justification that Somali pirates cite for “policing” Indian Ocean waters against foreign shipping.45

**Strategic Implications**

Why do these dangers matter to the United States and international community? As stated above, Africa’s irregular threats are not isolated phenomena. They create a vicious circle of insecurity, the impact of which is primarily borne by African civilians, but which increasingly has a direct impact on U.S. national security. Evolving fears over terrorism and the nature of U.S. counterterrorism programs in Africa demonstrate this nexus. Following the al Qaeda attacks of 2001, counterterrorism efforts have slowly evolved toward addressing the full range of irregular threats in Africa. Beyond kinetic operations attempting to defeat al Qaeda and its associated movements, U.S. concerns grew to encompass the wide range of vulnerabilities that allowed terrorists to penetrate and operate in African countries. These include the existence of safe havens where civil conflict allows terrorists to operate, the potential for rebel movements to find common cause with terrorists and criminals against state authorities, weak border security, and ineffective customs and ports controls. Additional focus has been placed on updating African legal codes, reducing foreign policy tensions that inhibit African cooperation, holding accountable government security services that are often seen as repressive arms of the state rather than guarantors of peace, and ending state complicity in illicit markets that lead to unwillingness to tighten controls.

U.S. interests in combating drug trafficking in Africa have yielded a similar broad set of security concerns that go well beyond targeting individual drug trafficking organizations and their operatives.46 First, while drug trafficking through Africa is organized primarily to funnel narcotics to Europe, the proceeds of that trafficking fuel operations targeting the U.S. market. Second, the enormous sums of money made available by drug trafficking are a key source of corruption of
African law enforcement agencies, militaries, border guards, and politicians. This allows black markets in many forms of contraband to flourish, and diverts the capabilities of Africa’s security sector away from ensuring public security. Third, drug-related corruption has led to new forms of dangerous elite political competition. For instance, in Guinea-Bissau in 2009, the president and military chief were assassinated on the same day in an apparent tit-for-tat struggle over control of a country that has been labeled Africa’s first “narco-state.” Fourth, facilitation of the drug trade through Africa has bolstered the capabilities of both rebel groups and terrorist organizations on the continent. In Northern Mali, for instance, ethnic militias from the Tuareg and Berbiche tribes and, more recently, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb run protection rackets against drug traffickers. They receive financial payoffs that are critical to their guerrilla operations in exchange for escorting drug shipments or simply leaving the traffickers unmolested. Finally, drug trafficking has a negative impact on African countries’ socioeconomic development. As traffickers increasingly pay their local counterparts “in product” rather than “in cash,” local consumption of cocaine and other drugs is on the rise. The public health consequences—rising addiction rates, increased prevalence of HIV, and associated criminal violence and domestic abuse—are one element of this equation. Another problem comes in the form of economic distortions caused by windfall profits and money laundering, which have consequences ranging from unexplained inflation to currency appreciation that makes legitimate exports uncompetitive (the “Dutch disease”).

Similar dynamics are at work with piracy, illegal oil bunkering, and most of the other threats detailed above. Crime and insecurity in the maritime domain interfere with open sea lines of communication, can limit global trade, and have damaged the global economy. Organized crime and rebellion, tied to corruption and governments’ unwillingness to clamp down on smuggling, provide both criminals and terrorists with ready networks for weapons proliferation, illicit finance, and illegal movement of men and materiel for operations. While all of these affect international security and politics, the human face of Africa’s irregular threats is more prosaic. African citizens are beset by all forms of criminal violence on a day-to-day basis, including robberies, assaults, carjackings, kidnappings, and sexual violence, with little recourse. Combined with the inability or unwillingness of African governments to provide for public security, the result of these threats has been labeled a “retreat from the state” by large segments of African societies. In this process, citizens opt to avoid direct contact with officials, and instead seek security and welfare in nonstatutory arrangements.

This has generated a political and security void that is increasingly filled by urban gangs, highwaymen, and criminal networks that are able to rival, surpass, or co-opt local military and law enforcement capabilities. Many African communities have responded by forming or supporting their own armed gangs, vigilante groups, and self-defense units. Examples abound, including the People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) in South Africa, the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria, shariah courts in Somalia, and the Mungiki and Taliban gangs in Kenya. In the first instance, supporting these gangs often appears as a rational response to ensure a level of local security. However, these initiatives often develop
military, financial, and even political autonomy from the communities that originally supported their formation, and they devolve over time into something more sinister—protection rackets that prey on locals with impunity, tools of violent political competition between ethnic groups, or ideologically motivated sects that pursue power for themselves and their vision of a correct society. For instance, elements of PAGAD became radicalized to the point of launching a terrorist bombing attack at the Planet Hollywood restaurant in Cape Town in August 1998.

This shift toward the informal and illicit is reflected in the economic domain as well, leaving a substantial portion of the public without essential public services or employment. High poverty rates, extreme income inequality, a demographic youth bulge, and rapid urbanization provide no shortage of willing participants seeking their livelihoods through criminal activities. Furthermore, gangs and self-defense units can function as proto-militias that can drive future civil wars, while their illicit peacetime activities serve as the basis for future war economies.

**Emerging Consensus**

In response to these challenges, the United States and other members of the international community have reached a consensus on required strategic responses. Under the overall rubric of security sector reform, the strategy emphasizes building African capabilities to confront these threats nationally and multilaterally, and with significant U.S. and European support. It includes efforts to professionalize African law enforcement, civilian intelligence, and border security agencies, as well as enhancing the continent’s legal capabilities and improving national coordination and regional cooperation.

The problem faced by a majority of African governments is that they oversee a range of security forces—military, gendarmerie, police, and intelligence—that have been trained and equipped for a traditional set of missions. Since the end of colonialism, the most competent of Africa’s security forces built significant capabilities for national defense against a foreign invasion that has never been likely to come. Moreover, some African leaders intentionally undermined the effectiveness of their own forces by relying on patronage networks, divide-and-rule tactics, praetorian guards, and private armies to provide security for ruling regimes.51

Security sector reform is now widely recognized as a fundamental requirement for governments to ensure that their security forces are designed, trained, equipped, and managed in new ways that allow them to address contemporary challenges that threaten public safety and security.52 Over the past decade, peacekeeping capabilities have been built—either autonomously through Africa's own subregional deployments, through bilateral training efforts such as the U.S. Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program, or via multinational efforts including the current Africa Standby Force initiative. However, training and reform for domestic security operations have been far more limited. This requires balancing the traditional focus on militaries with efforts to develop the continent’s police, intelligence, and gendarmerie/paramilitary forces. These initiatives must be suitable for tackling organized crime and protecting “homeland security” while adhering to the rule of law.

Law enforcement faces a particularly wide range of problems that limits its ability to effectively support African and international
security. Police in most countries remain poorly or irregularly paid, and often have little usable equipment. In addition to very poor ratios of police to population size, there is major bias in their deployment to large urban areas, with far less capability to operate in rural hinterlands. Africa’s police forces continue to face problems of ethnic-based recruitment that limit constructive relations with the community, are plagued by political appointments to top posts, and suffer from the proliferation of multiple, competing police services. Police forces serve only limited proactive or preventative functions, and remain focused on repressing general threats to public order. They have limited investigative capabilities, particularly in technical areas such as forensics. Finally, while investments in military professionalism have generally reduced the military’s role in politics, the continent’s police forces are considered a front line of corruption and human rights abuse.53

Police reform in Africa needs to take place at multiple levels to be effective. While better pay and working conditions, improved training in investigations and human rights standards, and the adoption of “community policing” approaches have been advocated for general police forces, these alone will not be sufficient. Additional efforts need to be directed at building and deploying in a preventative manner the investigative capabilities of special branches, criminal investigation divisions, and key task forces formed to confront the threats of terrorism, trafficking, and crime. In these particularly sensitive and challenging areas, elite units will need to be formed with substantial external support, and must involve the most experienced and aggressive officers with an ability to fuse intelligence and lead tactical operations. Technical capabilities are also required, including strengthening the forensics capacities and signals intelligence capabilities of reliable African partners.

Enhancing the rule of law remains a critical component of security sector transformation. On the legal front, many African countries have faced significant problems prosecuting individuals arrested for crimes related to terrorism, drug smuggling, and organized crime. In many jurisdictions, where colonial-era legal codes have not been updated, key tools to combat these threats are unavailable to African prosecutors. In some cases, there are insufficient provisions to bring charges for criminal conspiracies or the aiding and abetting of criminals. In other cases, there is no opportunity to engage in plea bargaining to give leniency to low-level criminals in exchange for evidence against their superiors. Their limited ability to introduce evidence collected by national intelligence services into courts of law is another critical concern. To enhance and judicialize intelligence collection, there is a need to establish rules for how African governments can legally monitor and regulate sensitive institutions that have often been abused by criminals. This particularly includes religious institutions, charity organizations, remittance companies, and the banking sector. Development of financial...
regulatory and monitoring capabilities, which can also be used to combat other financial crimes including corruption, money laundering, forgery, “419 scams,” and “land grabbing,” can make a serious contribution to good governance and democratization efforts. Finally, for legal reform to work, it must extend from simply drafting new laws to developing a functioning judicial system that can apply the laws. This requires extending “rule of law” training to the judiciary, prosecutorial and corrections systems, and parliamentary and other civilian oversight bodies.

Political engagement and negotiations are also required for African security capabilities to extend into new domains, ethnically and geographically. On the one hand, security institutions will need to be increasingly multiethnic, reflecting the national demographic makeup of their countries. This may require political dialogue with and recruitment outreach to disenfranchised or antagonized communities that see national security forces as a threat to their interests and independence. Without such confidence-building and force integration, pressing public security forces into disputed “ungoverned areas” on the continent is a recipe for exacerbating existing tensions and possibly pushing local actors into the arms of criminal or terrorist groups. On the other hand, African security forces need to increase their capabilities to deploy in arid or forested rural environments far from urban centers over a prolonged time. Other homeland security functions will also need to be bolstered in a similar manner, including immigration, customs, and port security, to ensure that the continent’s borders are properly controlled.

Traditional roles for military forces remain despite the need for increased focus on Africa’s civilian security services. The job of military forces should be providing critical support that augments the capabilities of civilian security efforts, particularly in the areas of border security and leveraging military intelligence. Efforts to build security capacities to patrol the continent’s extensive land and sea borders will have positive effects for other areas of African security sector performance as well. For instance, the development of robust coast guard capabilities in the police, gendarmerie, and naval services may cross-fertilize with efforts to enhance African peacekeeping capacities, where maritime assets are often required for the lift and sustainment of forces, force protection, maritime interdiction for sanctions enforcement, and the protection and actual delivery of humanitarian assistance. Maritime capacity-building would also enhance African search-and-rescue capabilities.

Intelligence collection and analysis capabilities must be addressed as an additional challenge. First, by their very nature, the threats discussed above are difficult targets for both African and international security services to understand and disrupt. Intelligence collection focused on national and regional threats needs to be increased across the board. Second, as in militaries and police forces, intelligence services must diversify. Today they are often staffed by ethnic groups associated with dominant tribes and clans while terrorist
and criminal threats frequently emerge in areas peripheral to state interests and among ethnic groups that have been marginalized in national politics and civil service employment. In response, African intelligence services simply need to ensure that their pool of human resources is diversified in order to penetrate the illicit networks of other groups. Third, African governments should build new capabilities to leverage financial intelligence and open source reporting. In combination with extended surveillance coverage across Africa’s maritime and air domains, the governments can then clamp down on transnational trafficking, commodity smuggling, and the illegal movement of persons, including both illegal immigration and terrorist foreign fighter flows.

National interagency coordination needs support by African governments. Domestic initiatives are required to eliminate stovepipes that hamper information-sharing and to initiate combined operations to confront multisectoral threats that go beyond the remit of any single ministry. Some countries have created dedicated national counterterrorism centers or “fusion centers” to collate intelligence and deconflict operational responses. Others have expanded participation in their senior-level national security councils to better integrate police, gendarmerie, military, intelligence, and border security efforts. These efforts need continued international encouragement and support as governments attempt to overcome years of factionalism and bureaucratic rivalry within the continent’s security systems.

Regional cooperation is the next step to confront the transnational challenge discussed above. Already, Africa-wide and subregional strategies have been developed by the UN, African Union, and regional economic communities. For instance, the African Union adopted a Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in 1999, followed by a Regional Action Plan in 2002. The latter stresses the importance of information- and intelligence-sharing, combined multinational operations, harmonized legislation, mutual legal assistance, and extradition arrangements. Similar “strategic systems” moving from global standards to local action plans already exist to confront small arms and light weapons proliferation, piracy, drug trafficking, and human smuggling and the trafficking of persons. Furthermore, working with INTERPOL, national police forces are increasing their cooperative efforts through a series of subregional organizations, such as the West African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization and its sister organizations for the Eastern, Southern, and Central Africa subregions.

Addressing the root causes of Africa’s internal threats is the only sustainable solution. Poverty leading to the rise of criminal livelihoods, bad governance leading to weak national security systems, and the resulting ease with which rebels or extremists can mobilize public discontent are the root causes of Africa’s security predicament today. The rise of these threats is only partly due to the growing reach and sophistication of foreign terrorist and criminal actors. The other side of the story is that these groups have found
highly accommodating political and economic environments in which to operate, and African states often remain embedded in the very threats that the United States and other partners are asking them to confront.

**Conclusion**

The consensus and initiatives presented above reflect U.S. strategy toward Africa, as detailed most recently in National Security Presidential Directive 50 (NSPD–50), signed by President George W. Bush in September 2006.\(^58\) It commits U.S. policymakers to consolidate democratic transitions on the continent, bolster fragile states, strengthen regional organizations, promote regional security, stimulate African economic development and growth, and provide humanitarian and development assistance. Despite the change in U.S. administrations since NSPD–50 was adopted, there is no indication of a substantial shift away from these goals under President Barack Obama.\(^59\) With the creation of U.S. Africa Command to oversee defense programs on the continent and encourage “whole-of-government” cooperation, U.S. strategy should be viewed through the prism of coordinated diplomatic, defense, and development responses to create and strengthen African capacity.\(^60\)

Already, through programs such as the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership, East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative, and Africa Partnership Station, as well as interagency efforts led by the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Treasury Department, the United States is investing heavily in building African capacities along the lines of strategies adopted by the United Nations, African Union, and European partners under the banner of promoting “African solutions for African problems.”

However, strategic planning and capacity-building are only two pieces of the puzzle in combating Africa’s irregular threats. The more difficult part is motivating African leaders and hardening their political will to manage and utilize their security sector capabilities to best effect. Despite the existence of excellent UN, African Union, and subregional frameworks to confront these threats, there has been a notable lack of national-level action by member states, where political will is often weak or short-lived. The United States and other foreign partners will need to increase diplomatic pressure on African leaders to live up to their commitments. Provision of additional security assistance should be conditional on improved performance, but effective operations and significant reforms should continue to be highlighted by U.S. officials in speeches, reports, and high-level visits.

Where African actions are limited by continued problems of the competence and capacity of security forces, consideration needs to be given to the formation of “vetted units” of elite, well-trained soldiers and law enforcement officers who operate under the oversight (if not directly under the command) of foreign partners to protect sensitive intelligence and prevent corruption and politicization of national forces by their criminal opponents. Embedding U.S. or other foreign military and intelligence advisors and mentors within African counterterrorism, counternarcotics, or other units provides an opportunity to maintain presence and pressure leaders to take actions at the operational level without compromising African governments’ sovereign control of their forces.
Relying solely on African leaders who choose to ignore or may be implicated in criminal and smuggling activities would be naïve. In some instances, Washington and other foreign governments will need to apply significant pressure on African leaders to take action. To this end, there are a number of new and innovative tools to motivate those leaders who are deemed recalcitrant. For instance, the Department of State has the ability under mechanisms such as the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act and Presidential Proclamation 7750 to impose criminal penalties, economic sanctions, or bans on entry into the United States for individuals (and their businesses) believed to play a significant role in narcotics trafficking.

UN investigations, possibly led by a “panel of experts” associated with the Security Council’s Sanctions Committee, are another potential tool. This could result in UN Security Council resolutions that oblige other countries to bar the entry of designated officials, or the freezing or seizure of foreign assets. Some analysts have already proposed that such investigations require the creation of “special courts” composed of regional and international investigators and jurists to lead prosecution of cases in sensitive areas, such as counternarcotics, which often involve official corruption. Finally, increased unilateral action outside Africa’s borders—for instance, further U.S.-European air and sea interdiction efforts in the Atlantic Ocean area—could be used to curtail illicit activities that transit those borders, even without assistance from African governments.

Africa, the United States, and other international partners will be best served by adopting a three-pronged strategy to effectively respond to irregular threats in Africa. First, long-term support should be expanded for building modern and effective state institutions that are capable of protecting their own borders and confronting violations of domestic law that could have regional and global consequences. Second, further efforts—including the use of sticks as well as carrots—are required to strengthen the political will of African leaders to actually deploy their evolving security sector capabilities in an aggressive manner that abides by the rule of law. Third, the United States and other foreign partners will need to deploy a growing number of their own intelligence, law enforcement, and military personnel to Africa to address terrorist and criminal dynamics that pose direct and immediate threats to the U.S. homeland.

There is nothing to prevent increased African, U.S., and international commitment to thwart the continent’s irregular, nonstate security threats. However, from a strategic perspective, the United States and other nations should only make this sort of commitment with their eyes wide open. This means understanding the complexity and durability of the problems, the limitations that African states confront in building their own capabilities and the political will to confront those problems, and the enormous resources (human, financial, and political) that will be required to be successful. Without such an understanding, U.S. and other security assistance providers will not only be frustrated in achieving their goals, but their investments in Africa may actually reward those who allow violence, predation, and plundering to continue.

This article was originally published as Africa’s Irregular Security Threats: Challenges for U.S. Engagement, Strategic Forum 255 (NDU Press, May 2010).
Notes


14 For additional details, see Anneli Botha, Terrorism in the Maghreb: The Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism, ISS Monograph 144, Institute for Security Studies, June 2008.

15 Dario Cristiani and Riccardo Fabiani, “AQIM Funds Terrorist Operations with Thriving Sahel-Based Kidnapping Industry,” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 8, no. 4 (January 28, 2010).


22 International Maritime Bureau, “2009 Worldwide Piracy Figures Surpass 400,” January 14, 2010. While total attacks were higher, the percentage of successful attacks in 2009 was less than the previous year.


24 UNODC, Transnational Trafficking, 19.


31 “South Africa Becomes Major Hub in Global Drug Trafficking,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1, 2005.


54 “419 scams”—named for the applicable section of Nigerian criminal code—are confidence tricks in which criminals ask their victims to provide upfront funding for a transaction of dubious legality (for instance, laundering money of a former dictator) that never actually takes place. Alternatively, victims are asked to pass sensitive bank details in order to receive a deposit, but then find their accounts vacated by the criminals. See Okolo Ben Simon, “Demystifying the Advance-fee Fraud Criminal Network,” African Security Review 18, no. 4 (2009), 6–18.

55 Developmental approaches to border security also exist. Infrastructure development, particularly road construction, can serve to regularize trade routes through remote border areas. This eases government monitoring of who and what is transiting the country, and allows concentration of human and technical intelligence collection against those traders opting to steer clear of good road networks. The harmonization of tax and tariff structures between neighboring countries can also help reduce commodity smuggling in order to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities.


61 Cockayne and Williams, 30.
Fifteen years ago, a small group of former senior military and civilian defense officials were troubled by the debate over American military strategy and its associated force posture. Given the implosion of the Soviet Union half a decade earlier and the stunning and overwhelming victory in the 100-hour Gulf War of 1991, the predominance of the U.S. military was assured. The weaponry was technologically the best in the world and the fighting force unmatched in ability. In essence, the first Gulf War finally cast off the dark shadow and unhappy legacy of Vietnam once and for all.

BY HARLAN K. ULLMAN

Harlan K. Ullman is a Distinguished Senior Fellow at the National Defense University, Chairman of the Killowen Group, which advises government and business leaders, and Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC.
But this group remained unsettled. Strategy was still premised on firepower and attrition and embedded with former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell’s focus on “decisive” force. In the context of conflict with the Soviet Union or Iraq, when armies, navies, and air forces could do battle with other armies, navies, and air forces, the Powell Doctrine made sense. And the implications meant that our military still required top-of-the-line, very expensive weapons systems from tanks and armored personnel vehicles to stealthy fighter aircraft and nuclear submarines.

Furthermore, neither the George H.W. Bush administration nor the subsequent Clinton presidency at that stage took what we thought was full advantage of the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War in reconfiguring our strategy and force posture. Instead, they decided to downsize the force by less than a third in total numbers while keeping the same general configuration for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, and emphasizing firepower to attrite any adversary. The difficulty was there were few adversaries left to fight in battles conceived for the inner German border and the onslaught of the Red Army.

Another nagging problem concerned us. General Charles Horner, USAF, who commanded the air war in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and went on to serve as commander of the Air Force Space Command, complained that in his bombardment of Iraq and its key targets, he was frustrated by not knowing where to “put the needle” to take Saddam Hussein down without destroying his military capacity first. These intuitions provoked us into action.

The result became known as shock and awe, a marvelously provocative phrase that subsequently became distorted and maligned and would quickly sink without a trace in the first days of the second Iraq War, launched in 2003, that led to Saddam’s downfall and a painful occupation of that country that continues today. Why and how that happened are interesting diversions. More important is the correct understanding of what shock and awe meant and why the concept is as relevant or more so today when there are no armies and navies to fight—certainly none in the conflicts that consume us in Afghanistan and Iraq. And anyone who reckons to take on China in conventional war should examine his or her assumptions carefully.

Shock and awe made its debut in a 1996 publication sponsored by the National Defense University titled Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance. Two years later, the Royal United Services Institute in London published a sequel entitled Rapid Dominance: A Force for All Seasons that proposed recommendations for experimenting with and testing the concept along with specific ideas for designing and deploying a shock and awe force including weapons and command and control systems.

What Is Shock and Awe?

First, a brief reminder of what shock and awe was designed to do would be useful. Using the philosophy of Sun Tzu, shock and awe, as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld put it, was a way to get people to do what we wanted and stop doing things that we did not want—or to win the war without having to fight the
battle. Our wording was more technical. Shock and awe was about affecting, influencing, and controlling will and perception. Hence, it recognized the Clausewitzian dictum that war was ultimately a conflict of wills.

In our usage, shock meant the ability to intimidate, perhaps absolutely; to impose overwhelming fear, terror, vulnerability, and the inevitability of destruction or rapid defeat; and to create in the mind of the adversary impotence, panic, hopelessness, paralysis, and the psychological incentives leading to capitulation. In general, shock would best be achieved with great suddenness, surprise, and unexpectedness.

If shock worked best when rapidly administered, the enduring aspect was awe. Awe may be present in the absence of shock in that a target or an adversary could be convinced to accept our will by the perception or reality of our overwhelming ability to affect, influence, and control his or her actions. In practical terms, shock often reinforces or creates awe. But to achieve long-term or lasting effects, it is awe rather than shock that is the applicable mechanism.
Rather than use more traditional criteria for defining shock and awe and its key components, four unconventional categories emerged. First was total knowledge. While recognizing that total knowledge was practically impossible to achieve, the intent was to develop sufficient understanding of the target or adversary, its culture and psychology, and the specific military and other capabilities that were in hand. The military side is often referred to as situational awareness. Our aim was to go much further—to understand how the adversary thought and would react. Hence, cultural understanding was as crucial as the enemy order of battle. To our detriment, a grave and potentially fatal weakness in U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq and before that in Vietnam was little or no cultural understanding, a flaw the U.S. military has been urgently trying to rectify since the Iraqi insurgency began in earnest in late 2003.

The second category was control of the environment. This meant that, night or day, we could control what the adversary saw or heard, or did not see or hear. It meant depriving the adversary of situational awareness and ensuring that any information or intelligence that was picked up conformed to what we wanted the enemy to have. Deception and disinformation were part of this, morphing images of enemy leadership as needed to dissemble and confuse and give wrong orders or messages.

Third was rapidity, meaning that we had to respond at all levels more quickly than the enemy. Unfortunately, as we are seeing in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly with improvised explosive devices, the enemy has proved more agile than we. Use of rapidity, if achievable, would reverse this.

Finally, the standard was brilliance in operations. We came close to achieving this level in Desert Storm and certainly in Iraqi Freedom. Operations had to be dazzling in execution and impact to achieve a sense of shock and awe. Fortunately, American fighting men and women have risen to the task. Where the real problems have arisen are in the whole-of-government approaches to nonmilitary tasks and, of course, in operations where there was no enemy army or air force to defeat and war was about the people and securing their support.

To tie these characteristics together, shock and awe was output- and effects-based. The ultimate political or strategic objective was defined first, and strategists then worked backward to bring together all the necessary military and nonmilitary tools to achieve that end. This was not done in either Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, where the object was to overthrow the Taliban and hunt down al Qaeda, or Iraqi Freedom, where destroying the Iraqi army, getting to Baghdad, and removing Saddam from power were the objectives. Shock and awe departed profoundly in this regard by getting the political aims right in the first place.

**Examples of Shock and Awe**

To demonstrate levels of shock and awe and means to achieve both, 10 examples were derived. These examples are not exclusive categories and overlap exists between and among them. The first is Decisive Force. The aim was to apply massive or overwhelming force as quickly as possible on an adversary in order to disarm, incapacitate, or render the enemy...
militarily impotent with as few casualties and losses to ourselves and to noncombatants as possible. The superiority of American forces, technically and operationally, is crucial to the successful application of decisive force.

The second example is Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in which a nation and government that seemed willing to commit suicide rather than surrender could be forced into rapid capitulation even though it had suffered massive numbers of casualties through intense aerial bombardments and blockades. The intent is to impose a regime of shock and awe through delivery of instant, nearly incomprehensible levels of massive destruction directed at influencing society writ large, meaning its leadership and public, rather than targeting military or strategic objectives even with relatively few numbers or systems. This example of shock, awe, and intimidation rests on the proposition that such effects must occur in short periods. Unfortunately, while this example was meant to show how to control the will and perception of a seemingly inflexible enemy, the mention of nuclear weapons led to the impression that this condition could only be applied through their use. That was wrong but understandable. What is interesting today is whether shock and awe could be used to deter or dissuade jihadist extremists and other religious radicals from becoming suicide bombers.

Third is Massive Bombardment. This example applied massive and, perhaps today, relatively precise destructive power largely against military targets and related sectors over time—a kind of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in slow motion and with conventional munitions. It is unlikely to produce an immediate effect on the will of the adversary to resist. In a sense, this is an endurance contest in which the enemy is finally broken through exhaustion. However, it is the cumulative effect of this application of destructive power that will ultimately impose sufficient shock and awe, as well as perhaps destroy the physical means to resist, and that will force an adversary to accept whatever terms may be imposed. The trench warfare of World War I, the strategic bombing campaign in Europe of World War II (which was not effective in this regard), and related B-52 raids in Vietnam and especially over the New Year period of 1972–1973 illustrate the application of massive bombardment.

The fourth example is Blitzkrieg. In real Blitzkrieg, shock and awe was not achieved through the massive application of firepower across a broad front or through the delivery of massive levels of force. Instead, the intent was to apply precise, surgical amounts of tightly focused force to achieve maximum leverage but with total economies of scale. The German Wehrmacht’s Blitzkrieg was not a massive attack across a broad front, although the opponent may have been deceived into believing that. Instead, the enemy’s line was probed in multiple locations and, wherever it could be most easily penetrated, attack was concentrated in a narrow salient. The image is that of the shaped charge, penetrating through a relatively tiny hole in a tank’s armor and then exploding outward to achieve a maximum cone of damage against the unarmored or less protected innards.

Fifth and sixth are derived from the Chinese philosopher-warrior Sun Tzu and were based on selective, instant decapitation of military or societal targets to achieve shock and awe. This discrete or precise nature of applying force differentiates this example from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki and massive bombardment examples. Sun Tzu was brought before Ho Lu, the King of Wu, who had read all of Sun Tzu’s 13 chapters on war and proposed a test
of Sun’s military skills. Ho asked if the rules applied to women. When the answer was yes, the king challenged Sun Tzu to turn the royal concubines into a marching troop. The concubines merely laughed at Sun Tzu until he had the head concubine decapitated. The ladies still could not bring themselves to take the master’s orders seriously, so Sun Tzu had the head cut off a second concubine. From that point on, so the story goes, the ladies learned to march with the precision of a drill team.

The next Sun Tzu example is based on the premise that all war is deception, misinformation, and disinformation. In this case, the attempt is to deceive the enemy into what we wish them to perceive and thereby trick, cajole, induce, or force the adversary. The thrust or target is the perception, understanding, and knowledge of the adversary. Two illustrations are the Trojan horse and the 19th-century revolt of native Haitians against French control. The Haitian leaders staged a martial parade for the visiting French military contingent and marched a handful of battalions repeatedly in review. The French were tricked into believing that the native forces numbered in the tens of thousands and concluded that French military action was futile and that its forces would be overwhelmed. As a result, the Haitians were able to achieve their freedom without firing a shot.

Seventh is Britain’s Special Air Service model, which is distinct from the Blitzkrieg or Sun Tzu examples because it focuses on depriving an adversary of its senses in order to impose shock and awe. The image here is the hostage rescue team employing stun grenades to incapacitate an adversary, but on a far larger scale. The stun grenade produces blinding light and deafening noise. The result shocks and confuses the adversary and makes him senseless. The aim is to produce so much light and sound as to deprive the adversary of all senses, and therefore to disable and disarm him. Without senses, the adversary becomes impotent and entirely vulnerable.

Eighth is the Roman example. Achieving shock and awe rests in the ability to deter and overpower an adversary through the adversary’s perception and fear of his own vulnerability and our invincibility, even though applying ultimate retribution could take considerable time. This is how Rome ruled its empire. If an untoward act occurred, the perpetrator could rest assured that Roman vengeance ultimately would take place. This model was exemplified by British “gunboat diplomacy” in the 19th century when the British fleet would return to the scene of any crime against the crown and exact its retribution through the wholesale destruction of offending villages.

The ninth example of shock and awe is Decay and Default, which is based on the imposition of societal breakdown over a lengthy period but without the application of massive destruction. This example is obviously not rapid but cumulative. In this example, both military and societal values are targets. Selective and focused force is applied. It is the long-term corrosive effects of the continuing breakdown in the system and society that ultimately compel an adversary to surrender or to accept terms. Shock and awe is therefore not immediate either in application or in producing the end result. Economic embargoes, long-term policies

had shock and awe in fact been applied in Iraq, the start point would have been the outcome that was to be achieved
that harass and aggravate the adversary, and other types of punitive actions that do not threaten the entire society but apply pressure just as Chinese water torture does, a drop at a time, are the mechanisms. Finally, the preoccupation with the decay and disruption of society produces a variant of shock and awe in the form of frustration collapsing the will to resist.

The last is the Royal Canadian Mounted Police example, whose unofficial motto was “never send a man where you can send a bullet.” The distinction of this example from Sun Tzu’s is proximity and standoff. U.S. drone attacks launched against al Qaeda and Taliban in Northwest Pakistan are illustrative. Whether the continued attrition of enemy leaders breaks the will of others or not remains to be seen. However, shock and awe from the suddenness of these attacks are surely generated.

Relevant but Misunderstood

Why and how shock and awe has been misapplied is unfortunate. Donald Rumsfeld as a part-time member of the group certainly understood the tenets of shock and awe. But the aim of the George W. Bush administration was to get in and out of Iraq as quickly as possible. The U.S. Central Command commander, General Tommy Franks, USA, and Rumsfeld worked interactively to develop the war plans. The Joint Chiefs were purposely kept at arm’s length from the war planning process, at least initially, to minimize bureaucratic interference from Washington. And the fact that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was General Richard Myers, an Air Force and not an Army officer, did not help, as Iraqi Freedom was predominantly a ground war.

General Franks liked the term shock and awe because it implied a lightning campaign. And his orders were to move quickly and get out quickly. The Air Force liked the phrase because it emphasized airpower and the argument, wrong as it was, that wars can be won from the air—a throwback to the case for strategic bombing that has persisted from the 1930s to today.

A few days after the war began with a combined air and ground assault, the British newspaper The Daily Telegraph ran an almost-full-page color photo of a U.S. or British bomb exploding in Baghdad in graphic detail. The large headline read: “Baghdad Blitz.” The reference to World War II and the Nazi bombing of Britain doomed shock and awe. It was not used again by Franks, the Air Force, or anyone else.

Had shock and awe in fact been applied in Iraq, the start point would have been the outcome that was to be achieved. Merely defeating the Iraqi army and dethroning Saddam were not sufficient. Building a stable and somewhat pluralistic state under the rule of law was. Hence, there would have been far more attention paid to the “What next?” question and recognition given to the reality that the peace would prove far more difficult than the war.

Is shock and awe relevant today? There are few armies and navies to fight. Our forces possess huge advantages. Yet conflict has shifted to and about the people. And success means providing the capacity for local populations to take on their own security.

By focusing on total knowledge, control of the environment, rapidity, and brilliance in operations along with outcome- or effects-based strategies, shock and awe can inform both the military and civilian sides essential for success. Whether it can deter, convince, or cajole jihadist extremists willing to die for their cause is an interesting question. That it worked in Japan may or may not be relevant. Examining the 10 examples of shock and awe is relevant, however.
Can we develop countermessages and messaging through deception or disinformation or telling the truth? Can selective targeting help or hinder? More important, can total knowledge or its pursuit provide insights to help disrupt, dismantle, and defeat terrorist networks? That answer is not immediately knowable. But there surely is good reason to give shock and awe another chance.

Notes

1 The original group consisted of General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., USA, commander of VII Corps in Operation Desert Storm; General Charles A. Horner, USAF, air war commander; Thomas R. Morgan, former Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps; Admiral Leon A. Edney, USN, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic; Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, commander in chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe; Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., former Pentagon director of research; Dr. James Wade, former Pentagon assistant for nuclear policy and head of acquisition; and myself. Joining the group later as observers were Donald H. Rumsfeld (before he assumed the post of Secretary of Defense a second time) and Admiral Leighton Smith, former commander in chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe.

2 In retrospect, Rapid Dominance turned out not to be the right name, as it implied other activities that diluted the meaning and focused attention away from shock and awe. A second error was not appreciating that in the examples of shock and awe that follow, greater caveats should have been used in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki cases in order to demonstrate that it was the effects that made the point and not the reference to nuclear weapons. The reference, unfortunately, led some people to conclude shock and awe was dependent on atomic weapons, which it certainly was not.
On January 13, 2009, in the waning days of the George W. Bush administration, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator Henrietta Fore unveiled the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide. The guide was the first of its kind—an attempt at an inter-agency doctrine reaching across civilian and military agencies in the U.S. Government. It sought to create unifying principles for the counterinsurgency fight and to unite the involved agencies through a common game plan to “achieve synergy among political, security, economic and information activities.” Coordinated by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the Department of State, the guide was coauthored by all the major government stakeholders in the counterinsurgency fight: USAID; the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, Homeland Security, Transportation, and Agriculture; and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Moreover, the guide’s creation brought together some of the leading counterinsurgency strategists from across the U.S. Government and drew upon current experience. Seemingly, the finished product was well poised to shape the way the U.S. Government thinks about and conducts counterinsurgencies.

And yet, more than a year and a half after its publication, the guide has languished in relative obscurity with little apparent impact on interagency planning, strategy, or operations in Iraq and Afghanistan or elsewhere. The result is particularly surprising in historical context, given the great success of two other doctrinal guides in shaping counterinsurgency strategic thought. The 1940 U.S. Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual is still widely read by military and civilian government officials alike more than 70 years after its publication. Moreover, the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3–24, Counterinsurgency, written by many of the same authors as the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, has already achieved almost canonical status in the counterinsurgency literature. Almost as soon as it was published, FM 3–24 joined the ranks of David Galula’s

Raphael S. Cohen, a former Active-duty U.S. Army intelligence officer, is a Ph.D. candidate at Georgetown University and was a summer researcher in the Center for Complex Operations at the National Defense University.
This article is a tale of two manuals—FM 3–24 and the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide—and their relative impacts. It briefly tells how each document came into being. Next, it wrestles with how we measure the impact of doctrine. Third, it explores a series of possible reasons for why the two had dramatically different impacts. Finally, it asks what this indicates for the future of complex operations within the whole-of-government approach and interagency counterinsurgency doctrine. Ultimately, this tale highlights the limitations of doctrine in shaping institutional behavior in a civilian interagency environment. In addition, it shows how people can overcome parochial questions of agency authorship to look for guidance, demonstrating that a document does not need to be a joint publication to have an interagency impact.

Writing the Manuals

The story behind the making of the two manuals is nested within a broader intellectual history of the American rediscovery of counterinsurgency doctrine in the post-Vietnam era.

Although not the first U.S. counterinsurgency, Vietnam has come to define the challenges of this form of warfare, trying to win over an often ambivalent local population while hunting an elusive, at least partially homegrown enemy. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, many took the “never again” approach to counterinsurgency. The war, after all, had scarred the military, divided the country, and cost over 58,000 American lives. For many, the lesson of Vietnam was that the United States “should have clearly defined [its] political and military objectives” before going to war and “should know precisely how [its] forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives.” Vietnam in particular and counterinsurgency more broadly, however, came to epitomize war done wrong, never to be repeated. Unsurprisingly, counterinsurgency remained a painful subject for the U.S. Government, and certainly not one to be institutionalized in doctrine.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, highlighted the need for counterinsurgency doctrine. In “Constructing the Legacy of Field Manual 3–24,” an article recently published in Joint Force Quarterly, John Nagl, one of FM 3–24’s authors, recounts the story of the making of the manual. In late 2005, with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan well under way, then-Lieutenant General David Petraeus was appointed to head the Army’s Combined Arms Command at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and soon thereafter set in motion the drafting of the manual. What followed was, at least according to Nagl, unparalleled in the world of doctrine writing. Although not officially an interagency publication, FM 3–24 brought together a mix of serving and retired military officers and a handful of civilian military scholars. After they fleshed out many of the major concepts, they published an interim article in Military Review
A Tale of Two Manuals

seeking additional comments.\(^6\) As Nagl writes, “No previous doctrinal manual had undergone such a public review process before publication or provided so many opportunities for comment to both those inside and outside the Army/Marine Corps tent.”\(^7\) Ultimately, after much review, the manual was officially published in December 2006.

A few months before FM 3–24 was published, a parallel effort to produce a U.S. Government–wide version got under way. The consensus for this manual came out of a State Department–led interagency conference held in Washington, DC, in September 2006. Drawing on principles from FM 3–24 and lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, the participants recognized that counterinsurgency requires a range of assets from across government agencies, not just from the military.\(^8\) As a result, they felt that counterinsurgency would require an interagency doctrine where all the government agencies with equities in the effort would be included in drafting the guide from the start, not in the ad hoc fashion that characterized the drafting of FM 3–24.\(^9\) Furthermore, the guide would be written in a style more readable and accessible to civilians than was FM 3–24. Like its military counterpart, the drafters of this new manual published an interim report. In October 2007, Counterinsurgency for U.S. Government Policy Makers: A Work in Progress was published as an interim effort to allow for comments.\(^10\)

Although not greeted with the same fanfare as FM 3–24, the interim manual did garner some press: it was mentioned on a number of blogs and cited favorably in military professional journals.\(^11\) And a little over a year later, the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide was published in January 2009.

Ultimately, from a process standpoint, the two manuals followed similar trajectories. Both were collaborative efforts to varying degrees; both published their initial interim findings relatively quickly; and both interim reports were—for the most part—well received. True, the guide took longer to produce than FM 3–24—well over 2 years for the former, as opposed to a little over 1 for the latter. Given the novelty of civilian-military interagency doctrine and the number of participants involved, this was to be expected. If anything, the guide’s longer production schedule should have heightened the collective anticipation of its release, and yet, as we shall see, the converse was true.

Measuring the Impact of Doctrine

The first critical question of this analysis is how to measure the impact of doctrine on organizations. In the military context, observing doctrine’s impact is fairly straightforward. Doctrine has long been a staple of the American military’s—and particularly the U.S. Army’s—culture. Practically speaking, from the moment Soldiers enter initial training, they are surrounded by doctrine. Be it FM 7–8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad Tactics, FM 3–0, Operations, or FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency, doctrine is drummed into Soldiers’ heads—they memorize, quote, and practice doctrine throughout training. And lest they forget, Soldiers will return to the military schoolhouse at regular intervals throughout their careers to relearn it. In the civilian context, by contrast, the impact of doctrine is far less visible. With a less regimented educational system and a more fluid
policymaking context, there are fewer natural inputs for doctrine to impact a civilian agency’s culture or operations. Three metrics, however, may be employed to observe doctrine’s effect: who reads it, who quotes it, and what policies, strategies, or operations substantively change because of such doctrine.

**Who Reads It?** Perhaps the most basic question to ask about any document—including doctrine—is whether it gets read, particularly by its target audience. Here, the impact of FM 3–24 is demonstrable. Unsurprisingly, the military reads doctrine in part because it is assigned to read it and required to abide by it, and FM 3–24 is widely taught within the military educational system. More surprisingly, however, is FM 3–24’s ability to reach beyond the American military audience. Within a month of its posting in December 2006, it was downloaded 1.5 million times. While this may not mean that 1.5 million people actually read the manual in the first month, it does imply substantial interest in and popularity of FM 3–24. And not only Soldiers read the manual: FM 3–24 was published by a civilian press (the University of Chicago) and can be purchased in commercial book stores. As an additional demonstration of its crossover appeal, FM 3–24 was reviewed in the New York Times, Foreign Affairs, and other mainstream media outlets.

By contrast, the extent to which the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide was read is harder to assess. While the guide is readily available on the State Department’s Web site, there are no easily available comparable statistics on the number of times it has been downloaded. Unlike FM 3–24, the guide has not been commercially published. Moreover, the extent to which the guide actually is read or assigned inside government is unclear. In one recently conducted survey of returning military and civilian Provincial Reconstruction Team members, for example, only 16.7 percent of the respondents reported using “Parent Agency Documents/Guide Books.”

**Who Quotes It?** A second metric of doctrine’s success is how often it is quoted and in what forum. After all, the preface states that the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide’s purpose is to serve as “a stimulus to disciplined, but creative thought.” While assessing thoughts—much less creative ones—is an elusive metric to capture, one proxy measure of a work’s influence is how widely it is referenced in academic literature. A search using the academic search engine Google Scholar reveals that FM 3–24 is overall about 10 times as likely to be cited in academic work as its interagency counterpart (517 to 45 references, respectively), about 6 times as likely to be cited in an academic publication (35 to 6, respectively), and about twice as likely to be cited in think tank and civilian government agency publications. To be fair, this is an imperfect metric of “creative thought”: the search does not wholly capture internal publications and briefings and only imperfectly captures less formal publications (policy papers, blog posts, and so on), but it does give at least a rough gauge of the impact of the two works.

**Does It Substantively Change Anything?** Finally, we need to measure the extent to which doctrine has substantively shaped policy, strategic planning, and operations. Drawing a causal
A relationship between doctrine and outcomes, much less trying to quantify this relationship, often proves difficult. For instance, common wisdom attributes some of the success of the Iraq surge to the implementation of FM 3–24’s precepts. The basics of the narrative—that FM 3–24 was written under General Petraeus’s guidance, that he later took command of forces in Iraq, and that the Iraq surge worked—are now reasonably well accepted. However, the relationship between FM 3–24 and the success in Iraq is hotly contested. For example, U.S. Military Academy professor Colonel Gian Gentile, USA, argues that the linkage between FM 3–24 and the turnaround in Iraq is at best incomplete, if not false. Meanwhile, Nagl and others continue to be strong proponents of the manual’s success.

If proving the impact of FM 3–24 is controversial, then finding the right way to judge the substantive impact of the guide is even trickier. Some experts, for example, argue that the guide’s impact can be measured by the commitment of the civilian agencies to the counterinsurgency efforts. Adam Schilling of the Army Center for Analysis remarked, “Despite the proliferation of government and think tank documents, like the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, advocating the whole of government approach, the civilian surge is yet to materialize in the numbers required, and U.S. policy goals are not pursued as effectively as they should be.” For Schilling, at least, the lack of a “civilian surge” is prima facie evidence of the failure of the guide to significantly impact the civilian counterinsurgency fight.

Others take a more measured view of the guide’s impact. One USAID representative who worked on the development of programs to support counterinsurgency stated that he “read the

### Academic Citations per Guide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian government agency</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think tank</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (foreign citations)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Google Scholar search conducted on June 17, 2010.
COHEN

COIN [counterinsurgency] Manual (FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency) shortly after it came out. The first five chapters were really the main ones relevant to the softer side of counterinsurgency.” As for the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, he said, “It was published after I had already been working on the issues for a while, so I reviewed it and saw no surprises.”23 In his experience, even civilian practitioners refer to FM 3–24 more often than the guide, but while doctrine provides the context for the program, neither FM 3–24 nor the guide is the primary influence on actual development of program design—which tends to be shaped more by core development principles, personal experience on the ground, and more detailed reports specific to the country and sector. Ironically, the representative said, in his experience, the State Department and USAID representatives were more likely than their military counterparts to have read FM 3–24.24

The impact of the guide on the State Department has been similarly tepid. One State Department official, currently posted to the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability, commented, “From my rather limited experience, I have not run into the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide either in the field or in DC. Some of that may be my own fault, as I have not actually read the final product (I reviewed some earlier drafts) but to date I have not heard the Guide cited or referenced in day to day work.”25 While such a reflection is anecdotal, the story seems to echo the more quantitative metrics: the guide appears to have faded into relative obscurity.

Why the Differences?

There are a number of possible reasons why the two manuals have varied so dramatically in their impact. Some have to do with the impact of doctrine itself, others with more systemic variables such as timing. Both have an element of relevance, but ultimately a large part of the explanation must point to bureaucratic culture.

Doctrine Does Not Matter for the Current Fight. Perhaps the first possible reason for the guide’s lack of a direct impact on operations is simply that doctrine does not matter to current conflicts. These proponents note that militaries typically train to fight the last war, and as a result, doctrine often tends to be one war behind the current conflicts.26 Washington, according to this view, is a far cry from war zones, so whatever is written there almost certainly will be outdated by the time it reaches the battlefield. This is not strictly an American phenomenon: when the Soviets entered Afghanistan in 1979, they did so with a doctrine better suited to a conventional war in Europe than a counterinsurgency and were never able to adapt a new doctrinal model despite over 9 years of operations.27 Even if the time and conceptual lag could be fixed, doctrine—like any other plan—almost certainly will not live up to the “first five minutes of contact with the enemy.” Doctrine of any type, according to this view, is bound to be an impotent document: to expect anything else is plain naiveté.

The history of interagency counterinsurgency and stabilization planning seems to lend some credence to this point of view. As Colonel Lew Irwin, USAR, professor of political science at Duquesne University, noted, “There is no shortage of interagency guidance.”28 In fact,
since as early as 1997, when the Clinton administration issued National Security Presidential Directive 56, “Managing Complex Interagency Operations,” there has been a steady stream of Presidential and agency guidance for stability and counterinsurgency operations.39 No matter how much guidance is given and how many documents are published, the effects so far have been uninspiring: as difficult as it was to shift the military into a counterinsurgency mindset, seemingly, reforming the interagency process to account for these operations has proven even more challenging.

Another variant of the “doctrine does not matter” argument is that doctrine’s purpose is not to change current policy—which is inherently a fluid process, especially among civilian political appointees—but rather to document and institutionalize changes that have already been made. According to this argument, doctrine is a reflective exercise, capturing the lessons learned by one generation and providing a starting point for future generations. This concern to capture institutional memory and learn from past actions has existed for generations, particularly in counterinsurgencies where soldiers and civilians rotate in and out of country. In his classic study Bureaucracy Does Its Thing, Robert Kromer notes that American interagency efforts suffered from this lack of institutional memory, as personnel in country changed: “We have devised a unique sort of bureaucratic machine which tends . . . to ensure that our operation in Vietnam will always be vigorous, will never grow tired, but will also never grow wiser.”30 Doctrine, rather than being an instrument for proactively setting policy, would be a mechanism for combating institutional memory loss in fluid environments.

Some military writing on doctrine’s relationship with lessons learned reflects this viewpoint. In fact, a memorandum of instruction from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff argues that one of the desired endstates of lessons learned is changes to doctrine.31 This concept is not unique to the military. For example, a State Department employee, reflecting on how his Provincial Reconstruction Team was structured in Baghdad, stated, “What I think we need to do with that model is to codify it and put it into doctrine, so this is a concept that people understand that we can use in other places. That way we do not need to reinvent the wheel.”32 Following this argument, it should be unsurprising that the guide has not had a direct impact on today’s counterinsurgency effort; after all, the guide should be geared to preventing institutional memory loss and preserving the lessons of today’s wars for future generations long after today’s practitioners move on.

And yet the “doctrine does not matter” argument seems incomplete. While it may explain why the guide has failed profoundly to alter today’s counterinsurgency strategy or operations, it does not answer why it has had dramatically less of an impact than FM 3–24. Moreover, the premise that doctrine cannot shape the current fight is, at the very least, a controversial one. Although the causal logic is difficult to prove, the conventional wisdom attributes the turnaround in Iraq to a new commander, more troops, and a political shift brought about in part by a new counterinsurgency doctrine. Even Gentile’s critique does
not deny that FM 3–24 has critically shaped the debate about the current counterinsurgency strategy. And finally, if doctrine primarily serves as a historical record of lessons learned, there is no indication that the guide will serve this function any better than it has stimulated creative thought about counterinsurgency today. Indeed, if the guide is largely marginalized in its own generation, why would future generations be any more likely to rediscover it?

It Is All About Timing and Politics. A second possible reason why the guide has not had the same impact as FM 3–24 is timing and politics. For doctrine implementation, the argument goes, it requires powerful backers at the top of the organization to break the bureaucratic inertia and ensure it is put into practice and successfully shapes policy. In this case, the guide was released at the tail end of the George W. Bush administration. A week later, the United States had a new President, Secretary of State, and national security team. By contrast, FM 3–24 was released in December 2006, midway through the second Bush administration, and backed by already established senior civilian and military leaders with sufficient time in office to ensure that the new doctrine was internalized. As a result, FM 3–24 was well positioned to shape the military in ways the guide was not.

Another variant of the timing argument looks less at internal government dynamics and more at the timing of the publications relative to world events. FM 3–24 was the first major U.S. doctrinal work on counterinsurgency published in the post-9/11 world. Moreover, FM 3–24 was published in the runup to the Iraq surge. As a result, the manual owes its success to being original at the time of its publication and being tacitly associated with a last-ditch attempt to turn around the war in Iraq. By contrast, the guide was not as novel in substance nor was it directly associated with a major policy shift in the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq, and as a result has not garnered the same public attention.

While there is an element of truth to both the internal and external timing arguments, however, the explanation is not wholly convincing for four reasons. First, while there were significant personnel changes between the two administrations, there were also key elements of continuity—most notably Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, as well as the career civil servants and military personnel who worked on the guide. And while the latter may not make policy, they could have at least ensured that the guide was not forgotten. Second, although the final version came out in the last week of the Bush administration, a draft version of the guide had been published in October 2007, well before the change in political leadership. Third, in terms of external timing, the guide represented a new approach: it was one of the first attempts at broad-based civilian interagency counterinsurgency doctrine and could easily have been associated with the new push in Afghanistan and the so-called “civilian surge.” Finally, and most important, the guide’s influence should have transcended administrations because the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy has not changed much. Indeed, even many of the buzz words remain the same. For example, the motto of the U.S. Interagency Counterinsurgency
Initiative, prominently displayed on the cover of the guide, is *whole of government; whole of society*, which dovetails nicely with the 2010 National Security Strategy’s emphasis on “Strengthening National Capacity—A Whole of Government Approach.”

**Bureaucratic Culture.** As James Q. Wilson famously remarked, “Every organization has a culture, that is, a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization.” And while every large organization—public or private—has a set way of doing things, not all of them are equally open to accepting formal doctrine. For the military, doctrine is enshrined in its bureaucratic culture, almost to a fault. As Wilson stated, “Some SOPs (standard operating procedures), such as those that seem central to the mission of the organization, continue to exert an influence even though they are actually getting in the way of producing good outcomes.” He cites the U.S. Army in Vietnam clinging to doctrine better suited for conventional wars in Europe as an example par excellence.

While the military may hold doctrine in the highest regard, the reverse can be said of the State Department, USAID, and other government bureaucracies. While each Government agency has its procedures, none of them is as regimented as the military, and for good reason. These civilian organizations—smaller than any of the individual Armed Forces and not having responsibility for large-scale, highly complex, life-or-death operations—have less of a need for rigid doctrine to ensure they march in the same direction. Moreover, one can argue that the very success of the other agencies’ core missions hinges on a degree of individualism and flexibility—tailoring diplomacy to individuals and development to specific problems and contexts. And as Wilson noted, while government agencies may be willing to change peripheral missions, they will resist tooth-and-nail changes to their “core tasks or altering their organizational culture.”

The story, however, is more complex than simply arguing that civilian government agencies do not “do” doctrine, whereas the military is a slave to it. Indeed, many civilians do read doctrine, perhaps not on esoteric, military-specific subjects, but certainly on hot-button issues such as counterinsurgency. After all, if civilians did not read doctrine, why would a major university press publish FM 3–24? Conversely, few soldiers will follow doctrine by the letter and look for textbook solutions to the answer for any tactical problem. The difference, however, is how civilians, as opposed to their military counterparts, use doctrine—less as a roadmap and more as background information.

This contrast between the civilian and military outlooks can be seen in how the two frame their recommended professional education reading lists. The U.S. Army Chief of Staff’s reading list is intended to facilitate “a deep understanding of the Army and the future of the profession of arms in the 21st Century.” In this context, a comprehensive grasp of doctrine provides the framework for gaining this depth of knowledge of military affairs. While doctrine may not provide the answers to the given problem per se, it does provide the template for a possible solution. By contrast, the aim of the Foreign Service Officer’s reading list...
emphasizes breadth of knowledge, including knowledge of international affairs, economics, and history, but also of American society and culture. While civilians may read doctrine to gain this breadth of knowledge, it will not hold the same central role it does for the military. Doctrine may shape the debate as other references do, but it will not provide the same overarching framework for operations and serve as the same jumping-off point for discussions as it does for the military.

Moreover, military doctrine may provide a different benefit for civilians—a degree of insight into the U.S. military as an organization. Paradoxically, given the guide’s broad-based, intentionally interagency authorship, FM 3–24 might in fact be more useful to civilians than the guide. Though some civilians worked on FM 3–24, there is no denying the manual’s distinctly military tone—from substantive issues such as its focus on “lines of operation,” command structure, and intelligence to its choice of jargon and complicated graphics. Indeed, this is one of the central themes in Samantha Power’s New York Times book review of FM 3–24. Power highlights

By contrast, the very fact that the guide was an interagency product may have decreased its value. As a result of the amalgamation of authors from a variety of agencies, the guide is more of a neutral document, reflecting a brokered consensus rather than a singularly distinct point of view. It therefore cannot serve this double function: while it may be able to inform operations, it cannot provide the same insight into any one institution or even the civilian interagency as a whole as can FM 3–24.

Lessons of the Tale

At the end of the day, the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide has made only lackluster impact on policy. In practically every metric, be it readership, citations, or apparent impact on planning or operations, it has lagged behind its military counterpart, FM 3–24. There are several reasons that help explain the differences in impact on policymaking and planning: some are due to the nature of doctrine itself and the timing of when the guide was released, but much has to do with the nature and culture of the bureaucracies themselves. While the military may be culturally receptive to doctrine, civilian agencies view it in a different light—as just another resource, and oftentimes not crossing between Presidential administrations. For civilian agencies, doctrine provides background information, topics for discussion, and perhaps a window to understanding the military institution. It does not, however, serve as a roadmap or even provide guidance in quite the same way that doctrine does for the military.
Perhaps three major lessons can be gleaned from the fate of the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide:

❖ Doctrine has its limits. First, the limited impact of the guide shows that doctrine has its limits for civilian agencies and is not the magic bullet for institutional change. In fact, doctrine rarely works independent of other factors—a supportive leadership, pressing need, and an accepting organizational culture. The bottom line is just because something is written in a document does not make it gospel truth for civilians, especially in civilian agencies where rigid doctrine is an anomaly.

❖ Interagency authorship does not equal significance or impact on interagency decisionmaking. Although one purpose of broad-based authorship is to stimulate “buy-in” by fellow stakeholders, it does not necessarily translate immediately into a broad-based embrace by the participating agencies. Despite the fact that the guide included many more stakeholder agencies in the drafting process than FM 3–24 and took more than 2 years to build interagency consensus over its verbiage, this has not guaranteed its acceptance within and across the agencies. There are multiple reasons to explain this phenomenon. Those who actually write the doctrine may be separated from their parent agencies’ true decisionmakers, and even if they do have the support of their own agency’s leadership, this may not assure buy-in from other agencies. As a result, the final verbiage often represents considerable
compromise and possibly the "lowest common denominator"—less a true consensus and more an aggregate of concessions.

❖ More guidance is not always more value added. Paradoxically, the success of FM 3–24 and the relative lack thereof for the guide can be viewed as a sign of successful interagency cooperation. After all, it shows that people will read whatever is useful, even if their agency is not officially a cosponsor. If this is the case, it should at least raise an important question: Are the benefits of coauthorship worth the cost in time and resources? The guide, after all, took over 2 years and countless man-hours to produce with little real change to show for it in the end. Might it not have been more effective to simply push for State Department and USAID employees to read the military’s FM 3–24 and conversely, to have military officers read State and USAID literature on diplomacy and development, rather than to create specifically joint doctrine? Anecdotal evidence indicates that at least some civilians already do this independently. Thus, it might be more cost effective to encourage this trend rather than duplicate the effort and produce specifically interagency guidance. In an era of resource-strapped bureaucracies, the question is at least worth posing.

In some ways, this tale of two manuals tells a larger story than just an attempt to improve interagency counterinsurgency efforts. It is a story of bureaucratic culture, institutional change, and limits of mandating change from the top down. Most important, it teaches a basic lesson: if the future of complex operations rests on a whole-of-government approach, the path to this endpoint may not be through whole-of-government manuals.

Notes


2 For example, the preface of the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide is written by State Department Counselor Eliot Cohen, who also was one of the authors of FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency. Similarly, counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen, one of General Petraeus’s advisors for the surge in Iraq, is identified as one of the leading contributors to the guide.

3 For one account of Vietnam-era attempts at population-centric counterinsurgency, see Bing West, The Village (New York: Pocket Books, 1972).


7 Nagl, “Constructing,” 118.

These agencies were USAID; the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, Homeland Security, Transportation, and Agriculture; and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.


For references of the interim report, see Daniel Roper, “Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War,” Parameters 38 (Autumn 2008). It was also mentioned on the popular online Small Wars Journal and the Council on Foreign Relations blogs.


As of June 28, 2010, a softcover copy was still available for purchase on Amazon.com.


A Google search for “counterinsurgency guide” and “download” produced no results, nor did any secondary source articles reference these statistics either.

Other formal guidance documents were similarly rarely utilized. The State Department’s Office of Provincial Affairs Planning and Assessment Guide, for example, was used only by 20 percent of those surveyed. “Preliminary Survey Results: U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq,” Center for Complex Operations, April 6, 2010. Unpublished.


By contrast, a Google search on June 18, 2010 (which would include less formal publications) for the “U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide” and “FM 3–24 Counterinsurgency” yielded 1,180 results for the former and 105,000 for the latter—a factor of 100 times the number.

For example, see “‘Big Ideas’ Key to US Surge Success in Iraq: Petraeus,” Agence France-Presse, May 6, 2010, available at <www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j-hgypUT8z0SQ58ZUvQvjsDhIwQQ>.


Interview with a USAID employee currently posted to Baghdad, June 30, 2010.

Ibid.

Interview with a Department of State employee, Washington, DC, July 14, 2010.


Ibid.


32 Taken from an anonymous respondent in a Center for Complex Operations–sponsored survey of Provincial Reconstruction Team members, conducted in winter 2010.


36 Ibid., 164.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid., 225.


41 Power.
Post-9/11 Stability Operations

How U.S. Army Doctrine Is Shaping National Security Strategy

BY CORRI ZOLI AND NICHOLAS J. ARMSTRONG

We recognize that in a contemporary operational environment in the 21st century, conventional military operations, offensive and defensive, will be conducted simultaneously with stability operations. Our hope is that [Field Manual] 3–07 [Stability Operations] becomes a source document not just for the military and agencies within our government, but also nongovernmental agencies with whom we routinely work.

—General William S. Wallace, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

It was only a matter of time before the elevated language of post-9/11 security discourse, and the phrase the global war on terrorism itself, was bound to reap both practical applications and studied reversals.1 Without the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan and each country’s challenging reconstruction projects, one might expect idealist solutions to this historical juncture.2 Only 8 short years ago, the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS 2002) offered just that, the virtues of pressing for freedom and democracy against a new breed of post–Cold War threats.3 In now memorable

Dr. Corri Zoli and Nicholas J. Armstrong are Research Fellows and Project Directors in the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism at Syracuse University.
military theorists have moved beyond 9/11 thinking to the belief that U.S. forces and particularly the Army must achieve not only military victories but also peace in postconflict settings.

Yet from a similar appraisal of this era, defined by the idealism of the 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategy policy documents, the newly released Field Manual (FM) 3–07, Stability Operations, adopts a very different tone and comes to very different conclusions. Briefly, stability operations is defined as the military support role for “broader governmental efforts” that include “various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.” Most notably, the new field manual (along with FM 3–0, Operations, and FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency) adopts the unprecedented policy position that nationbuilding missions will equal conventional warfare responsibilities, which means, as Lieutenant General William Caldwell concludes in his prefatory remarks to Stability Operations, “we must strengthen the capacity of the other elements of national power, leveraging the full potential of our interagency partners” since military success “alone will not be sufficient to prevail.” Thus, in a critical move that has gone largely unnoticed among various government and policy communities, this manual puts stability operations into doctrine after its importance was recently elevated on a par with offensive and defensive operations (see FM 3–0, Operations, 2001, and Department of Defense [DOD] Directive 3000.05, November 2005). In fact, this document may very well be unique among military doctrinal efforts to explicitly bridge the gap between traditionally separated realms of security strategy, development, and humanitarian arenas and to build an integrated initiative that gives shape to new U.S. foreign policy priorities on the horizon. In these ways, this field manual’s security analysis is decidedly complex, interdisciplinary, and, most interesting, not military-centric.

In this article, we attempt to capture this shift in tone and approach as articulated by the new field manual—one that amounts to new military doctrine with implications for shaping a still unsettled post-9/11 U.S. national security strategy. To do this, we analyze several key features of Stability Operations as contributing to an emerging sea change in security policy in light of lessons learned in two increasingly related areas: postconflict reconstruction and a critically reflexive
moment in U.S. national security policy defined by the influence of soft power in doctrinal and strategic planning.10 We describe, for instance, the changing nature of operational environments through the eyes of this document; the civilian tasks deemed necessary in new conflict environments; the changing role of the military and its new areas of responsibilities; and emergent practices in the evolution of postconflict reconstruction military paradigms. At the core, we see a major departure from 9/11-era security strategy (in NSS 2002 and NSS 2006, among other documents) in this manual as a function of perspective—a whole-of-government approach informed by both a war-based and a postconflict vantage point.11 We also see, as a product of this changed perspective, an increasing convergence of mission in U.S. national and international security policy objectives and in interventions more broadly, evident in the 2010 NSS. Most significantly, we frame Stability Operations as a document pervaded by a self-reflective process in which a military institution, in this case the U.S. Army, is in the act of reimagining itself to play a different role in international security and, consequently, adapting to a transforming identity.

The Changing Shape of Military Intervention

In framing this document, it is essential to begin with several ironies in expectations, most obviously that the military can and should spearhead tasks that assume, as mentioned, “military success alone will not be sufficient to prevail” in present complex environments. The impetus for this shift indicates how far military theorists have moved beyond 9/11 thinking to a new strategic orientation, namely, the belief that U.S. forces and particularly the Army must achieve not only military victories but also peace in postconflict settings. Such an orientation now includes, first and foremost,
charging the Armed Forces with “strengthening the capacity of the other elements of national power” and “leveraging the full potential of our interagency partners,” including working “with and through” the community of nations “to defeat insurgency, assist fragile states,” and “provide vital humanitarian aid to the suffering.”

This core “comprehensive approach” to stability operations, which integrates “the tools of statecraft with our military forces, international partners, humanitarian organizations, and the private sector,” is the distinctive contribution of this field manual. Without delving too deeply into U.S. civil-military relations, this changing comprehensive role of the Armed Forces also raises serious questions of whether our expectations about the military are an indicator of a reasoned approach to a changing security environment or symptomatic of institutional vacuums in our Federal system, leaving the military a role that no other agency can or will address.

Aside from an aggrandized view of the ability of DOD to influence other government branches, agencies, and non-U.S. political and nongovernmental actors, such efforts also imply a second, potentially flawed expectation: notions of victory discordant with feasible military objectives and a new role for the Armed Forces arguably incompatible with the nature of its missions. In today’s security climate, as Caldwell notes, “victory” itself must “assume new dimensions,” and we must “strengthen our ability to generate ‘soft’ power to promote participation in government, spur economic development, and address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world”—a recognition that winning wars in new ways creates conditions for peace. This enlarged view of victory acknowledges present “uncertainty and persistent conflict,” backed up by contemporary conflict data, where “the lines separating war and peace, enemy and friend” are blurred and where “drivers of conflict and instability” combine “with rapid cultural, social, and technological change.” This view also assumes a complex global security climate, one in which military success “alone will not be sufficient to prevail.” Part of this shift in thinking stems from redefining the nature of the threat: failed states have replaced “ideological causes” (of NSS 2002 and 2006) as the “greatest threat” to national security and the focus has shifted to governments “unable or unwilling to provide for the most basic needs of their people,” thus breeding crime, terrorism, and cultural (religious, ethnic) strife from “ambitious powers.”

Yet to imagine the Armed Forces as not only capable of but also deft at deploying soft power would seem to stretch even the innovative concepts of Stability Operations too far.

There is undoubtedly a role for the military in postconflict reconstruction, as well as a vital need now for a stability-oriented comprehensive approach and unity of effort among various players—approaches that we describe in detail below. Likewise, the emphasis on postconflict reconstruction reflects a broader sea change toward interagency initiatives in the Federal Government, particularly among foreign policy agencies and communities. The following initiatives and their metrics give some indication of the focused energy that such collaborative efforts are garnering, including the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator.
for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), its helpful Post Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix (2005), the Joint Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Association of the United States Army’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework (2002). But only the military, as Caldwell attests, has developed a detailed “how to” manual, new matrices, and best practices for the colossal interdisciplinary nature of these reconstruction efforts—ones that, given the major stability operations under way in Afghanistan and Iraq, are testing even U.S. military resolve. In this respect, the changing approach of Stability Operations is a moment of reflection and course-correction not only based on reasessing root causes of conflict and instability, but also gleaned from a pragmatic culling of experientially based insights for the purposes of strategic practice.21

It also must be said, however, that renewed interest today within the defense community regarding postconflict operations is also revitalizing an older available role that the U.S. military has played historically in conflict settings. “Contrary to popular belief,” as Stability Operations begins, “the military history of the United States is one characterized by stability operations, interrupted by distinct episodes of major combat of the United States.”22 In its short history, the manual authors are quick to note that the United States has actually fought few conventional wars (the American Revolution, arguably Operation Iraqi Freedom), the typical wars “for which the military traditionally prepared,” whereas it has conducted hundreds of military operations that we now would categorize as stability operations.23 The stability stance underlying the new field manual, then, draws upon an enduring role that U.S. forces have played in conflict settings to ensure “the safety and security of the local populace, assisting with reconstruction, and providing basic sustenance and public services.”24 But the manual also goes significantly further in derogating its own role to one of support of civilian agencies responsible for leading postreconstruction initiatives—an unusual formulation of the military’s role that we take up in the last section of this article.

Thus, one additional irony of expectations evident in Stability Operations emerges as the authors try to think well beyond Afghanistan and Iraq about “America’s future abroad,” one “unlikely to resemble” today’s conflicts, as Caldwell notes, “where we grapple with the burden of nation-building under fire.”25 In keeping with the de-centering of the traditional military role and mission, Stability Operations imagines a strategic future defined by collaborative and multilateral efforts that take on, at once, counterinsurgency, state vulnerability and failure, humanitarian aid, and development.26 If this distinctive comprehensive approach integrates military and statecraft instruments, while developing international, humanitarian, development, and private sector partnerships,27 the field manual is also defined at a less tangible level by “humility,” as Michèle Flournoy and Shawn Brimley astutely declare in their foreword to the University of Michigan Press edition. Flournoy and Brimley note that the manual accepts that “U.S. combat power alone cannot, in the end, produce lasting political change and enduring stability.”28 In many respects, such a sentiment attests to the evolving nature of armed conflict today as well as the trial-by-fire role the United States has played over the last two decades in its involvement in seven major postconflict reconstruction and stabilization operations (Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Liberia, Afghanistan, and Iraq) with varying results. But it also attests to a change in posture on the part of the military with respect to the traditional objectives of security.
Postconflict Reconstruction and Redefining the Role of Security

Today’s renewed interest in postconflict reconstruction is defined by five insights established by scholars and practitioners in the field to describe the evolution of armed conflict and its response. First, most post–Cold War conflicts are no longer conventional interstate wars but intrastate low-intensity conflicts in which security objectives are inseparable from multipronged stability and reconstruction missions. Second, the root causes of conflict have shifted from power struggles between states to the impacts of fragile or failing states on societies and regions. These conflicts then become at once humanitarian crises and national and international security concerns, as new kinds of actors and networks (insurgent, terrorist, organized crime) vie for power and increase regional anarchy. Third, governments and multilateral institutions that once avoided nationbuilding are now extending their institutional capacities into this area at the military and civilian levels, including refining intellectual models and frameworks for such missions. Fourth, there is broad realization of the complex and necessary interagency nature of stability and reconstruction projects, defined by what some term the four functions or pillars of reconstruction: security/public safety, justice/reconciliation, governance/public participation, and economic/social progress. It is important to note, however, that while there is broad recognition of the complexity of today’s conflicts and the multiple sectors necessary for their amelioration, well-worn paths for success are less than forthcoming. Fifth, states and multilateral institutions are devoting increasing percentages of their aid budgets to stabilization, peace, and postconflict efforts: a 1998 World Bank study, for instance, showed that its lending to postconflict societies increased by 800 percent since 1980 and that postconflict assistance is between 20 and 25 percent of total current lending (the World Bank lent $18.5 billion in 2003).

If a core tension in the changing conflict environment is the nature of the role the military is poised to play, then a further complexity is the status of security in the formula for postconflict success—an issue that often involves transitioning from conflict to postconflict functions. At the heart of this issue is the relative decrease in military authority and expertise in postconflict settings and the increasing importance, even aggrandizement, of security as a priority in practice, even by nontraditional agents and actors. In one view among the many academic and policy discussions of the various pillars of stability operations in the postconflict literature, the security element is simply equated with other tasks and functions. Yet, as Scott Fiel has importantly argued, conflict and postconflict situations have “by definition at their core” a “significant security vacuum that is often the proximate cause for external intervention.” As Fiel notes, if regional or domestic security forces and institutions could provide security, or if their security processes were compliant with current and accepted norms (eschewing corruption), there would be little need for military intervention in the first place. In fact, Fiel argues that the “absence of physical human security” is what “differentiates postconflict interventions” from those efforts “conducted solely for humanitarian reasons” (for example, natural disasters)—though, obviously, postconflict environments have critical humanitarian components.

Postconflict capacity-building in the various sectors of governance, economic progress, and civil and justice institutions, all of which are intertwined, requires security as a fundamental prerequisite for success. The importance of the
“provision of collective and individual security to the citizenry and to the assistors” remains “the foundation on which progress in the other issue areas rests,” Fiel notes. This priority remains evident in ongoing debates, for instance, about the protracted nature of stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, which many experts simply attribute to lack of security—the inability to secure the environment, which then disables other institutions and initiatives from taking firm root. But the security priority is also demonstrated in unexpected ways and by nonmilitary and nonconventional actors in conflict zones. Logistics experts at the World Food Program, for instance, will not place humanitarian personnel on-site if certain security provisions remain unmet because they know from experience that it will not only imperil staff but risk the effectiveness of their initiatives and programs as well. The elemental role of security is also clear in the strategic targets of nonconventional actors. A cornerstone of irregular warfare strategy is to transform civilian spaces, including aid launching areas, into battlefields with high civilian casualties so as to politicize aid and reconstruction along with military efforts, all of which belies identified core pressure points of a society. In this respect, contemplating security in postconflict settings requires nonformulaic and context-specific approaches to a given setting. But it also requires grappling with the tensions between the relative decrease in military authority in these settings and the increasing importance of security, even among nontraditional agents and actors. Recognizing the primary role of security also enables clarification about what constitutes security in conflict and postconflict settings, which may otherwise amount to one of the more politically contentious processes in nationbuilding.

*Stability Operations* addresses not only these critical aspects of postconflict security, but also, in its interagency emphasis, how these priorities rest at the nexus of policy and political tensions, especially involving areas of responsibility. In cases of transitioning a conflict to a postconflict situation involving specialized agencies, for instance, turf wars may result from fights over resources, especially where agency leadership and facilitation are calibrated to budget decisions or broader parameters of authority for planning efforts. An indication of systemic administrative and budgetary challenges of this kind can be seen in the S/CRS, which is designed to take a lead role in coordinating postconflict institutions and personnel-building processes. The location of S/CRS in the State Department not only ensured integration with U.S. foreign policy objectives, but also provided an interagency office to join capabilities across civilian and military worlds and efforts. Coordinator Ambassador Carlos Pascual explained the S/CRS role in 2006, including its limitations: “After the major conflict issues are over, we stand down, and then we have to learn it all over again . . . too often, we not only relearn the positive things, but we also repeat the mistakes” because “we haven’t had the people prepared, trained, and exercised to be able to engage in these activities.” Equally important, budgets for these programs are secured from DOD transfers, according to Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act, including $100 million per year in 2006, 2007, and renewed in 2008. This also included the
Office of the President’s 2009 DOD budget of $200 million to continue support for operations transferred under Section 1207 (in Lebanon, Haiti, Yemen, Colombia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Southeast Asia, and the Trans-Sahara), which integrate security, development, and governance in critical areas where immediate action can tip the balance toward peace. Though political processes, including budget disbursement, have not yet been challenged or changed, the interagency emphasis of the Stability Operations manual represents a critical shift in negotiating agency relations and responsibility before teams arrive in the conflict or postconflict zone.

In the meantime, FM 3–07 serves as a guidebook for Army leadership and officers, a means to collaborate with and assist other U.S. agencies in the brass tacks of postconflict reconstruction, a self-deprecating admission that military involvement is a necessary but insufficient factor for success in postconflict reconstruction, and a concrete instance in the transformation of strategic thought that is shaping, at once, grand strategy and intergovernmental policy.

**Elevating Stability Operations into Strategic Defense Policy**

Stability Operations details the Army’s new approach most directly in its second chapter, which defines stability operations on par with offensive and defensive operations within an overarching “full-spectrum operations” framework. Full-spectrum operations emerged in the 1990s as an inclusive way to envision the range and variable nature of the conflict spectrum and military operations in them (offense, defense, and stability efforts) in post-Cold War conflicts. Prior to this flexible approach, military actions were viewed along three bifurcated categories of operations: offensive (an assault on an enemy position), defensive (blocking an enemy force from a strategic piece of terrain), and deterrent (massing troop formations for strategic posture). Given rapidly changing and insecure conflict and postconflict zones and the increasing use of asymmetric warfare tactics, this linear vision of warfare changed. Full-spectrum operations embrace the “continuous, simultaneous U.S. combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks” through the application of “mutually supporting lethal and nonlethal capabilities of Army forces.”

Unlike bifurcated approaches of the last century, full-spectrum operations accommodate the ways in which the Army anticipates a flexible, changing, and wide-ranging role for its forces, from low-intensity conflicts such as those in Bosnia to more high-intensity combat as in both the Gulf War of 1991 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Moreover, the notion that a military force may conduct a “simultaneous combination” of offensive, defensive, and stabilization tasks captures the essence of full-spectrum operations that are designed to apply all available military resources in a contingent fashion, specific to a given situation, and factoring in echelon, time, and location—all with the understanding that no one single tactic is more important than another. It is the “simultaneous combinations of the elements, constantly adapted to the dynamic conditions of the operational environment” that is “key to successful operations.”

It is important to remember, however, that despite this new, holistic approach to military operations that implicitly values stabilization operations, these endeavors were viewed, until recently, as a marginal category of operations compared to institutionally favored offensive methods employed in traditional high-intensity, conventional warfare. The predecessor to Stability Operations, for instance, published just 1 month before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in February
2003, positioned stability operations as a discrete action alongside offensive, defensive, and civil support operations. In the aftermath of recent experiences, including U.S. and coalition interventions in Iraq, the Army manual makes a deliberate effort to highlight the elevated significance of stability operations and to integrate this operation with existing ones. As Stability Operations points out, “no single element is more important than another” and “simultaneous combinations of the elements, constantly adapted to the dynamic conditions of the operational environment, are key to successful operations.”

Not only does this change incorporate the “state-building under fire” approach that the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have used in Iraq and Afghanistan for the last several years, but it also represents a significant departure from the last Army manual.

Thinking from a full-spectrum operations approach maximizes opportunities in the combat phase to leverage for future stabilization and reconstruction initiatives—the collapse of organized resistance as in the offensive phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, for instance. The traditional hallmarks of combat operations are “speed, surprise, and shock,” where the force that is “better able to leverage these effects defeats its opponent quickly and incurs fewer losses.” Viewed in this light, traditional combat operations can pave the way for stability operations that, in turn, use the “coercive and constructive capabilities of the military force to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority.” In effect, military forces “set the conditions” to “enable the actions of the other instruments of national power to succeed in achieving the broad goals of conflict transformation.” In this process, “providing security and control” not only “stabilizes the area of operations” but also provides “a foundation for transitioning to civilian control and, eventually, to the host nation,” or supports the efforts of a transitional civil or military authority when no legitimate government exists. It is in this role that military forces—when no authorities exist—may also provide for the basic needs of the local populace until a civil authority can provide those services.

The operational “surge” of troops into Iraq under General David Petraeus in 2007 is a useful example for considering the integrated combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations under the full-spectrum concept. In accordance with the new canon, Army units employ a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks weighted appropriately to the nature of the environment in which they operate. In the months leading up to the bombing of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra, Iraq, in February 2006, for instance, U.S. forces had been largely conducting limited offensive operations while focusing mainly on defensive operations (such as protecting polling sites during national elections and securing key infrastructure) and stability operations (training Iraqi security forces, supporting governance, and restoring essential services). However, in the weeks and months following the attack, fierce Shia and Sunni sectarian violence greatly increased the complexity of the existing challenges that were posed by elements of
al Qaeda and Iranian-backed militias operating within Iraq. While this eventually led to a major increase in troop levels, most significant was the changed nature of U.S. operations in relation to the current circumstances. Instead of units conducting mounted patrols in Humvees, based out of large, well-fortified camps (defensive in nature), the new approach involved troops operating semi-permanently within the populace (more offensive in nature). By establishing a lasting presence on the ground, U.S. forces have successfully denied insurgents and sectarian elements the ability to influence the populace.50

The full-spectrum operations approach, thus, adds to—if it does not entirely modify—traditional definitions of offensive and defensive operations or “employing the lethal effects of combat power against an enemy force.”51 If offensive operations are “the most direct and sure means of seizing, retaining, and exploiting” the tone and pace of combat in a campaign, and if they “compel the enemy to react,” thereby exposing “weaknesses that the attacking force can then exploit,” the full-spectrum approach deals with the gaps in offense, when offensive moves cannot deal effectively with an “adaptive enemy.”52 The same is true in defensive operations. While these are traditionally designed to “counter the offensive actions of enemy or adversary forces, destroying as much of the attacking enemy as possible,” defensive moves can also be used strategically “to preserve control over land, resources, and populations, retain terrain, guard populations, and protect critical capabilities and resources, or even gain time through economy of force so offensive and stability tasks can be executed elsewhere.”53

Stabilization operations thus exemplify the full-spectrum concept, as these missions typically demand a mix of humanitarian development, offensive counterinsurgency efforts, and defensive protection of civilians and key infrastructure. Two concepts—reconstruction and stabilization—comprise the emphasis of these operations. Reconstruction, as the new field manual notes, is “the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socioeconomic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for long-term development.”54 Stabilization is “the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful long-term development.”55 Stability operations are thus a distinctive contemporary form of military operational response that embody, at once, the contingent, full-spectrum approach to conflict and the recognition, as mentioned, that military measures are insufficient to stabilize conflict and postconflict societies. Moreover, this integrated thinking at the operations phase has an impact on the overall posture of the U.S. Armed Forces that has “shifted from direct military action towards new capabilities to shape the security environment in ways that obviate the need for military intervention in the future,” as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates notes, including the “need to work with and through local governments to avoid the next insurgency, to rescue the next failing state, or to head off the next humanitarian disaster.”56

A similar operational shift to full-spectrum approaches and stability and reconstruction efforts is currently occurring in Afghanistan. Such a shift was initially evident in the Secretary’s analysis of strategic limits in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee: “It is also clear that we have not had enough troops to provide a baseline level of security in some of the most dangerous areas—a vacuum that increasingly has been filled by the
Taliban.” To date, President Barack Obama has increased both troop levels and the number of State Department civilians in Afghanistan. Both Generals Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus, likewise, integrated these approaches to counterinsurgency strategy, prioritizing the protection of civilians and soft power initiatives of winning hearts and minds above offensive operations, as the situation requires. Yet while the troop increase and these innovative methods are designed to turn around a deteriorating security situation, the civil-military imbalance in stabilization operations remains clear.

**Role Ambiguity: Civil-military Relations in Stability Operations**

If the long-established normative approach to civil-military relations in the United States is one of calculated separation, the new field manual implies practical and logistical overlap in tasks and responsibilities. Following its clarification of the military’s supporting role to S/CRS and its essential tasks for postconflict reconstruction, Stability Operations describes the many responsibilities that the military would assume in stabilization missions. According to the manual, the Army views its stabilization responsibilities in three categories: tasks for which military forces retain primary responsibility, tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations likely retain responsibility but military forces are prepared to execute, and tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations retain primary responsibility. Generally speaking, the military mindset typically errs on the side of caution by overestimating the threat or task at hand due to the unacceptable security consequences of a miscalculation. This should give indication that the U.S. Army will continue to think conservatively as an organization by preparing to carry the bulk of responsibility in stability operations, if necessary.

Stability Operations describes at some length what military forces do to properly execute these tasks, yet it only addresses the first two, those “essential tasks for which military forces retain primary responsibility” or “must be prepared to execute.” Tasks with a security component, such as enforcing ceasefires, disarming belligerents, and training host-nation security forces, fall into the first category where the military has the highest expectation of responsibility, whereas tasks such as providing support and resources to restore essential services, assisting in local governance support, or implementing public works projects for economic development are often shared civil-military responsibilities.

The absence of a discussion on how shared civilian and military responsibilities will be resolved over time leaves behind a grey area in interagency expectations on the ground. To an extent, this ambiguity allows a degree of flexibility for military commanders and civilian leaders to organize themselves in a manner appropriate to the situation. In fact, this flexibility is critical given the need to achieve tangible results quickly in postconflict environments. Organizational constraints and unnecessary layers of interagency bureaucracy can often hinder progress and perhaps become counterproductive, potentially leading to increased host-nation grievances and greater instability.

However, this grey area of shared responsibility between U.S. military and civilian
agencies drives to the heart of the ongoing debate: the appropriateness of the military role in conducting tasks for which civilians are better suited or prepared to execute and calls for additional civilian capabilities to perform nationbuilding tasks. Surely, some tasks such as humanitarian assistance and medical treatment would be carried out by the military exclusively at the outset of any intervention. While the new field manual stresses the importance of transferring responsibilities from military forces to host-nation forces or government agencies, it remains unclear as to if, how, or when responsibilities will transfer from military forces to U.S. Government civilian agencies or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the interim. At the very least, an acknowledgment in Stability Operations of the organization responsible (most likely S/CRS) for deciding the transfer of stability responsibilities between military and civilian agencies would be beneficial in providing better clarity, accountability, and planning guidance. A solution to this problem might entail the development of a “sliding-scale” guide by S/CRS, for instance, outlining the transfer of responsibilities from military to civilian as key objectives are met and as intergovernmental capacities allow. Such a planning tool would provide direction, clarify roles, and retain the necessary flexibility for responsive adaptation to conditions on the ground.

Nonetheless, this issue holds the potential for principal-agent challenges and tensions between the Departments of State and Defense, compounded by a current and contentious funding mechanism for foreign assistance in stabilization efforts in failed or failing states. Such a mechanism, as mentioned, allows DOD authority to transfer funds to State for postconflict reconstruction activities. Undoubtedly, this is a short-term solution to the larger administrative challenge of finding an appropriate allocation of resources between them. Transforming two major U.S. agencies while conducting two decisive yet very different stabilization missions overseas is no easy task. Even so, DOD currently possesses the greater share of human and physical capital to sustain ongoing stabilization operations, despite the fact that State is the more appropriate institution for certain functions of state-building. While the transfer authority is necessary to maintain support for an underresourced S/CRS and sustain current missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, this is an inappropriate funding mechanism that is surely not in line with the spirit of a whole-of-government approach to postconflict reconstruction. Simply put, if S/CRS is statutorily responsible for coordinating the interagency efforts in stability operations, it should control the funding stream for these missions, not DOD.

**Unity of Effort: Extending the Concept Beyond the U.S. Government**

Coordination of postconflict reconstruction efforts across the U.S. Government is arguably more problematic than any individual postconflict reconstruction task. While the Departments of Defense and State play significant roles in stabilization operations, other agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development and Department of Justice emerge as key players as conditions improve, along with a myriad of NGOs and international partners. The Clinton, Bush, and now the Obama administrations have clearly struggled with finding an appropriate solution to interagency coordination, reflected in the sundry organizational models implemented between the country team model of an ambassador and military commander (for example, two chains of authority) in the Balkans and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. This
ongoing challenge ultimately led to the creation of the S/CRS to function as the lead coordinator of all U.S. Government efforts in stability operations, including those of DOD.

The new Stability Operations emphasizes explaining the concept of unity of effort between the military and other U.S. Government civilian agencies. This runs counter to well-established theoretical propositions on civil-military integration claiming that: (1) “military doctrines tend to be poorly integrated with the political aspects of grand strategy” in order to reduce uncertainties of combat and increase independence from civilian authority, and (2) “civilians and soldiers tend to know too little about each other’s affairs” due to functional specialization. But in fact, the manual explicitly names S/CRS as the lead coordinator of all U.S. Government efforts in stability operations and emphasizes its central role in the interagency effort throughout the document. Since its inception in 2004, S/CRS has focused its efforts on developing interagency planning mechanisms and essential tasks to ensure unity of effort.

One benefit of this strong emphasis is the clarification of military goals as they fit within the more broadly defined interagency goals and ultimately the national security strategy. Stability Operations, in fact, devotes an entire chapter to explaining the interagency planning mechanisms, the military’s role within the S/CRS planning framework, and the essential post-conflict reconstruction tasks aligned along the five stability sectors: security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian and social well-being, governance and participation, and economic stabilization and infrastructure. Impressively, it provides in-depth explanation of the five stability sectors and associated military tasks, including useful descriptions of what each sector entails and demands, the appropriate role of the military operating in these sectors, and why each is important to achieving the desired endstate. At least on paper, the contents of this new field manual provide clear evidence of increased civil-military integration and motivation of Soldiers and U.S. Government civilians toward a mutual understanding of roles in a rapidly changing security environment.

But while this document is indicative of government-wide institutional learning from several hard-fought campaigns, it falls short in recognizing that today’s security environment requires a unity of effort on an international level as well. History suggests that multilateral, coalition-style efforts are more likely to succeed in the long run when they are viewed as legitimate by the host nation and throughout the international community. In this respect, unity of effort is paramount to an effective U.S. stability operations campaign. Thus, unity is needed not only at the national level, but also at the international level, as explained by Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart in their emphasis on the importance of collective power in Fixing Failed States. The “need for effective, dynamic international organizations” comprised of multidisciplinary specialists from the security, developmental, and political domains is critical, not the least because such international teams “play an invaluable role in bringing focus and unity to the task.”

Equally important is an understanding of how the U.S. Government will integrate its efforts into a multilateral operation. DOD and State have well-established relationships with their military and diplomatic counterparts,
as represented in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan, and the former Multi-National Forces–Iraq headquarters. While all missions are unique and require nuanced approaches to achieve success, surely there are some common principles to ensure unity of effort among international partners. Stability Operations provides less than two pages of description of its relationship with the United Nations (UN) and NATO in Annex A. Unfortunately, these sections amount to little more than a courtesy note that coordination with the UN remains within the State Department and the U.S. military might work with or under the umbrella of either organization. It offers little substantive description of key military relationships or multilateral planning processes.

A useful starting point for integrating the international component of stability and reconstruction operations into U.S. philosophy is NATO’s Comprehensive Approach. Analogous to unity of effort, the Comprehensive Approach is NATO’s attempt at an international doctrine for responding to conflict. Aimed at promoting cooperation and coordination across the international community, “it is a way of thinking and a tool that can be applied to all phases of conflict, to all the actors involved and at all operational levels.” While NATO is a military alliance lacking the full civilian capacities necessary for effective stabilization operations, the Comprehensive Approach recognizes this need, and NATO has made steady progress in its development, although more is needed in establishing the necessary partnerships with the UN, European Union, and NGOs in order for it to be adequately comprehensive.

Perhaps beyond the scope of Stability Operations, as a U.S. Army document, the publication of a formal document by S/CRS to clarify the U.S. role within the broader international Comprehensive Approach is necessary. Although NATO is the organization expending the greatest effort toward its development, fundamentally, the Comprehensive Approach is a concept for the international community—NATO plays one role out of many others within the larger global framework. With S/CRS holding sole custody of coordinating U.S. stabilization efforts, it is the most appropriate organization to draft such a document. A clearer policy on the U.S. role in multilateral stabilization operations would help to establish commonly understood planning concepts and capacities, serve the U.S. interagency in better shaping department-level policies much like Stability Operations, and strengthen the overall legitimacy of current and future conflict interventions. Expanding the unity of effort concept to the international level will remain a long-term objective for governments and NGOs alike for the foreseeable future. In this light, the U.S. focus must remain on resolving interagency roles and responsibilities in stabilization operations.

Conclusion

To date, Stability Operations is the most comprehensive public document that codifies collaborative concepts into U.S. defense and interagency policy. This fact suggests that through this publication the Army may influence and shape other U.S. Government institutions with respect to security policy and that
the Army is out in front of its intergovernmental partners in leading a major philosophical shift to stabilization and postconflict reconstruction operations—a measure of influence in the wider push toward unity of effort that is clearly evident in the 2010 National Security Strategy.77

In any case, as the security environment remains dominated by asymmetric threats originating in failed or failing states, stabilization operations will remain the dominant mode of civil-military and interagency operations for the foreseeable future. This newest field manual represents a clear sign of how the Army has transformed its mindset toward current and future military operations by stressing concepts such as the whole-of-government approach, unity of effort, and the roles and responsibilities between military and civilian agencies. In doing so, the manual reflects an agency that understands its critical yet insufficient ability to ensure success in a postconflict environment. In fact, it is important to realize that part of this revisioning of role is based on a core recognition on the part of the Army in relation to new battlefields: its own eclipse. This humility that Flournoy and Brimley describe emerges from a sober reckoning with a new “fog of war”—the inescapable fact that warfare at the operational level remains an unpredictable endeavor, an “immutably human affair,” replete with human frailties and errors, especially given the challenging conflict environments of Iraq and Afghanistan. But this self-critical stance that the military mission is only part of the solution, a significant but not exclusive player in new conflicts that cannot be ameliorated without partners, also emerges from a conceptual fog of war at the policy level in light of the shocks to the international
system over the last decade, including 9/11, which have resulted in efforts to rethink national and international security. In the midst of such reflective moments, an organization might simply reproduce outmoded doctrine or downplay the fact that many are bereft of solutions in a changing world. Stability Operations, by contrast, shows a conceptual agility in adapting its core assumptions, and an ability to rethink the complex continuum of conflict itself. In this respect, Field Manual 3–07 represents a significant departure from the Army field manual genre with its acknowledgment of the degree to which national and international security efforts will no longer be military-defense institutional endeavors alone. Such thinking will fundamentally expand the meaning of security to include such priorities as reconstruction, stability, and ultimately peace.

While Stability Operations represents a significant development in U.S. security policy, two issues remain: the appropriate mix of responsibilities assumed by military and civilian agencies in stabilization and reconstruction operations, and the extent to which the United States can partner with allies to create an international unity of effort. While these matters must be addressed in the National Security Council, a more robust force of civil servants, particularly in the Foreign Service Officer corps, would serve to build greater capacity for the civilian assumption of responsibility in stability operations.

Notes


2 Consider Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell’s prefatory remarks to the new Field Manual (FM) 3–07, Stability Operations, released October 6, 2008, which characterizes the post-9/11 security climate as an epic struggle against new adversaries:

Since the terrorist attacks on the American people seven years ago, we have been engaged in an epic struggle unlike any other in our history. This struggle, what may be the defining ideological conflict of the 21st century, is marked by the rising threat of a violent extremist movement that seeks to create anarchy and instability throughout the international system. Within this system, we also face emerging nations discontented with the status quo, flush with wealth and ambition, and seeking a new global balance of power.


The directive further stressed that stability operations were likely more important to the lasting success of military operations than traditional combat operations. Thus, the directive elevated stability operations to a status equal to that of the offense and defense. That fundamental change in emphasis sets the foundation for this doctrine (vi). See also Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, September 16, 2009, available at <www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf>.


11 Such a contrast in viewpoints is evident in the opening lines of NSS 2006 in which President George W. Bush began his discussion of policy with: “My fellow Americans, America is at war.”

12 Caldwell, foreword, FM 3–07.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.


19 Caldwell, foreword, FM 3–07.


21 The entree of stabilization operations into the sphere of military doctrine indicates the Army’s realization that troubled and failing states, as well as global hotspots and ungoverned spaces, threaten U.S. national security and fuel transnational grassroots extremists in ways that will aid international instability.
22 FM 3–07, 1–1.
23 Ibid.
24 Caldwell, foreword, FM 3–07.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
30 In fact, certain accounts defend this equalizing move by appeal to democratic procedural precepts of transparency and accountability, arguing that without such a constraint, the military component would take over reconstruction efforts. One problem with this view is that it conflates priorities in the post-conflict setting with prescribing government roles, as well as deferring inquiry into practice-based analysis of the security dimension in transitioning from conflict to postconflict settings. Scott Fiel (see note 31) defines security as comprising “all aspects of public safety,” including those institutions that enable “the development of legitimate and stable security institutions.” He likewise groups postconflict security aims into two core functions or tasks: (1) the “provision of collective and individual security to the citizenry and to the assistants,” especially from “immediate and large-scale violence,” and (2) “restoring the state’s ability to maintain territorial integrity.” After such security tasks as controlling belligerents, establishing territorial security, and the general protection of the populace are achieved, several cluster areas are identified to achieve minimal security in light of these twin functional objectives: (a) protection of key individuals, infrastructure, and institutions; (b) reform of indigenous security institutions; and (c) regional security.
32 Ibid., 98.
33 Ibid.
35 Participating agencies may be prompted to declare larger roles for their organizations, for instance, instead of recognizing the pivotal role of security in stabilizing a region.
36 The S/CRS mandate to “lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity” for postconflict situations, and to “help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife” toward sustainable peace also recognized that “struggling states” are “the greatest national and international security challenges of our day” as potential “breeding grounds for terrorism, crime, trafficking, and humanitarian catastrophes” that can destabilize an entire region.

37 David H. Gurney and Merrick E. Krause, “An Interview with Carlos Pascual,” Joint Force Quarterly 42 (3rd Quarter, 2006), 80–85. Ambassador Pascual previously served as Director of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.


39 Militaries have traditionally marginalized these missions in favor of preparing for and executing more conventional methods of warfare, but since the end of the Cold War, irregular and asymmetric conflict, humanitarian crises, and the lessons learned from past failures have exposed this strategic gap.

40 The term military operations other than war (MOOTW), which emerged in the 1990s, predates contemporary stability operations. MOOTW is not to be confused with full-spectrum operations, which is a distinct concept that describes the full range of possible operations that might be employed sequentially or in combination within a broader stabilization mission.

41 FM 3–07, 2–1.

42 Ibid.


44 FM 3–07, 2–1.

45 See FM 3–0 for a full description of on the concept of full-spectrum operations.

46 FM 3–07, 2–2.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 See also FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, December 2006), 1–19. This operational shift is also consistent with the Army’s latest counterinsurgency manual, whose development and publication (led by General Petraeus at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College) occurred throughout the contested political debate over the troop surge authorization. Counterinsurgency is a specific subset of warfare that employs a unique combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations based on the situation and mission.

51 FM 3–07, 2–2.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid., 2–2.

54 Ibid., 2–1.

55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
59 FM 3–07, 3–2.
61 FM 3–07, 3–2.
65 FM 3–07, 2–5.
68 Ibid., 2–9—2–12.
69 Fukuyama, 238.
71 Ibid., 225–226.
74 Ibid., 3.
75 The U.S. State Department has announced that it is in the process of producing a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review modeled on the Armed Forces document to provide a “blueprint for our diplomatic and development efforts . . . [to] guide U.S. to agile, responsive, and effective institutions of diplomacy and development, including how to transition from approaches no longer commensurate with current challenges.” See “The Department of State’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review,” Washington, DC, July 10, 2009, available at <www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/125956.htm>.
76 Ibid., 12.
Building Police Capacity in Afghanistan

The Challenges of a Multilateral Approach

BY WILLIAM B. CALDWELL IV AND NATHAN K. FINNEY

To lead an untrained people to war is to throw them away.
—Confucius

An effective police force is critical to achieving Afghan aspirations for stability and U.S. strategic objectives in Afghanistan. As the most visible representation of the government in towns and villages across the country, police capacity must be the highest priority of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and international community. When a sufficient and sustainable Afghan National Police (ANP) is built and employed, it will help assure the people that the GIRoA is committed to their security and prosperity, serving as a shield to protect them from malign actors and insurgent forces. The acquisition of this legitimacy is the primary objective that will help defeat the insurgency and bring enduring peace and stability to Afghanistan.

From the Bonn Agreement in 2001 to today, at least seven non-Afghan organizations have been created by the international community to support the reconstruction of a police force. The lack of unity of effort among these organizations created obstacles to developing this necessary force. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission–Afghanistan (NTM–A) was activated in November 2009 to overcome this lack of unity of effort, as well as attempt to bring greater coherence to the generation, development, training, and sustainment efforts for the ANP. Since its establishment, NTM–A has embarked on a new approach that includes greater synchronization of efforts with partner nations and organizations. To prosecute the new approach, NTM–A formed C3 relationships—not command, control, and communications—but cooperation, collaboration, and coordination with all of these organizations.

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, USA, is Commanding General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission–Afghanistan. Captain Nathan K. Finney, USA, is a Strategist serving with the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan.
How We Got Here

With the conclusion of the Bonn Agreement following the fall of the Taliban, the division of security sector reform took a lead-nation approach (see figure 1). The approach laid out five tasks that all lead nations were to strive for:

❖ make security forces effective
❖ improve management of security expenditures
❖ demobilize and reintegrate unneeded security personnel
❖ replace the military with police security
❖ remove military members from political roles.¹

Given decades of police association between Afghanistan and Germany, the Afghan Interim Authority created in Bonn requested that Germany take charge of police reform. Following Bonn, Germany pledged 10 million euros for renovation of the police academy, reconstruction of police stations in Kabul, provision of police vehicles, training instructors, and help with police reorganization and coordination of donor activities.² This would prove to be a significant task, as any centralized police forces that existed during the Afghan civil war of the 1990s were disbanded by the Taliban. During those years, there were no centralized government police forces.³ While professionalizing the nascent Afghan army was fairly straightforward, the process was not as easy with the police forces. Their bad habits had become ingrained, and corruption was endemic.⁴

Following Bonn, the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1401 established the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to assist in leading international efforts to rebuild the country, including the police. Additionally, the UN Development Program (UNDP) created the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) to channel multilateral aid to the police. The fund’s objectives were to finance the salaries of the police, which the Afghan government could not, procure nonlethal equipment, rehabilitate police facilities, train police, and strengthen law enforcement capacity across the country.⁵ UNDP, through UNAMA, is the UN LOTFA fund manager.⁶ Decisions on which programs to fund are made through a committee of all donor nations.

When it became clear that the lack of cooperative agreements among the lead nations as to the scope of their efforts and willingness to cooperate was not creating a sufficient police force to counter increasing threats by the Taliban and other insurgent groups, the international community searched for other donors capable of taking on this difficult task.⁷ Of particular concern, as one witness characterized it, was Germany’s narrow training-focused vision of how it was going to reform the police, as well as the few personnel and resources committed to the endeavor.⁸

In response, the U.S. Government gave the Department of Defense the responsibility to support police reform efforts already instituted under a contract managed by the Department of State.⁹ This was facilitated initially through the Office of Military
When it began training police as well as military forces, this organization was renamed the Office of Security Cooperation–Afghanistan and finally the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, which began developing programs, in conjunction with German police representatives, to reconstruct and reform the ANP. To complement this effort, the European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL) was created in 2007 to develop and coordinate broader European national efforts to support police reform in Afghanistan. This built on the efforts of the German Police Project Office and other international actions in the field of policing and the establishment of the rule of law.

Also in 2007, the Afghan government, the United States, United Nations, and European Union created the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB). It functions to coordinate efforts of all countries contributing to reforming the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the ANP. The IPCB meets monthly and is chaired by the Afghan Minister of Interior. It is supported by a secretariat with representatives from all contributors to the police development effort.10

Since 2001, various countries have developed bilateral agreements between the GIRoA and other nongovernmental partners to create specific programs. Examples include a bilateral agreement between the GIRoA and Germany to run the National Police Academy in Kabul and agreements for Turkish and Dutch training centers in Wardak and Uruzgan Provinces, respectively.
These programs are national contributions directly provided to the GIRoA, but beyond the scope and authority of the IPCB and NTM–A mandates to develop police.

The U.S. Embassy in Kabul, which funds the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to contract trainers, logistics, and security at seven police Regional Training Centers, is another organization that trains the ANP. The multiple organizations have led to a confusing system for police development. The lack of coordination among all entities developing the ANP has created uneven progress in police development and duplication of effort among competing organizations trying to attain the same objective. For example, the lack of integration of LOTFA into the overall unity of effort has led to two issues. The funds dispersed are from external donors, creating dependency on foreign aid, making Afghanistan a ward of the international community for years to come. Additionally, while the United States is the largest donor to the fund (giving $347 million of the $974 million donated from 2002 to 200911), the decision to disperse funds can be vetoed by any donor, regardless of the size of donation. This creates tension among partners and results in slower bureaucratic processes to affect police development.

Additionally, the State Department contract has led to confusion and delays in implementing the police training program. The lack of a unified chain of command, including the relative inability of one government agency to cede operational control of contractors to another, has led to problems in efficiently changing programs of instruction. Contract restraints also prevent the placement of instructors in dangerous areas, even though these areas may be where they are most needed.

While bilateral programs can increase both the capacity and capability of the ANP, several issues contribute to a lack of unity with other programs. Bilateral programs are comprised of national contributions directly provided to the GIRoA and are not necessarily coordinated with existing elements developed in Afghanistan to synchronize efforts across organizations, such as the IPCB. This also leads to different programs of instruction from different concepts of policing. Some national contributions focus on training ANP that are capable of community policing within safer areas, while others train counterinsurgency and survival techniques that fit in more dangerous environments. A lack of common standards creates forces not appropriate for the current threat environment.

Although formed in January 2007, the IPCB was not at full operating capacity until the beginning of 2009, leaving a coordination gap in the interim.12 In several areas, donors and the MoI still operate outside of agreed upon structures and beyond the authority of the IPCB. An example, as noted above, is a bilateral agreement, which does not necessarily coordinate with other efforts in country. Instead, contributions can be based on what the international donor is politically capable of giving, whether that capability is needed or not—creating further confusion and leading to duplication of effort toward developing the ANP.
Recognition of the lack of consistent and timely progress that these disparate efforts have shown led to the creation of yet another major command, the NTM–A. This organization, made up of military and police professionals from 19 nations, was designed to facilitate the close cooperation and coordination of all organizations involved with developing the ANP. It supports the development of self-sustaining institutions that will allow the ANP to train and professionally educate security forces to enforce laws and protect Afghans in the future. The key mission of the command in relation to developing the ANP is to establish their institutional training base and grow their force—in quantity and quality.

While most military organizations exercise command and control over their mission, this environment forced NTM–A leadership to think differently. To develop better unity of effort, NTM–A established a “C3 relationship”: cooperation, collaboration, and coordination in the development of the Afghan National Police. NTM–A has a focused strategy that includes two phases: development and transition. To effect its strategy, NTM–A first focused on all actors to develop both quantity and quality in the ANP until they are capable of controlling coercive force within the country without significant support from the international coalition. This will be complete when police forces within Afghanistan embrace their role in society, are able to resource them, and are capable of protecting the people within their borders while providing law and order to the state. The second phase is transition, which will occur when the GIRoA develops sustainable generation and training systems that can be perpetuated by the ANP. When this occurs, the international community will be able to step back into an assist role, allowing Afghans to take the lead for security.
The Way Ahead

To achieve this growth and professionalize the force, NTM–A and the Afghan MoI have developed five priorities that together make up a new approach to generating police forces, comprised of a Recruit-Train-Assign model, pay, partnering, predictability, and leader development. This approach is designed to create a police force of quantity with quality that has the enduring institutions to guarantee sustainability by GIRoA. Together, the initiatives will create a ripple effect across the programs developing the ANP.

First, NTM–A began with the institution of a Recruit-Train-Assign model (see figure 2). This model replaces the previous Recruit-Assign model that had been in place largely since the beginning of the reform effort. This new model ensures that all new policemen receive formal training before performing their duties. The MoI is establishing Recruiting and Training Commands to support this approach and provide better structure and unity of effort to bring in new personnel and ensure they are properly trained to a common standard. Additionally, NTM–A modified basic training and extended the training day to reduce the overall length of the course by 2 weeks. An
extended training day was necessary to increase the required throughput in order to enlarge the quantity of the ANP. To increase quality, the new 6-week course maintains the previous curriculum while adding 64 hours of mandatory literacy instruction for every police officer.

With 95,000 ANP already recruited and assigned in the preceding 7 years, developing a trained professional force was more than simply starting from the beginning; we were starting from a deficit. The consequence of failing to resource this mission properly was a police force that could not make its end strength goals and lacked the quality necessary in a professional security force.

To further support the Recruit-Train-Assign approach, NTM–A put great emphasis on increasing the coordination of bilateral efforts, including the:

- National Police Academy in Kabul headed by the Germans
- German police training centers in Mazar-e-Sharif, Feyzabad, and Konduz
- Czech police training center in Logar
- Turkish police training center in Wardak
- Dutch police training center in Tarin Kowt
- British police training center in Helmand
- French Officer Candidate School at the Regional Logistics Center in Mazar-e-Sharif.

Together with the national heads of delegation from each country, NTM–A focused each of these sites to create interoperable programs of instruction to increase quality and throughput to create police officers more quickly to meet growth goals. Coordinating disparate training throughout the country continues to be a challenge—beginning with awareness of ongoing programs. A year after its activation, NTM–A continues to discover programs conducted by international organizations.

NTM–A also fostered greater collaboration among the other actors that train the ANP. Through the IPCB, NTM–A is engaging UNAMA to leverage LOTFA funds to pay for the additional ANP required to meet internationally mandated growth goals: 120,000 police by March 2011, and 134,000 by October 2011. Additionally, EUPOL has been engaged in close cooperation to include its unique skills in the training of special police forces such as the Afghan National Civil Order Police.

Second, pay incentives were added to increase the quality and quantity of ANP in the new approach. Under these programs, the MoI now provides a living wage (including wage parity with competing jobs such as those offered in the Afghan National Army) and monetary incentives such as retention bonuses and hazardous duty pay. These actions enhance GIRoA ability to recruit and retain capable people who can be developed into a more professional police force. Critical to these efforts was the cooperation of NTM–A, UNAMA, and LOTFA, which have paid $60 million in base pay to police officers and $75 million for
a $45 per month pay raise and hazardous duty pay initiated by MoI so far in fiscal year 2010.\textsuperscript{15}

Third is partnering, which is key to gaining quality and increasing quantity through the new approach. Partnering helps patrolmen and officers who received their basic training to build further on the critical skills and basic tasks learned. This growth is essential for the professional development of each individual police officer. Partnership also provides mentorship that assists in accountability, development, and enforcement of standards critical to increasing the quality of the force. As coalition forces partner with their counterparts, they instill in the ANP leaders the need for a higher standard of care for their patrolmen and equipment, training, and leadership throughout their force, thereby increasing retention and reducing corruption.

Fourth, current operations tempo is creating unsustainable attrition within the Afghan National Police. The lack of any predictable pattern to their movement out of combat areas and into retraining/refitting causes police officers to leave the force. To provide more predictability to the force, the MoI is planning to institute an operational deployment cycle. Units fall within one of three periods: training, deployment to an area of conflict, or refitting/refurbishing from a deployment. This initiative moves Afghan National Police units that have been constantly in harm’s way for months on end, replacing them with fresh units. The ability to be removed from combat and take time to rest, take leave to visit family, attend more literacy and other education programs, and retrain for future operations should have a significant effect on decreasing attrition and improving retention.

Fifth, leader development is critical and is the number one priority for NTM–A. Poor leadership has been a prime factor in casualties, attrition rates, and endemic corruption within the ANP. To combat this, MoI and NTM–A have created programs to develop service-oriented, competent, and honorable leaders. These include inculcating an ethic of career-long education and development in current and future leaders; placing emphasis on appropriate manning and leadership for all schools and courses to provide oversight and leaders for trainees to emulate; and providing strategic leader development through advising and professional development courses. Key steps by MoI to implement these include the creation of a career development plan for patrolmen, noncommissioned officers, and officers consisting of training, education, and experience. To further training and education, enduring institutions are being created, including a 6-month officer candidate school, a 4-month noncommissioned officer course to complement the National Police Academy run by the Germans, and plans to create a command and staff college and company commanders’ course to develop midgrade leaders. To ensure these projects are successful and enduring, the collaboration and cooperation of bilateral agreements, EUPOL, and NTM–A with the MoI will be critical.

Conclusion

Instituting a Recruit-Train-Assign model, pay incentives, partnering, predictability, and
leadership development measures together make up the new approach to developing the ANP. However, even with these initiatives, many significant challenges lie ahead. Shortages of coalition trainers threaten the long-term viability of leadership development programs. A lack of robust Afghan training personnel, and those capable of being trained to be instructors, hinders the enduring nature of coalition-built training institutions. High demands for operational requirements throughout the country employ police forces faster than they can be developed. Each of these challenges can be overcome through a unity of effort based on the cooperation, collaboration, and coordination of the various actors developing the ANP.

Successful counterinsurgency operations and the transition of security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Force depend on the creation of a well-structured, highly trained, and professional police force. To provide security and control, a professional policing function is necessary at all levels, from patrolling cities and villages to monitoring border posts. Unfortunately, this has been absent throughout most of Afghanistan. One reason for this is the convoluted authority and responsibility mechanisms in place among the various organizations and nations developing the ANP. By creating better systems to cooperate, collaborate, and coordinate among the various entities supporting the ANP, a more resilient police force can be built with sustainable systems and the right type of organization to fight the insurgency. More importantly, it will help the GIRoA convince the people that their government has gained sufficient momentum to garner their support—which is critical to the peace and stability of Afghanistan. PRISM

Notes

5 Ibid.
6 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Central Asia, Bobby Wilkes, Testimony to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee of National Security and Foreign Affairs, “Oversight of U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice System in Afghanistan,” June 18, 2008, 7–8.
7 Howk, 10.
8 Ibid., 15.
9 Murray, 108–126.
10 The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Security Sector Reform Monitor No. 1, Afghanistan (Waterloo, ON: CIGI, July 2009), 8.
Ibid.

13 See <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52802.htm> for more information.


15 NTM–A/CSTC–A brief.
On Christmas morning 2005, at Saint Patrick's Catholic Church in Auckland, New Zealand, a priest stepped up to the pulpit to deliver his sermon. “Christmas is a time of giving. And this morning,” he said, while holding aloft a thick, off-white wool blanket, “several hundred children suffering from the aftereffects of the earthquake in northern Pakistan will wake up and...
receive one of these.” The priest then explained that several local farmers came to him wanting to do something special for Christmas. Through the church’s coordination with relief agencies in Pakistan, the farmers learned that bedding was desperately needed and made hundreds of wool blankets from the fleece of their sheep. The church shipped these blankets to Pakistan, where they were distributed by helicopters to villages and into the hands of cold children.

Ten weeks earlier, I had participated in the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) planning effort on Okinawa, Japan, to deploy a task-organized detachment of approximately 250 Sailors and Marines to Pakistan to provide humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR). Listening to the priest’s Christmas sermon, I began to understand the multiplicative positive effects that can spring from a well-planned and well-executed HA/DR campaign.

In the early years of the Cold War, the Berlin Airlift showed how a humanitarian assistance campaign could engender lasting political success in an ideological struggle. After Marshall Plan aid had flowed into Western Europe for 1 year, the Soviet Union blockaded West Berlin in July 1948 in an effort to force the Americans out of the city. For the next 15 months, American and British aircraft delivered 2.3 million tons of humanitarian assistance supplies to the more than 2 million people living in Berlin.1 Although few of President Harry Truman’s national security advisors believed it could be done, the American people stood solidly behind the President and the humanitarian effort. By April 1949, the cooperative strategy of the Western European powers had led to creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).2 In May 1949, the Soviet Union decided to lift the blockade, and by September, the airlift had officially ended. This is instructive because it shows how a humanitarian mission can contribute to a major political success.

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief remain a powerful strategic way to achieve political ends. In an ideological struggle, HA/DR campaigns project the best of American values abroad. While the American military has made considerable progress in its ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations, protracted land campaigns are politically and economically difficult to sustain. However, the HA/DR campaign in Pakistan, Operation Lifeline, provides a useful model of how humanitarian missions can contribute to political success. Lifeline included military partners along with government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working together to save thousands of lives. In the future, the American military will participate in more HA/DR campaigns such as Lifeline and should leverage the interagency process and military partnerships to achieve enduring strategic and political success.

The Qayamat

On Saturday, October 8, 2005, a 7.6-magnitude earthquake struck northern Pakistan, killing approximately 73,000 people and destroying more than 400,000 homes. Because Saturday is a school day in Pakistan, many children were among the dead and injured.3 The largest earthquake in Pakistan’s history displaced an estimated 3 million people and primarily affected two provinces: Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir (see map).4 These areas are among the most difficult places in the world to reach, with mountainous terrain, limited roadways, and elevations that range from 4,000 to 14,000 feet. Weather was severe, and the likelihood of snowfall by November increased the
risk of an even greater humanitarian crisis if displaced people became stranded in the mountains without aid. The earthquake severely damaged roads, bridges, and the airfield at Muzaffarabad, making provision of immediate relief difficult. The security situation in these provinces was not conducive for military relief operations, especially from the United States, due to the presence of radical Islamic groups. According to author Greg Mortenson, director of the Central Asia Institute, Pakistanis called October 8, 2005, Qayamat—“the apocalypse.”

Pakistan’s government did not have an organization akin to the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to deal with disasters of this scope. Its provinces did have Provincial Relief Commissions, but nothing substantial existed at the national level. While people expected a quick response from Pakistan’s government and military, the Pakistani army had lost hundreds of its own troops in Kashmir and could not provide immediate assistance. Moreover, because damage to the roads and bridges was so severe, relief support would have to be provided by air, and the Pakistani military lacked heavy cargo helicopters. Pakistan needed external support if it was to avoid a second major humanitarian crisis.

India, which controls its own portion of Kashmir, also suffered approximately 1,300 dead and 150,000 displaced. It offered to send relief supplies to Pakistan, but since travel through the line of control from Indian-controlled Kashmir into Pakistan was contentious even under
normal circumstances, Pakistan judged this to be only an offer of token aid. Pakistan did not instantly accept India’s offer of helicopters either, “apparently for fear of the symbolism that Indian army uniforms on Pakistani soil would represent.” Iran and Turkey landed C–130s at Rawalpindi with relief supplies, but did not deploy the lift capabilities necessary to deliver these supplies to the areas most in need. The United States was thus Pakistan’s brightest prospect for immediate assistance.

Seizing a Strategic Moment

The American Ambassador to Pakistan, Ryan Crocker, immediately saw how bad the situation was and knew that America’s response was “crucial to our future relationship.” Crocker had a long and distinguished career as a Foreign Service Officer that included tours in Lebanon, Iran, Syria, Kuwait, Egypt, and the reopened American Embassy in Kabul after coalition forces had deposed the Taliban. He understood the strategic importance of Pakistan to South Asia and the Middle East and “called in every chip he had to get more resources, military and civilian, to help with the relief effort.”

Crocker saw a “strategic moment,” and called General John Abizaid, the U.S. Central Command commander, to get support. Abizaid did two things for Crocker: first, he arranged for the Ambassador to coordinate with the American commander in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, to get immediate military support; second, he identified the ESG–1 commander, Admiral Michael LeFever, to command the military’s portion of the relief effort. Crocker, who earlier had immediately ordered 10 State Department counter-narcotics Huey II helicopters flown by Pakistani army officers to transport rescue teams to affected areas and to begin evacuation of the injured, had thus set the tone for the American response.

Bill Berger led the regional Disaster Assessment Response Team (DART) from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). His DART deployed to Pakistan from Nepal to determine requirements on the ground and provide technical expertise. Berger possessed extensive disaster relief experience and had played a major role in coordinating the American response for Unified Assistance. With Berger on the ground,
USAID called forward stockpiles of emergency relief supplies that included plastic sheeting, water buckets, blankets, and food. USAID also had about 50 employees in Pakistan who had established relationships with the prime minister's office and senior officers within the Pakistani military. As American officials started to arrive, these USAID officials facilitated contacts between them and their Pakistani counterparts.  

A day after the first American C–17 landed in Islamabad with 90,000 pounds of relief supplies on October 9, Admiral LeFever and a small staff from ESG–1 arrived to create Combined Disaster Assistance Center–Pakistan (CDAC–PAK). LeFever realized the importance of forging close military partnerships. As the Combined Maritime Forces commander during Bright Star, LeFever had led forces from 47 nations in the world's largest coalition exercise. LeFever's CDAC–PAK would be a task-organized expeditionary organization that would call forward capabilities from around the world that would then deploy into Pakistan by sea and air. The CDAC–PAK partnership with the Pakistani military would be crucial. With Crocker, Berger, and LeFever on the ground, the Americans had the right leadership team in place to partner with the Pakistanis to help save thousands of lives. But it would require a great deal of trust-building from both sides.
The Pakistani army took the lead in the international relief effort and committed more than 150,000 troops to it. But Pakistan’s military leaders recognized right away that they required assistance from the U.S. military to fill critical gaps to avoid a greater humanitarian catastrophe. They understood that the American military’s expeditionary field hospitals and rotary-wing aviation assets could save many lives and that its heavy engineering assets could supplement their own to open critical roads into northern Pakistan. But at the same time, they realized that a cluster of American troops at a base could be a lucrative target for potential violence in regions known to contain extremist groups.

Pakistan’s military leaders also understood that escalation-of-force incidents, in which American troops at security checkpoints fired their weapons at approaching vehicles, had become an unfortunate reality of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. They thus feared that either a terrorist attack upon American troops or an escalation-of-force incident that killed innocent Pakistanis could jeopardize the entire relief effort. After careful deliberation, they decided that the Pakistani military should provide security for all American military bases, personnel, NGOs, and government organizations during Lifeline.

While involved in planning for deployment of an expeditionary field hospital to Pakistan, the III MEF staff discussed this arrangement with the officers from CDAC–PAK. We were concerned about the prospect of Sailors and Marines deploying into northern Pakistan without their own security. But CDAC–PAK assured us that the Pakistani army had decided to provide this security and was taking this mission with the utmost seriousness.

Pakistan’s military leaders also appreciated the danger of rotary-wing aviation operations in the high altitudes and mountainous terrain of the affected provinces. They understood that if American military helicopters carrying relief supplies started to fall out of the sky, that too would jeopardize the relief effort. After announcing that eight helicopters were being transferred from Afghanistan to Pakistan, General Abizaid acknowledged the risks: “Operating in this part of the world . . . is dangerous. The mountains are high; the weather is bad; the conditions are difficult. But we’ve been doing it in Afghanistan. There’s no better trained group of people to do it than the people that are there now.”

While acknowledging the superb training of the U.S. pilots, Pakistan’s military leaders still formulated a plan to have their own “safety pilots” accompany American pilots into the cockpits as an extra set of eyes. They also planned to have Pakistani army crews retrieve the externally loaded slings that would carry relief supplies into the zones that were too dangerous to land in.

The American and Pakistani militaries had decided to take calculated risks in their military partnership to help save thousands of lives. Crocker, Berger, and LeFever planned to integrate their operations with each other and the Pakistanis at an unprecedented level; the challenge would come in execution. Crocker would later write that “building confidence is a long process, but sometimes you can take great strides in a short time.”

**Building Trust**

After the American team solidified its security arrangements with the Pakistani military, CDAC–PAK called forward niche capabilities to support Lifeline. For example, the 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) deployed by air from Angola and became fully
The III MEF Combined Medical Relief Team–3 (CMRT–3) deployed from Okinawa, Japan, and became fully operational in Shinkiari by November 17. CDAC–PAK eventually consisted of approximately 1,200 personnel and included the staffs of two surgical field hospitals, 25 helicopters to include 21 Chinooks, a company of 125 Navy Seabees who arrived by sea at Karachi, and a small detachment of “Pararescuemen” from the U.S. Air Force. Australia also contributed a detachment of 140 soldiers and four Blackhawk helicopters, organized as Task Force 632.

The Pakistani army’s provision of security for the field hospitals at Muzaffarabad and Shinkiari highlighted the positive effects that emanate and multiply from close military partnerships. The field hospital at Muzaffarabad, in particular, posed a significant security risk for CDAC–PAK because, according to USAID’s Julie Koenen-Grant, it was “surrounded by mountains and visible from all sides . . . like in the middle of a large cereal bowl.” But the hospital’s apparent vulnerability also increased its accessibility and visibility to Pakistanis who might have needed help, which is an important tradeoff in any HA/DR mission.

As the Pakistani army provided for 212th MASH security, Koenen-Grant noted the effect was that “the local Pakistanis all saw and noticed [that] the [hospital] lights were on early and well into the night, and commented favorably on the work ethic of the Americans and the respect for which they were treated.” CMRT–3’s field hospital at Shinkiari experienced a similar dynamic. In the same manner that the German people grew to respect Americans by watching their planes fly at all hours of the day and night into Tempelhof airfield during the Berlin Airlift, the Pakistani people grew to respect those Americans who were working tirelessly at the Muzaffarabad and Shinkiari field hospitals.

CDAC–PAK’s two field hospitals attracted doctors from throughout Pakistan and became key nodes for military doctors, Pakistani doctors, doctors of Pakistani origin from other countries, and physicians from international organizations such as the World Health Organization. Even extremist groups such as Jammat-ud-Dawa welcomed the support of these expeditionary American medical capabilities. One Jammat-ud-Dawa chief, Mohammad Khalid, stated, “I would invite the American doctors and medical staff to come and join us.” The two field hospitals became symbols of the American-Pakistani military partnership and an asymmetric advantage for the United States as American doctors treated many who had never been seen by a medical professional. And most importantly, the hospitals were not attacked. A Pakistani army brigadier general told me 4 years later, with obvious pride, that “during nearly six months of relief operations [from October 2005 to March 2006], there was not one terrorist attack upon a U.S. base, troop, or NGO worker.”

CDAC–PAK’s close partnership with the Pakistani military also had an enormous impact on the safety of rotary-wing aviation operations. CDAC–PAK and the Pakistani military executed their safety pilot concept by placing
Pakistani pilots into the cockpits of Chinooks. Pakistani army crews retrieved the externally loaded slings after cargo had been delivered into zones too dangerous to land in. The potential for a midair collision on these flights was high due to poor visibility, treacherous terrain, and the narrow flight corridors in which the Chinooks had to fly. Moreover, high winds significantly increased the danger of carrying externally loaded slings. The Pakistani safety pilots provided a valuable extra set of eyes for the Chinook crews while Pakistani army crews quickly recovered the slings and brought them back to Rawalpindi, enabling uninterrupted rotary-wing relief operations.

U.S. integration of diplomacy with military operations helped to create an asymmetric advantage over political and religious extremists who opposed their participation in the relief effort. For example, Crocker wrote how his coordination with the Chinook crews created a positive strategic effect:

*Early on, some of us thought it would be a good idea to put big American flag decals on the Chinook helicopters that had been ordered out of Afghanistan into Pakistan to deliver aid. “Are you completely crazy?” said the commander of the helicopter contingent. He’d just come out of a war zone, after all. “Why don’t we just save time and paint a big bull’s-eye on them?” “No, no. Trust us on this,” I said. “It’ll work.” And it did.*

Soon thereafter, one imam who criticized the Americans was “booed and heckled by worshippers.” Another Pakistani businessman told a reporter that “Pakistan is not a nation of ingrates. . . . We know where the help is coming from.” The Chinooks filled a critical void that helped to save lives by delivering the right aid—to include food, water, winterized tents, plastic sheeting, and medical supplies—to the right place at the right time. Before long, Pakistani children were seen playing with toy Chinooks as the large helicopters became the most visible symbol of the relief effort.

Major General Javed Aslam, the commander of Pakistan’s army aviation, stated that Pakistanis called the Chinooks “angels of mercy” for their delivery of relief supplies. An army brigadier general added that “Chinooks flying in Pakistani airspace came to resemble more than the U.S.-Pakistan [military-to-military] contacts, but actually the larger U.S.-Pakistan partnership in an unprecedented humanitarian effort.” Crocker best summed it up, writing that the Chinooks operating in Pakistan “became an emblem of the whole international relief effort.” The leadership team of Crocker, Berger, and LeFever took an approach that built upon the Pakistanis’ efforts and “got the tone just right.” CDAC-PAK’s diplomacy and partnership with the Pakistani military enabled nearly 6 months of aviation operations in which American helicopters flew more than 5,900 missions through some of the toughest terrain in the world—often loaded with external slings that weighed thousands of pounds—without one mishap, crash, or shoot-down.

The Americans’ interagency integration also made great strides in a short time. When CDAC-PAK moved its headquarters to Muzaffarabad and placed another forward operating base in Mansehra, Crocker sent his people forward to be his “eyes and ears” on the ground. “He bent every rule in the book to get our people up where they needed to be to liaise with the U.S. and Pakistani militaries, NGOs, and the UN [United Nations] Community on a 24/7 basis,” said Lisa Johnson, former director...
of the State Department’s Narcotics Affairs Section in Pakistan. Johnson added that these forward operating bases were not “secure,” and that Crocker had to keep Washington closely informed of where he deployed all of his people throughout the operation.

About 30 Pakistani USAID employees traveled to the devastated areas immediately after the earthquake while there was still the risk of an aftershock. Their purpose was to make initial contact with the victims and send information back to Islamabad. These people knew the language, the regional dynamics, and which assets could be marshaled quickly. As NGOs and United Nations personnel flowed into Pakistan, these USAID workers became the crucial node of coordination among CDAC–PAK, the American Embassy, and many NGOs to deconflict projects, establish priorities based on constant consultation with the prime minister’s office, prevent duplication of effort, and commit the fiscal resources to actually get the work done. These NGOs became USAID’s “troops on the ground” as OFDA committed “more than $69.4 million to earthquake-affected populations.”

Small Successes, Large Return

The American-Pakistani military partnership and the brilliant interagency integration of America’s leaders were only part of the reason for the success of Lifeline. Three anecdotes illustrate the active, upfront, and concerned leadership that characterized the American effort throughout the operation. First, Crocker accompanied one of Lifeline’s early flights to an outlying village and learned that there were several seriously injured people on the ground. He directed his crew to “place every seriously wounded person you can on this helicopter when it leaves; I want every inch of this
The helicopter crew filled the aircraft to its maximum capacity and transported the Pakistanis back to Mansehra, where they went on to appropriate medical facilities, and many lives were thus saved.

Second, on November 10, 2005, after 1 month of nonstop relief operations, Crocker encouraged his exhausted staff to attend the Marine Corps Birthday Ball at the American Embassy in Islamabad. During the evening’s ceremony, a staffer approached Crocker with an urgent crisis: a 5-year-old girl was then at 212th MASH in Muzaffarabad and needed immediate lifesaving surgery that required evacuation to Rawalpindi. Because of the treacherous terrain and danger to pilots, relief missions had not previously been flown at night. But a little girl’s life was at stake, so Crocker authorized one of the State Department’s helicopters with an American-trained, night-vision-capable Pakistani crew to fly the dangerous night mission, and the girl was successfully evacuated to Rawalpindi.

Third, Lance Corporal Stephanie Mendez exemplified how young Servicemembers deployed to Pakistan stepped up to fill positions normally held by more senior officers to help treat Pakistanis. Mendez was an electrician with CMRT–3 who was tasked with maintaining 100-percent generator reliability at the surgical hospital at Shinkiari. Faced with adverse weather conditions, a complex power grid, and an influx of hundreds of disaster-stricken people, she helped to develop and execute a plan to wire 45 tents and a 60-bed hospital that subsequently provided care to more than 14,000 Pakistanis. Her commander specifically remembered her “in freezing rain at 0100 [in the morning] up to her knees in mud making sure the generators were working” properly so that Pakistanis could continue to receive medical treatment. The truth is that throughout Lifeline, hundreds of similar stories could be told about everyone who participated with their Pakistani partners to help mitigate suffering from the earthquake, from the Ambassador down to the most junior Servicemember.

At a press conference announcing the transfer of 212th MASH to Pakistan in February 2006, LeFever said that his assignment as CDAC–PAK’s commander was “the most professionally and personally rewarding tour of my military service.” At a ceremony for the departure of CDAC–PAK on March 31, 2006, Crocker called Lifeline “the longest disaster assistance effort in U.S. military history” and “the largest humanitarian assistance mission since the [1948] Berlin Airlift.” At the same ceremony, Major General Javed Aslam told departing American and Australian troops: “You came in to do good. And in doing so, you have brought enormous honor on yourselves, your services, and your country. You have saved the lives of thousands and given tens of thousands the opportunity to put their lives back together.”

Stephanie Mendez went on to earn meritorious promotion, recognition as the III MEF “Marine of the Year,” and assignment as a Drill Instructor who is currently training recruits at Parris Island, South Carolina. Still, in an email to me 4 years later, she wrote, “That operation was the best thing I have ever participated in.”
Looking Beyond the Tactical

When asked about the lasting impact of the American-Pakistani partnership developed during Lifeline, one senior Pakistani diplomat told me, “We are looking beyond the tactical to think in bigger picture terms.” The United States, too, should view Lifeline through a wider lens to glean important lessons and future implications. First, HA/DR campaigns are an effective way to project American values abroad to make progress toward political ends. In the future, the United States should seek opportunities to translate operational success in HA/DR campaigns into enduring strategic partnerships and/or political alliances. These alliances are not likely to look like the NATO that emerged from the Berlin Airlift, and should be carefully tailored to counter current threats. But as with the Berlin Airlift, a HA/DR campaign such as Lifeline can catalyze larger political forces that can then cohere into an enduring political alliance if the opportunity is seized.

Second, the American military should continue to field general purpose forces capable of full spectrum operations. CDAC–PAK’s deployment of forces and relief supplies by sea and air showed how flexible maneuver from those domains can enhance military partnerships, provide leaders on the ground with operational space to better determine requirements, and minimize impact on the local people by not placing a large military footprint on the ground. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) emphasis on acquiring more enablers such as rotary-wing aircraft, foreign language expertise, tactical communications, and combat service support equipment are steps in the right direction. CDAC–PAK was fortunate to have Chinooks next door in Afghanistan to call forward; next time, these capabilities might have to come from the sea.

Lifeline, Unified Assistance, and recent HA/DR operations in Haiti attest to the enduring value of expeditionary, forward-deployed forces augmented by strategic lift by both sea and air, and the U.S. military should ensure that it retains these capabilities.

Third, the United States should not wait for natural disasters to occur to expand its military partnerships with countries in South Asia and the Middle East. We know that the northward movement of the tectonic plates in South Asia is causing the Himalayas to rise by about 1 inch per year, which indicates that there are likely to be more natural disasters in the region that contains Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, and Iran. The American military could sponsor HA/DR conferences, tabletop exercises, and interagency and interoperability working groups that prepare these vulnerable countries for catastrophic events. Exercises in the Pacific with countries such as Thailand for Cobra Gold and the Philippines for Balikatan might provide a useful model. Crocker stated, “Commanders globally should be incorporating HA/DR operations into their exercise schedules to develop and refine skills, practice interagency operations, and build their relationships with partner militaries.” The American military should also embrace being a “supporting” command to our partners when that is what the situation calls for. The Pakistani army had the lead during Lifeline, and its ability to integrate with CDAC–PAK showed that America can advance its national interests without always being the “supported” command.

Fourth, the interagency process is not broken and actually works quite well when the right people are involved. The team of Ambassador Crocker, Admiral LeFever, Bill Berger, and the numerous NGOs that participated in Lifeline integrated operations to produce truly stellar
results. Those public servants who demonstrate the flexibility and adaptability to excel in an interagency environment, especially during a real-world contingency, should be rewarded with promotion, awards, and having their stories broadly told across their organizations. Like a winning college football program, success will breed future interagency success if excellent performance is recognized and capitalized upon.

Fifth, we need to do a better job at getting our stories told. Human beings are naturally conditioned to receive a powerful narrative, but too often our best stories do not get told because we rely on the media or public affairs personnel to tell them, and these people are not always present. The ancient Greek historian Plutarch understood that an interesting anecdote could often provide a truer and more compelling account of an operation than the mass movement of armies, but we sometimes have difficulty getting our best stories out into the public domain. During the Berlin Airlift, for example, publication of the newsletter Task Force Times told readers about the exploits of American flyers, spurred competition between units, and even countered Soviet propaganda.59 One of the other innovations of Lifeline was the brilliantly coordinated public information campaign.60 The inherent goodness of the American people serving in the military, government, and NGOs is an asymmetric advantage that has no effective countermeasure, and we cannot lose sight of the larger strategic narrative that these people write before our eyes. Communicating our stories is essential and will enable the creation of powerful narratives that equal the deeds and character of our people.

Conclusion

On September 22, 2006, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf presented Admiral LeFever with the Sitara-I-Eisar (Star of Sacrifice) medal for his outstanding leadership of CDAC–PAK.61 The U.S. combined interagency efforts during Lifeline provided 370,000 people with relief supplies, treated 35,000 people for injuries, and inoculated 20,000 more. American military forces delivered more than 1,000 tons of relief supplies and 107 pieces of engineering equipment, while safely flying more than 5,900 relief missions.62 More important than all of these tangible statistics, the Americans and Pakistanis learned to trust each other in the process of saving lives. Lifeline made an enormous impact on Pakistan’s population and highlighted the good engendered when America’s values and interests are aligned and executed on the ground. Public opinion polls taken in May 2005 before the earthquake and in November 2005 during Lifeline showed that “favorable opinion of the U.S.” rose from 23 percent to 46 percent while “confidence in Bin Laden” plummeted from 51 percent to 33 percent.63 Lifeline showed how interagency integration, cooperation with partner militaries, and careful organization of an expeditionary force that filled critical needs can make a strategic impact. From CDAC–PAK’s close partnership with the Pakistani military, to Ambassador Crocker’s decision to launch a dangerous night mission to save the life of a 5-year-old girl, to Lance Corporal Mendez’s operation of the
generators at all hours of the day and night to treat Pakistanis, the Americans “got it right” in Pakistan. As strategists continue to grapple with how best to leverage the interagency process and get the most out of our military partnerships, the lessons from *Lifeline* are a good place to start. PRISM

**Notes**

1 Richard Reeves, *Daring Young Men* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), 274.
2 Ibid., 238–239.
4 Author interview with Brigadier General Amir Bajwa, Pakistani army, November 13, 2009.
6 Joint Center for Operational Analysis, “International Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations,” PowerPoint brief, January 23, 2007; Bajwa interview.
8 Ibid.
12 Author interview with Ambassador Ryan Crocker, March 17, 2010.
14 Koenen-Grant interview.
15 Crocker interview.
16 Ibid.
18 Koenen-Grant interview.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Joint Center for Operational Analysis, “International Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations.”
23 Bajwa interview.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
27 Koenen-Grant interview.
33 Koenen-Grant interview.
34 Ibid.
36 Johnson interview.
37 Bajwa interview.
38 Koenen-Grant interview.
39 Crocker, “Eight Years On.”
40 Stephens.
41 Ibid.
42 Crocker, “Eight Years On.”
43 Aziz; Bajwa interview.
44 Crocker, “Eight Years On.”
45 Crocker interview.
46 Johnson interview.
47 Ibid.
49 Johnson interview.
50 Ibid.
51 Email from James M. Gannon, February 5, 2010.
52 Ibid.
54 Aziz.
56 Email from Stephanie Mendez, February 24, 2010.
57 Author interview with senior Pakistani diplomat, February 25, 2010.
58 Crocker interview.
60 Crocker interview.
62 USAID, “Earthquake Relief Update.”
63 Joint Center for Operational Analysis, “International Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations.”
An Interview with
Jim Webb

Are we better at protecting our national security today than we were 10 years ago?

Senator Webb: Certain things are better. For example, our intelligence systems are much more advanced. Tactically, our people have adapted well to different situations, first in Iraq, and then in Afghanistan. But in terms of protecting national security, we’re really talking about national strategy. And if you look at where we are in terms of our national strategy—that involves economic policy, overall strategic forces, and how you connect and communicate to the rest of the world—here we have a lot of issues to address.

One is our vulnerability economically, with respect particularly to China, in terms of trade and how that impacts our diplomacy and our military operations. I have been talking about this for 20 years as this situation has evolved. I wrote a piece for the Wall Street Journal in April of 2001 basically warning that we were reaching a tipping point in terms of how vulnerable we are when our economy reaches a certain level of reliance on trade with a country, particularly one with a different economic and ideological system. We’ve held hearings on these issues in the Foreign Relations Committee—I chair the East Asia Subcommittee. We just recently saw in the Senkaku Islands, a sovereignty dispute between Japan and China that I was warning about 4 years ago.

So in terms of our ability to deal with the terrorist threat, per se, I think we’re really doing a good job. In terms of our overall national strategy, the economic vulnerabilities that we have, and the composition of our strategic forces, I think we could do a lot better. Look

Jim Webb, the senior U.S. Senator from Virginia, serves as Chairman of the Personnel Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee and Chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Webb has extensive knowledge of military and foreign affairs from his service as a highly decorated combat Marine in Vietnam, Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of the Navy.
at the size of the Navy right now; its floor for strategic planning is 313 ships. The Navy is now, I believe, at 288 combatants. When I was commissioned in 1968, we had 930 combatants. It was a different era, with different types of ships, but we went from 930 down to 479 post-Vietnam, and we got it up to 568 when I was Secretary of the Navy; now we’re back down to nearly 290. That is our strategic presence around the world. So the question requires a careful answer. We tend so often to focus on the tactical issues of the day, particularly when we’re committed on the ground, but we have to understand the larger vulnerabilities that we have as a nation.

We are face to face with China in Africa. Should we be doing more strategically in Africa?

Senator Webb: The Millennium Challenge Corporation [MCC] is an interesting case; MCC was designed to provide American tax dollars for infrastructure projects, particularly in Africa, without the money getting lost inside the governmental structures of these countries, which frequently have problems with payoffs and corruption. We discovered a couple of months ago that a significant amount of the MCC money was going to Chinese-owned companies. We were looking at the MCC in Mali specifically. I immediately wrote the head of the MCC saying no taxpayer dollars should be going to fund state-owned companies, particularly Chinese state-owned ones, as a part of this process. We got a commitment that will be taking effect, I think, at the end of October when they’re going to stop doing this. But it shows how strategically careless we have been with this mammoth governmental process in terms of protecting our own interests.

We have made a lot of executive branch changes over the last 10 years, most notably the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and a proliferation of interagency processes. Does more need to be done in terms of restructuring the executive branch to be more effective in responding to national security challenges?

Senator Webb: First I salute Secretary [of Defense Robert] Gates for having the courage and wherewithal to state that we need to reexamine DOD [Department of Defense] structure. I wouldn’t want to presuppose a result, but the first step is to have a proper analytical model to evaluate what we have today. That wasn’t done with JFCOM [U.S. Joint Forces Command], and that’s why we asked for hearings before deciding to dismantle the command.

I made a comment last week about the process—and this gets to what you’re talking about because the bureaucracy of DOD has grown and grown since 9/11. I would want to start with an analytical model from year 2000 baseline to 2010 in terms of all 10 of the combatant commands and see where growth has occurred. Then we should start examining in a structural way how we can downsize rationally. I’m not saying we need to preserve any one command at the expense of any other command. We need to be able to show in a very specific way the analytical model that was being used and why we made the decisions we made.

What about the architecture for interagency collaboration: the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, DOD, the National Security Council and how they interact?
Senator Webb: It is, as you know, very personality-driven—driven by relationships. It depends who the National Security Advisor is and who the principals are in terms of how they relate. My reaction is that they seem to be functioning well together. Structural changes are ways to get around the realities of process, personnel, and personal interaction. That’s something that’s pretty well driven by the President—any particular President, how he uses his Cabinet, his National Security Advisor.

The Project on National Security Reform [PNSR] proposed certain legislative changes. It argued that the committee structure reinforces stovepipes between foreign affairs and defense and between appropriations and authorizations. PNSR argued for a change in the way the committee structure addresses national security issues. Do you agree?

Senator Webb: Let me give you a different take on that. This is my third tour through government. I’ve spent most of my professional life in the private sector; I have 4 years Active duty in the Marine Corps, 4 years as a committee counsel in the House 1977–1981, and then 5 years in the Pentagon (1 year as a Marine and 4 as a defense executive 1984–1988), and now I’m a Member of Congress. I’m comfortable with the structure of the committees in Congress. My greatest surprise in the Senate was the lack of true oversight by Congress of the executive branch. It’s one of the major objectives that we have in this office—to rebalance the two branches. After 9/11, everything was moving fast; the money was moving so fast that DOD went off on its own inertia unchecked. I started from 2007 forward asking prototypical management questions: how do these things work? I’ll give you a couple of examples. There are two problems to be addressed in terms of congressional structure. One is whether Congress has the wherewithal to reassert its proper position and its proper role, and the other is the relationship between the authorizing committees and the appropriating committees. The authorizing committees, for instance the Foreign Relations Committee, just stopped authorizing. And that gives too much power to the appropriations side, where we don’t really get the right sort of policy hearings.

When I mentioned oversight with respect to the executive branch, I think this is what’s happened. People [in Congress] have confused a requirement for a report with what real oversight means. So the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs comes in with a thick book of reports and says, “I have to deliver to you every year a stack of reports this high.” I said to him, “Show us the ones you don’t think are appropriate.” A lot of times people in the agencies think they’ve solved a problem by submitting a report, and as you know, paper doesn’t solve a problem. With true oversight—like we had in 1977–1981 and 1984–1988, when I was on Caspar Weinberger’s staff and then Secretary of the Navy—agencies would not dare cross authorizing committees because they would be reined in. There was great respect between the two branches, and I don’t see that now.

When I came to the Senate in 2007 I saw—I’ll give you two data points here because you’ll see where I’m going—I read in the Wall Street Journal that San Diego County was protesting a facility that Blackwater was going to use to train Active-duty Sailors how to go room by room, or compartment by compartment, to determine if there were unauthorized persons on their ship. I wrote Secretary Gates a letter; I asked him: Was this ever specifically authorized by Congress? Was there any paper trail? (The Navy's training
contract had a ceiling price of nearly $64 million.) Was it ever authorized or appropriated in specific language, and, quite frankly, how have we reached the situation where a private contractor should be training Active-duty people how to do their job? It would be like Blackwater teaching me how to patrol when I was going through Marine Corps training in Quantico years ago. And we got stiff-armed. It's just like, “I'll have someone talk to you about it.” We got a non-answer. And I said, “All right, I'm holding up all civilian nominations from DOD until we get specific answers.”

Then they started talking to us, and the answer was that there was never any specific authorization. In other words, Congress never reviewed the use of these funds. They moved hundreds of millions of dollars of O&M [Operations and Maintenance] money through the appropriations committee to the Navy. I was told that such contracts had to exceed $78.5 million before they would be reviewed by the Service secretary. So without specific approval from Congress, they could kick these things off as long as the cost was $78 million or less. They called it “needs of the service/O&M money.” We’ve been working with DOD to get a more rigorous management model in place for senior-level oversight of such outsourcing contracts. That’s example number one.

Now we have the proposal to close JFCOM. My way of coming to positions is to try to go from the data to the answer. Emotional arguments are best made through facts; examine the data. I've done years of work inside the Pentagon; I know where the numbers are. I said, all right, let's look at the OSD staff, JCS staff, the Service secretary staff. Give us the data models—how many people were on these staffs in 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and today? That could be answered in a day and would give us a structured way to engage in the discussion. We’re still waiting. We sent them a notice yesterday that if I don’t get the data, we’re going to hold up DOD civilian and flag and general officer nominations again. That’s what’s happened in the breakdown of the process.

The Foreign Relations Committee has an important role to play. I chair the East Asia Subcommittee, and I spend a lot of time in East Asia. We can have discussions that go beyond simply military discussions, and on occasion we can pull the issues into the Armed Services Committee, like the planned realignment of Marines from Okinawa to Guam.

You mentioned Secretary Weinberger a minute ago. Does the Weinberger Doctrine, also called the Powell Doctrine, still have any relevance? Should the kinds of thresholds described in the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine still determine when we should apply military force, or is that outdated?

Senator Webb: I think you have to define what you’re doing in terms of use of force. In the situations that we’re in right now, these are campaigns—they’re long campaigns—and their strategic validity can certainly be debated in terms of how we’re using our people. I don’t think that it’s the same thing they were considering. Weinberger was very much the driver of that doctrine; I was on his staff when they were doing it. The year I was in Vietnam, 1969, we probably had in 1 year at least twice as many dead as we’ve had in all 10 years in both the Iraq and Afghanistan engagements combined. In 1969, we lost 12,000 dead in that 1 year, and 1968 was worse.

It’s not low intensity if you’re in it, but in terms of national policy, it’s a long campaign. So we have to shape the use of our military
to national strategy, not to one enunciation of one doctrine or another. So I know where Weinberger was going with that, and I fully agree that we need to be able to articulate the end point of what we’re doing, which has been a big problem in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I actually wrote an article for the Washington Post in September of 2002, 6 months before we went into Iraq, and said, “Do you really want to be there for the next 30 years? You need to be able to clearly articulate your exit strategy.” And they don’t have one. It’s hard on the people who are doing this, it’s hard on the country—we’re burning up a lot of money. This was one of al Qaeda’s strategic objectives: to burn us out economically. So the real question with respect to the Weinberger Doctrine is that we have to follow our national interest in terms of massive use of force. If we define the war in Iraq as the decapitation of the Saddam Hussein regime, it was over very quickly. But then we went into this interminable occupation, which I do not believe we should be involved in. The question for us is how can we get out of there—what’s the process we should use to get out of there without further destabilizing the region. It’s a delicate process; I don’t think we should keep 50,000 troops in Iraq.

Over the last 10 years, the military has started going into some nontraditional military mission objective areas, perhaps because of the lack of civilian manpower, or strength, for example, conflict prevention, development, and stabilization. Do you think these are appropriate roles for the military?

Senator Webb: I lived in that environment as a Marine in populated areas in South Vietnam. Almost all of the villages in the area I was in, the An Hoa Basin, were what they called “Category Five” villages; Category A was completely government-controlled, Category E was completely Vietcong-controlled, and Category Five was politically hopeless. These zones had free-fire zones—that didn’t mean you could shoot anyone that moved, but it meant you could get your artillery without having to go through political clearance.

But every day in this environment where you’re making moral decisions, you’re up against a civilian population that is very, very similar to what you have in Afghanistan right now—very similar in that mindset. When you’re in that environment as a young military leader, a part of what you’re doing is unavoidably those sorts of things you’re talking about. You have to try to connect. We did MEDCAPS [Medical Civic Action Programs]; we’d take care of stuff. It is wise that the young military leaders get the training so that they can carry on some of that environment, to connect and survive in the places that they’re operating. In the long term, though, on the larger scale, that should be something the State Department does.

We talk about the “three Ds,” diplomacy, defense, and development, as co-equal. If those three elements are co-equal in status, shouldn’t the three governmental departments leading each of those three elements be co-equal in status?

Senator Webb: I’m not sure I accept the premise that they are co-equal. In terms of importance to national security, they are co-equal, but not in terms of resources. You have to deal with all three in order to get the desired end result. So I would say in terms of access to the decisionmaker, you need to have all three at the table, no doubt about that.
Do you see any future for the concept of the national security professional as opposed to professionals from different agencies? That is, some title called a national security professional and taught at a national security university?

Senator Webb: You can do that with the right kind of cross-fertilization that we're seeing right now. I'll give you an anecdote. When I returned from Vietnam, I was stationed at Quantico. I had spent all these years reading the strategists, you know, the great makers of modern strategy, studying the history of national defense and warfare, etc. I was 24 years old, and I suddenly said to myself, “I am a military professional,” which is very similar to what you're talking about here.

I was assigned to Officer Candidate School, so I’d go over to the Breckinridge library and get every book I could get and read it, just a part of what I believed was my duty in order to be able to advance and eventually be in a position where I could affect policy. It didn't happen in uniform. I think that's endemic to our system; I'm not sure you would need to teach it in a separate place. PRISM
An Interview with Martin E. Dempsey

General Martin E. Dempsey, USA, is Commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

After almost a decade of war, our Soldiers and leaders continue to perform magnificently in the harshest conditions and within the incredibly complex operating environments of Iraq and Afghanistan. They operate as part of increasingly decentralized organizations, and their tasks are made even more challenging by the unprecedented degree of transparency and near-instantaneous transmission of information. These trends are not an aberration. The future operating environment promises to grow even more complex. Because of that, we believe it is important to reflect on what it means to be a part of a profession. We are asking ourselves how 9 years of war and an era of persistent transparency have affected our understanding of what it means to be a professional Soldier.

To begin the discourse, we are adding “The Army Profession” as a key objective in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Campaign of Learning over the next year and as a ninth imperative to our Leader Development Strategy. The Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE) will collaborate with the Center for Army Leadership and author a white paper that will serve as the catalyst for discourse on this subject as part of an Army-wide campaign. Ultimately, the results of this campaign will be incorporated as chapter 1 of Army Field Manual 1. To get the conversation started, Don Ahern of the Ahern Group, who was commissioned by CAPE to conduct a series of interviews with Army leaders on The Army Profession, recently interviewed me. By sharing this discussion with readers, I hope to make it clear that we will never take our stature as a profession for granted.

The Army’s professional ethic, though steeped in tradition, has evolved over time and will continue to do so. Why at this
time does the Army seem to be renewing its emphasis on the professional military ethic?

General Dempsey: An insight that has remained with me from my own professional development comes from a comment General Eric Shinseki made when he spoke to my class of brand new brigadier generals several years ago. General Shinseki was Chief of Staff at the time and someone asked him, “If we only remember one thing, what is a general officer’s principal responsibility to the institution?” His answer was, “Manage transitions.”

So to answer your question, “Why now?” I believe that we’re an Army in transition. Transitions are not discrete moments in time but have a temporal dimension. The transition we’re in now is a reflection of the institutional adaptations we’ve made in response to this era of persistent conflict. For example, ARFORGEN [Army Force Generation] is an institutional force management process that has allowed us to keep pace with operational requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan. We’ve adapted our force structure from an Army of Excellence organization to modular organizations. While we’ve always task-organized, we now move units around differently than we did before, and we’ve organized them differently to achieve this modular brigade-centric organization and structure within an ARFORGEN force management process.

However, in pursuing these adaptations, we may not have done so with a full appreciation of the challenges that would accrue in areas like leader development. So if you accept my premise that we’re an Army in transition—becoming more mindful of what it really means to be in persistent conflict, what persistent conflict does to leader development, what ARFORGEN does to leader development, what modularity has done to leader development—then I think it becomes imperative now that we examine our profession. We need to ensure that we’ve got the right emphasis in place to maintain our standing as a profession and to develop leaders of character despite the pressures of managing an Army in transition.

We talk about leadership at every level of the Army being indispensable and a fundamental part of the fabric of our Army ethic. What do you see as a leader’s responsibility to the profession?

General Dempsey: I think the leader’s responsibility is to preserve that which defines us as a profession. For example, expert knowledge, a commitment to continuing education, a certain set of values, notably among them the idea of service. We are a service-based profession that must remain apolitical in the American system of governance.

I think it’s also a leader’s responsibility to mold the young men and women who may join our ranks off the streets of America with a different set of values. I’m not trying to be judgmental, but I think we’d all agree that our particular skills, qualities, attributes, and values are different than what you would expect to recruit from the streets of America today. For that reason, I believe it falls to leaders to build our profession and to reinforce it over time. We have to “see ourselves.” We have to take a look at the pressures that impact upon our professional ethic. It falls to leaders at every rank to be introspective against this code of professionalism and to apply that code in how we lead the organizations under our control. In the case of Training and Doctrine Command, my job is to ensure not only that we’re delivering the hard skills required for combat operations, but also that we’re developing the
character of our Soldiers and leaders. In the end, it all comes down to character. We can’t afford to be a force absent character; it’s the foundation on which we have to build the American Army. Leaders must take ownership of that responsibility and avoid being pulled and tugged to the hard skills exclusively. I’m not suggesting that we have succumbed to current pressures and are neglecting character development, but there’s a risk there and we should always be mindful of it. Were that ever to happen we certainly couldn’t call ourselves a profession. Ultimately, it’s a leader’s responsibility.

How can we best shape the mindsets of Soldiers with respect to the profession?

General Dempsey: First and most important, the young Soldiers and leaders in our formations will emulate what they see, not what they hear. Recall that in my answer to your first question we discussed the effects of modularity on leader development. We’ve changed the way leaders interact with each other. The traditional mentoring, coaching, and teaching two levels down have been somewhat disrupted by modularity. Our corps and divisions are encumbered in the traditional sense because our brigades and battalions have a different operating relationship with higher headquarters as a result of modularity and the ARFORGEN process. We don’t have the same structures in place that in the past have allowed us to cultivate mentoring and coaching, so we’re going to have to work through that.

We had great discussions recently up at the West Point Senior Conference about why we stayed in the Army. What lit our fire? What we were really doing in that exercise was describing the act of emulation. If you find someone you want to be like when you grow up, so to speak, it’s much easier to follow a path that will get you there. If you’ve got a way to cultivate relationships that allows emulation, then I believe you have a recipe that will allow the profession and its values to permeate organizations. So I think first and foremost it’s in that context that leaders are able to influence the behavior of their organizations.

Secondly, we just have to enter into a discourse about our profession. We can’t take it for granted. We have to encourage, coerce if necessary, discussions within our ranks and within each cohort. By cohorts I mean officers, noncommissioned officers, warrant officers, and civilians. We need to collectively discuss what it is that makes us a profession and then encourage self-examination to help us understand whether we’re living up to it.

Then we need to reinforce our commitment to the profession through our policy, doctrine, and leader development. We have to make some revisions in our evaluation reports, in our promotion board guidance, and in other ways that provide an assessment of whether or not we’re reflecting the values of our profession. In other words, we can talk about it, but unless we place value on it and that value is reflected in promotions, advancement, and selection for command, then the discourse I described won’t much matter. To me, it’s some combination of personal conduct and setting the example ourselves while we in turn emulate the professional values of those we aspire to be, so it becomes an unbreakable cycle. It’s also encouraging this discourse but not without following through to find ways to reward professional ethic behaviors in our promotion and selection processes.

You’ve described why now is the time to focus on the profession, but what makes the Army a unique profession?
General Dempsey: First and foremost, I always remind audiences broadly that the Army can do a lot of things, but it must do one thing on behalf of the Nation. It must have a monopoly on violence. It must have a monopoly on the use of force. That's the foundation. Lethality, if you will, is the foundation on which everything we do must be built, but lethality brings with it incredible obligations and responsibilities. And I think it's in understanding those responsibilities that we find the ethic, that we find the ultimate requirement for character. Although it probably goes without saying, you simply do not want men and women who lack integrity, who lack character, who lack a sense of belonging to something greater than themselves wielding the instrument of force.

So what makes us unique is not only what the Nation asks us to do, but also the very values derived from that tremendous responsibility. We're unique because the stakes are much higher for us than they are in other professions.

What do you believe will come from this renewed emphasis on the Army profession? For example, as TRADOC commander, do you foresee future changes to training programs and doctrine?

General Dempsey: I'll answer that, but first let me describe what we plan to do to emphasize the profession over the next year or so.

We're starting with a white paper that the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic and the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth are collaborating on. The intent is for that white paper to be the catalyst for the discourse we want to have about our profession. To expand the discussion farther and wider, we'll use social networking—everything from blogs to Twitter to Facebook to whatever it happens to be—to begin to gain an appreciation for what the profession thinks about itself against this kind of benchmarking white paper.

From there, we'll encourage senior leaders and stakeholders who own those processes you described—the doctrine, training programs, as well as organizational development, leader development, and personnel policies—to adapt them as required because they all reflect and affect our profession. For example, our personnel policies on command tour lengths or on professional military education are important. We have to examine whether we have the proper incentives. Are there disincentives? All of these things affect this thing we call the profession. What we want to do is expose what we're doing well because we're doing a lot of things well. But we also want to know what we're not doing so well. With that gap analysis we want to take a DOTMLPF [doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities] look and then decide what we should do and what we can do. We will likely decide to do some things immediately. Others might have to be deferred because of the pressures of the current fight. But we need to understand it.

In describing my current concerns, I'd say that I sense some “weak signals.” My instincts born over 36 years of service are telling me that we've got some challenges that we need to address. In this first year or so, we'll take time to understand the problem, to frame the problem, and then we'll endeavor to make the adjustments we need to make.

Are there any other insights you'd like to share as you go forward?

General Dempsey: I'm always alert for ways to bring these issues alive for people, make it something tangible and understandable. To make
changes in a big organization, you have to appeal not only to reason but also to emotion. Generally speaking, people will accept your rationale but may not change because they haven’t been captured emotionally by what you’re asking them to do. So I think one of the challenges we’ve got is to bring it alive. I’ve been looking around a lot to find examples of why we should change. When I say change, by the way, particularly when we’re talking about the profession, there are many things we do that are enduring and must endure, but there are also some things that we are asking our profession to do differently.

I think probably the word *adaptation* or *adaptable* as an attribute has always been somewhat important, but in the context of an operating environment that’s largely decentralized, I think that adaptability becomes more important. Today it’s more important for a young captain to be adaptable than when I was a young captain. So what we’ve got to do is figure out how we get at that earlier as we develop our leaders.

Secondly, we’ve got to figure out what it means to decentralize. Decentralization has become a kind of unquestioned good. It’s in our joint and Army doctrine. We talk about pushing responsibility and authority to the edge. We talk about enabling the edge. My concern is that as we push capability and authority and responsibility to the edge, with it we’re also pushing all the risk. In pushing all the risk to the edge, at some point we begin to rub uncomfortably against one of the foundational aspects of the profession: trust. Because when we’re pushing all the risk to the edge and holding junior leaders accountable for failure, we may not be sharing that failure with them back up the chain of command. As failures occur, and they will, we begin to erode trust, and when we begin to erode trust, we begin to erode the profession.

That’s another reason why I think that now is the right time to conduct a comprehensive assessment of how these things intersect. One is our profession. One is this idea of leader development more broadly. Not just professional development, but leader development in general. Then there’s this issue of decentralized operations and what they mean to our profession and to the development of the leaders who will lead the profession.

But I mentioned trying to find some examples to bring it alive. You may have noticed that I walked into the room reading. What I was reading was a *New York Times* editorial by David Brooks called “Drilling for Certainty” that describes the crisis with the [April 20, 2010] oil well explosion in the Gulf of Mexico. The piece makes note that at the end of the day, the event was caused by a combination of failures. It was a failure of processes and a failure of systems. But most importantly, it was a failure of imagination and a failure in leader development. Because what engineers and corporate executives apparently failed to appreciate is that they were asking their subordinates to deal in increasing complexity. The act of drilling at 5,000 feet was exponentially more difficult than drilling at 1,000 feet. As complexity was building and risk was accumulating, they continued to push that risk to the platform. We can learn from that.

We’ve said that the operating environment in which we ask a leader to perform is complex, but we make some linear assumptions about it, and in so doing we assume that it’s manageable. Yet I think we’ve learned and continue to learn that risks and complexity are exponentially growing over time. If that’s the case, then the example of this catastrophe in the Gulf can potentially inform our thinking about leader development.

In terms of images that may help us understand our challenge, that’s a pretty good one. **PRISM**
Winston Churchill once famously declared, “Gentlemen, we have run out of money. Now we have to think.” Churchill’s admonition underlies the theme of *The Frugal Superpower*, a slender but trenchant work presenting a chastening forecast for American foreign policy in the 21st century. Michael Mandelbaum, who is the Christian A. Herter Professor and Director of American Foreign Policy at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC, explains how economic constraints will curtail America’s post–World War II role as the “world’s de facto government” and the consequences of that diminished role. The era of “American exceptionalism” has waned, he maintains; henceforth, the United States will behave more like an ordinary power. Written with verve and pith, this is a book for all readers, professional and general alike, who are concerned about America’s place in the world.

The financial crisis of 2008–2009 and stimulus spending to overcome it, the cost of the Iraq War, soaring deficits and debt, and a ballooning entitlement burden for retired boomers will severely limit resources available for foreign policy. For seven decades, “more” was the answer for domestic and foreign problems. Mandelbaum contends “less” will set the parameters for foreign policy in the future.

Nonetheless, for the foreseeable future America will remain the world’s major power, although its leadership will be in question. Unlike the anti-American polemicist Andrew Bacevich, who regards America as a malign force in world history,1 Mandelbaum thinks the world’s peoples will be worse off with a retrenched America. Since World War II, he writes, “the United States play[ed] a major, constructive, and historically unprecedented role in the world,” bringing peace and prosperity to much of the globe. It did so, of course, out of enlightened self-interest, not altruism.2 Foreign policy is not missionary work. America’s challenge in the new century will be “to provide leadership on a shoestring.” The age of scarcity, however, could have the benefit of restraining U.S. “carelessness” in foreign policy.

Mandelbaum judges President Bill Clinton’s eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the first “careless” blunder of the post–Cold War era. A crass partisan ploy to capture East European voters in the 1996 election, this move broke our promise to Russia not to advance to its border and sapped Russia’s trust in the United States
as a partner. Ambassador Jack Matlock supports Mandelbaum’s argument. Matlock was the note taker at a meeting on February 9, 1990, when Secretary of State Jim Baker persuaded Mikhail Gorbachev to allow a reunited Germany to remain in NATO with “a promise that NATO jurisdiction and troops would not expand to the east.” Matlock confirms that Gorbachev’s belief “coincides with my notes of the conversation except that mine indicate that Baker added, ‘not one inch.’” Oddly, Gorbachev did not ask for a written confirmation of this pledge.

The second careless blunder was President George W. Bush’s ill-conceived, bungled occupation of Iraq, tarnishing America’s standing in the world. Mandelbaum hopes an age of austerity will foster “prudence” thus far absent from our record in East Europe and the Middle East. A pinched pocketbook will prompt the United States to seek international cooperation, but Mandelbaum doubts Japan and Europe will offer much security assistance. He cites NATO’s anemic role in Afghanistan, a conflict sanctioned by the first invocation of Article V in NATO’s history. The viability and credibility of NATO have caused Defense Secretary Robert Gates to refer to the emergence of a “two-tier alliance,” where some members do the fighting, while others, not to put too fine a point on it, freeload. At a NATO meeting in February, Gates voiced alarm at NATO’s serious underinvestment in collective defense for over a decade and, particularly, at the “demilitarization of Europe.” The pacifism of European publics, Gates warned, poses an “impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st century.”

In 2011, and Poland plans to pull out its 2,600 troops in 2012.

With a cash-strapped America upholding global security and prosperity on a “bluff,” as the author puts it, he considers whether discontented powers such as Russia and China might contest the international status quo in Europe and East Asia. For the near term, Mandelbaum concludes, domestic problems, including a demographic crisis in both countries and economic incentives, will discourage China and Russia from calling our bluff and challenging the status quo.

Demography is destiny. Chinese and Russian demographic trends have historical salience. China’s rice bowl will not remain so full in coming years. On top of grave environmental degradation and other internal woes, China’s graying population will make the country old before it gets rich. The Communist Party’s one-child-per-family policy has lowered the fertility rate from 5.8 in the 1970s to 1.8 today, below the population replacement rate of 2.1. Moreover, the widespread practice of sex-selective abortion has produced excess males. A declining working-age population will drive up labor costs, eroding one of China’s key competitive advantages, and a large cohort of young, unattached males threatens social stability. At the same time, life expectancy has risen from 35 in 1949 to 73 today. By 2050, China’s elderly will increase from 100 million people over 60 today to 334 million, including 100 million over age 80. China lacks the means to care for this elderly nation.

If China faces dire demographics, Russia is caught in the throes of demographic suicide. Demographer Nicholas Eberstadt has documented Russia’s unstoppable depopulation due to a “death crisis” among working-age men and women, a trend that continued unabated.

Mandelbaum believes the Middle East will occupy the center of geopolitics in the new century. Oil is the crux of the matter. A sustainable foreign policy, he argues, requires a steep reduction in our oil consumption, which would strengthen international security as well as our own financial solvency. Americans’ demand for cheap gas represents the “single greatest failure” of U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century. The obvious solution is a stiff gas tax. Mandelbaum’s case makes common sense. But he acknowledges that Energy Secretary Steven Chu, having endorsed a gas tax while a private citizen, decided once in office that it was “not politically feasible.” Mandelbaum foresees dim prospects for a world with an economically constrained Uncle Sam. The world will suffer the baleful results of a United States with too little power: “One thing worse than an America that is too strong, the world will learn, is an America that is too weak.”

The age of austerity has arrived. Former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft has also spoken of its implications for foreign policy, noting that austerity will force us to assess goals and costs more carefully and to set priorities.10 A theme of the Obama administration’s national security strategy has been “mutual rights and responsibilities,” or burden-sharing. Other nations, however, have experienced the same economic problems that have beset America. NATO members have not met their defense-spending commitment of 2 percent of gross domestic product annually for the last decade and will certainly make deep reductions in the future. Last spring a senior Pentagon official stated in a briefing, “Of the world’s top 25 debtor nations, the number that are U.S. allies: 19.”11 The National Intelligence Council and European Union undertook a study of what the world would look like in 2025. The team interviewed officials in China, Japan, Brazil, South Africa, India, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates. The team found concern about the problems lying ahead, but not a will to solve them. One official connected with the study remarked, “What’s interesting is how little any other nation feels responsibility.”12

In a May speech at the Eisenhower Library, Secretary Gates cited President Obama’s invocation of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s counsel to maintain spending “balance in and among national programs.”13 Gates stated that the splurge of military spending cannot continue as it has, doubling in the last decade: “The gusher has been turned off, and will stay off for a good period of time.”14 He noted the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) staggering health care costs (at $50 billion, roughly equal to the State Department’s entire foreign affairs and assistance budget), unsustainable weapons programs, and bureaucratic bloat (overhead comprising 40 percent of DOD’s budget). His favorite example was how a request for a dog-handling team in Afghanistan had to obtain approval from five four-star headquarters before being dispatched. All this for a guy and his dog! The solution, Gates maintained, is not more study or legislation, but the political courage to make hard choices.
This summer Gates made a down payment on his commitment, announcing a decision to cut thousands of jobs and a major military command to streamline operations and ward off a budgetary meat-axe approach by Congress. He recommended dismantling the U.S. Joint Forces Command, employing about 2,800 military and civilian personnel and 3,300 contractors, eliminating two other Pentagon agencies, reducing intelligence advisory contracts by 10 percent, paring flag officers’ ranks by 50 positions, and shrinking contractor funding 10 percent annually for 3 years. Gates’s proposals aim to trim the tooth-to-tail ratio, shifting resources from overhead and bureaucracy to troops and weapons.15

As Gates announced Pentagon spending cuts, the State Department found itself $400 million short for its mission, beginning in September, to take over Iraqi police training from coalition military forces. State also plans to replace its current 16 Provincial Reconstruction Teams across the country with five consular offices outside Baghdad. To provide security for civilians now guarded by the U.S. military, State proposes to hire its own army of 2,700 security contractors and reinforce facilities for diplomats and police trainers beyond specifications now considered safe for military personnel. To transport civilians around Iraq, including medical evacuation if necessary, State has asked DOD to leave behind two dozen UH–60 helicopters and 50 bomb-resistant vehicles, heavy cargo trucks, fuel trailers, and high-tech surveillance systems, all to be maintained and operated by as-yet-unfunded contractors.

Congress has not given a warm reception to State’s request for additional funding. “They need a dose of fiscal reality,” said one senior Senate aide involved in the negotiations.16 “If they miscalculated by hundreds of millions of dollars, they need to tell us where they propose to find the money. . . . It’s not going to come from [funds allotted to] Afghanistan or Haiti.” Deputy Secretary of State Jacob Lew, now Obama’s nominee to head the Office of Management and Budget, told Congress the department will not deploy civilians where it cannot protect them. He warned that if more money was not appropriated for State’s operations budget, it would have to be taken out of development assistance programs for Iraq and elsewhere. “So now you have security, but no programs,” said a senior House staffer. “That’s what drives us nuts about them. They screwed this one up, and we have to fix it.”17

The days of a spendthrift superpower may be over, but the United States will not become quite an ordinary power either. Uncle Sam cannot be an all-purpose 911 number. Being a quixotic doer of all manner of good works—armed humanitarian interventions, feckless state-building where no state exists, the fool’s errand of “democratic transformation”—would forever entangle the United States in other states’ domestic affairs and prevent a match between financial resources and national goals. America must shed the hubris of “the indispensable nation.” A realistic acceptance of limits, a focus on vital interests, and acting in concert with other nations when our mutual interests coincide are essential steps toward reshaping a viable American foreign policy. PRISM

Notes


4 Ibid., 319.


7 In contrast, Robert Kagan sees the return of traditional power politics in *The Return of History and the End of Dreams* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008).


12 Ibid.


14 Ibid.


17 Ibid.

18 Fear can be a useful spur to realism and cooperation. A concert of mutual interest is forming in Asia, where Southeast Asian nations, led by Vietnam, are augmenting their military power and want a robust U.S. presence in East Asia to counter China’s aggressiveness. See John Pomfret, “Concerned About China’s Rise, Southeast Asian Nations Build Up Militaries,” *The Washington Post*, August 9, 2010, A8.
The Vietnam War, long viewed as an example of a U.S. military and political failure best to be forgotten, has reemerged as a hot topic of historical revision. With counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, analysts and pundits are drawing parallels between American mistakes today and those of 40 years ago. Unfortunately, too many merely offer polemics over reasoned analyses, either restating long-held assumptions about Vietnam formulated in the immediate aftermath of the war and unquestioned since or providing shallow summaries of the war intended to prove preconceived points. The Vietnam War, according to much of the literature, remains a fiasco directed by arrogant politicians and inept commanders and fought by luckless troops who stumbled about the countryside blind to the realities they faced. Yet the Vietnam War—as with all wars, to include today’s—proved to be a far more complex conflict than some would have us believe. If there were those whose hubris failed us, there were also dedicated military and civilians who fought mightily to achieve success. The inept served side by side with the skilled. While blame for ultimate failure can be fairly apportioned, in the end the United States eventually succumbed as much to the conditions and, with due credit not often granted by historians, the competent and well-led enemy it faced as to its own incompetence. Whether or not the Vietnam War could have been won (assuming winning is ever the objective of counterinsurgencies) remains a question that cannot be reduced to simple formulas or indictments of individuals or institutions. Instead, understanding the complexities of counterinsurgency, both then and now, demands a far more nuanced examination of the challenges inherent in these types of conflicts.

It is an understanding of these nuances that makes Why Vietnam Matters, by Rufus Phillips, such an engaging and informative read. A personal memoir by a self-professed idealist and somewhat accidental Army, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and then Foreign Service officer, Phillips’s story is one of discovery and intuitive adaptation to the challenges of complex operations, as well as of opportunities lost. It is also an informed narrative of innovative attempts at building grassroots capacities during the first decade of America’s involvement in the Vietnam War. During that critical period, the author labored to solve the root maladies fueling the conflict, both at the local level and as an advisor to both Vietnamese and American senior leaders. His book presents a candid, often impassioned, eyewitness account of the increasing violence that swept the country after French withdrawal in the mid-1950s and the subsequent American intervention.
He chronicles his frustration as he watched the United States seek a military solution to what was a largely political problem. If the Vietnam War remains half a century removed from the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, its track as recounted by Phillips possesses an eerily prescient contemporary relevance.

The book begins with the early experiences of the author in Vietnam in the mid-1950s. A bored law student at Yale, Phillips jumped at the enticements of adventure and elitism offered by CIA recruiters. In the shadowy civil-military world that characterized the agency at the time, he arrived in Vietnam ostensibly assigned to the U.S. military advisory group formed in the wake of France’s defeat and withdrawal. He was assigned to a small band of independently operating iconoclasts whose mission remains, to this day, clouded in secrecy, but that, at its roots, involved restoring Vietnamese governance and control in the countryside. They were led by the now famous (or infamous, depending on one’s historical sense) Edward Lansdale. An outspoken Air Force colonel and CIA official, Lansdale had already established his reputation as a highly controversial expert in counterinsurgency. As the personal advisor to Philippine minister of defense, and later president, Ramon Magsaysay during the Huk Rebellion a few years before, he overturned the policies of the American military advisory effort by dealing directly with Magsaysay (much to the chagrin of his nominal military commander in the U.S. advisory mission) to transform the Philippine army. Eschewing conventional military wisdom focused on combat operations against insurgents, Lansdale instead pushed for an army designed not only to provide security to the population, but also to address the political and economic ills underpinning the insurgency. Rather than conducting ineffective combat sweeps that inevitably disrupted and sometimes terrorized the rural population, Lansdale convinced Magsaysay to retool the army so it could not only establish security but, far more important, also serve as the initial face of governmental legitimacy by providing essential services, rebuilding shattered infrastructure, and restoring local faith in the government. Once feared and distrusted by villagers, the army soon garnered respect and admiration, in the process isolating the Huk guerrillas and making them highly vulnerable to the special units hunting them. Within a few years, the insurgency withered and died.

Phillips came to unabashedly admire Lansdale, who sought to implement a similar philosophy to rebuild the Vietnamese army. Initially frustrated by his quixotic commander’s apparent randomness and often perceived inaction, the author soon came to understand Lansdale’s gift for building personal relationships, gaining an understanding of problems in Vietnamese (rather than American) terms, and only then moving forward with his ideas. Sent to meet and observe the Vietnamese, Phillips and others on Lansdale’s team cultivated the same qualities. Gaining the trust of Vietnamese leaders, not surprisingly along with the animosity of much of the U.S. military advisory mission, they proceeded to remodel the Vietnamese army, whose units were demoralized by the French retreat. At a time when the French were leaving behind a fractured state and the political and security vacuum was being filled by well-organized and armed Viet Minh cadres, Phillips found himself retraining and then accompanying Vietnamese units as they reoccupied parts of the Mekong Delta and then the Central Highlands. Establishing the authority of the newly independent Saigon
regime, rebuilding infrastructure, providing food and medical care in villages, conducting what today would be called information operations not only through the media but also using such culturally specific tools as highly entertaining plays and musical concerts, and addressing civil as well as military problems, the army units proved to be remarkably popular. If perhaps not capable of fighting a well-equipped enemy in stand-up battle, it showed itself to be a highly effective political force, one able to neutralize Viet Minh encroachments and restore government authority.

In describing these innovative approaches, the author also details the bureaucratic infighting and competing priorities among American agencies operating in Vietnam, perhaps not surprisingly for those who have dealt with interagency planning and operations today. His ire becomes evident as he recounts policymakers in Washington and Saigon stubbornly issuing guidance that had little relevance to the countryside, supporting corrupt leaders, placing American interests in Saigon over democratization and development, and failing to integrate operations by the many U.S. agencies in the country. Notably, the author also cites the patriotism and integrity of Ngo Dinh Diem, president of Vietnam and eventual victim of assassination who, Phillips asserts, alienated American leaders largely due to his staunch nationalism and unwillingness to compromise Vietnamese sovereignty for U.S. purposes. It was, according to the author, this nationalism that Lansdale and his team understood, and that also caused them to butt against policies and priorities of the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM), responsible for all aid and assistance. While USOM concentrated on ensuring American influence in the capital, Phillips worked to rebuild government authority in the countryside in the face of a growing communist insurgency from the north. His comments on the dichotomies make telling and uncomfortable reading for observers of American counterinsurgency efforts over the past several years. They recount a theme that seems not to have altered in the decades since. In the author’s words, “Everything was centralized, from the top down. Not only did they appear incapable of understanding the bottom up idea of village development but they seemed to perceive it as a threat to their own programs.” When he departed Southeast Asia in late 1959, Phillips admits to being demoralized by the American effort and fearful of the consequences. He responded by leaving government service.

After a 2-year hiatus in the business world, the author returned to Vietnam in 1962, and much of the rest of the narrative recounts his deep involvement in the Rural Affairs and Strategic Hamlet Programs while working for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). His details of village problems, misguided programs and metrics, and lack of accountability have been documented by many historians and observers of the period. His is a tale of growing frustration carried over from his earlier experiences, with particular wrath directed at American leaders who failed to understand the Vietnamese context of the growing war, and the increasing militarization of the American effort leading to inevitable disaster. He bitterly recounts the coup and subsequent assassination of Diem, a series of events he sees as the direct result of duplicity and wrongheadedness. Even more bitterly, he describes the marginalization and eventual discarding in 1967 of Lansdale, his mentor, as the large-scale deployment of U.S. military forces changed the character of the war.
Lansdale’s demise, Phillips asserts, is the result of the clear failure of American leaders to comprehend the causes of the conflict. Indeed, much of the second half of the book is an indictment of that failure. His memories spare no one. USAID officials are castigated for their unwillingness to venture beyond Saigon, which directly led to the policy drift experienced by the Rural Affairs Program, then headed by Phillips. Particular venom is directed at James Killen, sent to Saigon in 1964 to direct the USAID mission. Killen’s penchant for bookkeeping and his unwillingness or inability to see beyond Saigon led him to downgrade the role of Rural Affairs, cancel many of its grassroots programs (he cites Killen as characterizing well-digging projects in villages as a “boondoggle”), and systematically remove many of those involved in the program—some of whom, perhaps not coincidentally, had been nurtured by Lansdale, who was also increasingly being marginalized, even though he was nominally an advisor to the Ambassador. By 1966, Lansdale’s relationship with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., had become so strained that the once-hailed expert of counterinsurgency had little influence on decisionmaking. Instead of relying on long-term patience and cumulative effects to help the Saigon government regain control of the countryside, U.S. leaders in Vietnam, pushed by Washington, demanded instant results. The United States needed to win a war, the Vietnamese to build a country. The two could not be reconciled.

Why Vietnam Matters is a story of competing approaches to counterinsurgency and nation-building, one top-down and the other bottom-up, and the inability to link the two. It is also one of divergent strategic and operational goals between a country engulfed in its own internal war and another seeking to achieve global objectives by rapidly winning that war. Yet the book suffers from what may be a fatal flaw: it lacks context. The personal experiences and frustrations of the author that give the book its authenticity and its urgency to today also make it suspect. An avid admirer of Lansdale, and obviously bitter at the controversial figure’s demise, Phillips views all events through a one-sided lens. His memories may be accurate depictions of what he experienced, but they are hardly balanced. His staunch defense of Diem, for example, dismisses contemporary and historical charges of ineptness and corruption as American excuses for duplicity. He fails to delve into many of the decisions and policies made early in the war, and thus his complaints appear somewhat shallow. The reader is not given the opportunity to decide for himself. Nonetheless, Phillips’s memories of those struggles in the countryside and among key decisionmakers, as a participant and an observer, are both interesting and instructive. One cannot help but draw analogies to the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, his discussion of Lansdale’s innovative approaches, especially retraining indigenous security forces for a larger purpose and his focus on local political and economic development, is instructive and relevant to today. His evident frustration with the political infighting between agencies, inability of American leaders to understand the root causes of the conflict at the local level, and incessant demands for progress from officials far removed from the scene leads the reader to reflect on just how little we have progressed in the past four decades when it comes to these types of wars. These insights, if for no other reason than they will cause the reader to stop and reflect, make the book a worthwhile read. One would do well, however, to have a working knowledge of the history of the era beforehand. PRISM
In Exporting Security, Derek Reveron provides a thorough analysis of the changing security environment within which the U.S. military operates, and throughout the book he makes the case why military strategy and engagement must continue their evolution beyond combat. There is compelling rationale why the face of the U.S. military must change, why the phasing of military operations must include the creation of a stable environment for development efforts, and why different approaches to security cooperation and efforts to promote maritime security are needed to suit 21st-century missions.

Reveron details recent military action within this new security environment that encompasses combat, counterinsurgency operations, foreign security force training, and foreign development assistance. These actions have changed the face of the U.S. military at times, even without an agreed upon definition of the role the new military should play around the world:

Current views of the security environment require that the United States “address security from a holistic perspective and integrate our efforts across the U.S. government.” But the military has painfully learned that it cannot rely on international organizations, allies, or other government departments to fill the void among national ends, ways, and means. It is accepted in doctrine that civilians should perform civilian tasks, but civilians (NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] included) have limited ability to deploy in sufficient numbers in violent or poorly developed areas of the world. . . . Consequently, the U.S. military has changed to deliver comprehensive solutions through a new model of defense-security cooperation.

Yet from the perspective of the NGO community and, I suspect, many civilians involved in diplomatic and development functions within the U.S. Government, Mr. Reveron takes his case too far.

The framework of the book is based on an expanded definition of security and the concept of exporting security to other realms, from diplomacy to development, that have not traditionally adopted the primacy of a military-defined security frame to shape their strategy and global engagement. While security is
important, and there is a role for the military to shape a security environment by preventing and preparing the ground during a phase zero of military operations, there are other approaches to U.S. global engagement that are just as valid. Advancing the Millennium Development Goals, promoting economic development, supporting human rights principles, creating democratic institutions, shaping environmentally sustainable growth, or ensuring the space for a diplomatic dialogue are all frames that should shape how the United States engages with the world. While a broader definition of security is part of this list, it is not the overarching frame. Each approach to global engagement has a cadre of professionals within the U.S. Government and public, from diplomats and development experts to environmentalists and human rights activists. The role and importance of these other professions are largely ignored in the book, and the overwhelming resources of the military become the primary reason why the U.S. military must broaden its scope to include, among other skill sets, warrior-diplomats and humanitarian soldiers.

International security has fundamentally shifted twice in the last 20 years, once with the fall of the Berlin Wall and again with the destruction of the World Trade Center. These two occasions, one filled with joy and relief and the other with shock and tragedy, have altered the way diplomacy, foreign and development assistance, and national security are carried out worldwide. Simultaneously, the nature of conflict has been shifting from a framework of interstate aggression to one of intrastate political power struggles and transnational armed networks. All of these complex security and combat shifts need to be reflected in U.S. military strategy.

As a major, if not the primary, global power, the United States has taken the initiative to rapidly adapt its military policy and apply these changes in Iraq, Afghanistan, and throughout Africa. Reveron expertly analyzes this new behavior, which includes maritime security aid in Africa’s Gulf of Guinea, security cooperation and training with national armies, and humanitarian assistance under the auspices of regional commands, such as U.S. Africa Command. The community of development-focused NGOs welcomes the U.S. military’s involvement in the professionalization of foreign forces. Such activities contribute to respect for civilian rule of law and human rights as well as to the overall stability of the countries receiving the help. These activities prove that the U.S. military has become more than a combat force; it is now also a security trainer, advisor, postwar reconstruction actor, and, if Reveron’s ideas are accepted, a diplomat and a development professional. The issue is not whether the face of the military should be altered from active combatant to security advisor to reflect these changes in international security, but where the roles of development actor and diplomat should lie.

Development actors and senior U.S. military personnel in Washington, DC, have noticed the civilian capabilities gap uncovered by the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates highlighted this issue when discussing U.S. civilian agency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and more specifically the “ad hoc and on the fly” manner in which the interagency Provincial Reconstruction Teams were created, which is untenable in a “climate of crisis.” The lack of civilian expertise has created a burden for the U.S. military as it attempts to fill the gap between development needs and capabilities.
These reflections and warnings have not stopped at Secretary Gates’s desk, but they have rather reverberated throughout the foreign policy community in Washington. Aid to many frontline states such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, and Pakistan increased in 2008, but as this aid increased, the responsibilities for oversight shifted to, or have been shared by, the Department of Defense (DOD). This has led DOD to grow into a major development funder at the expense of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which was once the foremost foreign assistance agency in the world. As aid programs have become increasingly fragmented across the U.S. Government, the USAID staff has decreased to less than half the size of 15 years ago. Recent studies by the RAND Corporation and the Government Accountability Office show that the lack of trained and experienced diplomatic staff has resulted in inexperienced U.S. diplomats filling positions in conflict zones instead of seasoned professionals or aid experts. This diminished civilian capacity led the military to take action to fill a perceived vacuum.

The expansion of the military to traditionally civilian activities complicates civilian efforts as well as the foreign perception of the U.S. military. In 2007, Secretary Gates warned of the “creeping militarization” of U.S. diplomacy and development functions, and emerged as a leading advocate for increased civilian-led development funding. This included voicing the need for increased funding for the Department of State and USAID. During the annual Landon Lecture at Kansas State University, Secretary Gates observed that “one of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win.” At a later event Gates stated, “America’s civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long—relative to what we traditionally spend on the military, and more important, relative to the responsibilities and challenges our nation has around the world.” While Reveron may not agree, it is apparent that U.S. development agencies and senior military staff believe that civilians should be the diplomats and should be taking the lead on U.S. development and humanitarian assistance projects.

It is important, however, to recognize that the U.S. military does have a critical role in humanitarian relief and, to a lesser extent, development efforts. In large-scale natural disaster emergencies, such as the recent Haiti earthquake and in the aftermath of the December 2004 tsunami in Indonesia, the U.S. military often plays a crucial role in disaster response by providing logistical resources, air and marine transport capabilities, and engineering services. Relations and operational norms between the military and NGOs have become increasingly routine in such settings. Beyond this critical role, as a general rule, experienced civilian agencies, especially USAID with its professional development and humanitarian staff, are best placed to support effective development, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction activities that address the needs of the poor.

While the U.S. military provides tireless assistance in these emergency situations, its involvement in complex humanitarian environments can be deeply problematic. The U.S. military’s chief focus is security, so its relief and development activities emphasize winning the “hearts and minds” of a population, not the humanitarian imperative of saving lives, doing no harm, and ensuring local ownership of reconstruction efforts. Moreover, the military
generally lacks specialized humanitarian and development expertise, so quick-impact projects and other activities motivated by security objectives often undermine sustainable development projects, community participation and ownership, and relationships built by the United Nations (UN) and NGO workers over years or decades. Quick-impact projects address the symptoms of development ills such as poverty instead of the causes. This is further complicated when well-intended projects may have negative consequences and may be unsustainable due to the military’s short-term goals and high turnover. Relief activities by the military can also compromise the security of U.S. NGOs in or near conflict areas by blurring the lines between humanitarian and military personnel, which can heighten insecurity for NGO staff, local partners, and beneficiaries and restrict access to the communities served.

This diminishing security for humanitarian NGOs is a major factor that shapes the views of the broader NGO humanitarian community and its relationship with an evolving U.S. military. Sadly, humanitarian workers have been directly targeted in armed attacks. Some 260 humanitarian aid workers were killed, kidnapped, or seriously injured in violent attacks in 2008. That year’s fatality rate for international aid workers exceeded that for UN peacekeeping troops and the 155 American soldiers killed that year in Afghanistan. Whether it is the direct targeting of NGOs by radical groups or the shrinking of neutral humanitarian space by the U.S. military, the safety of NGO staffs in war zones continues to deteriorate. Aid groups are now being attacked because they are perceived as Western or in partnership with Western governments and militaries, even though the majority of NGO staffs are of local or national origin. NGOs have begun to cooperate with militaries and private security contractors in order to address these issues.

To establish mutually acceptable boundaries, InterAction and DOD, working through the United States Institute of Peace, negotiated “Guidelines for Relations between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments.” The guidelines determine how the military is to work with other stakeholders on the ground, including NGOs and interagency colleagues. The publication provides recommended processes to improve the nature of the military-NGO relationship. The recommendations for the military include the wearing of uniforms or distinctive clothing to avoid confusion with NGO representatives, avoidance of interfering with relief efforts toward civilian populations considered unfriendly by the military, and respecting NGO views concerning the carrying of arms in NGO sites. The guidelines’ recommendations for NGOs are equally critical and shape the behavior of humanitarian NGOs working in war zones to ensure the U.S. military can conduct its operations effectively. These guidelines have been integrated into U.S. military field manuals and have facilitated greater cooperation between military and civilian organizations throughout the world.

Even though action is being taken to improve civilian-military relations and to limit humanitarian worker kidnapping, it should not be forgotten that Reveron’s vision of warrior-diplomats and development workers exceeds the military’s capabilities and core skill set. As Secretary Gates stated, the militarization of U.S. foreign policy and civilian activities is not the solution to underfunded civilian agencies. Allowing the expansion of the U.S. military into civilian sectors will not only continue the understaffing of civilian agencies and
complicate the mission of the military, but it will also contribute to a variety of obstacles, including insecurity, within the development community.

While the U.S. military provides much-needed technical and operational assistance to other nations during military training, humanitarian disasters, and transnational operations, the effectiveness of DOD as a development and diplomatic actor remains very much in question. Even after years of programs in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD does not appear to have a methodology for measuring the effectiveness of its development, humanitarian, and diplomatic activities. Best practices and sensibilities of the 21st century require that development organizations assess the community’s needs for the type and placement of buildings and for goods and services, including education and skill development, prior to taking any action. The military lens is necessarily different and often cannot be the same as the lens through which U.S. civilian aid workers and the NGO community view their tasks. The unfortunate result can be unusable buildings that feed the very “hard” feelings the military’s diligent work was intended to transform. The civilian diplomat is similarly shaped by a different skill set and broader orientation to diplomatic relations between states or with nonstate actors. Reveron’s argument for changing the nature of military and security in the world is well founded and unavoidable, but the expansion of the military into development and broader diplomatic fields requires skills and flexibility the military does not have, nor are they skills it should develop. Civilian agencies should lead development operations, and Reveron’s warrior-diplomats should adopt the more focused roles of ensuring better security cooperation, training peacekeepers, and building armed forces in the developing world that respect rule of law and human rights. As the U.S. military evolves and adapts to the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, it must cooperate with and help strengthen the U.S. State Department and USAID to align diplomatic, development, and defense policies and capacity.

Notes


