

# “Train as You Fight” Revisited: Preparing for a Comprehensive Approach

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In 1973 General William F. DePuy, first commander of the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), emphasized that it was necessary to expose soldiers to realistic battlefield conditions before they experienced actual combat.<sup>1</sup> Doing this should improve the soldiers’ preparation and thereby, in the long run, their effectiveness and efficiency. DePuy’s belief was widely shared and led to the development of new training methods and a training philosophy that is often referred to as “train as you fight”. Ever since, military training programs have continuously been improved and better shaped towards the real threats that soldiers were facing in the theater. A clear example reflecting the new philosophy was the establishment of the US Combat Training Centers (CTCs). The five pillars upon which the CTC program is based, require (1) that participating units be organized as they would for actual combat, (2) a dedicated, doctrinally proficient operations group, (3) a dedicated, realistic opposing force (OPFOR), (4) a training facility being capable of simulating combat conditions, and (5) a base infrastructure.<sup>2</sup> This suggests that the main focus in training is to develop a combat ready force that is physically and psychologically prepared to fight and win wars.<sup>3</sup> The dominant focus on combat readiness is also mentioned in a 2006 RAND report reviewing for the United States Army its leadership development. The authors concluded that whereas changes in operational environment were identified (e.g. “operations other than war”), “adaptation has centered largely on the more tangible elements and mechanics of war.”<sup>4</sup>

Indeed, as the RAND report mentions, many of today’s crisis operations demand that political, economic, developmental factors besides the security ones have to be addressed simultaneously, because they are highly interrelated.<sup>5</sup> Since this requires specific expertise and domain knowledge, global interventions are increasingly about coordinated and cooperative approaches of civilian and

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military actors, and state and non-state actors such as international and non-governmental organizations (IO/NGOs): a Comprehensive Approach to operations.

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This new and dynamic constellation of parties and disciplines, an ad hoc social system on its own, requires new competencies and skills in interacting with these diverse perspectives and understanding the complex interrelations. However, in most military training institutes, American and European alike, one observes only very limited incorporation of these new requirements.<sup>6</sup> In some institutes (e.g. Marine Corps Training and Education Command (TECOM)), cultural awareness has become one of the training objectives,<sup>7</sup> while in others (e.g. CIMIC Centre of Excellence in The Netherlands) relatively small numbers of dedicated Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) personnel are trained to support the commander's mission. Just as within the CTCs, training focuses mostly on the development of combat ready forces. Readiness for operating in complex environments with civil, military and local actors and effectors is largely ignored, even though this is quite likely demanded in many current and future theaters – in addition to traditional (kinetic) warfare.

Notwithstanding the importance of combat training, this article emphasizes the importance of fully incorporating a comprehensive approach to operations and involving professionals from relevant organizations in exercises. Such efforts are not only highly beneficial but also necessary for military units to properly

prepare for the complexities of modern operations. This comprises coordination and integration with other government organizations, with civil organizations such as IOs and NGO, with representatives of other ministries (e.g. Foreign Affairs, Development Cooperation) and with actors of the host nation such as local authorities.

This article starts by laying down the multitude of actors that are involved in contemporary crisis operations. It then addresses coordination demands and efforts involving these actors with an emphasis on training and mission-specific preparation. The fourth section elaborates on a unique and relatively large interagency exercise, Common Effort. The exercise was hosted in September 2011 by 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps (1GNC)<sup>8</sup> in Germany. It was organized together with the Netherlands and German Ministries of Foreign Affairs. As opposed to earlier civil-military exercises where subject matter experts role-play, in this project civil organizations exercised themselves in order to learn to better interact, coordinate and cooperate with the military, in addition to other internal objectives. After an extensive preparation period of about one year, approximately 300 military from the Netherlands, United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Norway and Italy, and 130 representatives of civilian agencies (e.g. GOs, NGOs, IOs, Police, Ministries) joined the exercise and were trained working within a comprehensive approach. A fictional scenario centered on the Horn of Africa enabled the participants to train their people, and test their organizations' functioning and interactions with each other for over 5 days. The process and outcome of this exercise is described here and used as an example for future exercises and comprehensive training methods. The article concludes with recommendations for the way ahead.

### Challenges of working with a multitude of actors

Most researchers and practitioners support the idea that successfully coordinated or harmonized civilian and military efforts are key to successful stabilization, relief, reconstruction and counter-insurgency efforts.<sup>9</sup> Coordination and cooperation are imperative to create the best conditions for stability, humanitarian relief, and development. No single actor can address this alone, and it has to be done simultaneously.<sup>10</sup>

The relationship and interactions between civil and military actors is however faced with many challenges. A first challenge is to define who coordinates with whom. Within military as well as civilian circles, multiple—and conflicting—stances on the appropriateness of the comprehensive approach are part of everyday reality. Some IO/NGOs are reluctant to be associated with a potentially unwelcome military force and thereby lose their protective patina of neutrality. Stoddard<sup>11</sup> refers to these principled organizations as being the “Dunantists”<sup>12</sup> who want to avoid any suggestion of partiality, whereas “Wilsonian”<sup>13</sup> organizations generally act more pragmatically and therefore interact more easily with military forces.

Secondly, the context of crisis operations is often chaotic, unstable and conflictive. Needs of the local population are high and there is a serious lack of knowledge, finance, and political and legal structures.<sup>14</sup> Another challenge for the civil-military relationship is the temporary nature of the coalition parties involved.<sup>15</sup> Since civil actors and their military counterparts frequently have different objectives and different ways of achieving these,<sup>16</sup> they look favorably on cooperation as long as they expect it to serve their best interests.<sup>17</sup> This can easily lead to opportunistic behavior. Moreover, differences in organizational culture, expertise, methods and objectives between two

sets of actors also contribute to this complexity.<sup>18</sup> An issue particularly influencing the interaction between governmental agencies, such as defense and foreign affairs, is the unbalance in both personnel as well as finances. Operational military organizations mostly have substantial numbers of people at junior levels with numbers decreasing towards the top (pyramid form), whereas civil organizations tend to have relatively small numbers of junior personnel, compared to mid and higher levels (nearly inverted pyramid).<sup>19</sup> If we look at the financial side, the division is just opposite. In most deployed units, civilians are responsible for the majority of the funds to be spent, most often on reconstruction and development projects. In addition, diversity brings barriers for interaction, stemming from a multitude of sources, such as language, style, values, cultures, competencies, structures, methods and resources.<sup>20 21</sup> Finally, lacking a unified theory of change, the conceptual challenge is to align the often very different opinions about what constitutes change and what instruments to use: what or what combination is most effective at what moment given the conditions, and how can that be measured to demonstrate progress or adjust the approach.<sup>22</sup>

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Adding to the diversity is the sheer number of actors in a mission area. In most areas, the main NGO players number in the tens rather than hundreds. However, in extreme and dramatic complex emergencies, NGOs multiply. At the height of the relief operations in Kosovo there were over four hundred NGOs,<sup>23</sup> and it has been estimated that there were between 3,000 to

*generalizations on either “the military” or “the civil” community can therefore hardly be accurate*

20,000 NGOs operating in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake.<sup>24</sup> A similar diversity factor holds for military actors. The number of different units and their sizes vary enormously per mission area. In Afghanistan for example, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are deployed at the same time, each consisting of many different (national) units operating within their own national caveats. In fact, the ISAF military units have 102 national caveats.<sup>25</sup> These include rules on patrolling by daylight only or rules that geographically bound troop deployment. Caveats are necessary for legitimacy in military’s home countries. Yet this further complicates the general stance of civil actors, be they humanitarian organizations, local population or authorities, toward cooperating with the military. How to govern this network of organizations is a daunting and paradoxical challenge: many organizations do not like to be represented by others, yet they also do not want to invest heavily in endless numbers of meetings with other organizations.

Actors involved in crisis operations differ from one another in many different ways. Generalizations on either “the military” or “the civil” community can therefore hardly be accurate. The civil community stands for a broad spectrum of civil parties, comprising governance, human relief, police, justice, economic development roles. Civil-military simplifications may persist from earlier times where the military had a sole actor role in war-like phases of a conflict. But also social identity processes may contribute to these simplifications linked to in-group out-group perceptions, which are strongly connected to stereotyping and prejudice.<sup>26</sup>

Allport’s Intergroup Contact theory claims that contact between groups reduces the effects of stereotype and prejudice.<sup>27</sup> Contact generates learning about the other group, changes behaviors towards the other group, generates person-to-person affective ties (empathy), and reshapes the group’s appraisal of the outside world.<sup>28</sup> This development is stronger when certain conditions are met: equal group status within the situation, orientation toward cooperation and common, superordinate goals, authority support, cross-group friendship.<sup>29</sup> In addition, reduction of feelings of intergroup uncertainty and anxiety, which developed from concerns about how one is perceived, how one should behave, or whether one is accepted, has shown to be critical to achieve the positive impact of intergroup contacts.<sup>30</sup>

We propose that a deliberate and structured contact approach should be used as an effective mechanism to improve open orientation towards other parties, increase understanding and building cooperation. Even interaction with a limited set of parties, at best chosen for being representative for and a hub to their network, can improve communication and interaction with other parties that have not (yet) been met. Contact with members of a group transfers its effects to the whole group,<sup>31</sup> and interaction with one group transfers to other groups of the same kind.<sup>32</sup> In conclusion, there is substantial evidence that intergroup interactions—given certain conditions—will lead to improved understanding and a broader orientation toward the diversity of the actors. These findings support a strong argument for organizing interagency interactions in training and preparation exercises. How can we achieve this with the military and civil parties? How can we prepare for better dealing with the complex diversities of military-civil collectives, keeping a check on the amount of effort it takes?

### Training and preparation for the comprehensive approach: Moving beyond improvisation

In many operations, civil-military coordination is improvisational, pragmatic, and ad hoc.<sup>33 34</sup> When meeting on the ground in theater, personnel works out solutions overcoming differences for the common good. As such, coordination evolves over time in response to specific needs on the ground. There is merit in this ad hoc approach. Some argue that every crisis has unique characteristics in which strategies and structures for civil-military relations need to reflect the specific and dynamically evolving circumstances.

That being true, there are at least two reasons to search for constants: to build on experiences and become more effective; and to train and prepare to become more proficient. The gap between the received training and the requirements to establish order on the ground results in a tremendous responsibility of the battalion commanders and their junior officers. As experiences from international missions such as the Balkans and Afghanistan show, commanders had to tailor much of their operations to the unexpected challenges they faced, rather than execute the sort of mission they were tasked, organized, and trained to perform.<sup>35</sup> In these conditions civil-military coordination depends strongly on the personalities involved and the qualities they brought to the table, rather than on planning and standard operating procedures.<sup>36</sup> As a consequence, many differences occurred within and between rotations and contingents. These differences included priorities, budgets, and involvement of the local population. Such an approach yields inefficient use of limited aid resources, delayed humanitarian relief efforts, enhanced inconsistency between rotations, and leads to conflicting objectives in the post-conflict environment.<sup>37</sup> This lack of coherence is one of the factors often

cited as contributing to the poor success rate and lack of sustainability of international peace and stability operations.<sup>38</sup>

Although there is no single solution to improve civil-military coordination at the local level, the logic of improved preparation is expected to lead to efficiency gains, greater respect for the comparative advantages of civilian and military actors, and enhanced mission effectiveness. However, as was raised in the introduction, most military training and education programs focus on purely military objectives and include the comprehensive approach only to a limited degree.<sup>39</sup>

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Over the last few years some of the training and exercises have been improved and partly adjusted to the new dynamics of the modern battlefield. Several armed forces training centers have introduced role-play exercises to allow their personnel to become accustomed with the local situation and civil actors. These exercises, however, have been mostly scripted by soldiers and in most exercises the roles of development workers, diplomats or local powerbrokers are being played by soldiers themselves, or by retired or ex-civil personnel hired for the occasion. Some level of industry has developed around this, with professionalism, but also with good-willed amateurism. Since this is role-playing, there is little assurance of realistic and valid civil behavior and perspectives of the parties that are role-played. In reality, many, often subtle, sensitivities characterize the civil-military interface. Hence, exercises would certainly benefit from structured

participation of a wide variety of civilian actors from the actual professional organizations and communities (e.g. diplomats, IO and NGO representatives). Playing themselves, they could be involved in the preparation of the exercise, define their own training objectives and play their own, real role in the exercise itself. This would enable military as well as civil actors to approach the “train as you fight” philosophy even more realistically, extending it to “train as you interact”. The scenarios should include kinetic and non-kinetic elements, just like real-life operations, creating varying role distributions. Each participating organization can achieve its training objectives and benefit from mutual interaction and synergies. They can effectively bridge their common training background and theater-specific needs. During the exercise they can mutually adjust their mechanisms and concepts to the local situation in a mission area. Precisely the latter approach was taken by the 1(German/Netherlands) Corps (1GNC) in the project and exercise Common Effort in 2011. The next section describes preparation, execution, and outcomes of the exercise.

### Design of exercise Common Effort

In September 2010, the German-Netherlands Corps (1GNC) based in Munster, Germany, led by Lieutenant General Ton van Loon, initiated project Common Effort. At the first so-called interagency meeting in November 2010, the idea for a common exercise was embraced by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of both Germany and The Netherlands. Their commitment was deemed essential to bring NGOs and IOs on board.<sup>40</sup> From the beginning the relationship between 1GNC and the ministries had to be fostered through intensive dialogue. 1GNC stressed that it was not their intent to lead the process but only to facilitate it. As such 1GNC served as a secretariat for Common Effort during the entire process.

During the entire preparation period, the German and Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs committed personnel. For most participating NGOs and IOs however, such commitment was perceived a major obstacle. Unlike 1GNC most civil organizations, including both ministries, had only very limited resources and personnel available for preparing the exercise. Despite this, several more interagency meetings were held to develop the exercise. It was agreed that the “The overarching aim of the exercise is to develop a shared perception of the Comprehensive Approach and a broad understanding of the mechanisms that enable its implementation”.<sup>41</sup>


To reach this aim, the exercise participants formulated a staggering number of 161 different training objectives that were finally aggregated into 12 main objectives. Examples of these objectives were to develop and trial:

- Principles and mechanisms to facilitate civil-civil and civil-military information exchange;
- Mechanisms to conduct collaborative Conflict Analysis, Knowledge and Plan Development prior to deployment and in theatre;
- Mechanisms to call upon and deliver (in-extremis) military support;
- Principles and mechanisms to achieve comprehensive operational assessment and strategy review.

Based on these training objectives and in accordance with the capabilities of the participating organizations, a script was developed by a working group comprising experts from the various fields of expertise including foreign policy, development aid, police, UN and the military. Geographically the script was located in the Horn of Africa.<sup>42</sup> The script resembled many of

Figure 1: Draft Strategic Design for Tytan – Exercise Common Effort

Annex B to Common Effort Comprehensive Design Dated 18 Jul 11



Key Decisive Conditions for Building Stability in Tytan

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|---|--|
| <p><b>Diplomacy</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 International Support for solution</li> <li>7 Generate Political Will for SSR</li> <li>14 Negotiations to end armed opposition.</li> <li>20 Regional Trade Re-estab &amp; Legitimate</li> </ul> <p><b>Defence – Security</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3 Protection of Civilians (SASE)</li> <li>5 Disrupt opponents of peace</li> <li>9 Develop SSR Strategy</li> <li>10 Border security of Tytan improved</li> <li>13 Maintain territorial Integrity of Tytan</li> <li>21 Capabilities of TYTAN Security Forces improved</li> </ul> | <p><b>Governance</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>6 Broad political dialogue established</li> <li>12 Democratisation - Political Process accepted by all</li> <li>15 Anti-Corruption Measures Effective</li> <li>17 GoT under Constitutional Framework</li> <li>16 SASE for IDP Returns</li> <li>22 Institution strengthening in Community</li> </ul> <p><b>Development &amp; Humanitarian</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2 Effective UN led co-ord &amp; funding</li> <li>4 Free access for Aid agencies</li> <li>8 Distribution of Aid is Safe &amp; Secure</li> <li>11 Humanitarian Situation Stabilised</li> <li>18 Tytan govt co-ord aid response</li> <li>19 National Recovery and Devt Plan</li> <li>23 Framework for Long term Devt established</li> </ul> |
|---|--|

**IC Stabilisation Aim for Tytan**

With international partners to create the Conditions for a safe and stable state under which Tytan's territorial integrity is respected and there is a political process aimed at fostering greater regional stability; and internal stability born of effective, representative, transparent and accountable government acting in the interests of the people and the nation, strong institutions (including effective security forces), the rule of law and Respect for human rights; an inclusive and equitable society with a viable sufficient and self-sustaining legitimate economy.'

NB: The details of these Key Decisive Conditions ( inputs, activities, measures of effect, and risks) are planning work in progress

the current challenges around which 5 vignettes were developed.

The first was labeled security sector reform (SSR), encompassing e.g. judicial, prison, police and defense reform. In the script the SSR program was critically endangered by a badly handled prison revolt and the statement of a regional power broker who claimed to re-arm militia. Subjects that were considered of importance for the interagency coordination included the development of a multilateral SSR policy and collaboration with host nation officials

The second vignette considered humanitarian assistance. In the script two countries were

in dispute over river water consumption for e.g. irrigation purposes. Interagency coordination subjects that were stressed included a regional political strategy, human security development, and military support to civil organizations.

Disaster relief was played in the third vignette. The area was confronted with an earthquake, causing civilian casualties and large-scale destruction in an already underdeveloped region. A humanitarian crisis developed while infrastructure critical to the relief effort turned out to be damaged or destroyed. As the area was incapable of implementing crisis response mechanisms the international community,

under UN leadership, was to coordinate the disaster relief effort. During the exercise itself this event was not being played as such due to an overburden of some of the participants.

*discussions amongst all partners led to the realization that different perspectives of all partners are required to reach a comprehensive assessment*

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The fourth vignette dealt with anti-piracy. In the story the humanitarian community faced the disruption of resource flows towards the theater when several large shipping companies refused to sail to ports in light of increased piracy. To address this issue the civil-military coordination had to focus on a regional political strategy, a targeting and information strategy, and sea and coastal security.

The final vignette focused on continuous civil-military coordination. The training audience was confronted with institutional requirements for coordination. These requirements emanated from binding commitments, organizational weaknesses, (temporary) capability shortfalls or opportunities for success.

After having developed the script, the partners started the process of a comprehensive situational assessment. This meant defining root causes of the conflict, mapping stakeholders and conflict drivers, and assessing the key factors and trends. Discussions amongst all partners led not only to a common understanding of the situation but also to the realization that different perspectives of all partners are required to reach a comprehensive assessment.<sup>43</sup>

During a planning conference early May 2011, participants defined common objectives of the mission. This led to a comprehensive campaign design and created a higher level of

identification with one common mission. Figure 1 depicts this design. Five lines of operation are identified: governance, diplomacy, development, humanitarian and defense-security. To reach the end state of a line of operation, milestones were defined, so-called key conditions for building stability in Tytan, the fictitious host nation in the exercise.<sup>44</sup>

Following the comprehensive design, the individual participants continued their internal planning processes. A final conference was held in September 2011 just before the actual start of the exercise, to harmonize the plans of all participants.

The exercise was geographically situated in the Horn of Africa, labeled as East Cerasia in the script. One of the countries in this region, Tytan, is a vulnerable pro-western democracy full of ethnic tensions. The country is very poor, a condition that is compounded by weak government and economic mismanagement. Tytan is the victim of the aggressive policies of its neighboring country, Kamon, to achieve ethnic domination in the region. The deteriorating situation in Tytan and the passing of a UNSC Resolution authorized the deployment of a NATO interim multinational force in Tytan (NIMFOR). 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps (1GNC) has been nominated to provide the land component of NIMFOR and Commander 1GNC has been appointed as Military Head of Mission (MHoM) of NIMFOR. The Governments of Germany and the Netherlands have agreed to coordinate the civilian efforts in support of the NIMFOR mission on a bi-national basis and have appointed a German diplomat to the post of Civilian Head of Mission (CHoM).

In addition, several (non) governmental organizations and UN agencies are involved in the exercise, including Kinderberg, Cordaid, Technisches Hilfswerk, World Food Program (WFP) and the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) is the senior UN Representative in East Cerasia and has the overall authority over the activities of the United Nations.

### Observations from Exercise Common Effort

The exercise Common Effort was held in the Air Force barracks in Munster, Germany, September 18-23, 2011.<sup>45</sup> An evaluation team, led by the not-for-profit, independent research organization, Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) as independent party, performed observations, interviews and a survey in order to assess the civil-military interaction during the exercise.<sup>46</sup> In their First Impression Report the evaluation team concluded that the first days were characterized by confusion amongst most participants,<sup>47</sup> with issues such as role unclarity, unwarranted assumptions and stereotypes from lacking knowledge about each other and command structure unclarity. In particular for the civil parties a serious preparation gap was observed, with most people being new to the situation of many different, civil parties, and unknown military culture, work processes, and terminology. The majority of the training audience had not been involved in the partners’ preparation phase meetings, and many participants struggled to catch up with the large read-ahead material. This was unlike the military training audience, who prepared themselves quite well and in most cases showed up 1-2 or more days before the actual exercise started. This observation reflects a structural difference which was commented to be close to reality, and which has implications we will discuss later. A clear example of role unclarity was whether the CHoM and his office were part of the NATO Interim Force and how the role of CHoM related to that of the office of

the UN’s SRSG. After two days it was decided that the CHoM would report through both a German and Dutch national hierarchical line within the respective ministries of Foreign Affairs. However, by then most NGOs and IOs perceived CHoM as an integral part of NIMFOR and treated their interaction with the CHoM as such.

In any case, the challenge is to step over the obstacles and to actively engage in order to resolve the issues via communication and cooperation. It took most civil participants just a few days to understand the relationships and their role. This resulted in a steep learning curve adapting with open mindset, dealing with frictions, and discovering mutual capabilities while building relations. In the final evaluation session most civil parties confirmed that they had a better understanding of the processes of the other parties and how to build communication lines. Moreover, the established social network with personal contacts was seen as highly beneficial for future missions.

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A mechanism that was introduced by 1GNC to facilitate the civil-military interface was the so-called Inter-Agency Centre (IAC). This responded to the needs of both 1GNC and the civil parties as they were interested in what structures or mechanism might support the civil military interaction best. The IAC was embedded within the 1GNC military force structure. It provided a selection of military liaison officers and experts (both military and civil) with different fields of expertise, including governance, cultural issues and rule of law. The aim of the IAC was

to support coordination and de-confliction of humanitarian, diplomatic, development and security efforts by linking civil stakeholders to matching military specialists or sections, while at the same time contributing to the military's decision making processes.<sup>48</sup> Most participants of the exercise appreciated the concept of the IAC as an intermediary. The IAC implementation was an experiment that provided rich information on the dynamics of such a function. The intermediary role also caused issues, such as cumbersome communication channels. As a result (and also because all were located at the same location for the exercise) civil organizations indicated that they wanted to talk to their military counterpart directly, and not via an intermediate such as the IAC.

The location was an issue that highly influenced the outcome of the exercise. As the exercise took place at one location, representatives of the different organizations were in close proximity from one another, and saw each other at the meals and the outside smoking places. This led to many informal interactions, for example between military and civilians. Those interactions would most probably have been impossible in a real crisis due to the distances and the insecurity situation. Moreover, part of the interactions would be deemed undesirable due to the association of civil representatives with the military from NIMFOR.

*for smaller size NGOs, having personnel participate during an entire week brought along a severe burden*

Despite the many challenges, participants valued the exercise, mainly because of intense exposure to civil and military ways of working and thinking. Those with little or no field experience saw the exercise as an important

opportunity to meet and connect before being deployed. The ratio between the costs and the benefits differed for most participants. For 1GNC, the exercise was generally perceived having a very positive cost-benefit ratio. Through the exercise the corps was able to interact with many civil actors and position itself as an ideal training platform for the comprehensive approach. 1GNC covered almost all the costs related to the exercise with a project budget of approximately 300,000 Euro and committed a large number of personnel.<sup>49</sup> However, these costs are considered to be relatively low, compared to most traditional military exercises. 1GNC personnel is tasked to train during peacetime, anyway. For most civil organizations the costs were in the absorption of personnel that participated in the exercise. Especially for smaller size NGOs, having personnel participate during an entire week brought along a severe burden. But, also for these organizations the ratio between costs and benefits was generally perceived as very positive.

### Conclusions and way ahead

Many of today's crisis operations demand that political, economic, developmental, as well as security factors have to be addressed simultaneously. As a result, the interactive relationships between civilian and military actors are of crucial importance for mission success. This paper has shown that the civil-military relationship is confronted with a wide array of challenges. To arrive well prepared in a mission area it is necessary for both military and civilian actors to be aware of and understand these challenges. Few institutions however seem to put much effort into doing this. Some include courses on cultural awareness or lectures on the UN and roles of IO/NGOs. And in most of the exercises that focus on the comprehensive approach, military personnel or hired civilians play roles of different organizations,

thereby overlooking the often-subtle sensitivities that characterize the civil-military interface.

Exercises moving beyond civilian role-playing such as Common Effort can fill this gap. These cannot solve all the issues that arise in the civil-military interface, but can provide an opportunity to practice styles and behaviours, and evaluate mechanisms for interaction. In such a process military and civilian actors are confronted with each other’s working methods, professional vernaculars and cultures. This can facilitate increased awareness and understanding and reduce the effects of stereotype and prejudice often hampering real-life operations.

Comparing the exercise Common Effort with Allport’s conditions for intergroup contact shows that despite the organizations having individual objectives there was an orientation toward cooperation and common, superordinate goals. The shared appreciation of the situation and the comprehensive mission design were clear examples of this. The group status however differed considerably. Despite the large presence of civil actors, the military far outnumbered the civil actors. The preparation gap that was identified in Common Effort was also a result of the different capacities that both types of actors were able to dedicate to the exercise. In this respect it is important to notice that military organizations are often tasked to train during peacetime. For UN agencies, IOs and NGOs, however, this is not the case, mostly because it is an unaffordable luxury in terms of money and time. Generally these organizations have far smaller budgets and numbers of personnel available to dedicate to such exercises. Such a preparation gap seems not to mirror operational reality and one might even argue that in reality the military is the one facing a preparation gap. In many cases IOs and NGOs are relatively familiar with the local circumstances due to previous activities in that particular area. Military are often

“newcomers” and have therefore less insight in local practice and social power structures. As a result they need the interaction with the present civilian organizations, as well as with actors of the host nation. This stresses the requirement to prepare for effective relation building as part of their operational proficiency.

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Exercises like Common Effort require careful management of cost-benefit ratios for those involved. Despite the many obstacles that came up in that exercise, all partners valued each other’s roles and opinions and several cross-group friendships developed during the exercise.

During the exercise feelings of intergroup uncertainty and anxiety could be reduced due to the open environment where one was allowed to make mistakes. This contributed to achieving a positive impact of intergroup interactions. After the exercise one manager of a sourcing organization indicated that while enthusiasm is fine for the exercise, the result should also show in policies (doctrine) to consolidate the benefits at organization level. Indeed, to achieve a positive cost-benefit ratio, experiences should be translated into concrete guidelines, policies, and measures. Dissemination of these policies within participating organizations is most effectively done through seminars and presentations with involvement of the participants themselves using situational narratives and anecdotes.

A “train as you fight” philosophy requires that civil and military personnel prepare to interact in realistic conditions—that is playing themselves, with realistic dilemma’s. Comprehensive training methods and efficient exercise models

following a Common Effort philosophy should be developed to realize that. Conducting (parts of) the exercise without colocation could be an option to improve the cost-benefit ratio. Even stronger would be to have these exercises embedded in the participating organizations' education and training programs. In any case, such deliberate and structured contact exercises should be developed together with civil parties in order to establish high performance before meeting each other in a mission. **PRISM**

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Greg Reeson, "Train as You Fight: The Development of the US Army's Combat Training Centers, How the CTCs Prepare Soldiers for War", *Yahoo Voices*, June 29, 2006, available at <[http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/40866/train\\_as\\_you\\_fight\\_the\\_development.html?page2](http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/40866/train_as_you_fight_the_development.html?page2)>.

<sup>2</sup> Greg Reeson, 2006, *op.cit.*

<sup>3</sup> Jenks Reid, *Training Ground Combat Forces for Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Newport: Naval War College, 2007), available at <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA476626>.

<sup>4</sup> H.A. Leonard, J.M. Polich, J.D. Peterson, R.E. Sortor and S.C. Moore, *Something Old, Something New. Army Leader Development in a Dynamic Environment* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2006).

<sup>5</sup> See for example J.P. Terry, "Stabilization operations: A successful strategy for postconflict management," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 58, no. 3 (2010), 45-47.

<sup>6</sup> S.J.H. Rietjens and M.T.I.B. Bollen, *Managing Civil-Military Cooperation: A 24/7 Joint Effort for Stability* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008).

<sup>7</sup> B.A. Salmoni, B. A., "Advances in predeployment culture training: The US Marine Corps Approach," *Military review*, November/December (2006), 79-88.

<sup>8</sup> See for more information <http://www.1gnc.org>.

<sup>9</sup> C. De Coning and K. Friis, "Coherence and Coordination: The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach", In: *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 15 (2011), 243-272; and Rietjens and Bollen, 2008, *op.cit.*

<sup>10</sup> A.P. Williams, "Implications of Operationalizing a Comprehensive Approach: Defining What Interagency Interoperability Really Means," *The International C2 Journal*, 4, no 1 (2010), 1-30.

<sup>11</sup> Abby Stoddard, *Humanitarian Alert: NGO Information and its Impact on US Foreign Policy* (Sterling: Kumarian Press, 2006).

<sup>12</sup> Abby Stoddard, "Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges and trends," *HPG Briefing* 12, (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2003). "Dunantist' humanitarianism is named for Red Cross founder Henry Dunant. The oldest of today's 'super-NGOs', Save the Children UK, was created in the Dunantist image at the end of the First World War. Others in this tradition include Oxfam and MSF. 'Dunantist' organisations seek to position themselves outside of state interests"

<sup>13</sup> Abby Stoddard, "Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges and trends," *HPG Briefing*, no. 12 (July 2003), available at <<http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/349.pdf>>. "Wilsonian' humanitarianism characterises most US NGOs. Named for President Woodrow Wilson, who hoped to project US values and influence as a force for good in the world, the Wilsonian tradition sees a basic compatibility with humanitarian aims and US foreign policy objectives. CARE, the largest and quintessentially American NGO, came into being during the Marshall Plan after the Second World War, and began life delivering 'CARE' packages to war-affected Europeans. Wilsonians have a practical, operational bent, and practitioners have crossed back and forth into government positions."

<sup>14</sup> Joris Voorhoeve, *From War to the Rule of Law: Peace Building after Violent Conflicts* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007).

<sup>15</sup> M.T.I. Bollen, *Working apart together: Civil-Military Co-operation*, PhD-thesis, (Wageningen: University of Wageningen, 2002), accessed at <[http://cimic.typepad.com/civilmilitary\\_cooperation/2006/11/dissertation\\_ba\\_2.html](http://cimic.typepad.com/civilmilitary_cooperation/2006/11/dissertation_ba_2.html)>. In Dutch.

<sup>16</sup> S.J.H. Rietjens, *Civil Military Cooperation in Response to a Complex Emergency: Just Another Drill?* (Leiden: Brill Publishers, Save the Children, 2004), and *Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian - Military relations in Afghanistan* (London: Save the Children, 2008).

<sup>17</sup> C. Seiple, *The US Military/NGO Relationship in humanitarian interventions* (Carlisle Barracks: Peacekeeping Institute Centre for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, 1996).

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- <sup>31</sup> Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006, *op.cit.*
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**The Military Sealift Command hospital ship USNS Mercy sails the Pacific Ocean on June 15, 2010. Since 1993 the U.S. has responded to some 28 foreign internal conflicts and over 50 humanitarian responses, every year.**