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John Trumbull's painting, Declaration of Independence, illustrating the Committee of Five presenting their draft of the Declaration of Independence to the Congress on June 28, 1776.
A Better Approach to War Powers

BY TIM KAINÉ

The hardest call during my first year in the Senate was my vote to authorize military force in Syria to punish President Bashar al-Assad for using chemical weapons against his citizens. When I was sworn in on January 3rd, 2013, I expected difficult votes. But I did not anticipate such a profound vote within my first nine months. Only the 18 Senators who serve on the Foreign Relations Committee had to take that vote on September 4, following President Barack Obama’s decision to ask Congress to formally authorize a military response. But as tough as the vote was, I am glad the President brought it to Congress instead of proceeding on his own.

The framers of the Constitution had a clear view. Congress must formally approve the initiation of significant military action and the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is responsible for the day-to-day management of a military action once initiated. The framers understood that a President might need to act before Congressional consideration to defend against attack or protect vital American interests. This made particular sense in the days when Congress frequently recessed for lengthy periods and transportation and communication technology made mustering the body for decision-making very time-consuming. But, even in the instance when a President unilaterally acted to defend the nation, it was still assumed that Congress had to formally ratify the decision to begin military action.

While the constitutional language is clear, the American practice has been anything but consistent. Congress has only declared war five times while Presidents have initiated military action well over 120 times. In some of these instances, Congress subsequently ratified a Presidential decision either by formal approval or some informal acquiescence such as appropriating funds for the effort. But in other instances, a President has acted without concern for Congressional approval. Most recently, President Barack Obama committed military forces to NATO action against Libya in 2011 without Congressional approval. He was formally censured by the House of Representatives for doing so.

Senator Tim Kaine was elected to the Senate in 2012. He serves on the Armed Services, Budget and Foreign Relations Committees as well as being Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on the Near East, South and Central Asian Affairs, overseeing American foreign policy in this critical region.
The variance between constitutional language and our historical practice is not just about executive overreach. Congress has often wanted to avoid accountability for a tough decision.

Letting the President make the decision allows members to have it both ways—appear supportive so long as the operation is successful or be critical if the operation does not work out as planned. This abdication hurts the public by depriving them of the opportunity to witness, and learn from, meaningful Congressional debate about whether military action is in the national interest.

In the summer of 1973, angered by President Richard Nixon’s secret expansion of the Vietnam War into Laos and Cambodia, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution, purporting to solve this tough policy issue by creating a process for consultation between the executive and legislature. It was a hyper-partisan time and the emotions of the ongoing Vietnam War made the act controversial. President Nixon vetoed the Resolution and Congress overrode the veto. Subsequent Presidents of both parties have generally asserted that the act is unconstitutional and it has not been followed by either the legislative or executive branches.

I entered the Senate with a personal obsession over war powers questions. Virginia is the most military state in the country, with a huge population of active duty, guard, reserve, veterans, DoD civilians, military contractors,
national security professionals, diplomats and all their families. With nearly one in three Virginia citizens directly connected to the military, decisions about when to initiate war affect us very deeply. And especially at the end of nearly 13 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, we owe it to our warfighters to clear up any confusion in how we make these critical decisions. We could hardly commit a more immoral public act than requiring a volunteer military force to risk their lives in battle without a clear political consensus supporting their mission.

With my own personal passion on the issue, I was aware of the constitutional intent, the inconsistent history of the executive and legislative branches and the failed 1973 effort to create a more workable process. I was also aware of very strong work done by the University of Virginia's Miller Center National War Powers Commission on this very issue. The Commission, chaired by former Secretaries of State James Baker and Warren Christopher, was composed of a bipartisan roster of talented leaders from Congress, the executive branch, the military, the diplomatic corps and academia. In 2008, they proposed a War Powers Consultation Act designed to allow the President and Congress to each exercise their full constitutional role in a clear and practical process on war powers questions. The Commission briefed Congress and incoming members of the Obama Administration, but the time wasn’t right for action. I took to the floor of the Senate in July 2013, the 40th anniversary of Senate passage of the 1973 Act, to announce that the time for action is now and that I was initiating an effort with Senator John McCain, based on the Miller Center’s work, to update and improve the old law.

Within weeks after commencing our effort, we were confronted with a real test case: the Syrian civil war and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons against civilians. After World War I, the nations of the world convened to ban chemical weapons. The international community decided that because chemical weapons are indiscriminate, nearly indefensible, and kill civilians and soldiers alike, their use would be forbidden. And in the 90 years since the international ban, the ban has protected citizens and service members in conflicts around the globe.

Since joining the Senate, I have been involved in dialogue about the Syrian civil war and what the U.S. should do about it. We are the largest provider of humanitarian aid to Syrian refugees who are currently streaming into Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq. And, we are working with other nations to get the Syrian government and opposition to discuss a negotiated end to the civil war. But the use of chemical weapons, against a clear and important international norm, raised the stakes. And the question became—would America go so far as to respond with military force?

Many Presidents would have acted unilaterally to do so. But in discussions with the White House and my colleagues, I urged President Obama to respect the constitutional framework and seek Congressional approval. We send a stronger signal when the executive and legislature are unified on matters of war.

The President did bring the matter to Congress to the surprise of many. The Foreign Relations Committee—by a narrow vote—supported the use of military force to punish the use of chemical weapons and degrade al-Assad’s ability to use them in the future. That show of resolve changed the previous
intransigence of Syria and Russia about these weapons and produced a diplomatic breakthrough in which an agreement was struck to dismantle the entire Syrian chemical weapons program and stockpile under the supervision of the United Nations. Time will tell if Syria follows through on its commitments. But while the war rages on at great cost to the Syrian people, the elimination of the chemical weapons stockpile is a significant positive for the country and the region.

I believe that the President’s decision to seek Congressional approval prior to military action in Syria was the right thing to do. It honored the constitution. It showed Syria and Russia that we were resolved to punish the outrageous use of chemical weapons against civilians. The fact of our resolve then led to a diplomatic breakthrough that is meant to eliminate one of the largest chemical weapons stockpiles in the world. We can learn from this example as we tackle the revision of the ineffective 1973 Act.

That is why Senator McCain and I, on January 26, 2014, introduced the War Powers Consultation Act of 2014 (WPCA). The act clarifies the consultation process between the legislative and executive branches of government and details Congressional procedures requiring that all members take a vote of support or opposition for any significant military action. The proposal creates a permanent Consultation Committee in Congress that would consist of majority and ranking Members of the national security committees (Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Intelligence and Appropriations). Committee members will have access to regular information on the process and the substance of national security matters and will meet with the President periodically. Under the WPCA of

2014, all Members of Congress eventually will be asked to vote on decisions of war. This ensures a deliberate public discussion in the full view of the American public, increasing the knowledge of the population and the accountability of our elected officials. What the WPCA of 2014 does not intend to do is decide the centuries-long debate between the executive and legislative branches of government. It does however codify a process that enables the executive and legislative branches to work together.

I attended a debate in the summer of 2013 on war powers at George Washington University. One student startled me by saying: “I know nothing about war; but I know nothing but war.” We have been at war for nearly 13 years and many of our young do not know an America at peace. But, with an all-volunteer force where only 1% of Americans serve in the military, many lack any meaningful

Enlistment poster from WWII
connection with the realities and sacrifices that war entails. We can restore the original constitutional vision of executive and legislative branches working together to make these tough decisions. If we do so, our deliberation and debate will educate our citizens and produce, when necessary, the strongest consensus behind any military mission and the men and women we rely on to carry it out. PRISM
Passengers in Mexico City wear protective masks to combat the effects of the Swine flu.
Governing for the Future
What Governments Can Do

BY PETER HO AND ADRIAN W. J. KUAH

On 25th February 2003, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) virus entered Singapore through three women who had returned from Hong Kong with symptoms of atypical pneumonia. The virus then spread with alarming speed through the hospital system, confounding doctors and healthcare professionals with its aggressiveness. The fatality rate was shocking: by the time the SARS crisis was declared over in Singapore, 33 people had died out of the 238 who had been infected.

Nicholas Nassim Taleb describes a “black swan” as a hard-to-predict event with a large impact. SARS was such a black swan for Singapore. Indeed, the impact of SARS on Singapore was profound and multifaceted, not only in the severity of the infection but psychologically in terms of public fear and stress. Overnight, visitor arrivals plunged, paralysing the entire tourism industry. SARS severely disrupted the Singapore economy, leading to a contraction and a quarter-long recession that year. While many lessons were learned from the SARS crisis of 2003, for the purposes of this paper one central insight stands out. It is simply this: other black swans will continue to surprise us, as much as, if not more than, the SARS crisis.

Recent years have seen a succession of strategic and catastrophic shocks including 9/11, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami and Fukushima nuclear meltdown, July 2011 Thailand floods, and the Eurozone crisis, just to name a few. The frequency of such shocks seems to be increasing, with the amplitude of their impact growing. The question is, why? More importantly, what can governments do about them?

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Complexity: It Ain’t Rocket Science – Pity

From the middle of the 20th century – a period that is sometimes called the “Great Acceleration” – change has accelerated at a pace and on a global scale that is unprecedented in history. The “Great Acceleration” has seen huge leaps forward in technology – in telecommunications, the internet, and transportation – leading to vastly increased trade and the movement of people around the world. Population growth has surged. Combined with rapid urbanization, it has generated enormous consumer demand. The effort to meet this demand through industrialization and mass production has had a huge but unpredictable impact on the earth’s ecosystem. Globalization resulting from and combined with technological innovation has, in turn, accelerated change on all fronts – political, economic and social.

Much of this change has followed unpredictable trajectories. The reason for this is “complexity.” And it is no small irony that there are different types of complex systems that include physical complexity, biotic complexity and conscious complexity. This paper argues that the public policy challenge of our times lies at the intersection of the physical, the biotic and the conscious.

Simply put, the complex is not the same as the complicated: it is something fundamentally different. The natural world is complex. In comparison, an engineering system – be it an airplane or a telecommunications satellite – is merely complicated. Its inner workings may be hard for a layman to understand, but it is designed to perform certain pre-determined functions that are repeatable. In other words, it embodies the Newtonian characteristics of predictability, linearity and reducibility to mechanistic causes and effects. A complex system does not necessarily behave in a repeatable and pre-determined manner. Cities are complex systems, as are human societies. Countries and political systems are complex. Indeed, the world as a whole is complex and unordered. In all likelihood, a complicated world has not existed for a very long time – if it ever did. Many of the catastrophic shocks mentioned above have their roots in the interlocking of human behaviors and the dynamics of the planet’s natural systems. In other words, such shocks are a consequence of an anthropocentric planet in which the human, far from being a detached actor in the natural system, is increasingly and inextricably enmeshed. And as Geyer and Rihani put it, the continued inability to move beyond the Newtonian clockwork paradigm, in the socio-political milieu at least, has resulted in “both the continued failure of social scientists to capture the ‘laws’ of social interaction and policy actors’ continual frustration over their inability to fully control and direct society.”

The ancient Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu instinctively grasped the complex nature of the world that we live in when he wrote in the “Tao Te Ching” (or “The Way”) that “everything is connected, and everything relates to each other.” But connections and interactions
within a complex system are extremely difficult to detect, inexplicable, and emergent. Efforts to model complex systems, such as the Club of Rome’s famous model of economic and population growth, have not proven very useful. Unlike in a complicated system, the components of a complex system interact in ways that defy a deterministic, linear analysis. As a result, policymakers continue to be surprised and shocked by black swans and other unknown unknowns. If only we were still doing rocket science.

Wicked Problems and Retrospective Coherence

Unfortunately, complexity not only generates black swans, but also gives rise to what the political scientist Horst Rittel calls “wicked problems.” Wicked problems have no immediate or obvious solutions. They are large and intractable issues, with causes and interlocking factors that are not easily defined ex ante, much less predicted. They are highly complex problems because they contain many agents interacting with each other in often mystifying and conflicting ways. Finally, they have many stakeholders who not only have different perspectives on the wicked problem, but who also do not necessarily share the same goals. Often they are problems where either no single agency owns them, or where many agencies own a piece of the problem, in which case they fall through the cracks of the bureaucracy.

The public policy enterprise is littered with wicked problems. Climate change is a very good example of a wicked problem: it is a problem that exists at the global level, and yet precisely because it transcends national boundaries and has implications for state sovereignty, the solutions that must necessarily involve the supra-national and the sub-national are continually still-born. State-bound perspectives can only go so far in solving global problems; indeed, sometimes they exacerbate them. Pandemics are another. In the developed world, the problem of aging populations is emerging as a critical wicked problem. Sustainable economic development, which is not unconnected to the triangular problem of food, water and energy security, is an enormously wicked problem.

Climate change is a very good example of a wicked problem: it is a problem that exists at the global level, and yet precisely because it transcends national boundaries and has implications for state sovereignty, the solutions that must necessarily involve the supra-national and the sub-national are continually still-born.

Tackling one part of a wicked problem is more likely than not going to lead to new issues arising in other parts. Satisfying one stakeholder could well make the rest unhappy. A key challenge for governments therefore is to move the many stakeholders towards a broad alignment of perspectives and goals. But this requires patience and a lot of skill at stakeholder engagement and consensus building.

One of the hallmarks of wicked problems is their tendency to “pop into existence.” The linkages between wicked problems and complexity theory become extremely compelling, especially through the idea of “retrospective coherence.” In a sense, the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard anticipated the notion of “retrospective coherence” through his observation that, “Life is understood backwards, but must be lived forwards.”

The current state of affairs always makes sense (even if only apparently) when viewed
retrospectively. But this is more than saying that there is wisdom in hindsight. It is only one of many patterns that could have formed, any one of which would have been equally logical. That an explanation for the current state of affairs exists does not necessarily mean that the world is a complicated and knowable world; rather, often it only seems that way.

Taken together, the concepts of emergence and retrospective coherence suggest that in a complex system, even if the same decisions are faithfully repeated, there is no certainty that the outcomes can be replicated. Put another way, it simply means that understanding and applying the lessons of history are no sufficient guide into the future. The past is clearly no prologue.

Indeed, the notion of “past as prologue” is a dangerous assumption if the operating environment is complex. At the same time, though, the assumption that the world is an orderly and rational place has long informed the public policy enterprise, to say nothing of being reassuring to the policy maker. However, complexity theory suggests that the internal dynamics of a system “create complex outcomes that are not amenable to precise prediction,” and that any coherence is only apparent or retrospective, or both.13

The Aral Sea in 1989 (left) and 2008 (right). A complex phenomenon with multiple stakeholders.
Governments that do not understand retrospective coherence will often assume that the operating environment is merely complicated – and not complex – one in which cause and effect are linked such that the output can be determined from the input, in which one step leads predictably to the next. A failure to appreciate and apply complexity theory appropriately creates a messy contradiction and stressful situation for policy makers “caught between the demands of orderly, rational central criteria and the messy reality of day-to-day local conditions and contradictions.”

Governments and Complexity

If we accept the central message of complexity theory, that the broad range of socio-political and economic phenomena are simply not amenable to prediction and therefore control, then how can we justify the strategic foresight enterprise? Is futures work simply “future babble”, as Dan Gardner puts it?

In Singapore, a strong futures orientation has always been an integral part of policy making. In a 1979 speech titled Singapore into the 21st Century, S. Rajaratnam, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs and one of the founding fathers of modern Singapore, not only dispelled the charge that futures-oriented speculations were not proper concerns of the policy-maker, but also argued that futures thinking was integral to Singapore’s long-term prospects:

There are practical men who maintain that such speculations are a waste of time and they have no bearing at all on solutions to immediate day-to-day problems. This may have been so in earlier periods of history when changes were few and minute and were spread over decades and centuries...
to manage complexity, and how to govern in a complex operating environment, will gain a competitive advantage over those that do not. But to manage complexity requires fundamental changes to the mind-set, capabilities and organization of government.

Professor Yaneer Bar Yam, a complex systems scientist, writes that “the most basic issue for organizational success is correctly matching the system’s complexity to its environment.” In other words, the complexity of the government developing the policy should match the complexity of the system that will be affected by the policy.

**Fighting a Network with a Network**

What then does it mean for the complexity of government to match the complexity of the problem? Singapore’s counter-terrorism effort provides a useful illustration of this concept in practice. On December 7, 2001, the authorities announced the detention of several Singaporeans who were members of a previously unknown network of extremists, the pan-Southeast Asian *Jemaah Islamiyah* (or JI). The JI had been plotting acts of mass terror against several targets in Singapore. Singaporeans were preparing to kill fellow Singaporeans in pursuit of demented ideological goals.

This was a black swan for Singapore that overnight produced a wicked problem for the Government – how to deal with the threat posed by extremists who were members of a larger Southeast Asian network, and who lived and worked within the community, like ordinary Singaporeans.

The insight that a network was needed to fight a network was a critical element in Singapore’s counter-terrorism strategy. The observation that the JI, as a sprawling, multi-layered network, was a complex organization led to Singapore’s response, both in terms of organization as well as policy, that matched the JI’s complexity.

Given its organic and diffused nature, it was not possible to destroy the JI network by just hunting down the leadership and decapitating it. To do so would be to deny the JI’s essentially complex nature. Thus, Singapore adopted a similarly organic whole-of-government – perhaps even a whole-of-nation – approach to the threat posed by the JI. The traditional approach, of delineating the boundaries between agencies so that each would be responsible for a particular area, clearly would not work. No government agency had the full range of competencies or capabilities to deal completely with this complex threat.

In contrast to the American solution of creating a centralized agency, its Department of Homeland Security, Singapore opted to strengthen coordination and integration among existing agencies, leveraging the diverse strengths of existing agencies. This entailed coordinating the counter-terrorism efforts of the line agencies and ministries at the operational level, while integrating strategy and policy at the whole-of-government level. This approach called for a small but active node – the National Security Coordination Secretariat – at the heart of the broader network with the capacity to drive the strategic national agenda in counter-terrorism, but which would not interfere with the accountabilities of each agency.

Such an approach called for many agencies for the security, economic and social sectors to be networked, and at different levels. Needless to say, it was not without problems. The classic problem of inter-agency rivalries
and parochialism had to be managed. For example, the non-security agencies felt that this was a matter to be dealt with by the security agencies, whereas the security agencies in turn felt that their mandate was being impinged on by interlopers.

**Lessons for Whole-of-Government Approach to Policymaking**

The logic behind the whole-of-government approach to policymaking is a compelling one. A complex and multi-layered network of government agencies and non-governmental organizations had been created. In turn, the policies that were generated and implemented were complex – both defensive and offensive, employing both hard and soft power. The counter-terrorism enterprise has since formed the template that the Singapore Government has applied to other wicked problems like population and climate change.

More generally, governments will need to consider how they should be organized to deal with black swans, unknown unknowns, and the wicked problems that complexity generates. Creating new departments to deal with new wicked problems can be wasteful and ultimately ineffective if these creations do not contain enough organizational complexity.

Developing policies and plans to deal with such wicked problems requires the integration of diverse insights, experience and expertise. People from different organizations, both from within and outside government, have to come together and pool their knowledge in order to discover potential solutions. Cooperative mechanisms need to be set up to enable the sharing of information and to strengthen collective action.

The whole-of-government approach injects diversity and complexity into the policy process, crucial elements identified by Scott Page for success in the public policy enterprise. It recognises that in complex situations, and when dealing with wicked problems, insight and good ideas are not the monopoly of single agencies or of governments acting alone. An integrated and networked approach strikes a balance between strength and stability of the formal vertical government structure, and the diversity from different perspectives and solutions derived from a larger and more varied horizontal network of government and other national resources.

While the case for a whole-of-government approach may be intellectually compelling, it is not easily achieved. Governments, like any large hierarchical organization, tend to optimize at the departmental level rather than at the whole-of-government level. Furthermore, in a traditional hierarchy, the leader at the top receives all the information and makes the decisions. But, under stress, hierarchies can be unresponsive — even dangerously dysfunctional — because there are in reality decision-making bottlenecks at the top.

Finally, complexity stresses hierarchies. The world that governments operate in today is too complex and too fast changing for the people at the top to have the full expertise and all the answers to make the requisite decisions. Indeed, it has become increasingly unclear where “the decision” is taken.

A whole-of-government approach requires that vertical departmental silos be broken down so that information can flow horizontally to reach other departments. The old “need-to-know” imperative must give way to “knowing enough” so that each component of the larger organization can respond to issues and challenges as they arise. An environment that encourages the spontaneous horizontal
flow of information will enlarge and enrich the worldview of all departments. This in turn improves the chances that connections hidden by complexity, as well as emergent challenges and opportunities, are discovered early.

The concept of auftragstaktik may hold clues for what the structures and processes for a whole-of-government approach might look like. The German military adopted with great success (at least at the operational level) a concept of military command called auftragstaktik, essentially a philosophy of command that acknowledged the complexity and the chaos of war.

In auftragstaktik, even the most junior officers were empowered to make decisions on the spot, because they had a better and more direct feel for the situation on the ground. It meant that down the line, every officer had to understand not just the orders, but also the intent of the mission. In turn he was empowered to make decisions to adjust to the situation as he judged it, in order to better fulfil the intent of the mission.

Whole-of-government implicitly contains the central idea of auftragstaktik, which is that in complexity, it is not possible for everything to be centrally directed. Not unlike auftragstaktik, whole-of-government depends critically on people at all levels understanding how their roles fit in with the larger national aims and objectives. Agencies must have a strong and shared understanding of the challenges that the nation faces, and the underlying principles to guide responses. Furthermore, leaders of each agency must ensure its own plans and policies are aligned with the national imperatives, to the point that they instinctively react to threats and opportunities as they arise, knowing that what they do will advance the larger national, rather than departmental interests.

Whole-of-government is a holy grail – an aspiration. In countries like Singapore, it remains very much a work in progress. It requires emphasis, support and constant attention from the top.

**Dealing with Cognitive Biases**

In addition to the limitations, even flaws, of the traditional bureaucratic structures that define modern government, the cognitive limitation and biases that plague the human condition also constitute a significant obstacle to the more effective management of complexity.

In April 2010, the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull erupted. When a huge cloud of volcanic dust started to spread over Europe, air traffic authorities grounded thousands of aircraft as a safety precaution. Europe was almost paralyzed. It caused travel chaos around the world and disrupted global supply chains for weeks. It has long been known that volcanoes erupt from time to time, and that it is risky to fly through volcanic ash clouds. Yet why, despite this knowledge, was the world so surprised and unprepared for the impact of this eruption?

First, although the risk of eruption is known, it is very difficult to assess its probability of occurrence. Behavioral economists point out that we underrate the probability of an event when it has not happened recently and overrate the probability of an event when it has. As a result of this cognitive bias, the risk of an eruption was underrated in this case, as the Icelandic volcano had been quiescent for a long time. This tendency to place less emphasis on future risks and contingencies, and to emphasize present costs and benefits is a
common cognitive bias known as hyperbolic discounting.  

Second, the effect of the eruption on aircraft flights was the result of complex interconnectivities and therefore highly unpredictable. When the Icelandic volcano erupted, aviation authorities depended on the predictions of analytical models and reacted with caution by shutting down all flights. But as the commercial impact grew, the industry began to question the reliability of these models and proposed doing experimental flights to probe whether it was safe to fly. In the event, the experimental flights proved to be a better indicator for action than reliance on the models. This is a clear demonstration of the value of exploration and experimentation when confronted with complex phenomenon, as opposed to depending solely on the predictions of analytical models.

Cognitive biases and the extreme difficulty of estimating the cumulative effects of complex events make preparing for unforeseen situations an exercise fraught with difficulty. It also adds to the challenges of governments operating in complex situations.

Finally, the reluctance to grapple with game-changing issues – be they volcanoes, financial crises or terrorist attacks – stems from an unwillingness to face the consequences of an uncertain and unpredictable future. These consequences interfere with long-held mental models, thereby creating cognitive dissonance. By extension, cognitive dissonance speaks of...

Flight disruptions at Leeds Bradford International Airport in 2010 after Icelandic volcano, Eyjafjallajökull, erupted leaving a huge cloud of volcanic dust.
denial: the inability to acknowledge uncertainty, the unwillingness and recalcitrance in accepting the need to adapt to a future that is not a straightforward, linear extrapolation from current reality.

Managing and Organizing Complexity

In such a complex operating environment, governments should be adaptive in navigating situations characterized by emergence, multi-causality and ambiguity. Governments often have to make big decisions, and develop plans and policies, under conditions of incomplete information and uncertain outcomes. It is not possible to prepare exhaustively for every contingency. Instead, a “search and discover” approach should be adopted. The deployment of experimental flights to check out the real risk of flying into a cloud of volcanic ash exemplifies this approach. The military calls this approach the OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act), which is a recurring cycle of decision-making that acknowledges and exploits the uncertainty and complexity of the battlefield.24

Scenario planning is a linear method of carrying out the OODA loop, in the sense that it projects futures based on our understanding of the operating environment today. Used intelligently, it can be a very important tool for planning, and can help overcome cognitive biases by challenging our mental models. But it is insufficient in a complex unordered environment.

In this regard, non-linear methods should be part of the government complexity toolbox. One of the more innovative methods has been policy-gaming, which is akin to military wargaming. Applied to the civilian policy context, policy-gaming helps to condition policy-makers to complex and uncertain situations, thereby allowing them to confront their cognitive biases. At Singapore’s Civil Service College, Applied Simulation Training (AST) was introduced in 2012, after being successfully piloted in a series of policy-gaming sessions held in leadership milestone programmes.25 Far from being an exercise in validating current policies and practice, the central aim of policy-gaming is the “expansion of participants’ comfort zones...”26

Governments must also be able to manage the risk that is a natural result of operating in complexity. There will always be threats to national interests, policies and plans, because no amount of analysis and forward planning will eliminate the volatility and uncertainty that exists in a complex world. These threats constitute strategic risk.

But there is little by way of best practice to systematically address or ameliorate the threats to national goals that these risks pose. In Singapore, the government is developing a unique Whole-of-Government Integrated Risk Management (WOG-IRM) framework – a governance chain that begins with risk identification and assessment at the strategic level, to monitoring of risk indicators, and finally to resource mobilization and behavioral changes to prepare for each anticipated risk.27 WOG-IRM also plays an imperfect but important role...
in discovering the inter-connections among risk factors. This in turn helps to reduce some of the complexity. The WOG-IRM framework is a work-in-progress, and we have started using it for strategic conversations on risks that occur at the whole-of-government level.

The WOG-IRM framework is also critical to building resilience, which is the ability to cope with strategic shock by adapting to, or even transforming with, rapid and turbulent change. Resilience, defined as the ability to “bounce back” and distinct from the “imperviousness,” is a prerequisite for governments to operate effectively in a complex environment.

Resilient governments must also go beyond an emphasis on efficiency. Lean systems that focus exclusively on efficiency are unlikely to have sufficient resources to deal with unexpected shocks and volatility, while also having the bandwidth to make plans for an uncertain future filled with wicked problems.

This is not an argument for establishing bloated and sluggish bureaucracies; rather, it is to reiterate the importance of a small but dedicated group of people to think about the future. The skill-sets needed are different from those required to deal with short-term volatility and crisis. Both are important, but those charged with thinking about the future systematically should be allocated the bandwidth to focus on the long-term without getting bogged down in day-to-day routine. They will become repositories of patterns that can be used to facilitate decision-making, to prepare for unknown unknowns, and perhaps to conduct policy experiments through policy-gaming or other simulations. A few examples will suffice to illustrate this point.

In 2004, the Singapore Government initiated its Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS) program. A major development in Singapore’s broader strategy to scan for complex risks, RAHS uses a computer-based suite of tools to identify and interpret weak signals that can evolve into sudden shocks. The primary rationale of RAHS is sense-making, used in the technical sense as articulated by pioneers in the field such as Karl Weick and Dave Snowden. Ultimately, sense-making is not about the “truth” or “getting it right;” rather, it consists in the continuous drafting (and redrafting) of an emerging story so that it becomes more comprehensive and comprehensible, and becomes more viable than alternative stories so that it can form the basis of present actions. Given the emergence of ubiquitous (and often equivocal) big data, coming in from multiple sources such as climate information, posts on social media sites, digital pictures and videos, financial transaction records, mobile telephony GPS signals and so forth, RAHS’s sense-making work has become ever more salient to Singapore’s risk management enterprise.

In going beyond the detection of weak signals to engendering strategic and meaningful shifts in thinking, the Singapore Government set up the Centre for Strategic Futures (CSF) in 2009. It is a think tank that promotes a whole-of-government approach to strategic planning and decision-making. It works on leading-edge concepts like complex systems science, WOG-IRM, and resilience. It promotes fresh approaches for dealing with complexity like policy-gaming, encouraging experiments with new computer-based tools and sense-making methods to augment the current horizon scanning toolkit. Although a small outfit,
the CSF is a catalyst for strategic change in the government and its agencies.

The setting up of the CSF at the heart of government – within the Prime Minister’s Office – is itself highly instructive. Its location within the establishment as well as its mandate of challenging dogma and orthodoxy speaks to how government futures work cannot be conducted in isolation, yet at the same time must be insulated and protected from the day-to-day machinations of government. This calls to mind noted futurist Wendell Bell’s example of General Matthew B. Ridgway, who in the mid-1950s served as the U.S. Army Chief of Staff:

When asked what he thought was his most important role as the nation’s top soldier, he answered, “To protect the mavericks.” What Ridgway meant was that a future war might be completely different from the currently dominant beliefs on which plans were being made...He was counting on the mavericks to be looking at the future in ways different from the dominant views, thinking beyond the orthodox beliefs and school solutions.²⁰

Conclusion

The future promises ever more complexity, carrying in its train more black swans and unknown unknowns. Governments must learn how to operate and even thrive in this complexity, and to deal confidently with strategic shocks when they occur. The first step is to acknowledge the inherent complexity of the operating environment. Then they should consider the imperative of a whole-of-government approach, and the adoption of new non-linear tools for managing complexity, and strategic risk. These will not eliminate shocks. But by improving the ability to anticipate such shocks, governments might actually reduce their frequency and impact. In turn this will help make governments and nations more resilient as their leaders govern for the future.

Notes

5. For examples and discussions of the different types of complex systems, see Fritjof Capra,
encourages greater initiative by leaders at all levels of command.


23 These were essentially outdated analytical models more than two decades old and that were furthermore derived from small data sets from Indonesian volcanic activities, a geological region with fundamentally different characteristics.


29 For more information on the Centre for Strategic Futures, please see its website, http://www.csf.sg.

To Build a Network

BY JOHN ARQUILLA

The fundamental dynamic of the Cold War era was an arms race to build nuclear weapons. But in the long, often covert, "cool war" against al-Qaeda and its affiliates that began in earnest after September 11, 2001, the driving force has been – and continues to be – an "organizational race" to build networks. It has grown increasingly apparent that the latest advances in information technology have greatly empowered flat, essentially leaderless groups unified more by pursuit of a common goal than any kind of central control. In the elegant phrasing of David Weinberger, co-author of a key contribution to the emerging information-age canon, *The Cluetrain Manifesto*, networks, particularly web-enabled ones, are comprised of "small pieces loosely joined."1 Weinberger's language offers a particularly apt description of al-Qaeda today, as the group's original concentrated core, formed around Osama bin Laden and Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, has long since given way to a far flatter, much more widely dispersed set of relatively independent cells and nodes.

Thus has the world's premier terrorist network survived over a dozen years of major efforts aimed at its eradication. Indeed, far from being on "the verge of strategic defeat," as former defense secretary Leon Panetta was wont to say,2 al-Qaeda has thrived by redesigning itself away from any serious reliance on central leadership. In this way, the targeted killings of any number of "high-value targets," including of course bin Laden himself, have had little effect on the organization's viability and vitality. So today a handful of American forces are back in Iraq fighting the al-Qaeda splinter group ISIS – and the country is burning. In Syria, al-Qaeda, ISIS and others are leading the fight against the Assad regime, much as terrorist networks played a similar role in the overthrow of Libyan dictator Moammar Qaddafi – and may have been involved, at least tangentially, in the humiliation inflicted upon the United States by the attack on the American diplomatic mission in Benghazi.3 The al-Qaeda network is operating in many other places, too: Algeria, Mali, Mauretania, Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen – to name just a few locales.

It is as if the death of bin Laden opened up al-Qaeda's "strategic space," creating room for the networked global insurgency envisioned a decade ago by its leading strategist, Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, in his *Global Islamic Resistance Call*. Over the past few years, al-Qaeda has taken on almost
all of the characteristics of al-Suri’s “call.” He was captured in Pakistan in 2005, and later turned over to the Assad regime – his nom de guerre means “the Syrian.”

Rumor intelligence suggests that al-Suri was released in the wake of the rebellion in Syria, but there have been no confirmed public sightings. This hardly matters. As he himself would no doubt say, it is the leaderless network concept that is important. There is no need to have a great man at the head of the organization. No one is in charge and, for a “dark network” of terrorists, it is far better to operate without a formal leadership structure. As al-Suri makes clear in his writings, the flatter the network, the better.

Clearly, al-Qaeda is fully invested in the organizational race to build networks. That terrorists would take so well to networking is something my long-time research partner David Ronfeldt and I have been worrying about for the past two decades. Our response back in the mid-1990s to the then-embryonic threat from terrorist networks was to contend that, in a great conflict between nations and networks, the generally hierarchical structure of nations would not serve them well in efforts to come to grips with networks. And so from early on we saw a need to enter the organizational race by starting to build networks of our own. Our key point: “It takes networks to fight networks.”

Many have taken up this mantra in the eighteen years since we first intoned it, most notably General Stanley McChrystal, perhaps the most network-oriented of all American military leaders. Sadly, some loose comments by a few of his subordinates about
Senior political leaders led to his dismissal. Thus an articulate voice in favor of taking a more networked approach was removed from the fight – a terrible self-inflicted wound from which the U.S. military has yet to recover fully.

And the problem goes well beyond the armed services. In the realm of intelligence, for example, the most significant organizational change made in the years since 9/11 was to add yet another vertical layer to the existing hierarchy by creating a directorate of national intelligence. The commission members charged – by the President and Congress – with finding potent remedies to the lapses that contributed to the surprise attacks on America in 2001 were in total agreement about calling for much greater inter-organizational cooperation and information sharing. Nevertheless, their policy recommendation was to create an entity that would wield ever greater central control.

The wiring diagram for the new directorate makes this abundantly clear in the final report of the 9/11 Commission. And the one other major organizational change made to the U.S. government was the creation of a Department of Homeland Security – yet another massive, bulky hierarchy. Its sheer size and complexity contributed significantly to the slow, confused response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster back in 2005. But if the civilian departments and agencies of the U.S. government have had a difficult time grasping the art of building networks, the military, by way of contrast, has shown a considerable and growing aptitude for doing so.

Some military-oriented examples of network-building

Given that small but key groups of civilian and military leaders accept the notion that the best tool for countering a hostile network is a network of one’s own, the central issue has come to revolve around exactly how one should go about building a network. The mixed experiences with creation of a directorate of national intelligence and the homeland security apparatus imply that fruitful insights into networking are perhaps more likely to be found “out at the edges” rather than at the policy-making core. And sure enough, even a modest amount of investigation quickly yields very interesting results. For it is “out there” that counterterrorist networks have formed up and have achieved some quite remarkable results.

One of the lesser known but more successful network enterprises operates out of a former French Foreign Legion base, Camp Lemonnier, in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa. From here just a few thousand soldiers, Marines, and civilians operate in conjunction with allies and many departments of the U.S. government to illuminate dark terrorist networks as a first step toward eliminating them. New York Times reporters Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker have thoughtfully assessed the operation in this way:

To an unusual degree, the mission has lashed together the government’s entire national security structure. Officers there describe a high level of cooperation among conventional military forces, the more secretive special operations teams, and the American intelligence community. Representatives from other government agencies, including customs and agriculture, routinely pass through.

With a decade of counterterrorism successes to its credit, along with major contributions to humanitarian aid and demining operations, the network operating out of Djibouti has gained official acceptance – after some
early efforts by the Pentagon to close it down – and is seen as “the centerpiece of an expanding constellation of half a dozen U.S. drone and surveillance bases in Africa, created to combat a new generation of terrorist groups across the continent, from Mali to Libya to the Central African Republic.”

In short, Camp Lemonnier serves as the key node – the hub, in fact – of a hub-and-spokes network that ties together civilian and military personnel from the United States and its allies in the war against al-Qaeda and its affiliates. And the results achieved with relatively minute manpower and but a tiny fraction of the level of material resources devoted to, say, the campaign in Afghanistan, have been remarkable. With amazing economy of force the Djibouti operation has played a key role in helping to inflict defeats on al-Qaeda and affiliates in Somalia, Yemen, and other locales that fall within its area of responsibility.

Moving from the Horn of Africa to the Philippines, one can find another excellent example of successful networking. With around 600 soldiers, the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (CJSOTF-P) has worked closely with the Armed Forces of the Philippines to inflict stinging blows on the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the related but more criminally-oriented Abu Sayyaf Group. Beyond its successes in counterterrorist field operations, the CJSOTF-P has also played a key role in ensuring the completion of civic improvement projects that have built schools, roads, and medical and disaster relief facilities. Its work has drawn high praise from the NGO community as well. Mark Schneider, a senior vice president with the International Crisis Group, views the CJSOTF-P “as a success story, especially in terms of winning hearts and minds through civic action and medical assistance projects.”

Another key networking success “at the edge” unfolded in, of all places, Iraq. From the outset of the mass uprising that began in earnest in August 2003, the insurgency there proved nettlesome, with levels of violence against innocent Iraqis mounting precipitously by 2006, a time when nearly 100 non-combatants were being killed each day. Yet, by the end of 2008, the violence had receded, with civilian deaths decreasing by about three-fourths, to the 9,000/year range. And the casualty rates continued to drop sharply until U.S. forces left at the end of 2011. However, the violence arose once again in the wake of the American departure, with losses in 2013 amounting to the worst level in the past five years. The conventional wisdom about why things got dramatically better seven years ago was that President George W. Bush’s decision to send an additional 28,000 troops to Iraq – “the surge” – finally gave commanders sufficient resources to deal effectively with the insurgency.

But what turned the campaign in Iraq around was not simply the addition of five brigades. There was also a critically important shift to a new concept of operations based on the idea of getting off the few dozen large forward operating bases (FOBs) on which most U.S. troops were posted and redeploying them – in platoon-sized packets, with similar-sized friendly Iraqi forces – to well over a hundred small outposts in areas where the violence was worst. Thus a physical network emerged, one comprised of many small nodes, improving the response time to attacks, the intelligence-gathering process, and overall relations with the populace.
The physical outpost network was complemented by the rise of a social network that grew from reaching out to many of the Sunni insurgents who had been fighting the occupiers for years. Some 80,000 of them switched sides, becoming the “Sons of Iraq” who formed such a big part of the Awakening Movement that drove a serious wedge between al Qaeda operatives and the Iraqi people. The “surge brigades” were not really necessary to achieve these results, as there were never more than about 10 percent of the troops in-country operating from these outposts, or more than about another 10 percent involved in supplying them, or protecting them from nearby “overwatch” positions. The key had simply been the willingness to adopt a network-building turn of mind, something that many platoon and company commanders, and their immediate superiors, had begun to do at the grassroots level, even before the surge.

By 2008, with the additional surge brigades now gone, it was clear to all that the counterinsurgency was not primarily a numbers game. The key was to populate the physical network with platoon-sized outposts and to keep reaching out to the Iraqi people. This was the way to “illuminate and eliminate” the enemy network. General Petraeus put the matter best in his commander’s guidance of June 2008:

*You can’t commute to this fight. Position Joint Security Stations, Combat Outposts, and Patrol Bases in the neighborhoods we intend to secure. Living among the people is essential to securing them and defeating the insurgents.*

*We cannot kill our way out of this endeavor. We and our Iraqi partners must identify and separate the “reconcilables” from the “irreconcilables” through engagement . . . We must strive to make the reconcilables a part of the solution, even as we identify, pursue, and kill, capture, or drive out the irreconcilables.*

*Defeat the insurgent networks . . . Focus intelligence assets to identify the network.*

Thus was a network built that defeated the al-Qaeda network in Iraq, and kept the levels of violence down – for years, until after the American withdrawal and the subsequent alienation of the Sunnis by the Baghdad government, which gave the terrorists the opportunity to come back.

**Network-building from the Byzantines to the Battle of Britain**

Clearly, the central organizational insight into network-building is the notion of being willing to create a large number of small units of action, and allowing them to operate relatively freely in pursuit of a common goal – even if in the absence of any serious degree of direct central control. While the recent examples of network-building described in the previous section are both interesting and valuable, it is important to mine earlier history as well for ideas about networking. “Looking back” is a very useful way to “look ahead.” The way to do it is to search for examples of the creation of systems comprised of many small nodes, cells, or units of action. And, while not particularly abundant, there are indeed some quite salient examples.

The security strategy of the Byzantine Empire comes easily to mind. Constantinople outlasted Rome by a thousand years. How? In part by making the most of its limited
resources. For centuries, the extensive eastern land frontier – the western part of the empire was shored up by Byzantine naval mastery – was subject to continual raids and invasions. There were never enough troops to maintain a preclusive, perimeter defense. So instead the Byzantines resorted to an extensive system of small outposts whose mission was to detect and pass the word of incursions – by couriers, with signaling mirrors, fire at night and smoke by day – to military “hubs” where armored cavalry striking forces were at the ready. In this way, attackers gained only a minimal advantage of surprise, and were soon beset from many sides (I would say, “swarmed”) by quick-reaction forces.18

The “field manual” of the time, the Tenth Century C.E. De Velitatione – which translates as Skirmishing – makes clear that a networked defensive system can also be used on the offensive – particularly if coupled with the vibrant intelligence networks that the Byzantines nurtured along the edges of their empire. Edward Luttwak’s recent research into this security system has led him to conclude that it enabled a “military renaissance” a millennium ago that gave the Byzantine Empire a new lease on life. Edward Luttwak puts it so well, about the more proactive aspect of the strategy, “the aim is to do much with little, with raids by relatively small forces that magnify their strength by achieving surprise.”19 Bernard Montgomery, one of the great captains of the 20th century, expressed much admiration for the Byzantine ability to use swarm tactics, offensively and defensively, noting how the network of outpost garrisons and mobile strike forces succeeded against a range of adversaries, from Avars to Arabs.20

A modern historical example that featured elements quite similar to the Byzantine network can be found in the defensive system propounded by Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding of the Royal Air Force – whose Fighter Command won the Battle of Britain in 1940. German military forces, fresh from a string of blitzkrieg victories culminating with the fall of France, found themselves unable to cross the English Channel – so an attempt was instead made to try to bomb Britain into submission from the air. Pre-war estimates of the destructive potential of strategic air attack had been particularly dire, and there was much debate about the correct defensive organizational form to adopt and the right combat doctrine to employ.

A major point of view was the “big wing” school of thought, whose goal was to mass as much defensive force as possible – in practical terms, this meant crafting units of action comprised of three squadrons, some 75-90 fighters – against enemy bomber streams. The problems with this system were two-fold: Luftwaffe leaders were clever about where they were going to strike next, often switching direction after crossing the British coast; and, even when the target areas were known, big wings would take a long time to come together from scattered airfields. One of Dowding’s chief subordinates – and a key supporter – was Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park, who argued that “the assembling of large formations of fighters was both time-wasting and unwieldy.”21

Instead of this approach, Dowding and Park preferred to allow single squadrons of just two dozen fighters to engage the large attacking bomber formations – and their fighter escorts – independently, as soon as information that flowed in about German intentions from any of the forty Chain Home radar stations positioned along the coast was confirmed by the relevant outposts of the
A thousand-node Observer Corps network that was sprinkled all over southeastern England.22

It turned out that Dowding and Park were right; the networked, swarm-oriented approach won out. Dowding, however, nicknamed “Stuffy,” had made many enemies, and was sacked as soon as the crisis passed. Prime Minister Winston Churchill and most of Britain’s senior military leadership may not have properly valued or rewarded Dowding for what he had achieved, but official German war documents make clear that the Luftwaffe had a correct understanding of how and why their campaign failed:

_The defense was forewarned of each attack by an unbroken chain of radar stations, which made surprise almost impossible. This and astute ground control saved the British fighter arm from being knocked out and German air sovereignty being won._23

The 30,000 civilian volunteers of the Observer Corps – the human nodes in the vast early-warning network formed to help defend their country against air attack – made out better than Dowding. They refused to be paid for their services; but in April 1941 King George VI made them the Royal Observer Corps in recognition of the contribution they made to victory in the Battle of Britain.24

**A Systematic Approach to Network-Building**

It should be clear from the foregoing examples – both the more recent and ongoing ones, as well as instances from earlier eras – that network-building hardly requires resort to alchemy. The foundational requirement, organizing into Weinberger’s “small pieces, loosely joined,” is fairly simple to meet – if institutional opposition is overcome – and the power of the “small and many” can be seen in all the cases considered. But there is surely more that is necessary to build strong, effective networks. For David Ronfeldt and me, there are four additional areas beyond organizational design that must be addressed in the network-building process: the network’s narrative; its social basis; the operating doctrine employed; and the technological “kit” required.25

The _narrative_ is the story that draws people to the network – and keeps them in it, even in adversity. Of the examples considered in this article, the Iraqi Awakening Movement provides perhaps the most salient case wherein a whole counterinsurgent network was energized and enlivened by a narrative about how al-Qaeda operatives were exploiting Iraqis, and that coalition forces were coming to outposts right among the people to protect, serve, and liberate. A measure of the effectiveness of this narrative was the fact that many tens of thousands joined the Sons of Iraq in support of this effort. The sharp drop in violence – mentioned earlier – that soon followed is yet another indicator that this narrative had positive effects.

In terms of the _social aspect_ of the network-building process, the great challenge is in bringing together actors from diverse places and making the network the focus of their loyalty. Militaries in most countries bring in recruits from all over their societies and create cohesion in service to “the nation.” Terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda have been able to do this sort of thing, too, the difference being that they instill a loyalty to _the network_. In al-Qaeda’s case, and among its affiliates, the ability to do this has been aided, quite often, by skillful exploitation of religious and kinship ties. Nation-states seldom have similarly strong social bonds; and social cohesion is further complicated by the fact that members of
networks are generally drawn from organizations, services, or the various departments of government to whom they continue to feel primary loyalty.

Dealing with the social component is not easy, but I would say that the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) provides an example of the successful creation of a sense of community among military elites drawn from all of the services. While all retain the outer trappings and many of the inner practices of their parent services, there is at the same time a crucially important sense of social fraternity and trust that goes beyond the color of their uniforms.

The current challenges for SOCOM at this social level of networking are to: 1. foster a strong sense of common identity among members of the relatively recently created United States Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC); and 2. make a similar social connection with international military elites in pursuit of the “global special operations network” that Admiral William McRaven has made the centerpiece of his long-term SOCOM strategy. As he put it in June 2013 when his plan was first unveiled:

*I need to get the military buy-in first, and then very quickly we move to the inter-agency (community), and then very quickly we move to our partners and allies.*

Clearly, he understands that network-building requires a very sound social foundation.

*The doctrine,* or concept of operations, that networks of all sorts employ – from mass popular movements like the Arab Spring to insurgents and, increasingly, even conventional traditional military operators – is to “swarm.” Their many small elements become habituated to coming together, often from several points of the compass, to converge upon a particular place and/or opponent. For a social swarm this might be Tahrir Square; for an outpost-and-outreach counterinsurgent network the convergence could come on a more operational scale – as was the case in Anbar Province in Iraq several years ago. Even the early historical cases considered herein reflected use of swarm tactics. Both the Byzantines on their eastern frontier and the Royal Air Force in the Battle of Britain swarmed their opponents. *Networks swarm.* If you intend to build one, make sure it has a capacity for swarming.

*Technological “kit” is the final foundational element to which network-builders should be attentive. It is crucially important that a network’s communications be capable of great throughput, but with a high level of security. Sad to say – from a counter-terrorist perspective – al-Qaeda and its affiliates have learned to use the world wide web and the Internet ubiquitously and securely. The network of nations aligned against the terrorists has sufficient levels of connectivity, but not yet the degree of security needed for the most efficient operations. The Byzantines offer an interesting example here: when they wanted to send out warnings of incursions without the raiders knowing, they used riders to pass the word – reasoning that smoke or fire signals would alert their enemies. Less technology may, at times, make for better security.*

But even with the availability of high-throughput, secure communications will prove ineffective if the organizational design of a network is vertically- (i.e., hierarchically-) rather than horizontally-oriented to maximize linkages among the many, small nodes that form the best networks. Thus in closing this
discussion of key factors in network-building, we return to the theme of “small pieces, loosely joined,” the implication being that organizational design is first among equals. If the organizational structure is not right, even the greatest narrative and a strong, trust-based social ethos will end up being sub-optimized.

**What next for networks?**

Clearly, Admiral McRaven’s effort to build a global special operations network is the broadest, boldest effort under way at present. But another interesting network-building enterprise was forming up, albeit on a smaller scale, in Afghanistan. The village stability operations (VSO) concept there has been very much an exercise in network-building. The core idea is quite similar to the outpost-and-outreach system that emerged in Iraq, beginning in 2006: small American detachments live with Afghan locals and operate from their villages.

The VSO concept tacitly recognizes that the center-outward nation-building experiment in Afghanistan should take a back seat to an “edges-inward” network-building approach. The original plan was to have over 100 of these “small pieces” in place, but this goal has fallen victim to the Obama administration’s desire to depart from Afghanistan as swiftly as possible. Perhaps events in Iraq will encourage some rethinking, and the original VSO plan will be reinstated. While some resist the idea that the networked approach taken in Iraq can also be used to good effect in Afghanistan, others have argued forcefully that the most important, usable lesson from Iraq is that “it takes a network to fight a network.”

A U.S. Soldier assigned to Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan where patrols were designed to deter insurgent operations and engage residents.
Thus the hypothesis about the value of network-building in the fight against terrorists and insurgents is undergoing a quite rigorous “field test” right now in Afghanistan. Wouldn’t it be useful if there were also such a test for networking closer to home, in the area of governance? Given the very low approval levels that elected officials currently suffer under, perhaps one thing that even bitter partisans might agree upon would be to try something bold, in terms of organizational redesign of government. There is even a bit of a blueprint in place, thanks to the work of Leon Fuerth, formerly the national security adviser to Vice President Al Gore.

Since 2001, Dr. Fuerth has been exploring the possibility of moving to a nimbler, more networked model of American governance – and has knitted together his own network of experts along the way. His and his team’s work addresses clearly all five of the network-building factors that David Ronfeldt and I think are essential. So in addition to Admiral William McRaven’s global initiative, and the emerging VSO network in Afghanistan, I would very strongly recommend pursuit of a third experiment in network-building based on Leon Fuerth’s ideas about “anticipatory governance.”

Given the evidence presented in this article of cases of successful network-building – both recently and in the more distant past – and the clear evidence that insurgents and terrorists have been racing to expand and improve their networks, we can only hope that our leaders make a firm decision to enter the “organizational race” as well.

Notes

3 The most recent reporting on the Benghazi attack suggests that the al Qaeda core network did not play “a significant role” in it. See David D. Kirkpatrick, “Deadly Mix in Benghazi: False Allies, Crude Video,” The New York Times, December 29, 2013.
4 His given name is Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Sitt Maryam Nasar.
5 The most extensive analysis of al-Suri’s work is Brynjar Lia’s Architect of Global Jihad (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). Aside from analyzing al-Suri’s writings, Lia also provides a thoughtful biography of this engineer-turned-terrorist.
6 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), p. 82.
11 Which, even now, in the last year of direct combat operations, will see some $80 billion spent there. Overall spending in Afghanistan since 2001 has totaled about $1 trillion.
13 See the Report on Human Rights Violations, prepared by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the United Nations News Service story that called out the figures just for Iraq from the larger report, "Over 34,000 Civilians Killed in Iraq in 2006" (January 16, 2007). The report notes also that over 36,000 Iraqi civilians were injured in 2006. Even taken together, these figures are dwarfed by the British Lancet report that
pegged Iraqi deaths and injuries at far higher levels – though it came under much criticism for faulty methodology.

14 Casualty figures cited herein for 2008 and 2013 are also from the United Nations News Service, which has sometimes reported slightly greater numbers of deaths than other monitors, like Iraq Body Count – but which is always far below the levels suggested by the British Lancet study.


16 An excellent account of how this process began to unfold in an almost spontaneous fashion can be found in Niel Smith, "Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point," Military Review (March-April 2008).


24 The Observers helped foster a continuing interest in plane-spotting which has resonated even into recent times, with spotter networks playing a key role in uncovering the secret flights that carried suspected terrorists as part of the "extraordinary rendition" process. See Gerard Seenan and Giles Tremlett, "How planespotters turned into the scourge of the CIA," The Guardian, 9 December 2005.

25 These dimensions of network-building are discussed in detail in our Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), especially pp. 323-343.

26 Cited in Paul McLeary, "Admiral: Global Special Operations 'Network' to Be Unveiled This Fall," Defense News, June 12, 2013. The plan was indeed "unveiled" before Congress last fall – an event that has sparked debate.

27 See especially the thoughtful analysis by General Stanley McChrystal, "Lesson from Iraq: It Takes a Network to Defeat a Network," LinkedIn, June 21, 2013.

28 See Leon Fuhrt and Evan M.H. Faber, "Anticipatory Governance: Winning the Future," The Futurist, Volume 47, Number 3 (July-August 2013). For a more complete exposition of the concept, see the full report, same title, published by the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies in 2012.
The Military Planning Problem

BY WILLIAM J. GREGOR

Scholars Sebastian L.v. Gorka and David Kilcullen recently observed that modern Western counterinsurgency (COIN) theory is built on a handful of books based upon practitioner experiences in a handful of 20th century conflicts. They also lamented that almost all the better known examples of counterinsurgency are limited to cases where colonial or post-imperial governments were fighting on the territory of dependent ex-colonies; conditions that are atypical of today’s insurgencies. Thus, they concluded that the translation of classic COIN doctrine to the contemporary threat seemed forced and misguided at best. The situation, however, is far worse than that. Drawing conclusions about how to counter insurgencies from a limited number of cases certainly brings into question whether those experiences can be generalized. However, expanding the range of cases not only increases the dataset but also challenges the doctrinal framework itself. It challenges the military doctrinal framework because understanding contemporary conflicts requires understanding those conflicts as politics, not as war.

Classic COIN

It is easy to establish that U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine is informed by a small canon of classic commentaries. U.S. Army FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency lists in its bibliography works deemed classics. The books listed deal almost exclusively with colonial insurgencies in the 1950s and 1960s. Among the works are books such as Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice by David Galula, and Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency by Roger Trinquier. All the classics are offered as general theory. The tenets of these works are seen as applicable to all insurgencies even though most of the references were written before 1970 or deal with insurgencies that occurred well before 1970. The bibliography also has a section labeled special subjects in counterinsurgency. Those works are of more recent vintage but largely deal with the same set of insurgencies; for example, John Nagl’s Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, or Bard E. O’Neill’s 1990 work, Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary

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The references reveal a general fascination with the French experience in Algeria, and U.S. and French wars in Vietnam, as well as nostalgia for communist or Marxist revolutions. Conspicuously absent is any reference to ethnic or religious insurgencies and conflicts such as the Algerian civil war 1991-2002.

**Contemporary Conditions**

The tenets of FM 3-24 come from the study of insurgencies associated with mass political movements, post-World War II anti-colonialism, and the Cold War. However, John Mueller has observed that imperial and colonial wars ended in the late 1980s, and international wars between nation-states have declined. Most conflicts now fall into the category of civil wars.  

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INTERVENTION IN INTRASTATE WARS

The latest version of JP 1 goes further. The manual expressly refers to war as a duel on a larger scale. However, unlike General Sullivan, Chapter 1 goes on to divide warfare into two forms: traditional and irregular. The previous edition of JP 1 did not make that distinction, but it did acknowledge that something was different about contemporary conflicts. In that manual, in the discussion of war termination, the doctrine added a vague third outcome to Clausewitz’ two categories, surrender and negotiated settlement; the indirect approach. That third category suggested that there was something different about how contemporary conflicts ended and, thus, these conflicts differed from traditional warfare. Unfortunately, the doctrine just could not specify how they differed. The current version of JP 1 does not discuss war termination. Yet, despite the division of warfare into traditional and irregular forms the doctrine clings to Clausewitz’ conception of war as a duel, leaving little room for understanding intrastate wars differently.

The U.S. military’s commitment to a Clausewitzian framework, however, cannot mitigate the pressure to respond to contemporary military planning requirements. The planning challenges are manifest in several ways in military doctrine. For example, version 1 of the Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) defines irregular warfare as, “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over relevant populations.” This definition does not differ greatly from the definition of political violence cited earlier. The Irregular Warfare JOC notes too that IW is inherently a political struggle that differs from the political element of conventional war. IW campaigns are also protracted, requiring a prolonged and persistent effort of at least a decade to achieve a political outcome. Hence, the planning requirements are different from those of conventional war. Unfortunately, like JP 1, the Irregular Warfare JOC cannot separate itself from the Clausewitzian framework and thus, tries to use Clausewitz’ trinity: the government, the population, and the military, to explain the difference between conventional and irregular warfare.

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The military planning systems have also recognized that war among the people or irregular warfare cannot be planned using conventional methods. Beginning with the aftermath of the conflict in Kosovo, new planning concepts have been introduced, starting with Effects Based Operations and Systemic Operational Design and finally incorporating into Army planning doctrine a design methodology and into Joint Doctrine operational design. In recognition of the fact that irregular warfare campaigns are typically protracted, operational design is now a significant element of theater campaign planning procedures. It is not necessary here to discuss the reasons for introducing these planning methods and the arguments for their inclusion in military planning doctrine. What is important is the military’s recognition that planning for contemporary conflicts needs new methods. However, the new methods have been introduced without any real effort to put aside the traditional
or conventional framework. Thus, the doctrine labels the new planning methodology design, but design of what? Design gives form to some concrete response to a problem, a building (architectural design), a product (product design) or a machine or structure (engineering design). The conventional military planning system was built on a base of knowledge. Hence, conventional military operations are planned using the assembled knowledge about those operations. That is why there is a well-known military lexicon of terms associated with designing conventional military operations and a list of consistent military information requirements. What then is the body of knowledge that informs design for wars among the people? The obvious answer would seem to be current counterinsurgency and stability operations doctrine. Unfortunately, as will be shown, that doctrine does not adequately comprehend the current security environment. Additionally, the new methodology does not stand alone. Instead, the new methods have been merged with conventional military planning processes, which impedes effective use.

A New Perspective

To assess what is wanting in both the counterinsurgency theory and doctrine, and in planning doctrine’s application, it is necessary to define a standard with which to compare the current doctrine’s approach. That standard needs to address both the insurgencies that inform the classic COIN canon and those that followed. Fortunately, a work bridges that gap. In States & Social Revolutions, Theda Skocpol reviewed the established explanations for revolutions, reexamined the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions and produced a new explanation. Although the French and Russian revolutions have not influenced U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, the Chinese revolution figures prominently in the discussion of anti-colonial revolutions and the U.S. war in Vietnam. Skocpol’s explanation of the Chinese Communist success differs from the
explanation found among the works in the classic COIN canon. Additionally, her work has influenced more recent analyses of non-European revolutions, such as Misagh Parsa’s book, *States, Ideologies & Social Revolutions*. Consequently, it is useful to begin a critique of COIN doctrine by reviewing Skocpol’s work.

However, before discussing theories of revolution, it is important to highlight some of the elements of Army and Joint design methodology to direct attention to those portions of the theory that relate to design. There are three primary elements to design: framing the operational environment, framing the problem, and developing an operational approach. The Army manual states that these activities are accomplished through dialogue and critical and creative thinking. Nowhere in the discussion of design can be found a discussion of theories that guide the collection and interpretation of data relevant to the perceived problem at hand. Thus, planners assigned to develop the operation frame for the environment must puzzle about where to begin. Similarly, when developing an operational approach – that is actions to address the problem and move the political system toward the policy goal – planners are again without a guide to assessing the relationship between actions and effects. To the extent that counter-insurgency doctrine seeks to be scientific, i.e. abstract and universally replicable, it makes no distinction between rebellions, secession movements, or revolutions. In contrast, political theory is context dependent and there is no guarantee that results can be replicated. Hence, the review of theories of revolutions should highlight both data related to an operational frame and elements of an operational approach.

Writing in 1979, Skocpol identified four major families of social-scientific theories of revolution. In her estimation, none was adequate. The first family of theory reviewed was Marxist theory. Marx understood revolutions as class-based movements growing out of objective structural contradictions between the modes of production and class relations related to property ownership. To Marx revolutions were not isolated episodes of violence. The revolution results from class action led by a self-conscious, revolutionary class. Marxist analysis clearly influences all theories of revolution but specifically informs those who have written about the insurgencies in Malaya and Vietnam.

Skocpol labels the second family of theory aggregate-psychological theory. Aggregate-psychological theories explain revolutions in terms of a people’s psychological motivations for engaging in political violence or joining oppositional movements. Ted Gurr’s book, *Why Men Rebel*, lies in the aggregate-psychological family. A third family consists of system/value consensus theories. These theories posit that political violence results from the actions of ideological movements spawned by social disequilibrium. The fourth family embraces political-conflict theory. Political-conflict theory rejects Ted Gurr’s notion that revolutions arise from economic and political discontent. Rather political-conflict theory argues people cannot engage in political violence unless they are members of at least a minimally organized group with access to resources. Skocpol rejects all these approaches in part because they all argue that revolutions arise from well-defined purposes. All these theories suggest that social order rests on the consensus of the majority that their needs are being met. The concept that social and political order rely on
some type of popular consensus does not find empirical support from the survival of many blatantly repressive regimes.\textsuperscript{24} In contrast to these four families, Skocpol proposes a structural approach to revolutions. The structural approach to revolution argues that political violence arises in the context of the state, which is anchored in both the class-divided socioeconomic structures and the international system of states. The internal and external relationships of the state and the state’s response to the struggles and crises determine whether the regime maintains the support of politically powerful and mobilized groups. According to Skocpol, the acquiescence or support of the popular majority is not a major element in a regime’s demise.\textsuperscript{25}

*States & Social Revolutions* provided a new explanation of revolutions and established a fifth family in the theory of revolutions. That explanation has significantly influenced the study of revolutions since 1979. In contrast, U.S. military doctrine does not consciously recognize the existence of any of these families of theory, and reflects the available theory when the classic COIN canon was formed. In other words, doctrinally there are only two explanations of intrastate conflict, Marxist and aggregate-psychological theory. Shortly after publication of FM 3-24, Frank Hoffman, a member of the manual’s writing team, commented that in writing the manual the classicalists focused heavily on Maoist and colonial wars of independence and over-generalized the principles drawn from them.\textsuperscript{26} The Marxist influence is easily found in FM 3-24. For example, FM 3-24 states, "An insurgency is not simply random violence; it is directed and focused violence aimed at a political purpose."\textsuperscript{27} That sentence comes directly from Marxist theory.
The doctrine’s reiteration of Mao Zedong’s theory of protracted war just as easily might have quoted directly the orthodox pattern from David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* published in 1964. Yet, by 1966, political theorists such as Barrington Moore, Jr., had already begun to challenge the classic interpretation of the Chinese revolution, which suggests that by 2006 the emphasis on Marxist revolution was myopic.

The doctrine also is enamored with aggregate-psychological theory, although the doctrine does not explicitly acknowledge that fact. The attention to aggregate-psychological theory can be inferred from the discussion of legitimacy and the focus on the population. The objective of COIN is the development of effective governance by a legitimate government. Legitimate governments rule primarily with the consent of the governed. The manual lists six measures of legitimacy that are collectively interpreted to mean that the government is supported by a sufficient majority of the population who find that their basic needs for security and services are met. These doctrinal observations do not comport well with the observation in *Understanding Civil War* that civil war is more a function of greed than grievance. These observations also stand in contrast to Theda Skocpol’s critique of the four families of theory she reviewed. They are, however, consistent with Ted Gurr and aggregate-psychological theories of revolution.

The fact that the counterinsurgency doctrine presents a very narrow perspective of intrastate conflict is clear. However, the narrowness of the perspective has other implications. First, the existing doctrine is supported largely by arguments by warrant, rather than by evidence. David Galula cannot be faulted for not considering evidence concerning the Chinese civil war that did not become available until after the Great Leap Forward or the Cultural Revolution, but doctrine writers can be. There seems to be no military concern for evidence supporting the assertions in the classic COIN references. Both Barrington Moore, Jr., in 1966 and Theda Skocpol in 1979 placed emphasis upon the role the Japanese played in the triumph of the Chinese Communist Party. More recently, Anthony James Joes in *Resisting Rebellion* challenged the classic COIN interpretation in a chapter labeled, “The Myth of Maoist People’s War.” Nevertheless, FM 3-24 is content with examining only Mao’s self-proclaimed account, *On Guerilla Warfare* and David Galula’s maxims. Similarly, the manual cites T. E. Lawrence’s *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* as an account of his attempt to organize Arab nationalism, even though Lawrence’s account is largely fictional. The inclusion of Eric Hoffer’s *The True Believer* among the classics is particularly telling. *The True Believer* is clearly a work that might be considered among the aggregate-psychological theories of revolution, except that Eric Hoffer was an atheist, longshoreman philosopher whose work is certainly not an empirical study. Written in 1951, the book represents Mr. Hoffer’s observations of mass political movements prior to World War II. Nevertheless, the COIN manual offers *The True Believer* as a general explanation of why people join cults and supposedly al-Qaeda. Clearly, Mark Juergensmeyer’s book, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, would have been more appropriate. Arguments by warrant simply require the acceptance of the author’s inferences without a proper concern for the evidence that supports the inference. This is a key shortfall because design begins with the need to develop an environmental frame. Hence,
design begins with the collection of evidence. Hence, classic COIN references and FM 3-24 do not directly support design.

Limiting counterinsurgency doctrine to two theoretical perspectives produces another problem for design. It constrains the collection and interpretation of data for both the environmental frame and the operational approach. A theory represents an intellectual commitment to a particular method of organizing, viewing, and explaining a phenomenon. Consequently, it directs attention to particular data and it guides interpretation. Thomas A. Marks’ pamphlet, *Insurgency In Nepal*, shows the impact of classic COIN theory. Dr. Marks devotes approximately ten percent of the pamphlet to assessing the Communist Party of Nepal, (Maoist) (CPN-M) action program. The CPN-M program was consciously Marxist but the conditions in Nepal did not support Marxist theory. Although CPN-M demanded an end to capitalist exploitation, the economy of Nepal was not capitalist. There was no industrial base, 90 percent of the population was rural, and 90 percent of the farmers were classified as owner operators. Contrary to Maoist literature the CPN-M could not draw resources from its base areas since the base areas were among the poorest regions in the country. Additionally, despite the attention paid by the CPN-M and Dr. Marks to the action program, the followers and the cadre were ignorant of both. The ignorance of the CPN-M cadre is even commented upon by Emile Simpson in *War From the Ground Up*. Emile Simpson not only found that the CPN-M guerrilla’s understanding of Marxism was incorrect but he observed that understanding Nepal’s civil war in insurgent versus government terms would be overly simplistic. To be fair to Dr. Marks, his text notes that in many areas the cadre appealed to local concerns and that the movement created a high level of popular fear, not conversion. Nevertheless, organizing the analysis of the CPN-M in accordance with classic COIN doctrine tends, as Emile Simpson would argue, to obscure rather than illuminate the dynamics of the Nepalese civil war.

**Design Analysis**

As mentioned earlier, design begins with the development of the environmental frame. Whether following Joint or Army doctrine the purpose of this step is to describe the current conditions and envision desired conditions consistent with the policy objectives. The Army manual refers to framing as building a mental model to help individuals understand situations, in essence making sense of both the situation and the policy objectives. Although FM 3-24 argues that the Army must learn and adapt, Hoffman observed that the manual did not address environmental factors that require us to rebuild our mental models. In other words, it is more likely that planners following the doctrine will collect and interpret data in accordance with the manual’s prevailing theories, Marxist and aggregate-psychological, rather than accurately interpret new phenomena. The planners will bring their theoretical frame to the data. When planners do not have multiple perspectives to drive the collection and interpretation of data, their inferences can be logical but also impoverished. This can be seen in Hoffman’s article. Among the new environmental factors he sought to illuminate were trans-national and trans-dimensional actors. Yet, Skocpol’s reinterpretation of the Chinese Communist Revolution decried the existing theories’ focus on intrastate conflict and the neglect of the international context.
Specifically, she wrote, “social revolutions cannot be explained without systematic reference to international structures and world-historical developments.” Thus, the attention paid by doctrine writers to counterinsurgency theory has left them blind to insights political theory made long ago.

Army and Joint doctrine require planners to describe the environmental frame by constructing a narrative and by developing a graphic. The causal explanation provided in the narrative is likely to be subjective and reflect the limited theoretical perspectives of the planner. The method for developing the graphic contains its own problems. Joint doctrine in discussing operational design and the environmental and operational frame layers a system approach addressing complexity upon the Clausewitzian derived concept of the center of gravity. This reflects, in part, the unwillingness to depart from the conventional war framework. Into the mix is thrown the concept of an Effects-Based Approach. However, the Effects-Based Approach figures more prominently in developing the operational approach than either the environmental or the operational frame. Nevertheless, it too is a problem. The concept of a center of gravity may be a misinterpretation or mistranslation of On War. In the translation of On War by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, the German word schwertpunkt is translated as center of gravity and as Emile Simpson has noted, the center of gravity is the physical representation of the enemy’s will. Schwertpunkt might also be translated as focal point, the point of main effort. In physics, the center of gravity or the center of mass is a unique point where the weighted relative position of the distributed mass is zero. Center of gravity is a simplifying

Out of work protesters from the People’s Movement of Nepal challenge Nepal police.
construct that permits understanding the motion of a body despite a complex shape. It is a simplifying method. Similarly, in military planning the entire military problem can be simplified by concentrating on the center of gravity. If, however, the military problem can be understood in terms of the center of gravity, then the problem is not complex. Similarly, military doctrine also refers to centers of gravity: tactical, operational, and strategic. In that case, the problem cannot be understood using a single focal point but can be by finding the focal point in three levels. A military problem that can be addressed by understanding centers of gravity is not simple; it is complicated. Military doctrine describes insurgency and counterinsurgency as inherently complex. Thus, describing the operational environment using the center or centers of gravity approach would not apply, but JP 5.0 mixes these methods with system analysis. Methodologically this is an error. This befuddlement is found in JP 5.0 Figure III-4. That figure lists the key outputs of the environmental frame as a system.
The definition of a system requires that the elements that are interrelated work together to produce an output. Defining the boundaries of the system in design requires the planner to define what elements of a polity he needs to understand. The planner is not interested in the social, military, political or economic systems per se and it is difficult to comprehend information and infrastructure as somehow separate from those systems. Additionally, the manual by arguing that systems analysis will produce a holistic view of enemy, neutral, and friendly systems creates the impression that the visualization of the environment begins with, rather than ends with a depiction of the system. In other words, rather than beginning the process of analysis with a description of the operational environment and making a subsequent decision to present the analysis as a system, the planner creates a graphic of a whole with little or no serious analysis. Naturally, the graphic will always include decisive points and centers of gravity.

Military planners are not interested in complexity theory and not every military problem is complex. They need to avoid what Michael J. Gallagher, Joshua Gelter, and Sebastian L. v. Gorka called the complexity trap. To avoid judging every problem as complex, planners need to recognize that military problems fall into a category that Todd R. La Porte labeled Organized Social Complexity. Organized complexity refers to systems in which there are a moderate number of parts related to each other in interdependent ways. Organized social complexity further limits attention to social groups with conscious purposes whose members are engaged in relatively self-conscious interactions. In other words, the members are aware of their connections and that their activities impinge on the activities of others. Such a system might resemble that described by Robert Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen in *Harnessing Complexity*. In any case, the process of describing the system would begin by identifying the members (persons or groups) and their number, the relative degree of differentiation, and the degree and nature
of their interdependence. A small number of members with little differentiation and low interdependence would not constitute a complex system. Similarly, if the dependence were hierarchical; that is, resources or influence flowing one way from top to bottom the system would not be complex. It would be a tree. If every member influenced every other member in the system then the system could be displayed as a full lattice.48

The world, however, displays few actual trees and probably even fewer full lattice matrixes. What that means is that any depiction of an actual system would be semi-lattice. A semi-lattice system might have some groups displayed with an abundance of interrelationships but those groups might only be loosely connected to other groups. Thus, the full system of interest would be decomposable, albeit not fully decomposable, into subsystems. The subsystems can be analyzed independently to explain the internal interactions and then the interaction between subsystems might be explored separately. If the system were fully decomposable then the system would present a situation similar to that conceived for centers of gravity. It would be complicated rather than complex.

Military doctrine recognizes that counterinsurgency is more political than military but political theory is rarely consulted.49

What does the admittedly abstract discussion of organized social complexity mean in practical terms for design and military planning? First, it means the planner does not need to start development of an environmental frame from the concept of a whole system. Where he begins the analysis will depend on the policy guidance he has received and the contemplated use of military force. He will still face the problem of defining the members or groups that compose the system but it will be possible to develop and interconnect subsystems defined differently. There will still be the requirement to specify what factors will constitute dependent and independent variables in the causal chain. For example, in some policy contexts it might be useful to examine poverty as a cause of civil war, in others the civil war might be the cause of poverty. Second, understanding that the system can be decomposed into subsystems enables the planner to avoid the problem identified by Emile Simpson. He will not need to be tied to Clausewitzian polarity; the motivations of the participants will not need to be understood in similar terms and their rules for interaction can be analyzed separately. That will be important for moving from the environmental and problem frame to defining an operational approach. Lastly, it will make possible, although perhaps unlikely, that the graphic that accompanies the narrative actually conveys information, instead of being a prop for the briefer.

Systems analysis or the system perspective should aid the planner’s assessment of a complex security environment. However, it must be understood as a method separate from those used for conventional warfare. Combining systems analysis with conventional planning requirements in the context of current counterinsurgency doctrine creates an impediment to developing an operational approach, the third step in design. As Gian Gentile put it, counterinsurgency becomes a strategy of tactics. Despite the call for system analysis, focus is always on the population as
the center of gravity and, regardless of the polity or the nature of the conflict, the operational approach is always long-term nation building and efforts to win the hearts and minds of the people. The Clausewitzian framework of war as a duel contributes to this problem. In irregular warfare operations such as stability operations and counterinsurgency, the United States military always intervenes to aid a failing government. In the recent example of Libya, the responsibility to protect concept sees the failing government as the predator and hence, intervention is always on the side of the rebels.

Yet, in the case of intrastate war, the parties should not be understood as two opposing camps and U.S. security interests may not be best achieved by aiding one or the other. The current civil war is Syria is a case in point. If systems analysis and design are to produce creative operational approaches then new theoretical perspectives are needed.

**Benefits of Political Theory**

Ernest R. Alexander observed in “Design in the Decision-Making Process” that design is a mix between search and creativity. A significant rational element in the design process is systematic search and information retrieval. He also observed that superior searches might be an indispensable ingredient of creativity. Systems analysis, properly employed, offers a new method for understanding the environment and displaying information. However, without a broader set of theoretical perspectives, there is little chance of drawing useful inferences about causal relationships and the military actions that will achieve intended effects. Military doctrine recognizes that counterinsurgency is more political than military but political theory is rarely consulted.

In the space of this paper, it is not possible to provide a comprehensive survey of relevant theory concerning intrastate war, but it is possible to make some initial recommendations. First, planners should take direction from works in the family of structural conflict theory, such as *States & Social Revolutions*. Military planners working on the environmental frame should consciously attempt to understand how the regime worked, if ever, prior to the current exigency. For example, it would have been useful in assessing the situation in Egypt in early 2011 to describe how the Mubarak regime had maintained its rule and particularly, how it maintained the support of influential elites and obtained the acquiescence of segments of the population. In that category, indisciminate violence is counter-productive in civil war. Using violence indiscriminately requires the user to clearly understand his purpose and to assess how the population will judge the use of force.

Marina Ottaway’s book, *Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism*, provides useful insights into the working of the Egyptian government as well as the role of elections and the problem of succession in semi-authoritarian regimes. Misagh Parsa, whose work draws from both the structural and political conflict families of theory, identifies structural variables that set the conditions for conflicts but do not determine their occurrence, timing or process. Parsa argues that the actual dynamics of revolutionary conflict are related to the exploitation of opportunities, organization, mobilization options, and perhaps, most importantly, coalition formation. The government’s opponents are rarely a coherent
Every intrastate war will have its own characteristics and the causal relationships observed in any given case may not be applicable in another.
military counterinsurgency planner when he attempts to assess the insurgency’s structure. FM 3-24 provides a list of questions about the insurgent organization; such as, “Is the organization hierarchical or non-hierarchical?” or “Is the organization highly structured or unsystematic?” These questions are not particularly helpful. The questions tell the planner what to ask but provide no insight into what the answer means. So what if it is hierarchical? Empirical studies of recent rebellions address the implications of the organizational data and, more importantly, suggest what that data mean.

Recent political theories of revolutions and civil war are not the answer to all a military planner’s problems. Every intrastate war will have its own characteristics and the causal relationships observed in any given case may not be applicable in another. Therefore, every inference should be treated as a working hypothesis until the inference is tested in the new setting. Nevertheless, moving outside the literature that considers counterinsurgency as the focus into the literature that focuses on intrastate war and political violence provides a means to break the reliance upon personal experiences during counterinsurgencies in the anti-colonial era. Additionally, by developing an explanation for the success or failure of the revolutionaries, secessionists, or rebels these theories identify data from the social, political, and economic systems that may be relevant to developing an environmental frame and to defining the problem. These theories also suggest operational approaches to counter the insurgents. They also avoid the counterinsurgency literature’s problem of addressing every insurgency as if the political goals, and hence, the insurgent’s strategies are the same. It might even be possible, if there are sufficient recent studies, to identify for the planner not only the right questions to ask but also to suggest what the answers might mean. The proper response to Drs. Gorka and Kilcullen call for a wider range of counterinsurgency case studies is greater attention to understanding intrastate war.

**Notes**

2. Ibid., 16.


8 In 1995, Joint Publication (JP) 3-07 was named Military Operations Other Than War. The current version of JP 3-07, dated 29 September 2011 is labeled Stability Operations. Stability operations are a type of irregular warfare operations.


10 Joint Publication (JP) 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (14 May 2007), I-1.


12 Irregular Warfare JOC, 6.

13 Irregular Warfare JOC, 18.

14 Ibid., 20.

15 Irregular Warfare JOC, 7-9.

16 Army design methodology is found in Chapter 2, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0 The Operations Process (May 2012), 2-4 to 2-11. Joint operational design is discussed in Chapter III, JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (11 August 2011) and in Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.01 Theater Campaign Planning Policies and Procedures (31 August 2012).

17 Those interested in the evolution of the planning methods might want to read my article in PRISM concerning this matter. William J. Gregor, “Military Planning Systems and Stability Operations,” PRISM 1, no. 3 (June 2010), 99-114.


19 ADRP 5-0 The Operations Process (May 2012), 2-6.

20 Ibid., 2-5.

21 Theda Skocpol, States & Social Revolutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 7.

22 Theda Skocpol, 9.

23 Ibid., 10.

24 Ibid., 16.

25 Theda Skocpol, 32.

26 Frank Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Insurgency,” Parameters XXXVII (Summer 2007), 71. This article was republished in Parameters XLI (Winter 2011-12).


31 Ibid.


36 Ibid., 11.

37 Ibid., 15.

38 Emile Simpson, 227-228.

39 Marks, 17.

40 ADRP 5.0 The Operations Process, 2-5.

41 Hoffman, 73. However, Mr. Hoffman took the phrase from David J. Killcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28 (August 2005), 615.

42 Ibid.

43 Skocpol, 14.

44 Simpson, 132.


48 La Porte, 8-9.

50 Alexander, 281.
51 Ibid., 287.
54 Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, 18.
58 FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 3-19.
Congoese soldiers with the FARDC being trained by American contractors wait for instructions during training at Camp Base, Kisangani in May 2010. The FARDC was rebuilt as part of the peace process following the end of the Second Congo War in July 2003.
Merging Competing Militaries After Civil Wars

BY ROY LICKLIDER

Until the end of the Cold War, conventional wisdom held that civil wars necessarily ended in military victories. Nonetheless, over twenty negotiated settlements of civil wars have been reached since 1989 in places as disparate as El Salvador and South Africa. Some of these compromise settlements have ended civil wars and resulted in postwar regimes that are substantially more democratic than their predecessors.

These settlements have often involved power sharing among the former contestants and other sectors of society. Many of these agreements have, as a central component, provisions to merge competing armed groups into a single national army. But how can people who have been killing one another with considerable skill and enthusiasm be merged into a single military force?

Other than a few scattered case studies and some contradictory aggregate data analyses, we have very little information about the process of military integration. Why has it been used? What strategies have been most effective? Does integration help prevent renewed civil war? Recent research has produced a number of case studies which suggest some tentative answers to these questions.

These are postwar cases, as opposed to cases of ongoing conflict. Military integration during the war is a much more difficult undertaking, as we have discovered in Afghanistan, although in both Uganda and Rwanda some integration was done during wartime, which served as a model for successful postwar policies.

Many (although not all) examples of military integration are linked to negotiated settlements of civil wars. Such settlements, in turn, have become more common because military victories are increasingly difficult to achieve for several reasons. The issues in dispute now tend to involve identity rather than ideology, making it more difficult for the vanquished to “convert” to the victor’s position. Genocide and ethnic cleansing have become increasingly difficult to implement, making military stalemate increasingly likely. The end of the Cold War reduced external support for many Third World states, making them less able to count on big power support to win quick victories. The peace industry, the new complex of international and nongovernmental organizations dedicated to encouraging the end of mass violence, has also contributed.

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Military integration is often seen as a response to three common problems after civil wars. (1) Security is a major issue. A generally agreed upon principle is that ending a civil war involves disarmament; but how do you persuade people to put themselves and their families at the mercy of untried security institutions controlled in part by people who have been their deadly enemies? Security is, of course, the central problem of any state, but the issue is particularly important after civil wars when the combatants must live side by side indefinitely in states with weak institutions to protect them from one another. Very few civil wars have ended in partition.

(2) Merging armies is one way to reduce the number of former fighters who have to be disarmed and integrated into the society. Most settlements include provisions for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of fighters into civil life (DDR), but at best this is a lengthy and expensive process, usually taking place in countries that cannot easily afford it. Taking some of these people into the military could presumably improve the situation. However, in practice relatively few people are usually involved, since a country usually needs to reduce the overall size of its military after a civil war, and indeed the necessity for armed forces itself often comes into serious question.

(3) The longer-term problem of negotiated settlement is how to create a nation out of competing groups. Creating a working state, a governmental apparatus that can collect taxes and deliver public goods to society, is hard enough after civil war; creating a nation, a diverse population that feels that they are part of a common loyalty group, is more difficult by an order of magnitude. We know that it is not impossible; most of the major states in the current international system have had to do this at one point or another, although usually...
after victorious wars—Britain after its civil war and then in integrating Scotland, Wales, and Ireland; France after the French Revolution; Germany after the wars of German unification; the Soviet Union and China after their respective revolutions. The United States has done it twice, after its revolution and its civil war. There is a tradition that the military can be used to create a feeling of national unity, although recent scholarship has generally been critical of this argument.¹

Military Integration Process

Why do some states use military integration after civil wars and others do not? A study of 128 civil wars between 1945 and 2006 found that the single most important factor in predicting military integration was involvement by outsiders.² The most extreme case is probably Bosnia-Herzegovina: the Dayton Accords, which ended the war, called for three separate military forces, but NATO essentially forced them to integrate into a single institution. In general, it makes sense that people who have been killing one another will not be enthusiastic about working together. Negotiated settlements of civil wars are not popular; they are everyone’s second choice because they cannot win the war. So not surprisingly outside support and pressure may be particularly important for military integration (although not in all cases as we will see), but this raises important ethical issues which are discussed later.

It is possible to successfully integrate competing militaries after civil wars under a wide variety of conditions. It has happened after civil war victories as well as negotiated settlements. A striking example was the successful integration in Rwanda of roughly 50,000 former enemy soldiers and individuals involved in the genocide into the victorious army to produce “a disciplined patriotic army that punches above its weight—the Israel of Africa.”³ Other cases include Uganda,⁴ Nigeria,⁵ Sierra Leone where the British intervention had defeated the opposition, and the Philippines where the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) had essentially been defeated by the combination of the government army and defections to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Military integration happened in cases with intensive international support (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sierra Leone) and with little or no involvement (South Africa, Rwanda, and Sudan in 1972). It happened when local political leaders supported it (South Africa and Mozambique), and when they opposed it (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], although this opposition drastically limited the success in the latter case). There is an argument that militaries in developing countries may develop an identity so strong that it is equivalent to a separate ethnicity;⁶ something like this seems to have happened in some of these cases.

However, political leaders can wreck even a successful military integration. Examples of this include political leaders breaking the peace in Sudan in 1983, reversing the integration and turning the military into a domestic political instrument in Zimbabwe, and deliberately destroying the integrated units in the DRC because they did not want a strong central military. Political concerns also severely limited the capabilities of the new militaries in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon. This certainly supports Stephen Burgess’ argument that lack of political will can make military integration unworkable;⁷ but it is at least possible that political will is a variable which may be
favorably influenced by the integration process itself.

Former adversaries were integrated as individuals rather than units in many cases, including the most successful ones. Successfully mixing the groups at the lowest level seems likely to ultimately improve cohesion, so it is encouraging that this rather risky strategy seems to have worked fairly well. Examples of relative success include Namibia, Lebanon, Rwanda, Philippines, South Africa, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Nigeria. Two cases which used segregated units were Sudan in 1972, which ended in renewed civil war after eleven years, and Bosnia-Herzegovina which remains under outside control.

Intuitively, bringing together people who have been killing one another and giving them guns seems a bad idea. But in fact there was little or no violence during training that mixed former adversaries in most cases. This is undoubtedly due in part to the fact that former combatants had volunteered for the new force and knew that getting along with former enemies was necessary. Fighters often avoided talking about the previous war, sometimes with a sense that it was a terrible mistake. Rwanda is an interesting exception since integration hinged on the ingando process which required personnel to participate in an intensive discussion of the past which seems to have overcome deep divisions. But regardless, large-scale violence within newly integrated militaries was the exception rather than the rule.

Very little adaptation in normal military training techniques was involved. The changes in training that took place generally reflected the different backgrounds and skill sets of the different groups. South Africa had a distinctive challenge in integrating eight military forces, ranging from a modern government military to rebel forces which had been trained and organized for guerrilla warfare. They lacked even a common language. Basically they got the standard training: officers were sent to the usual military courses (shortened to get them through quickly), and enlisted personnel were trained conventionally. Not surprisingly this caused considerable tension, and a fair number of trainers had to be replaced, but it was eventually successful. In the Philippines the military changed policies to meet the needs of Muslim men and women from the MNLF. In Burundi the rebels were in some ways more sophisticated militarily than the government forces, which made training easier than it might otherwise have been.

Outside support was helpful but did not guarantee success in preventing renewed civil war and was not always necessary to do so. It was helpful in South Africa (although the overall plans and control were local), which was a success, but not so in Zimbabwe which was a political failure. It was dominant in the DRC (an immediate failure), Sierra Leone (a success), and Bosnia-Herzegovina (still under outside control). It was non-existent in Rwanda (a major success) and Sudan (a failure but only after eleven years) and Lebanon (limited success).

This record does not really tell us much about the actual impact of outside support. It

Human rights violators were often not excluded from the new armies. It sounds plausible to recommend that each individual be vetted, but this is actually quite difficult and expensive.
seems likely that outsiders will be called in only for hard cases, making their record fairly weak. What is clear is that the amount of outside resources does not seem to have much to do with success, and the success of Rwanda, done almost entirely without outside support, is a case in favor of autonomous development.

Human rights violators were often not excluded from the new armies. It sounds plausible to recommend that each individual be vetted, but this is actually quite difficult and expensive. Moreover, negotiated settlements to civil war often involve some sort of amnesty, formal or informal. Interestingly, even forces whose members were not screened often did fairly well in terms of human rights violations (Sierra Leone is a particularly striking example); training and environment may be more important than past behavior.

Quotas were often used and were generally quite successful. Simple formulas (50-50 in cases with two groups, such as Burundi; 33-33-33 with three groups, as for senior appointments in Bosnia-Herzegovina) often were more useful, even if less obviously fair, than ratios based on population or other figures that might be unclear and disputed.10

Several of the new integrated armies were able to successfully fight unintegrated ethnic militias, one of the most demanding criterion for success. The Rwandan army has not only battled Hutu guerilla groups for years both inside and outside of Rwanda, but at one point it almost conquered the capital of the DRC (a tribute to its military prowess independent of the judgment of its political goals). In the Philippines the MNLF fighters were seen as very useful by the Filipino army in fighting the MILF, and in Burundi the new army defeated the remnants of the opposition. Several other new militaries have been fortunate enough to escape this issue—South Africa, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Zimbabwe among them. The most conspicuous failure involved the integrated units of the army of the DRC, many of which simply collapsed because of lack of support from their government.

The new armies were almost always less effective militarily than their predecessors, but they were also under civilian control and usually committed many fewer human rights violations. Examples of this pattern are South Africa, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Zimbabwe and DRC are exceptions.

Less clear is whether and how military integration made renewed civil war less likely. Several statistical studies suggest that cases with agreements to carry out military integration are less likely to restart war,11 but it is not clear whether implementation of the agreement is necessary as well. Even if this relationship exists, we do not really know why. Several observers have felt that the symbolic role of the new force is often more important than its coercive capacity. The military is often the most integrated institution in the country. People who have been killing one another but show that they can work and live together peacefully become powerful symbols in deeply divided countries. Thus even a weak military can become important in shaping the national image (Lebanon is an interesting example). However, as Ronald Krebs points out, this conclusion is based on opinion rather than hard evidence.12

The final conclusion is that military integration is not a technological substitute for politics. By itself it cannot prevent a renewed civil war, but if completed successfully it can be one element in a transitional process leading from war to peace. However, its use has
consequences and potential costs which should be explored.

Post-Integration Issues

There often does not seem to be a real need for a strong military after a civil war since there may be little real external military threat. Military integration often occurs at the same time as the total force is being reduced. Many of the new militaries search for a mission to justify expenditures which loom large in relatively poor countries. Peacekeeping is one popular choice; it employs soldiers, gains some prestige for the country, and can be self-supporting.

This in turn raises the question of what sort of military the country really needs. Obviously it varies from case to case—South Africa has no obvious outside enemies, for example, while the DRC literally cannot control its own territory in part because of encroachments by its neighbors. Outside advisers are sometimes accused of forcing other countries to adopt their own military models, not without some reason. But South Africa is a relatively advanced country with no obvious external foes and no foreign involvement in its decision-making whose military wants to sustain an expensive mechanized, land-based force even though its major tasks seem likely to be counterinsurgency and peacekeeping on land and monitoring of coastal waters. This seems to reflect some general cross-national professional concept of the image of a “real military.”

At a minimum it seems plausible that locals should decide on the kind of military that is required since they will pay the penalty

In coordination with the French military and African Union, the U.S. military provided airlift support to transport Burundi soldiers, food and supplies to Central African Republic.
for any errors in such a consequential decision. International advisors should try to avoid creating a military which is not financially and politically viable after the war, and work with locals to develop plans for a military that is sustainable in the long term. This is especially true since a weak military may be as useful as a strong one in preventing a new civil war.

But there is a more fundamental question—should external policy advisors be encouraging military integration at all? Military integration is attractive to outsiders because it promises to fulfill a real need for security in the post-conflict society. The importance of security was overlooked by many of those engaged in peacekeeping for a long time, although it was highlighted in one of the first systematic studies of the field.14 Today it is seen as critical. Military integration is also relatively easy to do by outsiders. It involves training a fairly small group of people to do things that they are generally interested in doing, as compared to, for example, setting up a functioning justice system which would usually be much more useful in establishing security but may well require changing the culture of the society as a whole. Moreover it fits the skill sets of the international community as a whole; we can readily deploy substantial numbers of people who can do this sort of training, but as shown in Iraq and Afghanistan we simply do not have the organizations or personnel to do the same for important civilian activities or institutions.

Unfortunately this does not mean that military integration is necessarily a good idea. A strong security apparatus inside a weak and ineffective government creates a temptation for military domination or coup. The impact of such change may go beyond the individual state; recent research on interstate war suggests that autocratic governments controlled by civilian elites are no more likely to initiate violence than democracies, but that military autocracies and personalist regimes are significantly more likely to do so.15

**Outsider advisors should stress not only the abstract values of civilian control, but the evidence that military governments do not bring economic development or political democracy and often result in the eventual weakening of the military itself. There are serious ethical issues when outsiders recommend policies in postwar societies. If these policies backfire, the locals will pay the price while the outsiders go home.**

Zimbabwe is a powerful example of an alliance between civilian politicians and military leaders to eliminate democracy (and military integration) in favor of authoritarian rule. Similar tendencies can be seen in Rwanda and Uganda. It is perhaps no coincidence that all of them have been involved in military action within the neighboring DRC. I am on record supporting policies that will produce short-term peace such as amnesty, power-sharing governments, and military integration, even at the possible risk of longer-term problems; my preference is to save as many lives as we can now and worry about the consequences later.16 But ignoring the risks involved is not simply oversight; it is negligence. Ultimately, of course, these decisions will be made by some of the locals, but it is likely that those with guns will have a disproportionate influence on the choices. Outsider advisors should stress not only the abstract values of civilian control, but the evidence that military governments do not bring economic development or political
democracy and often result in the eventual weakening of the military itself.

There are serious ethical issues when outsiders recommend policies in postwar societies. If these policies backfire, the locals will pay the price while the outsiders go home. This gives the outsiders multiple ethical obligations: to learn more about whether military integration works to help keep the peace; to learn more about the “best” way to go about integrating militaries under different sets of circumstances; to give more thought to the implications of all of this beyond short-term outcomes such as keeping the peace; such as its effects on democracy and human rights; and to be as candid as we can with the locals about these costs and benefits. All while not withholding our own inevitable uncertainties, even if we are concerned that some of the locals will use this information for ends that we would deplore.\textsuperscript{17}


\textsuperscript{8} Gaub, Military Integration after Civil Wars.


\textsuperscript{11} Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 63-86; Monica


17 Hartzell, op.cit.

Note: This article is part of a project funded by grant BCS 0904905 from The Social and Behavioral Dimensions of National Security, Conflict, and Cooperation, a joint program of the National Science Foundation and the Department of Defense/Department of the Army/Army Research Office. I acknowledge with gratitude the support and hospitality of the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute of the U.S. Army War College for our conference, particularly Raymond Millen and Col. Stephen T. Smith.

Except when noted, discussion of individual cases is based on material in Roy Licklider, *New Armies From Old: Merging Competing Militaries after Civil Wars* (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2014).
Marines assigned to the 2nd Tank Assault Amphibian Battalion supporting the Security Cooperation Task Force of Amphibious Southern Partnership Station 2011 conduct a subject matter expert exchange with Guatemalan Kaibil soldiers. Amphibious Southern Partnership Station 2011 is an annual deployment of U.S. ships to the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility in the Caribbean and Latin America.
The Organized Crime – Peace Operations Nexus

BY WIBKE HANSEN

Since the al-Qaeda attacks against the U.S. on September 11, 2001, and along with the debate about transnational security threats emanating from fragile states, transnational organized crime has entered the international security policy agenda. Various national and international security policy documents – such as the U.S. National Security Strategy (2002), the European Security Strategy (2003), the UN’s report on “Threats Challenges and Change” (2004), and NATO’s new strategic concept (2010) subsequently emphasized the threat posed by organized crime (OC). Many of these documents point to the linkages between organized crime and fragile states. The UN’s “Threats, Challenges and Change” highlighted in particular the linkages between organized crime and conflict noting that, “responses to organized crime during and after conflict have been decentralized and fragmented.”

More recently, the impact of organized crime on peace, security and stability has received increasing attention in the Security Council. In 2010, the Council considered transnational organized crime, piracy and trafficking in drugs and human beings as “evolving challenges and threats to international peace and security.” On numerous occasions, the Council has voiced concern about emerging linkages between terrorism and organized crime. In a 2012 Presidential Statement it noted that transnational organized crime “negatively impact[s] the consolidation of peace in countries emerging from conflict.” The Council furthermore highlighted the challenges that organized crime – whether drug trafficking, illegal resource exploitation or piracy – poses in a number of countries currently supported by peace operations, including Afghanistan, Haiti, Somalia, Guinea Bissau, Liberia and the sub-region, as well as, more recently, Mali.

In light of this increased attention – most notably with regard to the linkages between crime and fragility as well as crime and conflict – it is astonishing that there has not yet been a commensurate debate on the implications of organized crime for stabilization (peace-building and state-building) processes and indeed peace operations, one of the international community’s primary tools for stabilizing fragile or conflict-ridden states. Serious research on the subject matter is only just beginning.

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More importantly, heightened threat awareness has not yet translated into policies and strategies for the field. Considerations of the threats posed by organized crime have been largely absent from mandates, strategic guidance and capacities provided to peace operations.\textsuperscript{11} So while the threat posed by organized crime is part of the larger rhetoric around stabilizing fragile and post-conflict states, peace operations with their early peace-building and state-building processes are rarely designed to specifically deal with this challenge. They lack strategies, instruments and capacities to do so.

A more strategic approach for countering organized crime in the context of peace operations, however, is important – not only to contain the spread of criminal networks in fragile states but also to protect the achievements of peace operations and to make stabilization successful as well as sustainable. Such a strategic approach requires, as a basis, a deeper understanding of the various linkages and interfaces between organized crime and peace operations. By peace operations I understand operations mandated by the UN Security Council and led by the UN, NATO, the EU, AU, or other regional organizations.\textsuperscript{12}

**Organized Crime: Definitions and Labeling**

There is no commonly agreed definition of organized crime. The Palermo Convention offers a frequently referenced definition of an organized criminal group; “For the purposes of this Convention: (a)’Organized criminal group’ shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time

Pirates holding a Chinese fishing crew captive in the Indian Ocean.
and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.”

A joint working group of German police and justice authorities (“AG Justiz/Polizei”) provides a definition of organized crime as an activity, which is also used as a basis for Germany’s National Situation Reports on Organized Crime; “Organized crime is the planned commission of criminal offences determined by the pursuit of profit and power which, individually or as a whole, are of considerable importance if more than two persons, each with his/her own assigned tasks, collaborate for a prolonged or indefinite period of time, a) by using commercial or business-like structures, b) by using force or other suitable means of intimidation, or c) by exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration, judicial authorities or the business sector.” Only one of the three criteria (a, b, or c) has to be in place for the classification of an offence as organized crime.

Differentiating between organized crime as an entity and organized crime as an activity is particularly important when analyzing crime in fragile and post-conflict states. In these states, it is not only criminal entities or cartels that engage in organized crime. A broad range of actors uses organized crime as means to different ends. The distinction between organized crime as an entity and an activity, as Williams and Picarelli argue, “...allows analysis to identify the role of transnational criminal enterprises, on the one side, and the local warlords, ethnic groups, governments, and terrorist organizations, on the other, that have appropriated what is, in effect a ‘do-it-yourself’ (DIY) form of organized crime.”

Even with a definition at hand, however, a central challenge remains: Particularly in fragile and post-conflict contexts, it is often difficult to clearly categorize activities as organized crime. Reliable information or documentation is scarce. In some cases unresolved questions regarding the applicable legal code make a clear classification impossible. And in yet other cases, activities that are illegal according to the law may be seen as legitimate – and are indeed practiced – by large segments of the local population. Particularly in post-conflict situations or under conditions of severe economic hardship, divergences between the law and popular notions of legitimacy are to be expected.

In such situations, caution in applying the label “organized crime” is therefore required, particularly as such labeling usually comes with predispositions for certain types of responses. As Cockayne and Lupel note, "Calling violent disorder ‘crime’ suggests that there has been a violation of an international norm. And crimes are typically met with coercive responses to correct the deviation and hold the responsible actor accountable." However, coercive responses might not be the most appropriate or effective response in all cases. Being aware of the diversity of the phenomena and the effect of labeling is therefore of direct relevance for policy and operational responses.

The Organized Crime - Peace Operations Nexus

Even though organizations such as NATO, the EU, the AU and others have become increasingly active in the field of peace operations, the UN is still the largest deployer with more than
97,000 uniformed personnel currently serving in 16 operations worldwide.\textsuperscript{17} Although each operation is unique, an analysis of UN missions from the past two decades allows the identification of possible interfaces between peace operations and organized crime and offers insights for the broader field of stabilization, peace-building and state-building efforts.\textsuperscript{18} The seven most relevant interfaces are outlined below.

**Interface 1: Organized Crime Fuels Conflict**

Organized crime can prolong or exacerbate conflict by funding or resourcing armed groups and, at the same time, providing economic incentives for the continuation of conflict and the undermining of peace agreements. Aspects of this have been thoroughly researched in the context of the debate on so-called “war economies.” Terms such as “blood diamonds” point to the linkages between illegal resource exploitation and armed conflict.

The nexus between organized crime and non-state armed actors has become stronger since the end of the Cold War, when state funding for insurgent groups decreased. More and more rebel groups today are “self-financed” including through proceeds from criminal activities. Illegal resource exploitation and the drug trade are probably the most significant streams in this regard.\textsuperscript{19}

In some cases illicit profits seem to even have changed the motivational incentives of rebel-groups from political to criminal-economic motives. This was clearly visible in Eastern Congo. In his last report on MONUSCO, the UN Secretary General noted that, “[a]ll armed groups, whether Congolese or foreign, have also engaged in the illegal exploitation of the vast mineral and other...
natural resources of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as other criminal activities. For those groups, the benefits derived from the illegal exploitation of those resources not only finance their acquisition of illicit weapons, but have also become an end in themselves.20

Such “economic spoilers” are particularly difficult to deal with. Political strategies aimed at inclusion or power sharing are not necessarily an incentive for these groups whose business model could be threatened by the end of conflict. As the UNODC (UN office on Drugs and Crime) notes, “... drugs pay for bullets and provide a lifestyle that makes them less likely to come to the negotiating table.”21

Such dynamics can not only prolong active conflict but also extend into the post-conflict phase. Challenges for peace operations emerge, where as a consequence, peace agreements falter, or proceeds from organized crime provide incentives for the continued existence and operations of armed groups.

Interface 2: Organized Crime Undermines Security

Organized crime undermines security in fragile and post-conflict states in a variety of ways. Assessments by the UN itself – as contained in the Reports of the Secretary General to the Security Council – indicate to what extent organized crime is seen as a challenge to security in various mission areas.22

In some cases, such as in Haiti, insecurity has prompted UN missions to take robust action against actors involved in or supported by organized crime.23 In other cases, criminal actors have targeted UN personnel directly. Attacks on members of the UN Police in Kosovo, for example, were thought to be motivated by the mission’s increasing activities in combating organized crime.24

Proceeds from OC can also fuel the emergence or prolonged existence of non-state armed groups – even in the absence of armed conflict or once a peace process is under way. One example is the impact of the drug trade on the proliferation of gangs and other armed groups in Haiti. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, armed groups – oftentimes ex-combatants – still controlled areas rich in natural resources long after the civil wars had ended. At times these groups also acted as providers of security for segments of the population. At the same time such presences challenge the state’s monopoly of the use of force.

Interface 3: Peace Operations are Infiltrated by Organized Crime

There have been cases where peacekeepers themselves have been involved in organized crime. The issue attracted public attention notably during the 1990s Balkan missions – not least when an UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) contingent was redeployed due to its involvement in the drug trade. However, such incidents are neither limited to one particular operation nor to a particular troop contributor. Such cases, when they become public, attract a considerable amount of media attention and fan public debates on the faults of peace operations and peacekeepers. As a consequence, the public perception of the extent of this problem might not necessarily match reality. Even single cases show, however, that peace operations, too, are vulnerable to infiltration by organized crime. Peace operations should be prepared for this, particularly as the impact on the credibility of a mission – even of isolated cases – can be considerable.
Interface 4: Peace Operations Fuel Organized Crime

Peace Operations have “side effects” or unintended consequences.25 One of such side effects can be that peace operations – or accompanying measures – create opportunities for organized crime networks. The causal linkages between a rising demand for prostitution and an increase in human trafficking is well known, fairly well researched and documented, and has led the UN Secretariat as well as missions to adopt counter-measures. In fact, this is one of the few areas where missions can impact the demand side. However, the predominant OC activities in mission areas are generally driven by an international demand.

Peace operations – or accompanying measures – create opportunities for organized crime networks.

Peace operations are sometimes accompanied by restrictions and sanctions on individual actors, groups or states. “Embargo busting” is an important business for criminal networks, not only in the context of peace operations.26 This was perhaps nowhere more clear than in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Sanctions on the export of Sierra Leonean diamonds at first primarily resulted in increased smuggling of Sierra Leonean diamonds through Liberia. It was only after additional sanctions were imposed on the Liberian diamond trade that this dynamic could be reversed. Meanwhile, Liberian President Charles Taylor, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and wide international criminal networks benefited immensely from a flourishing diamond and weapons trade – to the detriment of attempts to end Sierra Leone’s civil war.27

Also deployment decisions, particularly during start-up, can advantage criminal actors. In Kosovo, Haiti and Sierra Leone security gaps during the deployment phase provided criminal networks with opportunities to establish themselves. UNMIK’s (UN Interim Administration for Kosovo) Central Intelligence Unit has found that Kosovo came to be seen as a safe transit area for illegal goods in 1999 and 2000 – a period of time during which KFOR and UNMIK were already deployed.28 Similar patterns can emerge when a mission withdraws. Regarding Afghanistan, the Secretary-General has noted that, “[t]he financial impact of the large-scale departure of international forces may make the illicit economy, notably that based on narcotics, even more attractive to those with large patronage systems to sustain.”29

Questions that arose about the impact of the procurement and contracting procedures of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) on criminal networks highlight yet another area where decisions by the mission can inadvertently benefit criminal actors.30

Interface 5: Peace Operations Co-Opt Organized Crime

In principle, strategies of co-optation make sense in the context of peace operations particularly as capacities to act against spoilers are limited and broad-based local ownership is essential for the sustainability of peace-building efforts. However, co-opting groups of actors into the peace process is more likely to be successful where actors pursue a political agenda and can be motivated by political incentives. The same kind of approach will
reach its limits where actors are motivated by a criminal-economic agenda.

In Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) largely financed its political and armed struggle through organized crime and its close ties with the Albanian Mafia. With the end of the war in 1999, the KLA was seen as the political representation of the Kosovo-Albanians and thus as a key partner for the international community in the ensuing transitional administration and peace-building process. Members of the KLA were successively integrated into Kosovo’s emerging governance and administrative structures without necessarily shedding their criminal ties. What was once a crime-rebel-nexus thus turned into a crime-politics-nexus. Three peace operations, UNMIK, KFOR and EULEX (European Union Rule of Law Mission for Kosovo) subsequently struggled with the implications.

In Sierra Leone, the peace process that followed the 1999 Lomé Peace Accord granted Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) participation in a transitional government – which the former rebels used to further their illegal economic agenda. Proceeds from the illegal diamond trade provided them with the incentive but also the capacity to violently challenge and undermine the peace process and bring the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) close to failure during its first year of deployment.

**Interface 6: Organized Crime Corrupts Elites**

For peace operations, the politically relevant elite is one of the key partners in the host nation. Without the cooperation of this group, sustainable stabilization and peace-building processes are almost impossible to achieve. For organized crime groups, the corruption of a country’s elite is a key strategy for conducting illegal activities with impunity. In various countries that currently host peace operations there is evidence of close linkages between members of the political elite and organized crime. The UN has on numerous occasions drawn attention to this. In relation to Guinea-Bissau, the Secretary-General argued that “[v]ery weak law enforcement capacity […] continued to provide organized criminal groups with an avenue for the unchallenged use of the territory as a transit point for international drug trafficking. Allegedly, this happens with the support of members of the defense and security forces, as well as members of the political elite. This has led to the unabated spread of cocaine trafficking in Guinea-Bissau.”

**Co-opting groups of actors into the peace process is more likely to be successful where actors pursue a political agenda and can be motivated by political incentives.**

In Haiti, members of the elite were not only suspected of involvement in the drug trade but also of employing the services of armed gangs for that purpose. The fact that the police service was also implicated in the cocaine trade raised questions about the sustainability or even the feasibility of police reform and capacity building.

**Interface 7: Peace Operations Combat Organized Crime**

Over time, peace operations have employed a wide range of measures aimed at countering organized crime and illicit economic activities or reducing its most detrimental impact on the host nation and on mandate implementation. Much experience has been gained by the UN
Police, be it in building the capacity of a host nation to combat organized crime, in providing planning and operational support to action against organized crime or in boosting a mission’s own capacities to detect criminal spoilers and take action against them.

Other measures that missions have previously employed fall outside the immediate activities of UN police. They include observation and/or patrolling of borders and coasts, control of ports and airports, policy advice to government and administration or measures aimed at strengthening community resilience against organized crime. In some cases missions were able to compensate for some inherent restrictions in countering organized crime – such as the lack of intelligence capabilities or of powers of arrest. In Haiti, the mission made use of its Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) to prepare for operations against gangs in Port-au-Prince. This included the use of informants. Operations were then conducted in close cooperation with the Haitian police who arrested criminals apprehended by MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti) during the operations.

In most cases, however, where missions actually took active measures to combat OC and illegal economic activities, these operations were not based on a strategy defined along with the mandate. Rather, instruments and measures were acquired and developed on an adhoc basis responding to concrete threats or challenges encountered on the ground. In

Members of a visit, board, search and seizure team from the guided-missile cruiser USS Chosin (CG 65) keep watch over the crew of a suspected pirate dhow as fellow teammates conduct a search for weapons and other gear. The boarding was conducted as part of counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Chosin is the flagship for Combined Joint Task Force 151, a multinational task force established to conduct counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia.
Kosovo, UNMIK’s Organized Crime Bureau was established more than three years into the mission’s life. Five years after its deployment, MINUSTAH was reinforced by a maritime component in order to support the Haitian coast guard in efforts to reduce cocaine smuggling via sea. The time-lags that occur until missions have strengthened their own capacities to tackle the problem are easily exploited by the criminal groups.

Implications for Peace Operations; Cross-Cutting Patterns

Not all of these interfaces are relevant in each and every mission area but none of them is limited to a few isolated cases. In fragile and post-conflict states, peace operations are frequently confronted with a whole array of illegal economic activities – some are clearly organized crime, others are organized but not criminalized and yet others are criminal but not organized – the lines between those different phenomena are often blurred. While many of these activities (often the better organized ones) are of a transnational nature, “local” organized crime – for example in the form of protection rackets, kidnapping or organized forms of robbery – is also a frequent phenomenon.

The examples above illustrate the range of actors involved in organized crime and the variety of motives behind their involvement: for cartels or criminal groups these activities are an end in itself; for rebels they can be a way of funding a political agenda; for elites, illicit profits can be a political resource; for ex-combatants crime can be a way of earning a living in a post-conflict situation.

The specific motivation that drives actors to engage in organized crime is not necessarily decisive for the impact on the state. Ex-combatants occupying resource-rich areas create zones out of state control just as drug-cartels controlling strategic territory. However, the motivation is a key factor when it comes to devising appropriate counter-strategies. In some cases, a narrow focus on law enforcement might end up criminalizing whole segments of the population where the creation of job-opportunities might have been a more effective counter-measure. However, where greed is the main driver, such measures will prove futile in light of the high profits organized crime yields.

The UN itself has highlighted how severe of a threat organized crime and the corruption that accompanies it pose to this core aim of its missions.

Counter-strategies will have to take into account that local groups and individuals are not necessarily coerced into criminal activities. In fragile and post-conflict countries, organized crime has a lot to offer: it offers jobs, income and opportunities for enrichment that are not available in the legal economy often dwarfing not only local salaries but also the financial potential of international donors.

Organized crime does not come as a total surprise in each instance. Certain sets of factors inevitably heighten the risk of certain criminal activities. Particular vigilance is warranted, for example, where:

- a geographic position along smuggling routes, high unemployment, larger numbers of non-state armed actors and weak border regimes come together, as was the case in Haiti;
- an arms embargo and the control of resource rich areas by armed groups come
together. Such constellations likely lead to arms-for-illicit goods barter arrangements such as in Sierra Leone and Liberia; peace agreements include power-sharing arrangements with groups erstwhile financed through criminal activities, as Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Afghanistan and other cases illustrate.

**Organized Crime Affects the Core Business of Peace Operations**

Clearly, a peace or stabilization operation as such is no sufficient deterrent for OC groups. However, there are cases where missions are believed to have a deterrent effect against the spread of organized crime, e.g. in Liberia which seems less affected by the growing cocaine trade through West-Africa than its neighbors. In other places – including in Kosovo – a sizeable international presence failed to prevent criminal networks from establishing roots and business in the area.

*Corrubtion or infiltration of institutions by criminal actors – undertaken to protect their own operations – can further weaken the fragile relations between states and their citizens.*

Missions are severely affected by the presence of organized crime in the mission area, and the impact is not limited to those parts of the mission explicitly dealing with issues of crime, such as the police component. In fact, OC seems to affect many areas of mandate implementation and, indeed, the core business of peace operations. OC can undermine a secure environment, spoilers motivated by criminal proceeds can undermine the implementation of peace agreements and – perhaps most critically – OC threatens to undermine peace-building processes and with that the sustainability of a peace operation’s efforts – and its exit options.

It is well established by now, that legitimate, functioning and reliable institutions are critical for long-term peace and stability. Peace operations today are also concerned with supporting the emergence of such institutions and with the extension of state authority. The UN itself has highlighted how severe of a threat organized crime and the corruption that accompanies it pose to this core aim of its missions.

Criminal proceeds influence the preferences of those involved to the detriment of state-building efforts. They can affect the will for genuine reform among political elites, reduce the attractiveness of critical disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs for ex-combatants, and undermine law enforcement if profiteers include members of the security services – a central dilemma for peace operations or other actors involved in stabilization and state-building processes.

In Haiti, corruption in the police service fueled the local cocaine trade and at the same time weakened the population’s confidence in the security sector. This led to an increased use of and reliance on non-state or private security actors (gangs, etc.) by parts of the population, which further weakened the states’ monopoly on the use of force. The example illustrates that corruption or infiltration of institutions by criminal actors – undertaken to protect their own operations – can further weaken the fragile relations between states and their citizens. It also directly affects the
implementation of mandated tasks such as police reform or the extension of state authority.

Mainstreaming Counter-Crime Efforts into Peace Operations

Neither the problem of organized crime nor the detrimental impact it can have on security, stability and state institutions in fragile and post-conflict states will go away by itself. Indeed, the challenges organized crime pose for peace operations will most likely continue to grow. In order to mainstream awareness of organized crime and strategies for protecting the mission, the mandate and the host nation against the most detrimental impacts of organized crime, the following measures should be considered priorities – a starting point.  

Strengthen Capacities for Analysis and Intelligence

A precondition for devising specific measures to counter organized crime is the detailed knowledge of the streams and networks as well as those power structures or clientele networks that underpin criminal activities. Peace operations therefore require specific capacities for information gathering and analysis.  

In the context of UN operations, “intelligence” has long been a sensitive term, however, this is beginning to change. Previously, missions have at times tried to compensate for the lack of intelligence capacities: MINUSTAH’s use of its Joint Mission Analysis Cell is one example. Today there is increasing recognition that in modern peace operations environments, intelligence becomes more and more indispensable and missions are starting to acquire requisite capacities. In Mali, MINUSMA (the UN Mission) is in the process of building up an intelligence fusion cell while MONUSCO in the Congo saw the first ever use of an unmanned, unarmed aerial vehicle (UUVAV) for information gathering purposes in December 2013.

Consider Threats Posed by Organized Crime in Mission Mandates and Planning

Consideration of the threat posed by organized crime, however, should not start once a mission is on the ground but well ahead of its deployment. Mission planning processes as well as pre-mission assessment missions need to include threat assessments focused specifically on organized crime and its potential impact on mandate implementation and staff security. In fact, the UN Security Council, in a 2013 Presidential Statement, explicitly invited the UN Secretary General to consider the threats posed by organized crime “in conflict prevention strategies, conflict analysis, integrated missions’ assessment, planning and peace-building support.” The operation should then be mandated and equipped to deal with likely scenarios from the outset. This way, time-lags which in the end benefit criminal actors might be avoided.

While concern about the “crime-terror-nexus” is warranted, such focus eclipses large parts of the networks and actors that enable crime and profit from organized criminal activities.

To mainstream consideration of OC threats into assessment and planning but also to strengthen mission capacities for analysis and response, the UN will require requisite personnel resources from member states. Sufficient expertise on organized crime is not automatically present in the contingents of police or troop contributing countries. Ideally
teams of experts could be made available by member states to support mission planning, mission start-up or information gathering throughout a mission’s life.

**Difficult to integrate into peace processes or state-building processes are those actors solely motivated by criminal gains, particularly as the legal economy does not offer commensurate incentives or options.**

**Recognize the Multiplicity of Actors Involved**

Counter-strategies will need to recognize the multitude of actors that have links to organized crime. In much of the security policy debate, the focus has been limited to one single constellation; the linkages between organized crime and terrorism. While concern about the “crime-terror-nexus” is warranted, such focus eclipses large parts of the networks and actors that enable crime and profit from organized criminal activities – including other non-state armed actors. Elsewhere I have suggested the term “OC-plus” for a conceptualization of linkages that recognizes the multitude of actors involved.38

The broad range of actors that draw on organized crime, and the diversity of motives behind such engagement, also means that quite different responses are required to lure such actors away from criminal activities. It also implies that countering organized crime is not limited to one particular section of the mission but is a crosscutting task involving various parts of the mission, whether it is the political affairs, DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration), or the rule of law sections.

For peace operations, two questions are particularly critical for mission planning and mandate implementation; first, who is involved or profits from the predominant organized crime activities in a host country; and second, what is the relationship between these actors and the state? If non-state actors profit, there is a danger they will become spoilers of the peace process. If state-actors are involved, there is a danger that state institutions will be hollowed out from within.

**Create Checks and Balances**

In some cases, peace operations – or the international community overall – have employed fairly intrusive measures to counter the threat posed by organized crime and the corruption that accompanies it. This includes international oversight provided in the context of Liberia’s Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), or the deployment of international judges to Kosovo to guarantee the independence of the judiciary in cases of organized crime.

The legitimacy of measures that constitute a deep intrusion into the politics and institutions of a sovereign state is often contested. However, particularly when organized crime and corruption are prevalent within the governing and politically relevant elite, considering such measures makes sense. Placing particularly vulnerable sectors under international oversight for an interim period for example, can contribute to making states – and state institutions in particular – more resilient against organized crime. GEMAP in Liberia is an example for such strategy.
Develop Strategies for Managing Economic Spoilers

The international community’s approach to dealing with economic spoilers is primarily reactive. In peace operations, too, a concept for proactive spoiler-management where actors disrupt peace and state-building processes out of criminal-economic interests is as of yet missing. For countering such spoilers, knowledge of their motives is paramount: is organized crime a means to an end or is it the end in itself? Difficult to integrate into peace processes or state-building processes are those actors solely motivated by criminal gains, particularly as the legal economy does not offer commensurate incentives or options. In such cases, a combination of pressure or sanctions that limit market options for illegally traded goods might be more appropriate. Le Billon suggests some very practical measures that peace operations can take to limit the access by spoilers to lootable natural resources: identify relevant actors; demilitarize resource rich areas; reduce illegal activities by monitoring transport routes, bridges and ports. Particular challenges occur for peace operations where economic spoilers are part of the government on whose consent the peace operation is based. Achim Wennmann poses another critical question: “How do you manage non-state actors that, as a result of their control of parallel markets, are more powerful than the state or the donor community?”

Focus on the Overall Environment/ Increase Local Level Initiatives

Principally, measures to counter crime can begin from different starting points; they can be aimed at the actors, the criminal activities, or at the overall environment that enables crime. It seems that most activities focus on the former two, combating actors and activities, with repressive or coercive strategies dominating. However, it is at least as important to address overall factors that make a country vulnerable to organized crime and provide opportunity structures or serve as enablers for criminal groups.

Particularly in the context of internationally supported state-building processes, more strategies aimed at countering the political economy of organized crime need to be developed and mainstreamed into these processes.

In that context, it is critical, for example, to also respond to strategies by criminal groups that seek to create loyalties and support among the local population, whether this is through the provision of protection, other basic services or through charity. Tolerance of or even support for criminal activities by the local population can be a powerful enabler for organized crime. This is particularly the case where organized crime as a method for various actors or parts of society is common or where it comes with the control of strategic territory.

Particularly in the context of internationally supported state-building processes, more strategies aimed at countering the political economy of organized crime need to be developed and mainstreamed into these processes.

Regionalize Efforts to the Extent Possible

Many aspects of OC activities are outside of the reach and sphere of influence of peace operations. This is true for the international demand that drives criminal activities in host nations just as much as for the transnational
character of most organized criminal activities. In countering organized crime, peace operations have the distinct disadvantage in that their mandate is usually tied to one national territory, whereas OC-groups operate transnationally. Moreover, nationally focused counter-crime strategies can result in a balloon-effect with activities simply shifting to neighboring states. For these reasons, efforts by peace operations to counter organized crime should be regionalized as far as possible.

Evaluating lessons, assessing risks and rethinking strategies will not only be a task for the United Nations but also for the EU, the AU, NATO and others.

Several missions have in the past supported regional approaches, for example by fostering police cooperation between neighboring countries or cooperation with Interpol. And where various peace operations are deployed in one region, synergies between those operations can be created. The UN Secretary General has made a number of suggestions for such “regionalization” including the flexible placement of personnel in different host nations or options for operating transnationally, for example in the case of hot pursuit.\(^4\)\(^1\) Even in regions where only one peace operation is deployed, options for acting transnationally should be considered, despite the legal hurdles that would need to be overcome.

Link Existing Instruments

A broad approach to countering organized crime, which includes local and international measures against actors, activities and enablers/opportunity structures, can only be realized through the combination, coordination and linking of various different instruments. Due to the inherent restrictions outlined, peace operations in particular can only be effective in countering crime when they are part of a larger strategy. In the UN System alone, there is a range of instruments and mechanisms aimed at countering illicit economic activities and organized crime. UNODC was created specifically for that purpose.

Holt and Boucher note that the work of expert panels supporting the UN sanction committees and that of peace operations could be much more closely linked. Analysis by expert panels could inform mandate implementation much more closely. Practical cooperation however, should not be limited to analysis and information sharing but could also be advanced in relation to mandated tasks such as border monitoring.\(^4\)\(^2\)

The West-African Coast Initiative, where UNODC, INTERPOL, UNDPKO (UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operations) and peace operations deployed in the region cooperate, is one example, where different mechanisms and expertise are linked. However, coordination within the UN as well as in the international community overall – or of specific projects focusing on the same region or the same illicit streams – is so far insufficient.

Conclusion

Peace operations and organized crime intersect in a variety of ways – not only because they share the same operational environment but also because they pursue diametrically opposed goals and often depend on the same actors for realizing them.

It is obvious that peace operations are not primarily a crime-fighting tool. It is also obvious, that organized crime in fragile and
post-conflict states cannot be contained through measures employed by peace operations alone. However, if the overall aim is to avoid a further destabilization of these countries through organized crime and, at the same time, to limit the space for transnational criminal groups in those states, then peace operations – with their security, peace-building and state-building tasks – play an important role. As peace operations are already involved in countering crime in various ways, it only seems logical to at least enable them to do so more effectively. It could also be a way of supporting effective mandate implementation and the sustainability of achievements.

Though the end of large stabilization and peace operations has often been predicted, it has in fact never arrived. While the international community is drawing down its largest operation – that in Afghanistan – new theatres have emerged in places such as Libya, Mali and the Central African Republic, while in other hotspots – notably Syria – future needs are still unclear.

Evaluating lessons, assessing risks and rethinking strategies will not only be a task for the UN but also for the EU, the AU, NATO and others. Within member states, too, there is a need for fresh thinking on organized crime and security. Organized crime in fragile states is a security concern because it could threaten homeland security but also because it threatens security in regions where there is a strategic interest in stability. PRISM

Notes

1 A/59/565, 2 December 2004, p. 50, para 169. UN documents in this article are referenced with document number and date.
4 S/PRST/2012/29, 20 December 2012, p. 3.
11 In fact, the new UN police policy which came out in February 2014, is one of the first official UN documents with explicit reference to responsibilities in an operational context, policy and tools.

17 Figures are from April 2014, see UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping Fact Sheet, April 2014. Figures refer to the number of peacekeeping operations. Additional UN deployments include the so called “Special Political Missions, see UN Department of Political Affairs: United Nations Political and Peacebuilding Missions. Factsheet, 31 January 2014.

18 The model offered below is largely derived from research on the UN operations in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), Liberia (UNMIL), Haiti (MINUSTAH) and Kosovo (UNMIK). Full research results have been published in Wibke Hansen, Mehr Interaktion als geplant. Friedenseinsätze und Organisierte Kriminalität in fragilen Staaten, Münster 2013.


27 This is fairly well documented in the reports of the Expert Panels that supported the sanctions committees on Liberia and Sierra Leone, see for example S/2001/1015, 26 October 2001; S/2002/470, 19 April 2002; S/2002/1115, 25 October 2002.

28 See UNMIK, Pillar 1 Police and Justice Presentation Paper, p. 36.


30 See for example Commander of the joint Chief of Staffs Address to the Troops at ISAF HQ Afghanistan, accessed at: http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/transcripts/commander-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-address-to-the-troops-at-isaf-hq-kabul-afghanistan.html

31 A leaked 2005 memorandum of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) illustrates quite clearly the extent to which the political elite was involved in organized criminal activities, see Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND Analyse vom 22.2.2005, accessed at: http://wlstorage.net/file/bnd-kosovo-feb-2005.pdf

32 Aspects of this are well documented in the reports of the Secretary-General for the time period concerned as well as in the reports of the expert panel, see for example S/2000/1195, 20 December 2000, p. 8, para 3 as well as p. 19 para 90.


37 S/PRST/2013/22, 18 December 2013, p. 4.


39 See, Phillippe Le Billon, Bankrupting Peace Spoilers: What Role for UN Peacekeepers?"


A soldier guards centrifuges - sensitive equipment used for producing highly enriched uranium.
Since India and Pakistan conducted their nuclear tests in 1998, every danger associated with nuclear weapons – proliferation, instability, and terrorism – has been linked to the region. And despite nuclear deterrence and the modernization of nuclear forces, South Asia is a far cry from achieving stability. Indeed, the security situation in South Asia has deteriorated and violent extremism has surged to unprecedentedly high levels. In the past decades, both states have operationalized their nuclear deterrent forces, increased production of fissile material and nuclear delivery means, and developed plans to field a nuclear capable triad. Concurrently, both countries are expanding civilian nuclear facilities in their quests for a cleaner source of energy to combat current and future energy shortages. As tensions and violence in the region have increased, both states blame the other’s policy choices for the scourge of terrorism that has seized the region. New leadership in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan however, creates an opening to tackle the immediate scourge of violent extremist organizations and unresolved historic conflicts. Ironically the traditional stabilizing force in the region – the United States – is drawing down in Afghanistan and shifting its focus to the Asia-Pacific region and to Russia where new tensions have erupted. Within this security context, India and Pakistan will be left on their own to devise mechanisms to mitigate and eliminate the regional risk of terrorism.

As the South Asian threat matrix becomes more complex and with concomitant progress in the nuclear field, these developments provide the basis for the spectacular terror attacks in New Delhi, Mumbai, Karachi, and Islamabad-Rawalpindi. As states possessing nuclear weapons, both India and Pakistan must find a common objective and mechanisms to deal with the metastasizing menace of terrorism. It is imperative that both states acquire the highest standard of nuclear security best practices and learn to live as peaceful nuclear neighbors. Individually, as well as collaboratively, India and Pakistan should direct their efforts to creating a cooperative relationship in the region and developing a nuclear security regime that encapsulates the nuclear security visions set by the three global nuclear security summits.1

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In order to analyze the dangers of nuclear terrorism, this article will examine four variables: threat, probability, consequence, and risk. The threat of nuclear terrorism undeniably exists, but the risk of nuclear terrorism is determined by factoring both probability and consequence. To enable state policy and regional discourse to address nuclear terrorism with the maximum effectiveness, an assessment of the risk—not just the threat—is necessary. This article will first outline the evolution of the threat of nuclear terrorism both globally and regionally. Next, we will describe South Asian threat perceptions and the impacts on nuclear safety and security. Then, the article will evaluate the threats based on probability and consequence, and finally identify the highest risk threat. Focusing on this threat, we will assess the current tools available and offer policy recommendations and ideas for regional cooperation between India and Pakistan to combat this threat.

EVOLUTION OF THE THREAT

While fears of nuclear weapons date back to the genesis of the weapons themselves, nuclear terrorism has largely gained attention as a substantial threat to national and international security since the mass casualties and destruction of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. Nuclear proliferation, security, and safety have historically been concerns, but only recently has terrorism added a new dimension and elevated nuclear terrorism to the top tier of U.S. national security concerns. For the purposes of this article, nuclear terrorism is designated as the use or threat of use of nuclear material in order to achieve a political goal.2

The threat from nuclear terrorism has for the most part mirrored historical trends. The development of nuclear weapons and then the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki created an existential fear of nuclear weapon use by state actors throughout the Cold War. The post-Cold War era saw a rise in the regulation of nuclear materials, followed by post-2001 strengthening of nuclear sites in hopes of preventing the “loose nukes” syndrome many had predicted.3 In its place, proliferation to weak states and the stability of nuclear states became the greatest concerns in nuclear policy.

In the 21st century terrorism has been linked to all U.S. national security-related policies, including nuclear security policy. The Obama Administration’s 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism states, “the danger of nuclear terrorism is the greatest threat to global security.” Preventing terrorists from acquiring WMDs and nuclear materials is ranked as one of the top overarching counterterrorism goals.4 Furthermore, the United States tied nuclear security to terrorism by stewarding biannual Nuclear Security Summits where member states pledge and work towards safeguarding nuclear materials in order to prevent their transfer to terrorists.

Meanwhile another significant development is the proliferation of nuclear facilities due to the rise of nuclear energy and the expanding ring of legitimacy for nuclear trade. Nuclear energy was seen as a “solution” to the environmental concerns associated with nonrenewable resources, but fear of terrorism has soured this view. After the Fukushima Daiichi disaster, nuclear energy facilities are seen in a new light as vulnerable to security threats emanating from both natural disasters and man-made attacks.5 This fact brings South Asia into focus in a curious way.

India is the beneficiary of a civilian nuclear agreement with the United States.
permitting it to retain and develop nuclear weapon capabilities and expand civilian nuclear facilities, with international cooperation in nuclear trade. This sets a precedent for the expansion of civilian nuclear facilities, as well as vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region. Pakistan has responded to the perceived legitimacy conferred upon India’s nuclear weapons program by this agreement by offsetting conventional military force weakness with nuclear deterrence, and plans to increase its civilian nuclear power plants to meet its energy shortages. As a result, nuclear facilities in South Asia are multiplying at the very moment the threat of nuclear terrorism is also growing.

Nuclear Terrorism in South Asia

The waves of terrorism currently afflicting South Asia flow from a long, complex history. Since their independence, both India and Pakistan have used proxies to affect each other’s internal dynamics. This has led to wars, crises, and even secessionism with the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Before 2001, India and Pakistan were the focus of attention due to proliferation concerns and the implications of being self-declared nuclear powers after the 1998 tests. After 2001, South Asia became the epicenter for the war against al-Qaeda. The problem of terrorism has become so complex that a spectacular terrorist attack could happen in any part of the region. South Asia has

A radiation hotspot after the Fukushima nuclear plant began releasing substantial amounts of radioactive materials in March 2011.
already seen such dramatic terrorist attacks as the 2001 attack on India’s Parliament, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the 2008 Marriott bombing in Islamabad, as well as various attacks on Pakistani government and military facilities. The region has come under even greater scrutiny for nuclear terrorism since the revelation that Osama bin Laden met two retired Pakistani scientists and showed interest in acquiring nuclear technology. In addition, both Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals have grown at a steady pace. Thus, the fears of WMD terrorism have added to the previous concerns of proliferation and stability, and generated heightened allegations and scrutiny. The permissive regional environment for terrorism is not easily reversed – it requires concerted, time-consuming, and costly efforts. Given the nature of these attacks and the growing nuclear arsenals and civilian nuclear facilities, nuclear terrorism is at the crosshairs of multiple regional trends.

In South Asia overall threat perception has mirrored trends in nuclear politics. The popular perception of nuclear terrorism combines nuclear safety, nuclear security, and terrorism into one issue. As any one of these issues becomes inflamed, the general fear of nuclear terrorism rises. In reality these three issues are distinct concerns with unique causes, solutions, and policy implications. First, nuclear safety management relates to the technical steps needed to prevent nuclear accidents and ensure optimal and safe operations. Second, nuclear security pertains to prevention of unauthorized access, tampering, accounting, and protection, as well as numerous preventive and reactive steps that require both technical and military security instruments and practices. Third, terrorism pertains to the presence and activities of violent extremist organizations operating with impunity across state borders; this of course is a central concern and its reduction and elimination require different tools and measures. Regardless of its nuclear status, a state is responsible for eliminating terrorism within its borders. The failure to mitigate or eliminate terrorism does not absolve a state from its safety and security responsibilities; rather all nuclear capable states must be committed to the highest standard of nuclear safety and security regardless of the internal or external threats. Without addressing the factors that allow terrorism to exist, nuclear terrorism will always remain a concern.

Another challenge for nuclear terrorism is that it is plagued by an imprecise lexicon. Placing “nuclear” as a prefix to terrorism dilutes the complexity and makes it difficult to differentiate between a hyped threat and a realistic threat. This is compounded by the propensity to use nuclear terrorism and nuclear security interchangeably. The rhetorical tensions result in increased hype concerning the nuclear terrorism threat and are often used by countries as a propaganda tool to defame states with which they have adversarial relationships. At the same time, nuclear security measures such as ratification of international treaties, legislation, and regimes allows nuclear-armed states to gain diplomatic mileage without identifying the realistic threat and constructing an adequate response. In order to fully understand the threat of nuclear
terrorism in South Asia it is necessary to understand the complexity of the threat matrix: the external threat, the internal threat, and the extent of international scrutiny.

**ASSESSMENT OF THREAT PERCEPTIONS**

The presentation of a balanced assessment of both India’s and Pakistan’s threat perceptions must address a central question: Why have India and Pakistan developed different parameters for nuclear security? We assess that this is primarily due to their differing threat perceptions and distinctive international involvement and approaches to each state.

**Pakistani Threat Perceptions**

From the outset, Pakistan confronted obstacles and opposition to its nuclear weapons ambitions that affected the nuclear security regime of the country. Over time three threat perceptions emerged that shaped Islamabad’s nuclear security management. First, beginning in the late 1970s, several incidents forced Islamabad to focus on the external threat of a sudden disarming attack that could prevent the nascent buildup of its capabilities.7 Second, like all nuclear weapon states, an “insider threat” was feared – a mole or spy from an external hostile intelligence agency determined to compromise nuclear secrets or sabotage the program from within. Pakistan had a special reason to focus on this threat because its official policy denied the existence of a military nuclear program due to repressive nuclear sanctions and attempts by Western intelligence agencies to spy on Pakistani centrifuge facilities.8 The third perception developed after 2001, when violent radical threats within the state became rampant in Pakistani society in general while specific incidents occurred that targeted Pakistani security forces.9

Today, Pakistan perceives threats to its nuclear facilities from a host of both external and internal threats. Recent events that exacerbate these fears include the fatal attack on Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad; reports of CIA covert operations disguised as vaccination campaigns to collect DNA in the search for bin Laden; CIA contractor Raymond Davis’s killing of civilians in Lahore; relentless drone strikes; and border incidents on the Salala post of the Afghan-Pakistan border. The regional security situation deteriorated further after the Mumbai terror attack and continuing terrorist operations in Afghanistan – especially those led by Afghan Taliban. While external threat perceptions deepened, the Pakistani internal situation has also deteriorated exponentially. The 2007 operation in Lal Masjid and the establishment of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other violent extremist groups and sectarian religious groups have challenged the writ of the state. For over a decade, Pakistan has faced a separatist violent movement in Baluchistan. The combination of tribal border region tensions and al-Qaeda attacks has embroiled Pakistan’s military in multiple counterinsurgency contingencies.10 Given these multiple complex threats, the Pakistani nuclear security regime has evolved much differently in the past decade than was the case in the earlier decades of its nuclear program.

**Indian Threat Perceptions**

In contrast, India’s nuclear security discourse has developed an entirely different narrative.
While Pakistan braces for both internal and external threats, India is relatively spared from either. China remains India’s primary external threat and India’s worst case threat perceptions are rooted in the persistent belief in Sino-Pakistani collusion on everything from economic deals to intelligence matters. However, this belief does not play a significant role in Indian nuclear security perceptions. India does fear an external attack emanating from China by aircraft or missile, though it has never been subject to a deep aerial attack directly from China. Thus, fear of a preventive strike linked to China or another external power does not compute in India’s threat calculus. Although India’s relationship with China is antagonistic and its threat perceptions are based on long-term perceptions, India’s immediate security focus is on Pakistan. With a bitter history of wars and crises, the most significant perceived threat is a terror attack master-minded by a Pakistan-based extremist organization that India believes is state-sponsored. In any case, even as India’s adversarial relationships with China and Pakistan are likely to continue with ups and downs, the prospect of an external power attacking India’s nuclear facility is perceived as unlikely. Further India’s internal security situation is qualitatively different than Pakistan’s, and as such India’s nuclear security culture has evolved differently.

The composition of India’s internal threat is vastly different from the domestic threats within Pakistan. India is home to a host of secessionist, fifth column, saboteur, and radical extremist groups. These groups range from socio-revolutionary groups like the Naxalites in the “red corridor” in Eastern India, to secessionist movements and centrifugal forces from Kashmir in the north to Tamil Nadu in the

southeast. These movements and the associated tensions have existed with sporadic intensities throughout almost the entire history of independent India. Further, terrorist groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) are supporting operations in the Kashmiri struggle and elsewhere in India. India is also experiencing a rise of Hindu extremist groups which always have the potential to ignite a communal conflict; sparks have ignited in Mumbai, Gujarat, and the “train terror” (Samjhota Express). These groups have been proven to operate within India and wage high-consequence terror attacks including major ones such as the 2001 Indian Parliament and the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

While these groups within India are numerous, they are of a different level of magnitude than their counterparts in Pakistan, which is threatened internally by terrorist organizations both within Pakistan itself as well as across the porous border in Afghanistan. It is unknown whether a radical insider from any of these movements could possibly penetrate India’s nuclear facilities, though such a possibility cannot be ruled out. From India’s viewpoint its internal threats are primarily those sponsored by external agencies. The 2008 Mumbai terror attack re-confirmed the belief that the internal terror threat is due to terrorists infiltrating from neighboring states or externally sponsored sleeper cells. However, India does not fear the same challenge from rampant instability that is evident in Pakistan. India’s nuclear security culture has a greater emphasis on an outside sponsored terror attack on its facilities rather than an insider instigating a nuclear security breach.

Quite apart from differing threat perceptions, another factor that has affected Pakistan’s and India’s respective approaches to nuclear security is the nature of the international approach towards terror in the region during the past decade.

**Implications of the International Approach**

The international community has dramatically influenced nuclear threat perceptions in Pakistan. In the context of the American-led Global War on Terror, the flourishing terror infrastructure has adversely affected U.S.-Pakistan relations. Internal threats have raised American and international concerns over the legacy and possible survival of the A.Q. Khan proliferation network, and the level of central control over government facilities. In reaction to Pakistani military operations in tribal areas, terrorist organizations have proven their ability to retaliate in kind against both military bases and soft civilian targets. Specifically, terror attacks against military headquarters and bases have undermined the authority of the military and intelligence institutions and widened the opening for international scrutiny and conjecture about nuclear terrorism in Pakistan.

Although Pakistan operates under continuous intense international scrutiny, it has made substantial gains in bolstering its nuclear architecture, safety, and security. Pakistan has developed a Center of Excellence and offered to provide counterpart training in nuclear security practices. Pakistan has also selectively opened its Center and its training facilities to respond to nuclear security incidents. Recently Pakistan allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Secretary General to visit the Center of Excellence, who was reportedly very impressed. These accomplishments have been recognized and acknowledged by the international community as shown in the recently released 2014 Nuclear Threat Index.
(NTI). Still, the heightened levels of scrutiny undermine Pakistan’s ability to overcome its nuclear legacy and reduce international fears of nuclear terrorism in Pakistan.

The international community has had a profoundly different role in the formulation of India’s nuclear security infrastructure. The most significant factor shaping the international community’s approach towards Indian nuclear safety and security today is the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement, which governs civilian nuclear trade between the United States and India. The international community has interpreted this agreement as an indicator

Results from the 2014 Nuclear Threat Index showing that Pakistan has surpassed India in nuclear materials security. (14-15)
of legitimacy and tacit approval of India’s nuclear program, as well as symbolic verification of India’s superior nuclear safety and security. Therefore, India faces considerably less international scrutiny than Pakistan.

As noted above, India is not entirely immune from nuclear safety and security concerns; it is only afforded a relative degree of confidence compared to Pakistan. Even though India has demonstrated a past track record of effective nuclear management, this must be understood in the context of the limited tools to measure of effectiveness.\textsuperscript{13} There is general international agreement with India’s perception that any threat to its nuclear security is likely to originate from an external source and any such threat will be sufficiently addressed before escalating to a nuclear incident. It is likely that India has taken significant steps to ensure nuclear security in an environment of internal and external threats. However, compared to Pakistan, India’s measures and response are less widely known as it does not advertise its nuclear security best practices. This is not likely to change due to the aforementioned international approach that has created an environment where India has little incentive to further improve nuclear safety and security.\textsuperscript{14} Despite these positive perceptions and modest improvements, India ranked lower than Pakistan in the 2014 NTI Index.\textsuperscript{15}

As a result of both India’s and Pakistan’s perceived external threats and their long-standing strategic rivalry, South Asia does not have a culture of openness on nuclear security. Spotless performance in the absence of meaningful measures of effectiveness does not necessarily equate to nuclear security.\textsuperscript{16} Rather, India and Pakistan choose to veil site security in secrecy and boast about achievements. If terrorist attacks have been thwarted at these facilities, they are not publicized for a host of reasons: (1) a sensitive site could be compromised; (2) intelligence methods on site protection could be publically revealed; (3) admitting vulnerability reinforces propaganda about site insecurity. Without a public record of measured effectiveness or information on how current site security measures have been performed, nuclear site security remains a serious concern and must be acknowledged as a factor leading potentially to a breakout of nuclear terrorism.

A balanced and objective assessment should conclude that the threats facing India and Pakistan respectively are qualitatively different. Pakistan faces a greater internal threat than India and also endures significantly greater international scrutiny on nuclear safety and security. Therefore it is not surprising that Pakistani measures to deal with safety and security are correspondingly greater. India is not subject to the same level of international scrutiny, and experiences less pressure to publicize its nuclear security arrangements and advertise its best practices. From a performance perspective, as recognized in public acknowledgements worldwide concerning both nuclear armed South Asian states, there is a degree of confidence. However, there is little to no public source to analyze measures of effectiveness.

**EVALUATING THE RISK**

Calculating the risk of nuclear terrorism in South Asia must take into account an understanding of both Pakistani and Indian threat perceptions, as well as their respective internal nuclear politics. The phrase, “nuclear terrorism,” creates the specter of nuclear catastrophe with severe consequences. The fear of these consequences and the dissemination of histrionic literature on the possibilities cause
policymakers, academics, and the public to lose sight of the probability and focus only on the devastating outcomes.

Policy proposals should be based on a realistic assessment of the threat in order to maximize effectiveness and cost-savings. To calculate the risk of nuclear terrorism, this article uses the formulation of risk equals probability times consequence. The majority of the current assessment and preventive steps for nuclear terrorism base risk solely on the severity of the consequence instead of factoring in probability. If the probability is zero or near zero, the consequence is irrelevant because the risk is the same as that of the level of probability. To avoid complacency, a sober assessment of probable scenarios is necessary to evaluate the risks and to encourage constructive thinking towards realistic solutions.

**Hyped Threats**

Predictably, the buzzword of nuclear terrorism transforms into an imaginative and hyped proposition. Sifting realistic and probable threats on the question of nuclear terrorism challenges from overestimated and improbable assertions allows sober assessment of probable scenarios, reduces complacency, and encourages constructive and forward thinking in the international community.

The most realistic threat is determined by an evaluation based on technical and security rationales. We use Ferguson and Potter’s four “faces” of nuclear terrorism to survey the threats: (1) theft of an intact nuclear weapon; (2) theft of fissile material leading to the development of an improvised nuclear device (IND); (3) acquisition of radioactive material to fashion a radiation dispersion device (RDD) or radiation emission device (RED); and (4) an attack on a nuclear facility that releases radioactive materials.  

We assess that the first two of Ferguson and Potter’s scenarios are of high consequence, but the least probable. One of the most pervasive hyped assertions is that the radical religious groups or TTP in Pakistan could usurp state power and gain access to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Instead of basing the risk on a measured assessment, these fears are based on multiplying two trends: the rise of religious extremism and TTP in tribal areas, and the growth of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The combination conjures up images of exponentially increased likelihood and consequence. The surge of religious groups, intolerance towards minorities, and TTP are an outgrowth of three decades of religiously based guerrilla wars waged in the tribal lands of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The core of violent radical threats
resides in these borderlands, and military operations continue there at the time of this writing. Pakistanis have borne the brunt of terror attacks across the entire country and have repeatedly rejected radical religious parties in its two democratic political transitions. While it is true that Pakistan faces unprecedented threats from radical forces the probability of a takeover of the state is hyperbole and near zero. Similarly, the drivers of growth of nuclear weapons are related to the strategic competition with India and its deterrence requirements, and have no correlation to the threat in the tribal areas. Nevertheless, it is important that this internal threat is recognized and not ignored by the state.

Another exaggerated threat is based on the fear that Islamic militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) will gain access to nuclear materials and either auction them on the black market or develop an IND. This fear is based on previous examples of militants utilizing ransom, kidnappings, and drug sales to gain revenue. In an era of increased localized autonomy of al-Qaeda offshoots, there is an increased need for local self-financing. The potential for enormous payoff makes selling stolen fissile material a logical venture. However, it is impractical to acquire, transport, safely store, and transfer nuclear weapons materials because this highly sensitive process would be fraught with safety and security dangers that terrorist groups with limited resources would be unable to surmount.

To date there is no evidence such a theft has occurred in South Asia. States consider nuclear weapons as their national crown jewels and guard them with utmost secrecy and protection. Significant dangers are associated with the acquisition and transportation of such materials and both accounting and protection are receiving greater attention. While this threat is exaggerated, the development of a dirty bomb with radioactive materials and conventional explosives cannot be ruled out.

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How probable is it then that such a threat would materialize? Even if the most unlikely scenario occurs, what are the consequences and what are the most realistic risks to evaluate? In order to effectively meet the challenges of South Asian nuclear terrorism, the most realistic threats in the region must be separated from the hyperbolic threats.

Most Realistic Threat

The third and the fourth scenarios fall into the higher probability categories, with a spectrum of possible consequences. An RED or RDD attack will have immediate economic and psychological consequences and might constitute the classic definition of terrorism. Similarly, an attack on a nuclear facility, whether or not it succeeds, would create a psychological specter of terrorizing the state, as could holding the nuclear facility or material hostage. The psychological impact of a penetration of a nuclear installation will instantly create an international panic based on the possibility of insider-outsider collusion.

First, it is technically less difficult to make an RED or RDD than an IND. In our assessment, an attempt to make an IND by a terrorist group is more likely to result in an RDD due to the scientific design challenges, which are not as simple as some scholars believe.
an RED or RDD were achieved in a terror attack originally designed to detonate as an IND, it would still have significant radiological dispersal consequences. In South Asia, an RED or RDD can be used to replace the conventional terror response such as a car bomb or suicide attack. Over a period of time, Indian and Pakistani security forces have developed counterterror tactics to expose and prevent conventional terrorist attacks; therefore, an RDD is an adaptive replacement. Especially in Pakistan, terrorists have claimed to have carried out attacks on soft targets in cities and military garrisons in retaliation for ongoing operations or drone strikes conducted by the United States. Should a conventional terror attack fail because of countervailing strategies by security forces, an RED or RDD could be the new tool.

**Though far short of “success,” the hype and fear created by such events evokes a serious psychological impact that allows terrorists to achieve other objectives.**

In South Asia, we assess an armed attack on a nuclear installation as the threat with the highest combination of probability and consequence. Unlike the other scenarios, there has been evidence of terrorists employing this strategy with some success. In this situation, the probability is high due to the evidence of similar style attacks in both India and Pakistan. A commando-type siege would not show signatures that would exist in the theft or movement of a nuclear weapon or nuclear material. Both India and Pakistan have experienced several attacks on military facilities, government sites, and symbolic soft targets. In Pakistan, examples include the 2012 attack on the Minhas Air Force Base in Kamra, the May 2011 TTP raid on Pakistan Naval Station (PNS) Mehran in Karachi, and the 2009 TTP attack and hostage crisis at the Pakistan Army General Headquarters. Examples of attacks on military and government facilities in India include the 2001 Parliament attack, the 2002 attack on an Indian army base in Kaluchak, and the 2008 synchronized attacks and hostage siege in Mumbai. Such attacks may not have succeeded in their respective missions, and each resulted in only modest destruction. However, though far short of “success,” the hype and fear created by such events evokes a serious psychological impact that allows terrorists to achieve other objectives.

We believe that such an attack would result in a moderate consequence level—less devastating than the detonation of a nuclear bomb on a population, but more damaging than a radiological attack. Since the probability of the first through third scenarios is close to zero, the probability of this attack is a more important factor than the level of destruction that would result. It is important to note that our threat assessment does not anticipate a situation where the terrorists accessed radioactive materials at the facility. We assess the probability of an attack on the nuclear facility resulting in the release of substantial radiation as small. Ultimately, the actual attack on the facility is the most probable situation; the high consequence interaction with radioactive materials would only confirm and compound the already evident consequence.

On the other hand, Rajesh Basrur and Friedrich Steinhäusler evaluated such attacks in India and identified security risks for Indian nuclear power plants. They offer scenarios
including attackers gaining access to a base and detonating a bomb that releases radioactivity, suicide truck attacks on facility entry points, and a suicide attack on the nuclear facility’s spent fuel storage pool by a civilian aircraft. Due to India’s three-pronged approach for its civilian nuclear infrastructure, the different types of reactors have different strengths and vulnerabilities.

The most probable threat in South Asia is an attack on nuclear infrastructure as its expansion provides more targets for terrorists. The growing number of facilities also increases the potential of vulnerabilities from insider threats. Despite the rigor of personnel reliability screening programs, there inevitably remains a potential for violent attacks from insiders. This has previously occurred in India, for example when Indira Gandhi was killed by her own bodyguards. Similarly, Pakistan Governor Salman Taseer was assassinated by his own bodyguard in January 2011. Personnel reliability programs are very important in South Asian states and provide opportunities for assurance and cooperation in both countries, but as these examples show they are far from perfect.

Site security is intrinsically linked to site selection. In South Asia, site selection must balance the external and internal threat matrix with the proximity of resources and response capacity. All these factors must be considered from the safety and security standpoints. First, major research centers must be in close proximity to technological hubs and the availability of top scientists and technicians as well as access to reinforcement from military garrisons. Second, power plants have different requirements for water and cooling resources. Plants must be located at a sufficient depth from borders to provide adequate warning of external attack – especially from the air – but cannot be too close to volatile borderlands and hostile areas. Third, storage sites selection may have different criteria to limit vulnerabilities without compromising security. These criteria include limited access, camouflage requirements and proximity to deployment areas. Compared to India’s vast territory, Pakistan’s geography and terrain do not allow the luxury of a wide choice of locations. However, the nature of the terrain and the proximity of garrisons and water sources provide well-controlled venues where site protection and security parameters can be developed into a robust system. And given Pakistani threat perceptions and the role of nuclear weapons as the source of ultimate national achievement as well as a tool for survival, it is not imaginable that these crown jewels would be managed in a lackluster manner. On site security, India has the luxury of space and fewer internally disturbed areas which afford it more flexibility. Pakistan is limited by space restrictions and pervasive domestic instability that increases the pressure as arsenals grow.

We recommend that both India and Pakistan respond directly to terrorism, nuclear security, and nuclear safety through a combination of the existing international and multilateral regimes, as well as implementing national legislation to establish future bilateral steps.

An attack on a South Asian nuclear facility has not occurred for several reasons. First, existing outward security deters terrorists from waging an assault. It is likely that the trend toward a growing number of nuclear facilities, and as other targets previously deemed impervious to attack are compromised, terrorists will
be emboldened to attack even seemingly well-guarded nuclear facilities in the future. A highly guarded facility would be logistically difficult to attack due to multiple rings of security. However, terrorist organizations have proven adaptable and capable of circumventing even the best guarded infrastructure. Another possible explanation is that the locations of many nuclear storage sites are highly classified and unknown to terrorists. It would be reasonable for terrorist groups, having done a cost-benefit analysis, to conclude that conventional weapons are sufficient to create a high-consequence terror attack.

Given the prospects of realistic terror threats in South Asia and examples in other areas of the world, we recommend that both India and Pakistan respond directly to terrorism, nuclear security, and nuclear safety through a combination of the existing international and multilateral regimes, as well as implementing national legislation to establish future bilateral steps.

**Regional Response**

South Asia has a long history of developing innovative Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). Yet so far, there has been no substantive progress on conflict resolution or the structuring of an arms control regime that encompasses conventional force balances, nuclear restraint measures, and other forms of risk reduction. Worse, the menace of terrorism that has increasingly bedeviled the region for multiple decades has been met with an inappropriate and inadequate response by both India and Pakistan; terrorism should be elevated as the highest priority to South Asian security and must be effectively addressed. This article has portrayed terrorism as a stand-alone issue and nuclear terrorism as a component of the broader terrorism challenge in the region. We recommend that India and Pakistan deal with regional terrorism above all other cross-border or other disputes. All nuclear arms control negotiations and CBMs must include discussions of terrorism, as well as of nuclear safety and security, cooperation, and bilateral consensus.

In order to identify future steps, we examine below the existing multilateral initiatives that contain binding obligations. By identifying the highest risk, both countries can re-purpose and expand the established mechanisms.
to deal directly with the nuclear security environment in the region.

**Existing International Tools and Obligations**

As a first step, India’s and Pakistan’s international obligations require both states to take legislative measures, physical responses, and international cooperation on issues in nuclear safety, security, and terrorism. This creates the foundation for both states to build on their existing individual responses and to cooperate bilaterally and regionally on these topics. Regional responses are necessary because terrorism and the implications of nuclear expansion do not recognize political boundaries.

Taking into account the highest risk nuclear terrorism attack and the threat from terrorism itself, there are many tools to equip the international community to prevent and mitigate nuclear terrorism. However, most of the existing international initiatives and United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) regulate proliferation and the transfer of materials. A first proposal is to create a regional regime derived from the UNSCR 1540 (discussed below). A second recommendation is to develop a regime focusing on terrorism utilizing the existing structure created in the 1999, 2004, and 2007 bilateral regional agreements that will each be explained in detail below. In combination, we propose the recently incoming Indian and Pakistani governments develop a regional security response to a potential nuclear incident or nuclear terror attack.

UNSCR 1540 mandated the development and enforcement of legal and regulatory mechanisms for proliferation of nuclear materials and criminalization of non-state actor involvement with nuclear weapons. Although this resolution mainly addresses proliferation, it is derived from a series of UNSC resolutions regulating international terrorism. As part of this regime, UNSCR 1540 aims to incorporate counter-terrorism into the nuclear and proliferation legislation and set forth standards for implementation under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Therefore, non-state actor involvement with anything related to nuclear weapon safety and security is a criminal act recognized as such by both states because the domestic legislation in both India and Pakistan has been brought into line. A criminal activity or accidental activity in either territory or in a geographically proximate region obliges both countries to develop a response and cooperate with international efforts. We propose that the domestic and international components should be transformed into a regional obligation in the case of a threat to a nuclear installation. As part of a future regional cooperative agreement, both India and Pakistan must act in a transparent manner and cooperate with international measures.

We propose the recently incoming Indian and Pakistani governments develop a regional security response to a potential nuclear incident or nuclear terror attack.

To weave together a regional regime on nuclear terrorism, existing regional agreements are already available to India and Pakistan. The foremost document is the 1999 Lahore Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which was coincidently signed by the two parties now in power – the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz). Part III of the Lahore MOU commits both states to reducing the risk of accidental or
unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and to notify the other of the risk of any decision or actions that would result in adverse consequences. Although at the time this was restricted to unauthorized use of weapons or a nuclear accident, this could now be expanded to incorporate the UNSCR 1540 requirements on terrorism. Second, during the 2004 joint India-Pakistan statement following the Twelfth SAARC Summit, both countries pledged to prevent terrorism in the region and are bound to not support terrorism in any manner. In addition, the Islamabad Declaration reaffirmed the commitment to a SAARC Regional Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, and included the signing of an Additional Protocol on terrorist financing. The third instrument was the 2007 CBM between India and Pakistan for the “Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons.” This agreement pledged each to notify the other in the case of an accident involving nuclear weapons. This agreement was originally established for five years and reaffirmed in 2012 for a five-year extension.

**POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to multiple CBMs to prevent situations in which non-state actors gained control of any part of their respective nuclear arsenals. These CBMs existed in an environment with limited internal terrorist threats and extensive nuclear security and safety systems to keep the arsenals secure. As discussed above, India and Pakistan have numerous reasons to create a regional nuclear security architecture. Yet there have been no major steps, dialogues, or even the exchange of CBMs and nuclear risk reduction measure ideas since the 2007 bilateral broad based agreement. The shroud of secrecy surrounding nuclear weapons in South Asia must be removed to establish necessary CBMs on nuclear security, nuclear safety, and nuclear terrorism.

Based on UNSCR 1540 and the existing bilateral agreements, we offer a list of policy recommendations to combat the most realistic threat from nuclear terrorism in South Asia:

- **Committed military and political leadership:** Combatting all strains of terrorism requires considerable political will and dedicated leadership from both the political apparatus and the military. While lower levels of bureaucratic engagement can contribute to progress, routine senior meetings dedicated exclusively to terrorism issues are necessary to generate results. Although the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers meet on the sidelines of international meetings, there is a need for periodic regional bilateral meetings between the Prime Ministers, Directors General of Military Operations (DGMO), and heads of intelligence agencies.

- **Regional bilateral engagement:** We recommend direct regional bilateral contact between the chairmen of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), as well as between the Pakistani Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) and the Indian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (INRA).
National risk reduction centers: Since a host of confidence building measures and nuclear risk reduction measures have failed to create durable peace, nuclear risk reduction centers (NRRCs) should be established. NRRCs can build on the existing CBM and NRRM framework to serve as coordination centers to facilitate communication, identify triggers for escalation, and negotiate conflict resolution. NRRCs are intended to bolster official lines of diplomatic or military communication in the event of a nuclear emergency, not replace established communication.40

Exchange of radiation data: We recommend sharing radiation data around nuclear power plants of each country and the exchange of documents that identify steps for protective measures against accidents taken by each country.

Civil society summits: In order to incorporate valuable subject matter expertise from regional think tanks and universities, the major think tanks in India and Pakistan should hold joint seminars to directly address regional nuclear questions and issues.

Indefinite extension of nuclear agreements: The Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons was initially signed in 2007 and extended for an additional five years in 2012. This agreement should be extended indefinitely and include an additional protocol agreement to deal with consequence management of a terrorist incident at a nuclear installation and any incidents of nuclear terrorism.41

Notes

1 The first Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, DC in 2010 with the aim of preventing nuclear terrorism around the globe. Succeeding summits were held biannually in Seoul, South Korea in 2012 and in The Hague, Netherlands in 2014.

2 A full definition of nuclear terrorism is found in the 2005 International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism: “The convention defines the act of nuclear terrorism as the use or threat to use nuclear material, nuclear fuel, radioactive products or waste, or any other radioactive substances with toxic, explosive, or other dangerous properties. The definition includes the use or threat to use any nuclear installations, nuclear explosive, or radiation devices in order to kill or injure persons, damage property, or the environment, or to compel persons, States, or international organizations to do or to refrain from doing any act. The unauthorized receipt through fraud, theft, or forcible seizure of any nuclear material, radioactive substances, nuclear installations, or nuclear explosive devices belonging to a State Party, or demands by the threat or use of force or by other forms of intimidation for the transfer of such material would also be regarded as acts of nuclear terrorism.” http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/conventions/Conv13.pdf.


7 Such threat perception was reinforced when Israel successfully destroyed Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981. India then contemplated mimicking Israel to destroy Pakistani centrifuge facility program. See Khan, Eating Grass, 212-13.

8 For an example, see Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United

9 A detailed analysis is given in Feroz Hassan Khan “Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Separating Myths from Reality,” Arms Control Today (July/August 2009); Also see Naeem Salik and Kenneth N. Luongo, “Challenges for Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,” Arms Control Today (March 2013).

10 Pakistan has often alleged Indian intelligence agencies to be involved in the support for Baluch insurgency just as India alleges Pakistani intelligence agency involvement in internal instability within India.


14 Almost like a default response to any Western publication or assertion of nuclear security concern, Pakistani official reaction is to contemptuously dismiss the report and state that its nuclear security regime is foolproof and iron-clad. For example, see “Pakistan: Nuke security fool-proof,” CNN, January 26, 2008.


16 Conversely, the United States has a culture of openness and is able to publicize shortcomings in site security. One example is a May 2014 admission that the U.S. Air Force failed to effectively respond to a simulated assault on a nuclear missile silo. Although questions are raised regarding the implications of security, ultimately it has allowed corrective measures and do not undermine the missile’s safety. See http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_NUCLEAR_MISSTEPS/SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2014-05-22-02-54-38.


18 State Department Country Reports on Terrorism.


21 An IND manufactured by a terrorist group is more likely to behave like a RDD than a full-fledged nuclear explosive device with nuclear explosion and chain reaction.


26 The three-pronged approach includes utilizing indigenous uranium to fuel thermal reactors, harvesting the plutonium produced in the thermal reactors for fast breeder reactors, and created thorium-reactors to produce uranium-233 to power these reactors. For more information, see Charles D. Ferguson, “Assessing the Vulnerability of the Indian Civilian Nuclear Program to Military and Terrorist Attack” in ed. Henry D. Sokolski, *Gauging US-Indian Strategic Cooperation* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 131-185.

27 Basrur and Steinhäusler, “Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism Threats for India.”


29 Some western writings have made comical assertions. See “The Ally From Hell,” Jeffrey Goldberg
and Marc Ambinder, Atlantic Monthly, October 28, 2011


31 Leslie Cockburn and Andrew Cockburn, One Point Safe (New York: Doubleday, 1997), 1-12.

32 For a full list of CBMs in South Asia, see the Stimson Center “South Asia Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) Timeline at http://www.stimson.org/data-sets/south-asia-confidence-building-measures-cbm-time-line/.


34 Peter van Ham and Olivia Bosch, eds. Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism: The Impact of UNSCR 1540 (Baltimore, MD: Brookings Press, 2007), 6-8.


36 Full text of the joint statement between Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee during the Twelfth SAARC Summit at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3372157.stm.


Hezbollah flag in Lebanon
Hezbollah’s Syrian Quagmire

BY MATTHEW LEVITT

Hezbollah – Lebanon’s Party of God – is many things. It is one of the dominant political parties in Lebanon, as well as a social and religious movement catering first and foremost (though not exclusively) to Lebanon’s Shi’a community. Hezbollah is also Lebanon’s largest militia, the only one to maintain its weapons and rebrand its armed elements as an “Islamic resistance” in response to the terms of the Taif Accord, which ended Lebanon’s civil war and called for all militias to disarm. While the various wings of the group are intended to complement one another, the reality is often messier. In part, that has to do with compartmentalization of the group’s covert activities. But it is also a factor of the group’s multiple identities – Lebanese, pan-Shi’a, pro-Iranian – and the group’s multiple and sometimes competing goals tied to these different identities. Hezbollah insists that it is Lebanese first, but in fact, it is an organization that always acts out of its self-interests above its purported Lebanese interests. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, Hezbollah also has an “expansive global network” that “is sending money and operatives to carry out terrorist attacks around the world.”

Over the past few years, a series of events has exposed some of Hezbollah’s covert and militant enterprises in the region and around the world, challenging the group’s standing at home and abroad. Hezbollah operatives have been indicted for the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri by the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in The Hague, arrested on charges of plotting attacks in Nigeria, and convicted on similar charges in Thailand and Cyprus. Hezbollah’s criminal enterprises, including drug running and money laundering from South America to Africa to the Middle East, have been targeted by law enforcement and regulatory agencies. And shortly after the European Union blacklisted the military wing of Hezbollah, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) followed suit, banning the provision of financial or other support for the group from GCC countries, and began deporting suspected Hezbollah supporters.

But all this pales in comparison to the existential challenges Hezbollah faces over its active participation in the war in Syria. By siding with the Assad regime, the regime’s Alawite supporters, and Iran, and taking up arms against Sunni rebels, Hezbollah has placed itself at the epicenter of the violence. The group’s participation in the Syrian civil war has put its organization in direct conflict with numerous factions, including the Sunni rebels it opposes and the Kurdish forces it supports. This has led to significant casualties and a loss of influence for Hezbollah.

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a sectarian conflict that has nothing to do with the group’s purported raison d’être: “resistance” to Israeli occupation. After Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech in August 2013, defending the group’s activities in Syria as part of its “resistance” against Israel, one Shi'ite Lebanese satirist commented that, “Either the fighters have lost Palestine on the map and think it is in Syria (or) they were informed that the road to Jerusalem runs through Qusayr and Homs,” locations in Syria where Hezbollah has fought with Assad loyalists against Sunni rebels.7 Now, in 2014, with Hezbollah’s credibility as a resistance group on the line, the group’s activities in Syria place it at odds with the majority of Sunni Palestinians, especially those in Lebanon and Syria where the conflict is felt most acutely. Indeed, in January 2014 Hamas leaders stepped in and pleaded with Hezbollah and Iran for humanitarian relief on behalf of the besieged and starving Palestinian population of the Yarmouk refugee camp near Damascus.8

By siding with the Assad regime, the regime’s Alawite supporters, and Iran, and taking up arms against Sunni rebels, Hezbollah has placed itself at the epicenter of a sectarian conflict that has nothing to do with the group’s purported raison d’être: “resistance” to Israeli occupation.

While most Palestinian factions are trying to maintain an official policy of disassociation from the crisis in Syria, that is becoming an increasingly difficult position to hold. Already, some Palestinian Islamist factions openly criticize Hezbollah for its involvement in the war supporting Assad. There have been incidents of Sidon–based members of the Hezbollah-affiliated Resistance Brigades attacking residents of the city.9 In December, two Fatah members of the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian camp on the outskirts of Sidon were shot at by masked gunman, killing one and injuring the other.10 The camp now hosts an additional 10,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria who fled the Yarmouk camp on the outskirts of Damascus. The camp has an official disassociation policy, but it also has posters of men killed while fighting with rebels against Assad in Syria. One of the suicide bombers in the November 19th attack on the Iranian embassy was also a resident, and it is also believed to have been the residence of the mastermind behind that attack, Majid al-Majid.11 Alarmed by these events, Hezbollah officially dissolved the group.12 More alarming still, these same Palestinian Islamist factions have warned security officials that they “would not stand by idly in the event that Hezbollah gunmen attack their rivals in Sidon.”13

Hezbollah in Syria

Speaking in late May, Hezbollah Secretary General Nasrallah declared that the battle in Syria was Hezbollah’s fight: “We will continue along the road, bear the responsibilities and the sacrifices. This battle is ours, and I promise you victory.”14 To that end, Hezbollah went “all-in” fighting alongside Assad regime loyalists and Iranian Revolutionary Guardsmen against Syrian rebels. The impact of Hezbollah’s involvement cannot be overstated, as was seen most clearly in the battle for Qusayr, where Hezbollah gunmen reportedly fought house to house, took significant losses, and played the decisive role in turning the tide against the rebels who ultimately lost the
battle. That battle also laid bare the myth that Hezbollah was not fighting in Syria.

Although Hezbollah had already admitted it was fighting in Syria, it insisted that it was only either fighting along the border to protect ethnic Lebanese living on the Syrian side of the border, or protecting Shi’a shrines, specifically the Sayyeda Zeinab shrine in Damascus. These narratives used by Hezbollah and its allies in Iran and Iraq have pervaded their propaganda in the past two years.\(^\text{15}\)

While the Sayyeda Zeinab shrine is indeed a major Shi’a pilgrimage site, Hezbollah has more than just spiritual ties to the shrine. As early as the 1980s, Hezbollah used the shrine as a place at which to spot potential Shi’a recruits. For Saudi Shi’a recruits in particular, the Sayyeda Zeinab shrine served as a transfer hub and as a cover for travel between Saudi Arabia and training camps in Lebanon and/or Iran.\(^\text{16}\)

Hard evidence of the Sayyeda Zeinab’s operational significance for Hezbollah came to light in the context of the FBI investigation into the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing which killed 19 U.S. Air Force personnel and wounded another 372 Americans.\(^\text{17}\)

In May 2013, Nasrallah insisted Hezbollah had not intervened in the fighting in Syria until just several months earlier. While “tens of thousands of (Sunni) fighters” joined the fight in Syria, Nasrallah lamented, the international community only complained about foreign intervention in Syria when “a small group from Hezbollah entered Syria.”\(^\text{20}\)

But Hezbollah’s destabilizing activities in Syria date almost to the beginning of the country’s uprising in 2011. These activities, as a journalist in Lebanon put it, have “torn away the party’s mask of virtue.”\(^\text{21}\) Within weeks of the uprising, Nasrallah himself called on all Syrians to stand by the regime.\(^\text{22}\) As reports emerged in May 2011 that Iran’s Qods Force was helping the Syrian regime crack down on anti-government demonstrators, Hezbollah denied playing “any military role in Arab countries.”\(^\text{23}\) But by the following month, Syrian protesters were heard chanting not only...
for Assad’s downfall, but also against Iran and Hezbollah. Video footage showed protesters burning posters of Nasrallah. According to a senior Syrian defense official who defected from the regime, Syrian security services were unable to handle the uprising on their own. “They didn’t have decent snipers or equipment,” he explained. “They needed qualified snipers from Hezbollah and Iran.”

Over time, Hezbollah increasingly struggled to conceal its on-the-ground support of the Assad regime. In August 2012, the U.S. Treasury Department blacklisted Hezbollah, already on the Department’s terrorism list, this time for providing support to the Assad regime. Since the beginning of the rebellion, Treasury explained, Hezbollah had been providing “training, advice, and extensive logistical support to the Government of Syria’s increasingly ruthless efforts” against the opposition. Most funerals for those killed in the fighting were quiet affairs, as Hezbollah tried to keep a lid on the extent of its activities in Syria, but news began to leak. In August 2012, Hezbollah parliamentarians reportedly attended the funeral of military commander Musa Ali Shehimi, who “died while performing his jihadi duty.” A few weeks later, another Hezbollah military commander, Ali Hussein Nassif, was killed in Syria, along with two bodyguards, also “while performing his jihadi duties,” according to a Hezbollah newspaper. Hezbollah’s “resistance” rhetoric notwithstanding, U.S. officials informed the UN Security Council in October 2012, “the truth is plain to see: Nasrallah’s fighters are now part

Hariri memorial shrine, September 2, 2005.
of Assad’s killing machine.” Two months later, a UN report confirmed Hezbollah members were in Syria fighting on behalf of the Assad government. Amid increasing concern that the struggle in Syria would engulf the region in conflict, Hezbollah set up training camps near Syrian chemical weapons depots in November 2012. According to one senior U.S. official, “The fear these weapons could fall into the wrong hands is our greatest concern.”

Hezbollah’s Strategic Interests in Syria

By engaging in this sectarian war, Hezbollah threatens the stability of the fractured and deeply divided sectarian society that is Lebanon. Ignoring the government of Lebanon’s stated policy of non-intervention in Syria, Hezbollah dragged Lebanon into a nasty sectarian war. Recognizing this, Nasrallah upset a great many of his countrymen when he suggested Lebanese could fight each other all they wanted in Syria, just not in Lebanon:

“We renew our call for sparing Lebanon any internal clash or conflict. We disagree over Syria. You fight in Syria; we fight in Syria; then let’s fight there. Do you want me to be more frank? Keep Lebanon aside. Why should we fight in Lebanon? There are different viewpoints, different visions, and different evaluation of obligations. Well so far so good. However, let’s spare Lebanon fighting, struggle and bloody confrontations.”

But Hezbollah’s fight has not limited itself to the Syrian side of the border. Nor will Hezbollah pull back from its support of the Assad regime. Hezbollah thinks it is in its interests to fight until victory because it sees at stake three interlocking strategic interests critical to the group that Nasrallah – who, according to the Treasury Department, has personally “overseen Hezbollah’s efforts to help the Syrian regime’s violent crackdown on the Syrian civilian population” – is willing to risk further undermining Hezbollah’s standing in Lebanon and the region.

First, Hezbollah seeks to keep Assad in power for its own interests. For years Syria has been a reliable patron of Hezbollah’s, a relationship that only grew deeper under the rule of Bashar al-Assad. While Hafez al-Assad used Hezbollah as a proxy, he also kept the group at arm’s length and at times used force to keep the group in line. In 1988, Syria issued a warrant for the arrest of Imad Mughniyeh, the head of Hezbollah’s Islamic Jihad Organization. By 2010, Syria was not just allowing the trans-shipment of Iranian arms to Hezbollah through Syria, but was reportedly providing Hezbollah long range Scud rockets from its own arsenal. Nasrallah explained the nature of Hezbollah’s alliance with Syria very clearly:

“I frankly say that Syria is the backbone of the resistance, and the support of the resistance. The resistance cannot sit with hands crossed while its backbone is held vulnerable and its support is being broken or else we will be stupid. Stupid is he who stands motionless while watching death, the siege and conspiracy crawling towards him. He would be stupid then. However, the responsible, rational man acts with absolute responsibility.”

Second, Hezbollah’s support of the Assad regime is not just due to a romantic sense of obligation. Hezbollah is keen to make sure that air and land corridors remain open for the delivery of weapons, cash and other materials
from Tehran. Until the Syrian civil war, Iranian aircraft would fly into Damascus International Airport where their cargo would be loaded onto Syrian military trucks and escorted into Lebanon for delivery to Hezbollah. Now, Hezbollah is desperate to either secure the Assad regime, its control of the airport and the roads to Lebanon or, at a minimum, establish firm Alawi control of the coastal areas so Hezbollah can receive shipments through the air and sea ports in Latakia. Over the past few years, FBI investigations into Hezbollah criminal enterprises in the United States and Europe revealed at least two cases where Hezbollah operatives planned to procure weapons – in one case MANPADs intended to take down Israeli airplanes – and ship them to Hezbollah through Latakia. In another case, a European Hezbollah procurement agent told an FBI undercover agent that the weapons would be exported to Latakia, Syria, where Hezbollah controlled the port. Secrecy would be guaranteed there, he assured the undercover agent, because Hezbollah could shut down all the cameras when the shipment arrived and no shipping paperwork would be required once the items arrived in Syria.

And third, Hezbollah is also fighting for the Assad regime in support of Iran’s interests. Hezbollah’s ideological commitment to Iranian Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s revolutionary doctrine of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist), which holds that a Shi’a Islamic cleric should serve as the supreme head of government, is a key source of tension since it means that the group is simultaneously committed to the decrees of Iranian clerics, the Lebanese state, its sectarian Shi’a community within Lebanon, and fellow Shi’a abroad.

In February 2012, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper characterized the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran as “a partnership arrangement… with the Iranians as the senior partner.” This “strategic partnership,” as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) director Matthew Olsen put it, “is the product of a long evolution from the 1980s, when Hezbollah was just a proxy of Iran.” The implication is clear: Lebanon’s Party of God is no longer a pure “Islamic resistance” fighting Israel, but a sectarian militia and Iranian proxy doing Bashar al-Assad and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei of Iran’s bidding at the expense of fellow Muslims.

### Building Proxies

To contend with the possibility that – after as many as 200,000 reported deaths in the civil war – Iran, Hezbollah, and Syria are unable to definitively defeat the rebels and pacify the Sunni majority, Hezbollah has already established local proxies through which it can maintain influence and engage in mischief to undermine stability in the country for some time to come.

Helping establish, train, and equip militias in Syria is nothing new for Hezbollah. It also took part in these activities during the Iraq war last decade in coordination with Iran’s IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps). Two of these Iraqi militias – Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH) – are now being instrumentalized by Lebanese Hezbollah to build up auxiliary forces to assist the Assad regime. The key militias fighting with and in some cases directly for Hezbollah in Syria have been the Jaysh al-Sha’abi (JS), Liwa’ Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA), Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS), Liwa’ Zulfiqar (LZ), and Liwa’ ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir (LAIY).
Jaysh al-Sha’abi (The People’s Army) is a U.S. designated terrorist organization and militia force that maintains a connection to the Assad regime’s military apparatus. This highlights how the regime has adapted its forces to fight an asymmetric and irregular war. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, Jaysh al-Sha’abi “was created, and continues to be maintained, with support from Iran and Hezbollah and is modeled after the Iranian Basij militia.”

In contrast to JS, the other militias are not within Syria’s security apparatus, but rather new independent proxies established by the IRGC and Hezbollah. Most of these groups use the same type of iconography and narratives that Hezbollah has put forward as it relates to the resistance, its “jihadi duties,” and protecting Shi’a shrines. Of these four forces, Liwa’ Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA) is the most prominent and has been involved in the conflict since the fall of 2012. LAFA’s fighters are a combination of members of Lebanese Hezbollah, Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq. It has mainly been operating in southern Damascus.

Since then, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS) and Liwa’ Zulfiqar (LZ) have spawned from LAFA and have proven to be key fighters in areas like southern Damascus. KSS and LZ both draw fighters from Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi’a. LZ is also believed to gain some fighters from Muqtada al-Sadr’s Liwa’a al-Yum al-Mawud (Promised Day Brigades).
KSS was set up in mid-April 2013, while LZ was established in early June 2013. Unlike LAFA, KSS, or LZ, Liwa’ ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir (LAIY) does not operate in southern Damascus around the area where the Sayyeda Zeinab shrine is located. Instead, LAIY is mainly operating in rural Aleppo, even farther north than Lebanese Hezbollah’s operations in Qusayr and Homs. LAIY first began operating in May 2013 and has been involved with some fighting, though only less than ten fighters have been reported killed.

The region is strategically important, not only commanding the key road from Damascus to the Alawite areas around Latakia to the north, but also as a key rebel smuggling route across which rebels elements move weapons and supplies from supporters in nearby Lebanon into Syria.

Although Lebanese Hezbollah and the IRGC have built up these auxiliary forces, Lebanese Hezbollah has itself also been engaged in fighting against Syrian rebel forces.

Hezbollah’s Spring Offensive

In the Spring of 2013, Hezbollah took on a more public presence in the fight against the Syrian rebels when martyrdom notices for fallen Hezbollah fighters began to appear on the group’s official and unofficial websites, forums, and Facebook pages. Based on Hezbollah’s organization structure and disciplined messaging, it is likely these notices were sanctioned by the leadership in the organization despite the fact that they did not publicly admit to being involved in Syria until late May. Determining the number of fighters Hezbollah has sent to Syria is difficult to ascertain, but according to French intelligence sources its believed that 3,000-4,000 individuals have made the trip to assist the Assad regime. The numbers may be slightly higher according to other sources, in the range of 4,000-5,000 fighters on the ground in Syria at a time and rotating in and out of the country on thirty day deployments.

Hezbollah has proven to be an invaluable fighting force for Iran and the Assad regime. Within a few weeks of Nasrallah’s public proclamation that Hezbollah had entered the conflict, Hezbollah retook the strategic city of Qusayr for the regime, a significant defeat for Syrian rebels. Hezbollah is believed to have suffered significant losses in that battle, losing as many as a few hundred men. Still, despite the high cost, the battle vindicated Nasrallah’s pledge just a few weeks prior: “I say to all the honorable people, to the mujahedeen, to the heroes: I have always promised you a victory and now I pledge to you a new one in Syria.”

In Hezbollah propaganda, the battle of Qusayr was portrayed as no less a victory than the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and Hezbollah’s self-proclaimed “divine victory” over Israel in the summer of 2006. Since then, Hezbollah has moved from securing al-Qusayr in an all-out lighting attack, to a slower less dramatic pace of taking one village at a time in the mountainous Qalamoun region between Damascus and Lebanon. The region is strategically important, not only commanding the key road from Damascus to the Alawite areas around Latakia to the north, but also as a key rebel smuggling route across which rebel elements move weapons and supplies from supporters in nearby Lebanon into Syria. According to the Hezbollah field commander, Abu Jihad, the plan was to encircle the region
and then with support from the Syrian military, Hezbollah would take the lead on the assault on the ground. Sheik Ahmad, a high-ranking Hezbollah commander in charge of intelligence for Qusayr and Qalamoun, clarified that “We took the decision that none of them is allowed to go out alive.”

**Importing Violence to Lebanon**

Despite Nasrallah’s assertion that violence in Syria could be kept in Syria even with Lebanese groups participating in the carnage, this has not been the case. At first verbal jabs unsurprisingly came from extremist circles. In June, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, a Lebanon-based al-Qaeda-affiliated group, released a statement challenging Nasrallah and his Hezbollah fighters “to fire one bullet at occupied Palestine and claim responsibility” for it. They could fire at Israel from either Lebanon or Syria, the statement continued, seeing as Hezbollah “fired thousands of shells and bullets upon unarmed Sunnis and their women, elderly and children, and destroyed their homes on top of them.”

On July 9 2013, Hezbollah’s stronghold in the Beirut suburb Dahiyeh was struck in a car bomb attack. Though approximately 53 were injured, luckily none were confirmed killed in the attack. Nonetheless, the illusion of Hezbollah’s activity in Syria not having any security repercussions for the important Shia base in Beirut was fractured. One month later, Dahiyeh was struck again this time killing 16 people, and injuring another 226. On November 19, the Abdullah Azzam Brigade issued another statement, this time claiming responsibility for a double suicide attack on the Iranian embassy itself. The attack killed 25 people, including Iran’s cultural attaché Ebrahim Ansari, and injured 150 others. Clearly Nasrallah’s pitch for a gentleman’s agreement under which Lebanese citizens would only slaughter one another across the border has failed with his fellow Lebanese, who wanted an end to Lebanese interference in the war in Syria.

Two weeks after the attack on Iran’s embassy, Hezbollah was dealt another blow. Haj Hassan Hilu Laqis, a senior Hezbollah procurement officer (who at one time oversaw a Hezbollah procurement network in North America) was assassinated by at least one unidentified assailant with a silenced 9mm pistol. On January 2, yet another bombing occurred in Dahiyeh, this time near the residence of Hezbollah deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem. This attack occurred less than a week after former finance minister and Hariri advisor Mohamad Chatah was assassinated in Beirut near the Lebanese parliament building. The Hezbollah associated al-Akhbar paper reported that in response to the January 2 attack, “It is clear that the popular mood, after the attack in Dahiyeh, was convinced now more than ever of the need to confront extremist groups in Syria and Lebanon. Perhaps the perpetrators thought that by striking at innocent civilians, they would drive them to renounce Hezbollah, or put pressure on the Resistance Party to withdraw from Hezbollah. However, the opposite happens after each attack.”

The day before the January 2 attack, authorities arrested Majid bin Mohammed al-Majid, the leader of the al-Qaeda affiliated Abdullah Azzam Brigades which had claimed responsibility for the Iranian embassy bombing. But within days al-Majid was reported to have died (of kidney failure) while in custody. His suspicious death raised many questions and was quickly followed by a statement released by the Abdullah Azzam Brigades
vowing revenge: “The project of its leader, Majid al-Majid, will be maintained by attacking Iran and its party [Hezbollah] even after his death.”

**Hezbollah Pursues its own Interests at the Expense of Lebanon’s**

Hezbollah’s deliberate violation of the official Lebanese government’s policy of “disassociation” from the fighting in Syria is not the first time the organization has acted directly against Lebanese interests. In May 2008, in the midst of an ongoing political crisis in which the country was without a President since the previous November, the Lebanese government discovered a Hezbollah surveillance camera in Beirut’s airport. The camera was removed and the army commander in charge of airport security, Brigadier General Wafiq Choucair, a suspected Hezbollah sympathizer, was rotated to a new position. Later that week, the government announced it would no longer tolerate Hezbollah running its own fiber optic communications network, outside of government regulation or control, and described the network as part of Hezbollah’s “attack on the sovereignty of the state.” Nasrallah saw the removal as a “declaration of war.”

Local criticism arose soon after when Hezbollah briefly seized control of part of West Beirut, turning the weapons purportedly maintained to “resist” Israel against fellow Lebanese and contributing, according to a senior U.S. intelligence official, “to a dramatic increase in sectarian tensions.” In the course of the fighting, nearly 100 Lebanese were killed and 250 wounded.

In 2012, when the government of New Zealand blacklisted Hezbollah’s military wing, it determined that the group’s “pre-planned and well-coordinated operation” to take over West Beirut, and the group’s use of machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades during street battles, constituted an act of terrorism. Still, even before the open intervention in Syria, Hezbollah refused to relinquish its private stockpile of arms to the Lebanese Army, despite periodic explosions of poorly stored weapons in which Lebanese citizens were killed. “We consider our arms like blood flowing in our veins,” Hezbollah Shura Council member Mohammad Yazbek explained in October 2012, pledging not to turn over the party’s weapons “no matter what the costs are.”

It should not be a surprise that Hezbollah made a miscalculation in Syria; Nasrallah’s view of reality is through a prism of self-interest and absolute obedience to Iran. In late 2012, U.S. and Israeli officials received intelligence that the commander of the Iranian Qods Force, Qasem Soleimani feared the Assad regime was in danger of being defeated by opposition forces. Hezbollah would need to become involved in a much greater military capacity in Syria, or Soleimani argued the window of Iranian supplied advance weaponry directly to Hezbollah through Syria would close. U.S. intelligence assessments noted that Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah at first declined repeated requests from Iranian leaders for Hezbollah to send large numbers of experienced fighters to fight on behalf of the Assad regime. While some Hezbollah leaders were inclined to provide the fighters, others resisted what they (correctly) feared would prove to undermine their position and Lebanon and be, as one official put it, “bad for the brand.” Nasrallah only acquiesced, officials explained, after receiving a personal appeal from Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Iran, the Supreme Leader made
clear, not only expected Hezbollah to act, but
Hezbollah’s disregard for Lebanon’s sta-
ability is especially highlighted in its role in the
2005 assassination of former Prime Minister
Rafiq Hariri. It wasn’t until June 2011 when the
UN’s Special Tribunal for Lebanon – the body
charged with investigating the assassination –
indicted Mustapha Badreddine and three other
Hezbollah operatives for their roles in the
2005 assassination of former Prime Minister
Rafiq Hariri (a fifth was added recently as well
but it has yet to be decided if he will be tried
with the other four). Evidence implicating
Hezbollah as a primary suspect in Hariri’s
assassination first appeared in May 2009. A
story in Der Spiegel reported on blatantly suspi-
cious cell phone activity, including one
Hezbollah operative who called his girlfriend
from a handset used in the operation. And
both Le Monde and the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation have detailed the group’s role in
the assassination and its efforts to undermine
the Tribunal’s investigation.

Badreddine is by far the most significant
person named in the trial that began proceed-
ings in January 2014. Although Hezbollah
never publicly announced Mughniyah’s succes-
sor as head of the IJO, Badreddine is often
cited as a possible candidate. Like Mughniyah
before him, he reportedly sits on the group’s
shura council and serves as a senior advisor to
Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. According
to a Hezbollah member interrogated by the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service,
Badreddine is “more dangerous” than
Mughniyah, who was “his teacher in terror-
ism.” In a sign of Badreddine’s ongoing leader-
ship role in Hezbollah militancy and terror-
ism, the Treasury Department added him and
Talal Hamiyah, “two senior terrorist leaders of
Hezbollah,” to the department’s terrorist des-
ignation list “for providing support to
Hezbollah’s terrorist activities in the Middle
East and around the world.” In May, there
were also reports that Badreddine himself was
on the ground directing the battle in Qusayr.

Having fanned the flames of war in Syria
based on a distinctly sectarian divide,
Hezbollah bears significant responsibility for
the violence that has now spilled over the
border into Lebanon.

Conclusion

Hezbollah has long played a dominant role in
Lebanon, extending its influence through
political and social activism as well as terror-
ism, political violence, and military prowess.
But it has long insisted that it acts only with
Lebanon’s best interests at heart. Today,
Hezbollah can no longer maintain that fiction.

Having fanned the flames of war in Syria
based on a distinctly sectarian divide,
Hezbollah bears significant responsibility for
the violence that has now spilled over the bor-
der into Lebanon. Indeed, Hezbollah’s activi-
ties on both sides of the Lebanon-Syria border
demonstrate that, contrary to its own propa-
ganda, Hezbollah acts primarily out of its own
and in Iran’s interests, not those of the
Lebanese people.

The implications of Hezbollah’s now pub-
lic “strategic partnership” with Iran is multifact-
eted. Both Hezbollah and Iran are “all in” in
the fight to defend the Assad regime in Syria,
and their increasingly close partnership has
now spread to other areas as well. For exam-
ple, consider the statement of Hezbollah
leader Hassan Nasrallah regarding the P5+1
negotiations with Iran over Iran’s nuclear program. “The alternative to an agreement (on Iran’s nuclear program) is a regional war.” Given Hezbollah and Iran’s presence on the ground in Syria, that may already be the case.

Notes

17. United States of America v. Ahmed Mughassil et al., Indictment, United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, No.01-228-A, June 2001
18. United States of America v. Ahmed Mughassil et al., Indictment, United States District Court, Eastern
District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, No.01-228-A, June 2001
19 United States of America v. Ahmed Mughassil et al., Indictment, United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, No.01-228-A, June 2001
20 Hasan Nasrallah, "Words on Eid al-Muqa-wama and the Liberation."
33 Hasan Nasrallah, "Words on Eid al-Muqa-wama and the Liberation."
38 Hasan Nasrallah, "Words on Eid al-Muqa-wama and the Liberation."
43 Statement of Matthew G. Olsen, Homeland Threats and Agency Responses.

45 For more on these two Shia Iraq militias see: “Kata’ib Hizbollah,” The International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, March 5, 2010; Sam Wyer, “The Resurgence of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq,” Institute for the Study of War, December 2012.

46 For detailed analysis of these groups see Phillip Smyth’s work at http://jihadology.net/hizballah-cavalcade/


51 Ibid.


55 Substantiation of these can only be confirmed via their own videos (without anything else to solidly ID it) and Facebook statuses unlike the other groups where other sources have been able to independently confirm the content. Therefore, for now, one should be cautious when analyzing this particular data point; Phillip Smyth, “Liwa’a ’Ammar Ibn Yasar: A New Shia Militia Operating In Aleppo, Syria.”

56 While efforts to publicize these death notices only occurred in the spring of 2013 there were other signs that Hizb Allah was already fighting in Syria. This was based on funerals being publicized in the press as noted earlier in this article; Phillip Smyth, “Hezbollah’s Fallen Soldiers.”


58 Author Interviews with Western Intelligence Officials, December 2012.


60 Hasan Nasrallah, “Words on Eid al-Muqa-wama and the Liberation.”


Lebanon-News/2013/Dec-04/239908-lakkis-was-key-figure-in-hezbollah-drone-program.ashx#axzz2mXskPsp9.


Government of New Zealand, “Case to Designate Lebanese Hizbollah’s Military Wing,”


Mexican federal police display arrested Los Zetas members, confiscated drugs, weapons, and ammunition.
The Terror-Crime Nexus
Hezbollah’s Global Facilitators

BY CELINA B. REALUYO

Over the past decade, a convergence of illicit networks has empowered terrorists, criminals, and proliferators around the world and amplified transnational threats against nation-states. Hezbollah, the militant Shiite Muslim group in Lebanon, designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union, has capitalized on these illicit networks, leveraging facilitators in the Lebanese diaspora community to secure financing and support from overseas. Hezbollah and its global activities perhaps best represent the terror-crime convergence phenomenon through its networks in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the Americas. Before the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001 perpetrated by al-Qaeda, Hezbollah was the terrorist group responsible for the most U.S. casualties from terrorist attacks. More recently, Hezbollah has been in the headlines for its active political and military support for the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. This article will illustrate how Hezbollah uses its global facilitators to finance itself through criminal activities and will underscore the need for more cross-border collaboration among military, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies to combat the convergence of illicit networks and groups like Hezbollah. Since these illicit networks cannot operate without facilitators who enable their activities, it is imperative that governments pursue, detain, and prosecute facilitators as aggressively as they do the criminals and terrorists themselves.

Introduction

In the age of globalization, we have witnessed a convergence of illicit networks with terrorist groups increasingly relying on crime to support themselves while criminal groups are using terrorist tactics to dominate their operating areas. Traditionally, organized crime was considered a domestic public security problem and was addressed by state and local law enforcement authorities. Meanwhile, terrorist and insurgent groups were regarded as armed groups with political objectives, including regime change, that directly threatened the sovereignty of the nation-state. These illicit actors actively seek out governance gaps, socioeconomic vulnerabilities, and character weaknesses as openings to conduct their nefarious activities and expand their power and influence throughout the world. With globalization, terrorists and criminals groups have

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internationalized their support and operations, brokered formidable alliances, and present complex transnational threats that put security and prosperity at risk around the world.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, many terrorist groups lost state sponsorship, namely from the Soviet Union, and were forced to turn to crime to maintain themselves and their agendas. Organizations that represent this dangerous terror-crime nexus include the Taliban and Haqqani Network in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Shining Path in Peru, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and Lebanese Hezbollah. Hezbollah is considered perhaps the best organized and most business savvy terrorist organization that relies on global facilitators engaged in drug, arms, counterfeit trafficking and money laundering for funding and support. To address this convergence of terror-crime networks, governments need to engage in more cross-border collaboration among military, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies to better understand and combat illicit networks like Hezbollah.

The Rise of Lebanese Hezbollah

Before al-Qaeda, there was Hezbollah (“Party of God”), founded in 1982 in response to the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon in the First Lebanon War. Hezbollah is a Shiite Muslim political group in Lebanon that views itself principally as a resistance group opposed to the state of Israel and Western involvement in the Middle East. With significant support from Iran and Syria, the group maintains an extensive security apparatus, political organization, and social services network in Lebanon, where the group is often described as a “state within the state.” The U.S. and European Union have designated Hezbollah’s militant wing as a terrorist organization and consider Hezbollah a global terrorist threat and a menace to regional stability.

Hezbollah has close ties with Iran and is considered one of its surrogates. In its infancy in the 1980s, Hezbollah obtained critical financial support and training from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. The suicide attacks on the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983 that left 258 Americans dead and withdrawal of U.S. Marines from the multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon furthered Hezbollah’s image as leaders of the Shiite resistance. In its 1985 founding manifesto, entitled “Nass al-Risala al-Maftuha allati wajahaha Hizballah ila-l-Mustad’afin fi Lubnan wa-l-alam,” Hezbollah pledged its loyalty to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini, urged the establishment of an Islamic regime, and called for the expulsion of the United States, France, and Israel from Lebanese territory, as well as for the destruction of the state of Israel. In an abridged English translation provided by the Jerusalem Quarterly, it stated:

“Our primary assumption in our fight against Israel states that the Zionist entity is aggressive from its inception, and built on lands wrested from their owners, at the expense of the rights of the Muslim people. Therefore our struggle will end only when this entity is obliterated. We recognize no treaty with it, no cease-fire, and no peace agreements, whether separate or consolidated.”2

In October 1997, the U.S. State Department designated Hezbollah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and believes the group operates terrorist cells in Europe, Africa, Asia,
and Latin America. The Obama Administration described Hezbollah in 2010 as “the most technically capable terrorist group in the world.” With Iranian sponsorship, “Hezbollah’s terrorist activity has reached a tempo unseen since the 1990s,” according to a 2013 State Department fact sheet. Western diplomats and political analysts in Beirut have estimated that Hezbollah received up to $200 million a year from Iran. With Iran under increasing hardship from the strict economic sanctions imposed by the West for its nuclear ambitions, it is believed that Iranian financing and support of Hezbollah has decreased and has forced Hezbollah to rely more on fundraising from sympathizers among the Lebanese diaspora.

Several major terrorist operations across the globe have been attributed to Hezbollah or its affiliates, though the group disputes involvement in many.

HEZBOLLAH TERRORIST OPERATIONS

- 1983 Suicide truck bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut
- 1983 Bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut
- 1984 Attack on the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut
- 1985 Hijacking of TWA Flight 847 from Athens to Rome
- 1986 Khobar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia
- 1992 Israeli Embassy bombing in Buenos Aires
- 1994 AMIA Jewish Community Center bombed in Argentina
- 2005 Assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri
- 2006 Northern Israel border post raided, two Israeli soldiers taken captive
- 2012 Suicide bombing of Israeli tourist bus in Bulgaria

Hezbollah’s recent terrorist activities have not been limited to the Middle East. Hezbollah was blamed for the deadly July 18, 2012 suicide bombing attack on a bus transporting Israeli tourists at the Burgas airport in Bulgaria. The attack killed five Israelis and the Bulgarian driver, and injured 32, and served as the catalyst for the European Union’s intensely debated decision in July 2013 to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist group. Since 2012, alleged Hezbollah operatives have been detained in Nigeria, Thailand, and Cyprus, where a court convicted a Swedish-Lebanese man for plotting multiple attacks on Israeli targets. These incidents and foiled plots illustrate the global reach of Hezbollah. Given Hezbollah’s current, active political and military support of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, U.S. officials suspect that Hezbollah is using the proceeds from illicit activities to support its operations against the Syrian rebels.

Support From The Tri-Border Area Of South America

There is a significant Lebanese diaspora community, comprised of Christians and Muslims, that eclipses the actual population in Lebanon. Most emigrated from Lebanon to North America, Latin America, Europe, and the Gulf to escape from the Lebanese Civil War between 1975 and 1990. The largest Lebanese expatriate communities in Latin America are in Brazil,
Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Some of the most famous Latin Americans of Lebanese descent include the wealthiest man in the world, Carlos Slim of Mexico, and pop-music artist, Shakira from Colombia. Within the diaspora community, there are both Sunnis and Shiites, including some Hezbollah sympathizers among the Muslim Shiite Lebanese expatriates in Latin America.

The 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy and 1994 bombing of the Jewish Cultural Center in Buenos Aires, Argentina attributed to Hezbollah and Iran, focused attention on Hezbollah’s networks in Latin America. According to Argentine special prosecutor Alberto Nisman, Hezbollah began its infiltration of Latin America in the mid-1980s, with its first major stronghold in the Tri-Border Area (TBA), a relatively ungoverned region along the frontiers of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. From this base in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, Hezbollah set up illicit enterprises to fund its operations in the Middle East and elsewhere; the organization’s endeavors included money laundering, counterfeiting, piracy, and drug trafficking. A 2004 study for the Naval War College determined that Hezbollah’s operations in the TBA generated about $10 million annually, while a 2009 Rand Corporation report said Hezbollah netted around $20 million a year. For Paraguay, the dark side of globalization, manifested through drugs, arms, and counterfeit goods smuggling, as well as the money laundering that accompanies these illicit activities, is a threat to the country’s economic prosperity and security. Counterfeit goods sold in the black market, such as fake pharmaceuticals, threaten the safety and health of consumers, defraud those who researched...
and developed the patents for those products, and deny the government vital tax revenues.

Paraguayan authorities acknowledge the threat of Hezbollah and its facilitators operating in the Tri-Border Area. They have established specialized units monitoring suspected supporters and detecting money laundering and terrorist financing schemes. Director of Paraguay’s Secretariat for Terrorism Prevention Carlos Benitez explained his team is working with their Argentine and Brazilian counterparts on several investigations. In 2011, Paraguay extradited suspected Hezbollah financier, Moussa Ali Hamdan, a dual U.S.-Lebanese citizen, who had been detained in Ciudad del Este, to the United States where he was charged in a conspiracy to provide material support to Hezbollah, in the form of proceeds from the sale of counterfeit currency, stolen (genuine) cash, and fraudulent passports.

According to the indictment, Hamdan and several other defendants were charged with transporting stolen goods and trafficking in counterfeit goods. These stolen goods included cellular telephones, laptop computers, Sony Play Station 2 systems, and automobiles, which the conspirators transported to such overseas destinations as Lebanon and Benin (Africa). Hamdan also allegedly bought counterfeit goods—namely, counterfeit Nike® shoes and Mitchell & Ness® sports jerseys from a cooperating witness. Hamdan is a member of the Lebanese diaspora in the United States who sympathize with and support Hezbollah.

Paraguayan security officials are engaged in several ongoing investigations of transnational criminal organizations and Hezbollah facilitators; however, they admit that they lack sufficient intelligence and law enforcement capabilities to effectively counter these threats despite receiving technical assistance from partner nations like the U.S. According to the U.S. State Department, Paraguay continues to be hampered by ineffective immigration, customs, and law enforcement controls along its porous borders, particularly the TBA with Argentina and Brazil. Limited resources, sporadic interagency cooperation, and corruption within customs, the police, the public ministry, and the judicial sector hinder Paraguay’s law enforcement initiatives throughout the country. Meanwhile, Paraguay has been confronted by an internal insurgent group, the EPP (Paraguayan People’s Army), which has been conducting terrorist attacks on government security forces; this has resulted in public demands for governmental response and kept terrorism in the policy forefront throughout the year. U.S. officials have long known about Hezbollah support networks operating in the TBA where the group runs drugs and large scale counterfeiting rings, but are now concerned about support networks beyond the Tri-Border Area to other parts of Latin America.

**Funding Terror Through Drug Trafficking**

Drug trafficking continues to be the most lucrative criminal activity in the world. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and European crime-fighting agency EUROPOL estimate the global drug trade at around $435 billion a year, with the annual cocaine trade worth $84 billion. From the mountains of Afghanistan to the jungles of Latin America and Southeast Asia, nation-states have been engaged in the so-called “War on Drugs” for decades. In these zones of instability, we are witnessing terrorist groups increasingly engaged in criminal activities, including drug trafficking. Indigenous terror
groups, like the FARC in Colombia and Shining Path in Peru, are directly engaged in the cocaine business in Latin America, but these businesses are going global, and Hezbollah and its supporters are increasingly getting into the act.

Operation Titan’s revelations illustrate how Hezbollah receives direct support from sympathetic members of the Lebanese diaspora community in Latin America to finance its activities.

Operation Titan was a joint endeavor by U.S. and Colombian investigators that in October 2008 dismantled an international cocaine smuggling and money laundering ring that allegedly directed part of its profits to finance Hezbollah. The two-year investigation resulted in more than 130 arrests and the seizure of $23 million by Colombian and U.S. agents. Among those arrested was Lebanese kingpin, Chekry Harb in Bogota, Colombia. He used the alias “Taliban” and acted as the hub of an alarming alliance between South American cocaine traffickers and Middle Eastern militants, according to Colombian investigators. Harb was accused of being a “world-class money launderer” of hundreds of millions of dollars each year, from Panama to Hong Kong, while paying some 12 percent of profits to Hezbollah, according to Gladys Sanchez, lead investigator for the special prosecutor’s office in Bogota. She cited “this (case) as an example of how narco-trafficking is a theme of interest to all criminal organizations, the FARC, the paramilitaries, and terrorists.” Harb was charged with drug-related crimes in a sealed indictment filed in Miami in July 2008, but terrorism-related charges were not filed. The suspects allegedly worked with a Colombian cartel and a paramilitary group to smuggle cocaine to the United States, Europe, and the Middle East.

Colombian authorities explained that the case originally began as a money laundering investigation, but as agents “followed the money trail,” they discovered the links between Harb and Hezbollah operatives. Investigators employed 370 wiretaps and monitored 700,000 conversations. Harb logged extensive travel to Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria, and was in phone contact with Hezbollah figures, according to Colombian officials. The inquiry grew into Operation Titan over the course of two years of U.S-Colombian collaboration. Operation Titan’s revelations illustrate how Hezbollah receives direct support from sympathetic members of the Lebanese diaspora community in Latin America to finance its activities. In the case of Chekry Harb, it was through the laundering of proceeds of cocaine trafficking from Colombia; drugs destined for the United States and beyond.

For decades, Colombia has focused on vanquishing the FARC, a Marxist-Leninist rebel group, intent on regime change since the 1960s. In the 1990s, the FARC, which had provided security services for the powerful Cali, Medellin, and Norte del Valle drug cartels, succeeded the drug cartels once they were defeated and dismantled by Colombian and U.S. counternarcotics operations. The FARC not only filled the power vacuum in Colombia’s illicit economy but also filled its own coffers with the proceeds from the lucrative cocaine trade. Experts estimate the FARC takes in between $500 million and $600 million annually from the illegal drug trade. The group also generates income from kidnappings, extortion schemes,
and an unofficial “tax” that it levies in the countryside for “protection” and social services.\textsuperscript{23} The FARC’s wealth has allowed it to equip, train, arm, and support its guerrillas and wage a prolonged and aggressive insurgency in Colombia.

*Operation Titan* uncovered the links between Hezbollah’s facilitators and the FARC as well as other Colombian armed groups. While these groups may not espouse the same political aspirations or ideology, they do engage in lucrative illicit activities like narco-trafficking and money laundering that support their respective networks. The case of the FARC, at times described as a narco-insurgency, is one of the best examples of the terror-crime nexus in Latin America. The Colombian government under President Santos and the FARC are currently engaged in a peace process that may bring an end to this 50-year old insurgency but will not stop the cocaine trade.

Just as the FARC replaced the Colombian drug cartels in the 1990s, Colombian officials and security analysts anticipate that the BACRIM (Bandas Criminales) or criminal bands already engaged in organized crime activities, such as drug trafficking, extortion, kidnap for ransom, and illegal smuggling in Colombia, will succeed the FARC. The BACRIM are the heirs to the AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) that were formed in the late 1990s to fight the FARC, citing the state’s inability to do so effectively. Despite the demobilization of some 31,670 members of the AUC in August 2006, several armed groups continued the AUC’s lucrative illicit activities. According to the Colombian National Police, 3,870 people make up the six key emerging criminal groups; Los Urabeños, in the departments of Antioquia, Chocó, Bolívar, Magdalena and Norte de Santander; Los Rastrojos, in Nariño, Cauca and Putumayo; and El Bloque Meta, Los Libertadores de Vichada, Renacer and Los Machos, in Meta, Vichada and Guainía.

According to the National Police, the BACRIM are deeply rooted in narco-trafficking, from growing coca – the main ingredient used to produce cocaine – to turning it into cocaine before they export it or sell it to international narco-trafficking groups. According to a Colombian newspaper *El Tiempo*’s investigation, it is believed that the BACRIM now control 50 percent of the cocaine produced in Colombia.\textsuperscript{24}

The BACRIM have crossed Colombia’s borders, expanding their markets in search of better profit margins and eluding Colombian authorities. At the same time they are supplying the Mexican drug cartels’ expanding operations into Central America. Moreover, security officials believe the BACRIM are the new suppliers of cocaine to traffickers associated with Hezbollah. The BACRIM are primarily motivated by profit, in contrast to the FARC with its political agenda, and will replace the FARC to capitalize on the illicit economy to enrich themselves.\textsuperscript{25} Given their international illicit activities, the BACRIM are considered a transnational criminal organization (TCO) by the U.S. government.

With the Colombian government and FARC rebels negotiating a peace settlement, Colombia is dedicating more security and judicial resources to address the growing threat from the BACRIM. Deputy Director of the Colombian National Police’s anti-narcotics force, Colonel Esteban Arias Melo, said his 7,600 officers “focus on both drug trafficking as well as fighting the restructured Bacrim (organized crime groups), as it’s now impossible to separate these two factors.”\textsuperscript{26} In 2013,
pressure from the combined forces of the Army and National Police led to the apprehension of 1,738 BACRIM members, including 168 members of demobilized paramilitaries. Additionally, 300.5 tons of narcotics were seized.\textsuperscript{27}

\textbf{Joumaa and his associates allegedly shipped an estimated 85,000 kilograms of cocaine into the United States and laundered more than $850 million in drug money coming out of Mexico from the Los Zetas cartel through various front companies and the Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB).}

To complement the anti-BACRIM operations of the security forces, the Colombian government has expanded its specialized, vetted unit of top prosecutors in the Attorney General’s Office to bring those associated with the BACRIM to justice. The unit examines the different criminal activities of the BACRIM to include kidnapping, corruption, arms trafficking, counterfeit smuggling, money laundering, and drug trafficking. Some of their BACRIM investigations are exploring links among the BACRIM, the Mexican cartels, and Hezbollah facilitators particularly in the cocaine trade.\textsuperscript{28}

\textbf{Ayman Joumaa: A Critical Hezbollah Facilitator}

Many terrorist groups and criminal organizations rely on key facilitators for support, financing, and logistics. Ayman Joumaa, a dual Colombian-Lebanese citizen, engaged in global narcotics trafficking and money laundering operations, is one such facilitator for Hezbollah. In certain countries in Latin America like Colombia, there is a significant Lebanese diaspora community comprised of Muslims and Christians who maintain close ties with Lebanon. On November 23, 2011, a U.S. federal grand jury indicted Lebanese drug kingpin Ayman Joumaa, a.k.a “Junior,” \textit{in absentia}, for distributing tens of thousands of kilograms of cocaine from Colombia through Central America to Los Zetas in Mexico and for laundering millions of dollars of drug money from Mexico, Europe and West Africa to Colombia and Venezuela.\textsuperscript{29}

According to the U.S. Justice Department and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Joumaa and his associates allegedly shipped an estimated 85,000 kilograms of cocaine into the United States and laundered more than $850 million in drug money coming out of Mexico from the Los Zetas cartel through various front companies and the Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB). In February 2011, LCB was designated by the U.S. Treasury as a “Primary Money Laundering Concern.” U.S. officials said some officers of LCB and subsidiaries had connections with Hezbollah. During the course of the conspiracy, Joumaa typically picked up between $2 – 4 million at a time in Mexico City.\textsuperscript{30} He was allegedly charging fees between 8 – 14 percent for laundering the funds and remitted the funds to Hezbollah.

According to the 2011 indictment, Joumaa’s coordination of money laundering activities occurred in Benin, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lebanon, Panama, the United States, and elsewhere. This illustrates the global nature of Joumaa’s activities. U.S. Attorney Neil MacBride said, “money fuels the drug trade, and Mr. Joumaa is alleged to be at the center of it all, working with those producing the vast majority of the world’s cocaine to get their drugs safely into the hands of Mexican cartels, and then moving hundreds
of millions in proceeds all around the world so the money can’t be traced back to him in Colombia.”

Although indicted and designated as a narcotics kingpin, Ayman Joumaa remains at large at the time of this writing. This case shows the extensive financial support network Hezbollah enjoys in Latin America and beyond. This partnership between Joumaa, a prominent Hezbollah facilitator, and Los Zetas, the most violent Mexican cartel in the drug trade, is a disturbing development of the terror-crime nexus that challenges security forces around the world. While it is unclear how well corroborated this alliance is between Hezbollah facilitators and Los Zetas, these illicit actors share a deep profit motive in the narcotics trafficking trade and present a threat to security around the globe.

Hezbollah finances its terrorism using a sophisticated drug-trafficking operation where it combines its drug profits with proceeds from used-car sales in Africa.
Lebanese Canadian Bank – Hezbollah’s Bank Of Choice
Facilitators of terrorism and crime can be individuals, groups, and even institutions. This was the case of the LCB. As of 2009, LCB was Lebanon’s eighth-largest bank, headquartered in Beirut, with approximately 35 branches throughout Lebanon, and total assets worth more than $5 billion. This bank and a series of Lebanese exchange houses served as conduits for money laundering and the funding of Hezbollah through a sophisticated used car sales scheme through the Americas, Africa, and the Middle East.

The February 10, 2011, Treasury Department designation of LCB as a financial institution “of primary money laundering concern” under Section 311 of the PATRIOT Act highlighted the bank’s role in facilitating the money laundering activities of an international narcotics trafficking and money laundering network. The network also engaged in trade-based money laundering, involving consumer goods throughout the world, including through used car dealerships in the United States. The Treasury Department had reason to believe that LCB managers were complicit in the network’s money laundering activities. This action exposed Hezbollah’s links to LCB and the international narcotics trafficking and money laundering network.

According to U.S. authorities, at least $329 million was transferred by wire from LCB and other financial institutions to the U.S. to purchase used cars that were then shipped to West Africa from January 2007 to early 2011. Cash
from the sale of the cars, along with the proceeds of narcotics trafficking, were funneled to Lebanon through Hezbollah-controlled money-laundering channels. LCB played a key role in these money-laundering schemes and conducted business with a number of Hezbollah-related entities. Reflecting on this case, DEA Administrator Michele Leonhart stated, “DEA and its partners have exposed the Lebanese Canadian Bank as a major money laundering source for Hezbollah. The connection between drug traffickers and terror networks is evident. By attacking the financial networks of those who wish to harm innocent Americans, DEA is strengthening national security making our citizens safer.” The complex investigation of LCB and the illicit networks transacting with LCB was a great example of U.S. interagency cooperation between the Treasury and Justice Departments as well as specialized law enforcement agencies like the DEA.

To settle this case, LBC agreed to pay a $102 million settlement on June 23, 2013, a fraction of the amount of money allegedly laundered by the institution on behalf of illicit actors. U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York Preet Bharara said:

The settlement shows that banks laundering money for terrorists and narco-traffickers will face consequences for their actions, wherever they may be located. This type of money laundering network fuels the operations of both terrorists and drug traffickers, and we will continue to use every resource at our disposal to sever the connection between terrorists, narco-traffickers, and those who fund their lethal agenda.

The DEA Administrator also commented:

Regardless of how or where, DEA will relentlessly pursue global drug criminals and their huge profits, in particular those associated with terror networks such as Hezbollah. This settlement is significant and addresses the role the Lebanese Canadian Bank played in facilitating illicit money movement from the United States to West Africa to Hezbollah-controlled money laundering channels. Drug trafficking profits and terror financing often grow and flow together. One of DEA’s highest priorities will always be to promote U.S. and global security by disrupting these narco-terror schemes and protecting the systems they abuse.

The LCB case provided important insight into how Hezbollah’s facilitators are leveraging global trade and international financial institutions to realize their criminal activities around the world and support the terrorist organization. It also served as a valuable example of how financial intelligence and “following the money trail” are actively targeting and pursuing the facilitators of terrorism and crime.

Due to the lucrative nature of the narcotics trade and money laundering, other financial institutions such as money-exchange houses have taken the place of LCB to serve as conduits for terror-crime networks like Hezbollah. Following the Treasury Department’s action against LCB, Ayman Joumaa’s narcotics network turned to Rmeiti Exchange and Halawi Exchange to handle its money-laundering needs according to the Treasury Department’s top counter-terrorism official David Cohen. Kassem Rmeiti & Co. for Exchange, moved nearly $30 million in drug proceeds through the U.S. since 2008, according to Treasury and DEA officials. The
company’s owner, Haitham Rmeiti, has also emerged as “a key facilitator for wiring money and transferring Hezbollah funds,” the Treasury and DEA said. Meanwhile, a second exchange, Halawi Exchange Co., was facilitating the shipment of more than $220 million of used cars, which originated in the U.S., into the West African country of Benin in 2012 as part of the same drug-trafficking operation, U.S. officials alleged.

On April 23, 2013, the Treasury Department named both exchange houses as “primary money laundering concerns” under the Patriot Act, an action that bans these firms from the U.S. financial system, and freezes their dollar-based assets. Lebanon’s central bank governor, Riad Salameh, said in an interview in April 2013 that Beirut’s financial regulators had independently been scrutinizing the businesses of both exchange houses. U.S. officials are particularly worried about the operations of money exchange houses in Lebanon and the broader Middle East because of their focus on moving bulk cash and the fact they are less regulated and monitored than banks. Thus, efforts to identity, pursue, and dismantle the networks of terror-crime facilitators continue around the globe.

The Implications Of the Convergence Of Terrorism And Crime

In the age of globalization, we are witnessing an emerging threat – the convergence of terror-crime networks that capitalize on global resources, supply chains, markets, capital, and facilitators to pursue their political and profit agendas, respectively. Threats from illicit networks, including terrorists, criminals, and proliferators are nothing new, but the drivers of globalization have broadened the scope, accelerated the pace, and magnified the impact of their activities that endanger security and prosperity around the world. While indigenous terrorist groups like the FARC in Colombia and Shining Path in Peru exploit the lucrative drug trade and focus on national regime change objectives, Hezbollah is a foreign terrorist organization that does not limit its operations and logistical support to Lebanon and the Middle East. It targets U.S. interests and those of its allies, especially Israel, and draws the support of global facilitators. The organization has been responsible for several terrorist attacks and plots beyond the Middle East, including the 2012 Burgas, Bulgaria bombing of a bus filled with Israeli tourists. More recently, Hezbollah is playing an active role in the Syrian civil war supporting and fighting alongside Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

In its 2012 Country Reports on Terrorism the State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism indicated that there were no known operational cells of either al-Qaeda or Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere; however, it acknowledged that sympathizers in South America and the Caribbean provide financial and ideological support to those terrorist groups. The State Department also reported that the TBA area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay continued to be an important regional nexus of arms, narcotics, and human smuggling, counterfeiting, pirated goods, and money laundering that are all potential funding sources for terrorist organizations.

The cases of Operation Titan, Ayman Joumaa, and the Lebanese Canadian Bank demonstrate how Hezbollah relies on overseas support from facilitators among the Shiite Lebanese diaspora community in Latin America. These cases illustrate the complexity and sophistication of these illicit networks and their ties to terrorism. These facilitators are
allegedly interacting with illicit actors including the Mexican drug cartels and Colombian armed groups like the FARC and BACRIM. The drug trafficking, money laundering, and counterfeit trade in Latin America that fund Hezbollah are impacting U.S. consumers, financial institutions, and markets. The global operations and reach of these networks present formidable challenges to counterterrorism and counter-crime officials. These illicit networks are often better armed, equipped, and funded than government forces. Hezbollah may not be conducting or plotting terrorist operations in the U.S. and Latin America, but security forces and intelligence services must remain vigilant and be prepared for potential threats. The 2011 White House National Strategy for Counterterrorism and National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime recognizes these emerging threats and the terror-crime convergence phenomenon. They seek to channel the appropriate U.S. government resources to address them. To confront the convergence of illicit networks, we need to promote more effective interagency and international cooperation, such as joint task forces and vetted units, to better understand, analyze, and devise specific measures to impact these illicit networks. PRISM

Notes

1 The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
6 Compiled from State Department and Council on Foreign Relations websites. Several events are disputed regarding attribution of responsibility.

Author’s interviews with Paraguayan National Police and Central Bank Financial Intelligence Unit officials in Asuncion, Paraguay, November 8, 2013


Author’s interviews with Colombian Attorney General’s Terrorist Finance Unit in Bogota, August 2013.


Author’s interview with Colombian Attorney General’s BACRIM Unit, Bogota, Colombia, September 25, 2013


Ibid.


Ibid.


U.S.Treasury Department Press Release, Treasury Identifies Kassem Rmeiti & Co. for Exchange and Halawi Exchange Co. as Financial Institutions of “Primary Money Laundering Concern,” April 23,


I
welcomed with great anticipation my copy of Matthew Levitt’s *Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God*. Levitt is also the author of a 2006 book, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*. My anticipation for *Hezbollah* was driven in part by Levitt’s noteworthy background in the subject of terrorist groups, with his work as a researcher and scholar at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and as a practitioner at the U.S. Department of State, Department of the Treasury and the FBI. Its timing was stimulating, for the book arrived in the midst of controversy and concern regarding Hezbollah’s deepening role in the Syrian civil war. My anticipation also was fueled by the chance to read Levitt’s work as a detailed refresher to my own late 2008 monograph published by the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy titled, *Sunni and Shi’a Terrorism: Differences that Matter*. As its title implied, that monograph took a comparative, 25 year look at the terrorist activities of groups inspired by radical Sunni Islam and those inspired by radical Shi’á Islam in non-combat zones around the world. Lebanese Hezbollah was a feature Shi’a player in this comparative analysis. Levitt’s work promised a much deeper dive into the world of radical Shi’á terrorist groups.

With very minor exceptions, Levitt’s work lives up to expectations. It is lucidly written with a compelling narrative, strong on detail regarding specific terrorist events and activities attributable to Hezbollah and its affiliate groups, and features a trove of unique and interesting sources – including many non-American sources. Levitt effectively sketches the wide panoply of international activities undertaken by Hezbollah’s terrorist network over the past 30. He also leaves the reader no doubt that Hezbollah’s global terrorist activities link directly to Iran, with especially compelling evidence of the consequences of this in the Levant – in Lebanon, in Syria, and against Israel in particular. While his portrait of Hezbollah’s terrorism threats in the majority of the world, vice its fundraising and money laundering ones there, do not appear yet to meet the standards for declaring it the kind of international threat against non-Israeli targets he seems to suggest, Levitt’s book achieves its self-described aspiration to “kick start” a debate on the full range of Hezbollah’s worldwide terrorist activities.

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From his opening paragraphs, Levitt writes *Hezbollah* with an aim to more fully expose its worldwide clandestine activities. Before getting to a brief recitation of Hezbollah’s founding in Lebanon and its role in providing social services for previously disenfranchised and oppressed Lebanese Shi’a there, he chronicles the foiled 2009 terrorism adventures of two Lebanese nationals in Azerbaijan against Israeli and Western targets noting how these two were sponsored by Iran. He then introduces readers to the greatest coordinator of regional and global Shi’a terrorist activities in history, the late Imad Mugniyah, who guided the Islamic Jihad Organization (IFO) for almost 30 years. Mugniyah died from a targeted explosion in Damascus, Syria in early 2008. While other authors including Augustus Richard Norton of Boston University, Ahmad Nizar Hamzah of American University in Kuwait and Eitan Azani of Israel’s Herzliya Center have written on the complex relationships between Hezbollah’s domestic socio-political role in Lebanon and its martial ones in the Levant and beyond, Levitt’s purpose is more limited and clear. He asks the question, “Is Lebanese Hezbollah a terrorist organization?” He answers strongly in the affirmative.

Levitt provides a comprehensive narrative of successful and failed Hezbollah and IJO terrorist plots spanning three decades. His first three chapters focus on Hezbollah’s violence-led ascendance in Lebanon in the 1980s emphasizing how its activities there targeted westerners in order to advance Lebanese Shi’a and Iranian aims in the Levant and across the Gulf. He then provides an extended and very useful recounting of Hezbollah’s role in carefully choreographed terror activities in Europe – and especially in France. Levitt’s documentation of failed attacks in France, Italy and Germany makes valuable contributions to a record that is otherwise hard to glean from open source terrorism data, for these often don’t capture failed plots. Levitt also does a good job of profiling the logistical and financial activities of Lebanese Hezbollah and IJO operations across Europe in the 1980s-90s demonstrating an organizational reach that is not well understood. The value of Levitt’s work in this area is unquestionable making it a highly useful reference.

Yet one might take issue with a bit of Levitt’s narrative here – a thread which continues later in the book. While clearly peppering his descriptions of Hezbollah and IJO European terrorism operatives as from these groups, Levitt isn’t quite as diligent in clearly labeling the many terrorists and assassins during this dark period of terrorism in Europe, who were directly linked to the Iranian government, its embassies and consulates, and the Iranian intelligence agents who choreographed them. As one example, Levitt chose to use a questionable March 1989 Times of London report commenting on two 1987 assassination attempts on Iranian monarchist exiles in London to claim that even though the assassination suspects were London-based Iranian expatriates they were, “…believed to be tied to Hezbollah extremists in south Beirut.” To my knowledge, this claim was speculative then and remains unproven to this day.

My own research for *Sunni and Shi’a Terrorism* clearly established that the assassination campaign against Shah of Iran era expats in Western Europe and North America that ran from 1980-92 was an Iranian operation inspired and staged through Iranian embassies and consulates and rarely involved Lebanese Hezbollah agents in other than limited ways. So too was most of the 1984-88 terror
campaign in France which in large measure aimed to end French support for Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in its ongoing war against Iran – an effort which complemented Hezbollah bombings of French assets and kidnappings of French nationals in Lebanon — and succeeded brilliantly.

Levitt’s narrative of Hezbollah terror activities in Argentina (February and May 1994), Khobar Towers (June 1996), and Iraq (2003-10) is compelling and most helpful in drawing together the clearly established interconnection of Hezbollah and IJO terrorist activities with Iranian agents worldwide. The Iraq section develops themes regarding Hezbollah training and assistance to Iranian Quds-Force sponsored Iraqi Shi’a militia that provide insight into how much of this and more now must be ongoing between Shi’a elements in Syria’s civil war.

Levitt’s recounting of Shi’a terrorist support and plotting activities in Southeast Asia (1990s), North America (1990s-2000s) and East Africa (1990s-2000s) makes interesting reading and illuminates the nature of far-flung financing and logistical support pursued by Hezbollah through Lebanese expatriates and sympathizers. His combination of these activities in a single volume is a most useful contribution. In these pages Levitt draws upon unique official sources from places like the Philippines, New Zealand, Singapore and Canada providing another most helpful record. Yet while this record is important, it strikes me as far short of making the case that Hezbollah is a dramatic much less looming terrorism threat in any of these areas – a conclusion that Levitt seems keen to have us draw. In North America for example, the only clear-cut case of a Shi’a terrorist attack was that planned against the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States and uncovered in the summer of 2011. Levitt himself acknowledges that this produced a legal indictment against the leader of the Iranian paramilitary Quds Force, General Qassem Soliemani, and not against any Hezbollah or IJO operative. In this vein, scrutiny of the detail Levitt offers actually suggests that agents in these locations are mainly in the business of fundraising, money laundering and logistical support for Hezbollah brethren in the Levant. One can only wonder how much greater a finance and logistical presence was maintained by groups like the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Basque Separatists in similar locations without there being a credible threat of operational terrorism in these locations.

I found much to like in Levitt’s final chapter where he helpfully links together the radical Shi’a terrorist strikes of 2010-12 in Burgas, Bulgaria against Israeli tourists and New Delhi, India against the Israeli Embassy with the failed attack planned for Bangkok, Thailand against unspecified Israeli targets. He does well in demonstrating that these far-from-random acts came from a high level decision in Tehran to exact revenge for a supposed Israeli-managed assassination campaign against Iranian nuclear scientists. This assessment tracks well a diverse array of other unclassified intelligence assessments I have seen. Thus Levitt’s conclusions about Iranian sponsorship are spot-on even if poorly understood in the Western World.

Less compelling however is Levitt’s conclusion that a reorganized and rejuvenated IJO served as a critical component in these attacks – attacks that had far more to do with Iranian national interests in vengeance than with Hezbollah interests. Levitt’s documentation for this conclusion cites conversations with
unnamed Israeli intelligence officials in late 2012. Yet other sources – including regional sources like those I read regularly from India and Thailand and uncited in *Hezbollah* -- more directly implicate actors with unambiguous ties to Iran and Iranian agencies like the paramilitary agency (IRGC-Quds Force) or Iranian intelligence (MOIS). While one can understand the perspective that Israeli officials would have regarding the links between IJO and Iranian agents — fearing the worst — it would seem prudent to credit Hezbollah and IJO only with those activities which can be clearly placed at their doorstep.

The questions that arise in those instances of Israeli sole-sourcing notwithstanding, Levitt’s work is commendable for its variety and detail in references. He utilizes a most helpful array of declassified or partially declassified assessments from the CIA, FBI and Department of the Treasury of Shi’a terrorism as practiced by Hezbollah and Iranian agencies. He updates the record of radical Shi’a terrorist groups in a compelling and readable historical narrative, astutely noting the senior partner to junior partner relations between Iran’s security and intelligence services and the leadership of Hezbollah’s military wing. In doing so Levitt generates a narrative of that Iranian state senior partner as one with global reach and a global aim to strike-out using terrorism against Israeli interests and against those that would threaten the Mullah-led regime. And while the junior, non-state Hezbollah partner most surely remains committed to operational terrorism in the Levant in reprisal for Israeli actions globally, apart from a widely networked fundraising and propaganda agent, its direct role in terrorism operations beyond the Levant remains historically anomalous. Is that Hezbollah role now something much more?

Inspired by this commendable book, let the debate begin! PRISM
U.S. Army soldiers help the crew of a U.S. Navy MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopter from the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson unload food and supplies at the airport in Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
Establishing a Conceptual Framework for Interagency Coordination at U.S. Southern Command

BY JOANNA GUTIERREZ WINTERS

Given the U.S. government’s current resource constraints U.S. government agencies are examining ways to reduce costs and leverage current resources. Agencies focusing on expanding interagency initiatives must seek ways to become more cost efficient. Interagency coordination is a challenging task complicated by diverse agencies’ different and sometimes competing cultures, priorities, strategies, goals, plans and incentives. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has followed the progress of interagency coordination between the Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. State Department and other agencies. In several studies, GAO identifies four key areas that could improve interagency coordination: (1) developing and implementing overarching strategies; (2) creating collaborative organizations; (3) developing a well-trained workforce; and (4) sharing/integrating national security information.

U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), one of DOD’s six regional Combatant Commands, is taking an active role in interagency coordination. The threats in SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility for the most part do not require a military response, SOUTHCOM has leveraged the interagency community to accomplish its mission, especially in the areas of humanitarian assistance and counter-narcotics. Considering defense budget cuts, synergizing interagency capabilities at the military operational level, at the Combatant Commands for example, helps reduce duplication of effort among agencies and maximizes use of limited U.S. government resources. SOUTHCOM is thus well-positioned to further the interagency process and create a more solid foundation for establishing an interagency coordination framework.

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This article examines SOUTHCOM’s mission, examines how the organization addresses interagency coordination in the four GAO described areas, and provides recommendations for further enhancing interagency coordination. Humanitarian assistance and counter-narcotics serve to highlight specific strengths and weaknesses in SOUTHCOM’s overall interagency process and progress. The article is composed of four sections with the body following GAO’s key areas for consideration in improving an organization’s overall interagency coordination.

SOUTHCOM’s mission is, “to conduct joint and combined full-spectrum military operations within the Area of Responsibility, in order to support U.S. national security objectives and interagency efforts that promote regional security.” Two of SOUTHCOM’s focus areas are countering transnational organized crime, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief. Because most of the challenges in SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility are related to issues such as gangs, drugs, natural disasters, poverty and inequality, SOUTHCOM is incorporating a whole-of-government approach working with other U.S. government agencies and the private sector in conducting its mission. Furthermore, a decrease in the overall U.S. defense budget, affecting all Combatant Commands, requires that all Commands look for ways to leverage interagency resources. SOUTHCOM, with a smaller budget than other commands, has greater incentives to work with other agencies toward this goal.

Developing Overarching Strategies

Interagency coordination is more easily accomplished when there is a clearly articulated mission/goal, and when leaderships of Combatant Commands and relevant agencies are committed to achieving a specific outcome. Creating an overarching interagency strategy could provide a catalyst for interagency engagement thereby driving different organizations to work together to create a sense of collaboration that permeates the agencies involved. Studies on leadership point out the importance of defining a mission as a catalyst for creating a successful organization. Successfully defining team direction contributes significantly to a team’s effectiveness and success.

According to GAO, “strategic direction is required as the basis for collaboration toward national security goals. Defining organizational goals and responsibilities and mechanisms for coordination can help agencies clarify who will lead or participate in which activities, organize their joint activities and individual efforts, facilitate decision-making, and address how conflicts would be resolved, thereby facilitating interagency collaboration.”

Overarching strategies are critical in providing different agencies with clear direction in accomplishing common national security objectives. This is the first step in organizing a group of people/agencies to move in the same direction. However, a strategy should not be so broad that implementation is ambiguous and/or confusing. Establishing roles and responsibilities as well as coordination mechanisms to facilitate decision-making is critical in building effective teams.

“Although some agencies have developed or updated overarching strategies on national security-related issues, GAO’s work has identified cases where U.S. efforts have been hindered by the lack of information on roles and
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responsibilities of organizations involved or coordination mechanisms.”

SOUTHCOM’s overarching strategic document is the Command Strategy. The Command Strategy encompasses the Commander’s vision for the entire Combatant Command including SOUTHCOM’s sub-elements. It takes into account national level documents such as the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, U.S. Military Strategy, and the Global Employment of the Forces (GEF) laying out the strategy for the organization within the context of its geographic area of responsibility.

The Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) is derived from the Command Strategy. This plan takes the Commander’s vision and converts it into a plan of action for the entire Command. Parallel to execution of the TCP, Component Commands and Security Cooperation Offices develop their own plans – the Component Support Plans and the Country Campaign Plans respectively – which support the TCP and the Command Strategy. Because U.S. military representatives at embassies create the Country Campaign Plan, this must be synchronized with the embassy’s overall Mission Strategic Plan at the country level.

The Command Strategy is not an interagency strategy. It is not created as an interagency document with strategic inputs from other agencies; it is a SOUTHCOM document that directs the command to work with interagency partners in achieving SOUTHCOM objectives. As a result of this direction, creation of the TCP does include interagency participation. In 2009 and 2010, SOUTHCOM conducted its first interagency planning meetings. The Command produced the TCP and presented the plan to over ten U.S. government departments and offices for inputs and comments. According to some SOUTHCOM officials, interagency representatives believed the TCP was already too far in the planning process. They felt it was too late for them to make any substantive inputs. USAID representatives commented that SOUTHCOM leadership, prior to holding the TCP interagency meeting, had already approved most elements of the plan, and they were not expecting their inputs to be reflected in it. However the meetings provided a venue for understanding diverse agency missions and served as a basis for seeking areas to align future activities and resources.

SOUTHCOM is taking initiatives to involve the interagency community in its plans by suggesting roles and responsibilities via its TCP.

These initial interagency meetings were an attempt to create a coordination mechanism that more specifically delineates roles and responsibilities laid out in the TCP in support of the Command Strategy, but because the TCP was nearly complete when the meetings took place, it was considered a SOUTHCOM plan, not an interagency plan. The plan also contained elements for which other U.S. government agencies besides DOD were leads in overseeing specific activities and tasks. SOUTHCOM was attempting to encourage the agencies to take a more active role in activities laid out in the TCP.

While the Command Strategy is not an interagency strategy, SOUTHCOM is taking initiatives to involve the interagency community in its plans by suggesting roles and responsibilities via its TCP. SOUTHCOM planners are advised to be cautious and not appear to be dictating actions to agencies.
Furthermore, since an overarching interagency strategy does not exist instructing the interagency organizations to work together, the TCP could continue to be viewed as a SOUTHCOM plan rather than an interagency one.

**Overarching Strategies: Humanitarian Assistance, DOD and USAID**

The current SOUTHCOM Command Strategy highlights humanitarian assistance/disaster relief as one of SOUTHCOM’s focus areas and recognizes the importance of working with other U.S. government agencies and the international community in this area. USAID is the lead agency overseeing foreign humanitarian assistance efforts for the U.S. government. In an effort to better synchronize USAID and DOD humanitarian assistance, in November 2009, USAID issued, Policy Guidance for DOD’s Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Program. This document lays out specific procedures for how USAID should work with DOD on DOD’s humanitarian assistance projects. The document also contains specific DOD instructions for implementation of these projects. According to DOD guidance, “the humanitarian assistance program should complement, but not duplicate or replace, the work of other U.S. government agencies that provide foreign assistance.”

While this is a useful overarching interagency document, it only focuses on USAID and DOD engagement. During the 2009 Continuing Promise mission, a SOUTHCOM humanitarian assistance initiative, U.S. public health officers from the Department of Health and Human Services filled 49 medical, engineering and environmental health positions. The Policy Guidance issued by USAID provides a structured framework for the delineation of

![U.S. and Canadian service members, along with USAID and World Food Program representatives gather in Haiti to discuss hurricane relief efforts.](Image)
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roles and responsibilities on humanitarian assistance efforts between DOD and USAID, but it does not encompass activities of other U.S. government agencies.

**Overarching Strategies: Counter-Narcotics**

The SOUTHCOM Command Strategy identifies counter illicit trafficking as another focus area in its area of responsibility. Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S), a component of SOUTHCOM, is tasked with leading counter-narcotics efforts for SOUTHCOM. JIATF-S is unique in that its role as a counter-narcotics task force has allowed the organization to be very specific in its focus and mission. Additionally, the counter-narcotics mission has received national attention for several decades. Because of this, JIATF-S has evolved into a more mature interagency organization with a strategy that touches the activities of numerous U.S. government agencies:

*JIATF-South’s directive authority is a mix of top-down congressional and executive branch mandates and negotiated outcomes. After experimenting with various lead agency approaches in the 1980s proved ineffective, Congress and the executive branch decided fighting drugs was a national priority that demanded a national response. Declaring drugs a national security problem brought DOD support to the table and led to the creation of the national task forces, with implied authority to coordinate across departments and agencies. More important, the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan makes JIATF-South the sole agent that can perform detection and monitoring within its 42-million-square-mile operating area. This singular responsibility makes the task force the natural focal point for intelligence fusion and reduces the problem of multiple agencies with competing jurisdictions.*

This unique role, along with a national focus on counter-narcotics, has provided JIATF-S with the national support it needs to conduct its mission. The overarching strategy is set by national directive and as such, is supported by several agencies that make up the organization. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) created the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP) as a result of the National Drug Control Strategy. Signed by DOD, the Coast Guard and U.S. Customs service, the NICCP further enhances interagency coordination on counter-narcotics at the strategic level, thus creating a framework for conducting interagency coordination operationally and tactically. JIATF-S took this overarching interagency strategy and more specifically laid out the roles and responsibilities of the agencies involved at the operational and tactical level: “When JIATF-South adopted an end-to-end understanding of its mission, the entire interagency team could support it. The mission is discrete and well understood and helps the agencies achieve their organizational goals.”

**Developing Overarching Strategies: Summary**

Overarching interagency strategies create a basic framework for initial engagement by agencies involved in achieving a common goal. Going beyond an overarching strategy and focusing on a specific mission facilitates the interagency process in that roles and responsibilities of relevant agencies are more easily identified – as in the cases of humanitarian assistance and counter-narcotics. For
humanitarian assistance, USAID is the lead U.S. government agency tasked with overseeing this initiative outside of the U.S. While overall policy guidance exists in how DOD and USAID should work together on humanitarian assistance issues, other U.S. government agencies are not taken into account. An overarching interagency strategy that encompasses all applicable government agencies would create a stronger incentive for agencies to work together in this area. In the case of counter-narcotics, there are numerous agencies that have roles including DOD, Homeland Security, Justice Department, and the U.S. Intelligence Community. The existence of national level guidance facilitates the coordination necessary to effectively carry out the national counter-narcotics mission. In other words, the evolution of the overarching national guidance on counterdrug policy has successfully served to shape JIATF-S into what it is today.

In both the humanitarian assistance and counter-narcotics cases, a narrow mission facilitates coordination as roles and responsibilities are more easily identified. An overarching strategy written and endorsed by SOUTHCOM’s key interagency partners could lay the framework for a holistic approach to interagency coordination. Furthermore, clearly documenting an overarching interagency strategy could more formally establish the framework for creating collaborative organizations so initiatives that are put in place are less easily altered with changes in leadership within any of the agencies involved.

Vice Admiral Joseph D. Kernan, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command and U.S. 4th Fleet, looks at pallets of drugs seized by the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard.
Creating Collaborative Organizations

One of the main challenges to effective interagency coordination is differences in organizational culture among the numerous agencies. GAO reports, “Organizational differences—including differences in agencies’ structures, planning processes, and funding sources—can hinder interagency collaboration. Agencies lack adequate coordination mechanisms to facilitate collaboration during planning and execution of programs and activities.”

In 2002, The Office of the Secretary of Defense tasked Joint Forces Command to support each of the Combatant Commands in developing a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) for the purpose of creating a more collaborative interagency environment at each Command. At SOUTHCOM, interagency coordinators were hired to work within the J7—Experimentation Directorate. From its inception, success of this group depended heavily on personal interactions with interagency representatives mostly focused on information exchange with external agencies. The coordinators reached out to the interagency community attempting to find areas of potential collaboration between SOUTHCOM and their respective organizations. In 2008, under the direction of SOUTHCOM Commander Admiral James Stavridis, the group evolved into the Partnering Directorate or J9—a separate directorate within SOUTHCOM.

The creation of J9 was met with internal organizational resistance, primarily because it
was manned with personnel taken from other directorates; but J9 proved a successful facilitator of interagency collaboration, including establishing coordination mechanisms critical to the collaborative environment described by GAO. The Partnering Directorate’s mission statement is:


Interagency coordination does not occur solely within J9. The directorate is a catalyst providing other directorates with interagency connections and advice. J9 facilitated the placement of interagency personnel throughout the Command. It serves as the Command’s interagency arm; its main focus is to provide the Command with essential interagency contacts and recommendations for interagency inclusion in Command day-to-day functions. SOUTHCOM currently has over 30 interagency representatives from 15 different agencies serving in part-time or full-time roles supporting the Command.  

Likewise, SOUTHCOM has representatives located at other agencies including the headquarters of USAID and the Department of Homeland Security. The creation of J9 and its focus on providing interagency engagement opportunities while creating mechanisms for coordination is a significant step in moving towards the collaborative organization described by GAO.

Creating Collaborative Organizations: Humanitarian Assistance

In the case of humanitarian assistance, USAID has three full time representatives working at SOUTHCOM. The Senior Development Advisor, detailed to J9, serves as the Command’s Senior Advisor on development issues. USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has two representatives detailed to J7. They are responsible for working on disaster relief efforts. OFDA representatives proved extremely helpful to the Commander during the January 2010 Haiti earthquake crisis providing daily updates on USAID activities thus allowing the Commander to make better informed decisions and more effectively support USAID disaster relief initiatives.

Creating Collaborative Organizations: Counter-Narcotics

JIATF-S provides an exemplary example of interagency coordination at operational and tactical levels on counter-narcotics issues. Not only does the physical co-location of interagency personnel at the task force headquarters facilitate coordination, the organization has also implemented effective coordination mechanisms, including periodic coordination meetings and a 600 page standard operating procedures manual that lays out guidelines on how to work with interagency and international partners. The manual addresses differences in culture, language and practices. Different agencies, for example, have different meanings for the same words and phrases; in
the manual, the phrase *tactical control* has one definition and it applies to everyone. Understanding what assets each agency brings to bear on an operation is also important in coordinating successful activities. The manual provides this information allowing agencies to holistically plan their activities.

Additionally, interagency representatives serve in leadership positions and have authority to make decisions on behalf of their respective agencies. “For task force participants to feel connected to results, they must be part of the command. Within the JIATF-S organizational structure representatives from DOD, Homeland Security and the Justice Department, along with U.S. Intelligence Community liaisons and international partners, work as one team.”

Not only does JIATF-S have an overarching national and interagency strategy, it has created clear mechanisms such as recurring planning meetings for coordination, which continue to foster an environment conducive to a collaborative organization:

> To facilitate the asset allocation process, JIATF-South hosts a semiannual planning conference that brings together all its counterdrug partners. The interagency and international partners review their efforts from the past three months, plan for new initiatives and combined operations, and decide what assets they want to give the task force for the next 6-9 months usually by calculating the number of airplane hours and ship days.

Creating Collaborative Organizations: Summary

GAO describes the creation of adequate coordination mechanisms as necessary for collaborative organizations. At the SOUTHCOM headquarters level, establishing J9 was an important catalyst in creating a collaborative organization; it focuses on bringing interagency participation to all command activities including the Command’s structure and planning processes. Embedding interagency personnel within the Command facilitates a collaborative environment and an appreciation of different agencies’ cultures. In the cases of humanitarian assistance and counter-narcotics, the existence of higher-level strategic guidance provides a framework for establishment of effective coordination mechanisms and has led to collaboration among agencies in these mission specific areas.

> JIATF-S has created clear mechanisms such as recurring planning meetings for coordination, which continue to foster an environment conducive to a collaborative organization.

Research conducted by GAO shows that agencies’ concerns about maintaining jurisdiction over their missions and related resources can be a significant impediment to collaborating with other agencies. These barriers can be overcome by building trust among interagency partners and developing a willingness to work together.

“SOUTHCOM’s leadership has focused on building relationships of trust, open dialogue, and transparency with partners. According to interagency partners we spoke with, leadership at SOUTHCOM has been important in building relationships among agencies. While SOUTHCOM has encountered some resistance to its collaboration efforts, it has overcome much of this resistance by building
relationships, providing information on the Command’s activities, and discussing the overall benefits of the interactions for the region."³¹

Developing A Well-Trained Workforce

GAO reports that, “Agencies do not always have the right people with the right skills in the right jobs at the right time to meet the challenges they face—including having a workforce that is able to quickly address crises. Moreover, agency performance management systems often do not recognize or reward interagency collaboration, and training is needed to understand other agencies’ processes or culture.”³²

In many cases interagency coordination is personality driven and informal, making interagency progress vulnerable when an organization experiences a high turnover rate.

This is potentially one of the greatest challenges in institutionalizing an interagency process for a combatant command or any other military organization. The high turnover in military personnel is an impediment to establishing sustainable cultural change. Military personnel, especially higher-ranking officials, who come to the Command with no prior knowledge of or experience in interagency engagement, could potentially be an obstruction to the organization’s interagency initiatives and progress. If the incoming leadership, including the directors and their immediate staff, do not see the benefits of interagency collaboration, the process could experience significant setbacks. Command leadership should ensure new personnel are provided with appropriate tools to maintain Command interagency focus. Strong leadership among civilian personnel, who tend to remain in their positions for longer periods of time, is critical in order to provide a level of continuity required for ensuring a sustained shift towards an interagency culture in an organization that experiences large turnover. In many cases interagency coordination is personality driven and informal, making interagency progress vulnerable when an organization experiences a high turnover rate. "Without formalizing and institutionalizing the interagency planning structure, we (GAO) concluded efforts to coordinate may not continue when personnel move on to their next assignments."³³

This is also the case at SOUTHCOM. "While GAO’s work on SOUTHCOM did not focus on training, personnel from the Command also expressed the need for more opportunities to improve their understanding of working in an interagency environment."³⁴

Developing a Well-Trained Workforce: Humanitarian Assistance

Every year, SOUTHCOM conducts a number of humanitarian assistance exercises that serve as training platforms for U.S. military personnel. Exercises include construction of schools, wells, and clinics; others focus on medical readiness – U.S. personnel providing healthcare to host nation citizens. Other exercises focus on disaster response efforts. Some of these involve interagency personnel and partner nations. For example, in the Continuing Promise Mission (a humanitarian assistance operation involving medical personnel and civil engineers) U.S. Public Health Service Officers from Health and Human Services filled approximately 49 medical, engineering and environmental health positions.³⁵ Such opportunities for interagency personnel to
train with the U.S. military creates a better interagency trained workforce.

**Developing a Well-Trained Workforce: Counter-Narcotics**

JIATF-S does not have a formal structure to train incoming personnel on interagency engagement, and it takes a long time to train new personnel to the point where they are fully productive and understand the JIATF-S culture. Evan Musing and Christopher Lamb, in a comprehensive study on JIATF-S, provide this perspective from several interviews conducted with JIATF-S personnel:

> It takes time, however, to develop a positive team culture. Members must overcome their parochial Service, agency, or personal worldviews, appreciate diverse perspectives, and be committed to fulfilling the team purpose by working as an integrated unit. **But newcomers to JIATF–South usually experience culture shock, feeling “dazed and confused and scared.” Some confess that the complexity of the operations leaves them feeling they are moving too slowly or are overreacting when they do take action. Newcomers often have had little experience working with people outside their own Service or agency. After arriving, they are acutely aware that they have entered a different culture, surrounded by a bewildering array of unfamiliar uniforms and languages, or as the familiar quip goes, “the Star Wars bar scene.”**36

A big part of this initial confusion has to do with the differences in agency culture. JIATF-S is a military organization that has successfully embedded interagency personnel who bring their own agency cultures and biases to the organization. A newcomer must face an array of differing cultures while trying to adapt to the organization’s collaborative, open environment. Law enforcement agencies, for example, are more prone to withhold information until they have built a strong enough case for prosecution, whereas agencies involved in monitoring and detecting more openly share information to complete an operation.

**J9 could serve the Command well by institutionalizing a training program to teach newcomers SOUTHCOM’s interagency process.**

**Developing a Well-Trained Workforce: Summary**

A well-trained interagency workforce is critical in developing an interagency culture. Personnel who are knowledgeable on different agencies’ cultures and understand the benefits of interagency engagement more easily and quickly overcome the initial barriers associated with working in an interagency environment. Creating a well-trained workforce should facilitate quicker development of formal coordination mechanisms where informal coordination currently exists. GAO finds that, “by using informal coordination mechanisms, agencies could end up relying on the personalities of officials involved to ensure effective collaboration.”37 Adequately trained personnel, who understand the benefits of interagency collaboration, work more effectively and create more effective mechanisms leading to collaborative organizations.

**J9 could serve the Command well by institutionalizing a training program to teach newcomers SOUTHCOM’s interagency process.** Currently, J9 provides a general presentation...
on SOUTHCOM’s role in interagency coordination; a more detailed training program including how the directorates engage with interagency partners would provide a better overview. This training could also provide newcomers with knowledge on how interagency coordination efforts affect their positions within the Command. An overview of national level guidance instructing agencies to work together would also highlight the importance of interagency collaboration for SOUTHCOM and national security. Additionally, the opportunity to provide Command personnel with an interagency exchange program would increase SOUTHCOM knowledge of other agencies’ roles and missions. This would allow Command personnel to become more sensitive to other agencies’ cultures and more aware of interagency collaboration possibilities.

Information sharing can occur on many different levels. It starts with informal initial exchanges and can lead to more formal mechanisms including the establishment of databases and more elaborate information sharing networks. Interagency information sharing occurs throughout SOUTHCOM for many purposes. J2 focuses information sharing on intelligence priorities, issues and threats. J3’s operational role leads it to focus information sharing on current operations and plans. J5, whose focus is on developing strategies and policies for SOUTHCOM, focuses information sharing at a strategic level. J9, given its unique role at SOUTHCOM, conducts information sharing at all levels with numerous agencies.

Physical presence of interagency personnel at SOUTHCOM facilitates information sharing, mostly on an informal basis. J9 has established monthly interagency meetings, but these meetings lack a formal agenda and do not focus on specific outcomes.

In terms of formal mechanisms, several databases exist at SOUTHCOM serving as repositories of information and a foundation for information sharing. SOUTHCOM, by implementing the TCP, instituted a more aggressive campaign to populate the Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS). TSCMIS is an internet-based program, which provides a map of activities carried out throughout the area of responsibility. SOUTHCOM provided U.S. government agencies access to TSCMIS to compile DOD and interagency activities in the region.
Improve Information Sharing: Humanitarian Assistance

SOUTHCOM has several tools to facilitate information sharing. USAID and State Department officials embedded at SOUTHCOM assist in coordination of humanitarian assistance efforts. As mentioned previously, two USAID representatives assigned to SOUTHCOM provide information on humanitarian assistance activities throughout the AOR. The Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System (OHASIS) is the information database used by DOD to compile information related to Humanitarian Assistance. It is used to report humanitarian assistance activities to Congress. Exercises serve as another tool for information sharing. These exercises bring together U.S. government agencies with roles in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Despite specific DOD-USAID guidance instructing all humanitarian assistance projects be entered into OHASIS, in a recent report analyzing humanitarian assistance projects and information sharing, GAO found OHASIS was not being effectively used by SOUTHCOM and other Combatant Commands. The report cited only six projects marked complete for SOUTHCOM from fiscal year 2007 through 2009 in the database, while DOD’s report to Congress listed at least 81 completed projects for each fiscal year for each of the Combatant Commands. The report indicates not all Humanitarian Assistance projects were being reported.

Improve Information Sharing: Counter-Narcotics

JIATF-S information sharing has evolved over the years. The organization has overcome issues of trust, issues of interoperability among agencies, and issues related to classification. JIATF-S has reached a point where agencies that work at the task force see the benefits of sharing information for the attainment of a common goal. The sharing of information in many cases is seamless, especially when conducting operations. Each agency understands the uniqueness of each other’s roles contributing to the overall counter-narcotics mission. DOD focuses on detection and monitoring, while law enforcement agencies focus on interception and arrests. Whereas, agencies were initially hesitant about sharing information because of different goals and cultures, JIATF-S has overcome barriers by maintaining a clear focus on its counter-narcotics mission. For example, DEA was wary of releasing intelligence to DOD because law enforcement is sensitive about sharing intelligence due to its longer-term role in prosecuting suspects, while DOD wants to terminate its involvement soon after detection. Not only has JIATF-S been able to overcome differences in agency cultures to improve information sharing with its interagency partners, it has also demonstrated success in information sharing.

Fully utilizing established tools for information sharing is key to establishing a common operating picture for effective interagency coordination.
with partner nations.

JIATF–S is unique in having established effective procedures for routinely and quickly converting classified intelligence and sensitive law enforcement information into a form that can be shared at an unclassified level under bilateral agreements with partner nations capable of taking responsive actions.\(^{43}\)

**Improve Information Sharing: Summary**

Information sharing is critical to interagency coordination. Fully utilizing established tools for information sharing, such as existing databases and exercises, is key to establishing a common operating picture for effective interagency coordination. Formal mechanisms play an important role, but creating an environment of trust and a clear understanding of mutual benefits derived from information sharing enhance interagency coordination efforts. SOUTHCOM has worked to establish trust with and among its interagency partners. This is the basis for a collaborative environment that enhances information-sharing efforts.

**Recommended Next Steps For Interagency Coordination: SOUTHCOM**

SOUTHCOM is recognized as achieving a relatively successful level of interagency coordination compared to other Combatant Commands, partly because of its many years of interagency coordination experience in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and counter-narcotics initiatives.\(^{44}\) Change takes time and becoming an interagency focused command has been an evolutionary process for SOUTHCOM.

While SOUTHCOM’s Command Strategy instructs the organization to work with interagency partners in accomplishing objectives, an overarching interagency strategy signed by the Commander and his/her peers from different U.S. government agencies could further solidify SOUTHCOM’s interagency collaboration commitment. This would create a shared mission and vision among agencies and could enhance interagency coordination throughout all levels of agencies involved – similar to JIATF-S’s accomplishment where all agencies come together focused on one shared mission. This could, however, be more challenging (but not impossible) at the Combatant Command level where missions tend to be broader than they are at the task force level.

Adequate coordination mechanisms create collaborative organizations according to numerous GAO reports cited in this study. SOUTHCOM’s J9 serves as a catalyst in creating coordination mechanisms for the entire Command. However, implementing two examples from JIATF-S, would further improve coordination mechanisms. Firstly, JIATF-S’s focused interagency meetings where representatives come together to review past efforts, plan new initiatives and discuss allocation of resources represents coordination at a more profound level. Secondly, JIATF-S’s manual of standard operating procedures for interagency coordination is another good example of a successful coordination mechanism. SOUTHCOM has a basic interagency plan that is broad in nature and does not have the level of detail that the JIATF-S plan has. This plan, Annex V, is part of SOUTHCOM’s TCP. A more detailed plan that is supportive of an overarching interagency strategy would more clearly delineate roles and responsibilities of the
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interagency partners under the framework of a unified interagency strategy.

A well-trained workforce is critical in establishing a culture of interagency collaboration. SOUTHCOM would facilitate greater interagency coordination by providing appropriate training and incentives to work with other agencies. J9’s role should be expanded to provide this type of education throughout the Command. As previously noted, the TCP, Component Support Plans and Country Campaign plans are the planning documents that support Command Strategy. These plans are the driving force for SOUTHCOM in executing all its activities in its area of responsibility. These documents are created by all the different elements of SOUTHCOM. By educating the workforce, SOUTHCOM will be closer to ensuring interagency collaboration is detailed in these plans.

Concerning improved information sharing, SOUTHCOM’s embedded interagency staff have provided the Command immediate interagency access. The Command should update existing formal mechanisms for information sharing such as its humanitarian assistance database to improve interagency collaboration. On a broader scale, J9 should take an active role in identifying other agencies that may have a part in SOUTHCOM activities by analyzing their strategies, programs, plans and objectives. In this area, J9 has an important role in linking SOUTHCOM’s priorities to potential interagency resources including personnel and funding that could be leveraged.

The second sentence of this study states that, “Interagency coordination is a challenging task complicated by diverse agencies’ different and sometimes competing cultures, priorities, strategies, goals, plans and incentives.” It is also an evolving phenomenon that must be pursued with patience and a steadfast vision focused on the benefits of working in a collaborative interagency environment. Taking some of the recommendations cited in this study and continuing to deepen interagency engagement by focusing on the four main areas described by GAO could serve as a template assisting SOUTHCOM in achieving its vision and mission. While each Combatant Command has unique roles, taking these four elements into consideration as well as understanding the SOUTHCOM interagency experience offers insight for enhanced interagency coordination across DOD at the Combatant Command level. PRISM

Notes

1 A regional Combatant Command is an organization of the Department of Defense that conducts military engagements in a designated geographic area of responsibility.

2 GAO-10-801: U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation; July 2010; Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives

3 House Armed Services Committee, Posture Statement of General Douglas M. Fraser, US Southern Command, before the 112th Congress, March 6, 2012
The Component Commands are elements of the different military services (air force, marines, army, navy and special operations) that report to the Combatant Command. In addition to these, there are functional Component Commands or Joint Task Forces that have specific missions. SOUTHCOM has three: Joint Task Force Bravo, Joint Task Force Guantanamo and Joint Interagency Task Force South.

The Security Cooperation Office is the military organization at US Embassy's around the world that represent the regional Combatant Command.


During this period, the author was the J9 Branch Chief of Non-Traditional Security Initiatives and observed first hand the internal and external reactions to new SOUTHCOM interagency initiatives.

Most combatant commands are organized using a J-code structure where each J# represents a directorate within the organization (e.g. J1: Personnel, J2: Intelligence, J3: Operations, etc.); at the time of this initiative, the J7 was the directorate responsible for experimentation and simulations.

House Armed Services Committee, Posture Statement of General Douglas M. Fraser, US Southern Command, before the 112th Congress, March 6, 2012, p.2


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In my role as a Division Chief in the Partnering Directorate, I detailed one of my subordinates to the Department of Energy (DOE) for six weeks. During this time there, he became knowledgeable of DOE’s organizational culture and potential areas for engagement with SOUTHCOM and DOD in general. He was instrumental in moving along an MOU between SOUTHCOM and DOE that eventually led to the full time detail of a DOE representative to the Command.
How do you interpret the President’s intention with respect to the strategic shift to Asia and the Pacific? What do you think he means by that?

Locklear: When we put out the new strategic guidance, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” in early 2012, there was a fair amount of deliberation among all aspects of the government including the Defense Department, the National Security Council, and the President. This discussion followed a decade or two of the type of operations we had been doing in the Middle East. We wanted to understand if we had the right prism to reshape our force, reshape our thinking, and reshape our planning. And I think we got it about right. I thought that before I was the PACOM commander, when I was in my last position in Europe and in NATO. So it’s not just about where I’m currently sitting. If you take a look at the next century, and where the interests of our children and our grandchildren will be most impacted, all the vectors point to Asia, the Indo-Asian Pacific region.

What do you think are the major threats to international security or to national security emanating from Asia and the Pacific?

Locklear: You’ve got to start the hierarchy of threats with those that directly threaten the homeland. From a military perspective, certainly the most pressing is the nuclearization of North Korea and their ability to develop delivery systems that would not only threaten the Korean peninsula, but the Asia-Pacific region, and even the United States. We can’t really underestimate the strategic importance or the danger of that scenario. That has to be solved. The question for our future security is how we see this playing out from this third generation of North Korean kings, and it’s not getting any better.
How would you assess the stability of North Korea in this third generation of kings?

Locklear: The North Korean regime and the country are a pretty dark space as far as being able to assess exactly what is happening there. That is probably a strength of the regime – to keep their own people in the dark and the rest of the world sequestered from what happens in there. My sense is that the new leader has been able to take a relatively good handle on the leadership role. He appears to be fully in power. I believe what will fundamentally undermine him in the long run is that he is out of touch with the rest of the world. His people are not well fed; they are not generally well-attuned to what is going on in the world. They are denied the types of liberties and freedoms that most of the world enjoys today, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. They are not integrated in the international market place. If you look at South Korea, it has a thriving economy and democracy. People are moving on in South Korea, but in North Korea, they are frozen in time. In terms of stability, there is always speculation that it is going to collapse. I do not see that happening anytime soon based on the way the regime manages the country. But, I think there are indicators that are very disconcerting. On average, half the population receives 800 calories a day, and the medical care is poor. But I don’t know if the problems are so grave as to cause a regime collapse anytime soon.

Middle East watchers might have said the same of Egypt, Libya and Syria ten years ago. If we can speculate say ten years down the line, can you envision a collapse of the North Korean regime, following which we would have U.S. troops on the ground?

Locklear: I think that we need to plan with our allies who would be impacted for a number of possibilities. One of those possibilities is a rapid regime change, or a collapse of regime, or a disaster in the country that causes the regime to lose control. First, humanitarian issues will need to be addressed. Weapons of mass destruction would need to be managed and controlled, otherwise they would be subject to proliferation or loss of control. This would not be the sole responsibility or role of U.S. forces, but an international community approach in which the U.S. would certainly play a role, and U.S. forces would possibly play a role.

The defense strategic guidance of 2012 that you referred to directs us to expand our network of cooperation with emerging partners throughout the Asia-Pacific region to ensure collective capabilities and capacity for securing common interests. What kind of progress has PACOM made towards that goal?

Locklear: We are making good progress, but it’s a complex environment. The region includes 52 percent of the world, 36 countries, and the largest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia. There isn’t a central security mechanism that manages the flow of bilateral-historical relationships, bilateral emerging relationships, or multilateral forums within the region.

Taking a look at the shared challenges, this is where the U.S. has an opportunity to build partnership capacity. In 2012, the President provided guidance that focused on refreshing and renewing alliances for this century. Because of this, there is a concerted effort across all parts of government and the DOD, including through our military-to-military
partnerships, to see those alliances and how they fit into the security architecture in the next 30, 40, or 50 years. To some degree that in itself is building partnership capacity.

Take a look at our five formal alliance partners: Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines, and Thailand. In one way or another we are at different stages with each, of improving our ability to work together, working together on command-and-control, promoting shared interests in the security environment, forming access agreements, improving exercises, etc.

So with our allies I think we have a good plan. We are planning together, and we do that very deliberately. As it relates to other partners in the region, we are at various levels depending on the history or the background/relationships the U.S. has with them. We have some strategic partnerships such as with Singapore, who we have a very good partnership and friendship with, and partnership capacity building is already built into that relationship. In other areas, Indonesia, Malaysia, Oceana, China, all the ASEAN countries, depending on our mutually shared interests, we are pursuing capacity building in both directions.

Are there any U.S. partners in the region that require significant or more help than others to shore them up and to help them to help us?

Locklear: They all have their own individual security concerns. We are working to renew our relationship with the Philippines by better understanding what more we can do to help them develop a minimal credible defense. In developing this partnership, we are trying to develop our parameters of responsibility and resources within their plan. To be clear, the Philippines have a good plan. They understand what they need. We understand where it is that we can help them and we are just working through some issues of how to go forward. In the Philippines there is always a concern of going back to the past, and we don’t want to go back to the past. We want to move the relationship into the future. And that means that we need to build the type of access and relationships that allow us to help them with their defense, not detract from it.

What about Indonesia? As you mentioned, it’s the largest Muslim country and recently transitioned from the Suharto regime to a democratic regime. What kind of relationship are we building with them on the military side?

Locklear: We are building a good relationship. There was a period of time when it wasn’t as productive as it could have been. However, I believe the Indonesians have made very good progress in areas of concern such as human rights practices within their military and special operations community. I have recommended that we continue to step up our military-to-military engagement. The Indonesians will have a big role to play not only in Southeast Asia, but all of Asia as they grow economically and in influence. They, like all Asian countries in this last half of this past century and the early part of this century, are beginning to focus more on external security than internal security.

Do you think that Indonesia has the capacity in the near future to become a security exporter?
**Locklear:** Well, it depends on how far you talk about exporting it. I think they have a potential to be a real net provider of security in their sphere.

**Many developing regions are confronting a lack of capacity across the board, not just military, but in their planning ministries, economic ministries, and generally throughout their civilian services.** Some countries are finding that their militaries are the most functional institutions they have, which leads to the suggestion by some that they should be using their military to bolster their national economic development, education and public health systems, and even build infrastructure. **Would you support those kinds of internal roles for the Indonesian military or the Philippine military?**

**Locklear:** It’s really up to each country how they structure their government organizations to provide public services. I believe that the model we use in our country is a good model. We rely heavily on other elements of government power to provide internal security and internal support. Mixing that with military, other than in cases of real emergency, I think adds complications to the way you manage your military. The system of civilian and military separation that works for us could probably work for them.

**South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan had prolonged periods of military autocracy in the 20th century, and yet emerged as economic superpowers and very robust democracies. Do you think that there are any lessons we should derive from those earlier periods of military autocracy as we look at other countries in transition like Burma or Indonesia?**

**Locklear:** In general, military autocracies don’t have good luck historically. The military should have a limited role in the way the affairs of a nation are conducted. It should be in my view, confined to providing the overall security that allows the other elements of government power to work. In our own country, if you affirm the oath that we all take, it is to the constitution. It’s not to a party, a king, or anything else. It’s to the constitution. The constitution I would argue is not a perfect document and never has been; but it is the fabric that defines the checks and balances in our government. What the military provides to some degree is a defensive security network that allows that democratic architecture to work. So we encourage our partners, who are trying to shape their militaries and the roles and responsibilities of their militaries, to put it in the context of the “enabler” for security. It shouldn’t be the thing that runs your government.

**When PACOM engages with other countries in what we might call security sector reform, do you work closely with civilian agencies, U.S. agencies, like the State Department or USAID on those kinds of projects?**

**Locklear:** Yes, absolutely. In the theater most of the nations in my area of responsibility already have mature forms of government and most are functioning adequately. In fact some of them are functioning very well, with the exceptions of outliers like North Korea and a few that are smaller that may be struggling.

To strengthen U.S. influence in this part of the world, we have to come at it with an inter-agency plan, even though we may talk about U.S. military power and moving more military
assets into the theater. The rebalance strategy that the President proposed is much, much more than just military. Our success will depend on the ability to understand how and when military power most effectively influences the other aspects of government and national power, particularly in the Asia-Pacific where they all have to work together.

Are you getting the kind of collaboration with the U.S. civilian agencies in your AOR that you were hoping for?

Locklear: Yes. Because of the size of the U.S. military, and our ability to plan, organize and execute (that’s what militaries do well) we can be supportive. Not that the civilian organizations don’t do those things well, but a large part of what we do is planning and we have the resources to dedicate to planning. The relationships with the interagency developed by bringing civilian agencies into those planning constructs are important; and it is important for the military to lead that process when necessary to ensure that the dialogue happens within a planning construct. The military has the broadest planning construct, particularly in the PACOM AOR. We have a theater campaign plan that goes out about five years that looks at how we interact with each country in the AOR and what the goals and objections are, not only from a U.S. perspective, but a regional perspective, an alliance perspective, and a multilateral perspective. It looks at each of the countries in the AOR and how they fit together through a variety of different lenses. There are inputs from State and our Embassy teams. I view the 27 or so ambassadors in my AOR as my customers. The defense attaches that work for them, work for me as well. I place them in the embassies and resource them to provide insight from the embassy teams on how to use the elements of military power to synchronize with the other elements of national power. USAID, the State Department, Interior, Homeland Security, FBI, CIA... They all have a role in this plan.

Some argue that civilian agencies should be included on the COCOM staffs and that they add the necessary perspectives for successful foreign policy initiatives in the region. Do you have civilian agency personnel on your staff? And are there any problems integrating them in?

Locklear: I do have some on my staff. My command team consists of me, my Deputy, and my foreign policy advisor who is from the State Department, and is either a former ambassador or future ambassador. That position is vital to me because it provides me with a personal link to what Secretary Kerry and the State Department are doing. And that is the first and most important position. The next important position on my staff is my J-9; and embedded in that organization are my outreach or in-reach embeds from various agencies, such as the Department of Energy, Department of Agriculture. I also have representatives from the CIA, FBI, DIA, and Coast Guard. And in the development of this theater cooperation plan, they have a huge role.

To what extent have you developed the concept of Phase Zero planning in your theater plan?

Locklear: I am beginning to think that the world has moved beyond the Phase Zero, Phase One, Phase Two, and Phase Three planning mentality. That construct isn’t flexible
enough for the theater that I am in. Phase Zero would indicate stability, but Phase One would indicate deterrence. So we are in Phase One in some places and Phase Zero in other parts of the AOR, and it could change at any minute. To think of your plan as just maintaining day-to-day stability misses the point.

We go deterrence phase with North Korea about every six months. I am walking away from the term Phase Zero although the rest of the joint community teaches and uses it. What I look at is how you manage a complex theater across multiple phases that aren’t clear at any particular time, particularly concerning where you are in those various phases. The bottom line is to look at your theater cooperation plan, at all the things you do and invest in. We have aligned that plan to look at all these countries, and then break them up by sub-region and issue. Then we consider resources. We look out five years and give that as a planning factor for the services and components to actually fund the exercises, activities and billets.

In the year of execution, I put out a theater TCO or a theater command order that tells the services what are the highest priorities. Then I modify that command with fragmentary orders as I would in the other planning scenarios, and modify what the components do in order to ensure that we are being efficient with our allocated resources. So a big part of what we do at PACOM falls into Phase Zero, even though I think the Phase Zero terminology needs to be rethought.

**You just think basically that the phasing concept is too…**

**Locklear:** Rigid. It’s too rigid. And that’s one of the things that we always tend to do, put things into neat columns so that they fit easily. But the issues are in a continuous state of flux across phases, even in peacetime.

**One thing that is emerging in other regions is evidence of the collusion, collaboration, and even convergence of illicit networks of various kinds, such as transnational terrorists, criminal organizations, etc., are you seeing any of that in your AOR?**

**Locklear:** We’ve got 59 percent of the world’s population in our AOR. Over 100 improvised explosive devices a month explode in our AOR, but as a country we have been focused on the Middle East, and we have assumed that the Pacific countries can manage their own environment. And to their credit, most of the governments are mature enough. Most of the security organizations in these countries are mature. A large percentage of them are working against the terrorist threat. Information sharing is rapidly increasing among all the players including India and China, in terms of how we look at terrorist threats. There are different definitions of terrorism depending on where you sit. We have a tendency to look at global networks; some of these countries look internally at what they would consider disruptive factors in their own countries that they categorize as terrorists. But none of us can afford a dangerous security environment in the Asia-Pacific, a region with four billion people, which will increase to six to seven billion in this century; a region that is very diverse ethnically, socially, and economically. We can’t allow security features that permit organized terrorists organizations to come in and camp out without us knowing it, without taking action. What we want to do is stay
ahead of the problem in the Asia-Pacific region rather than lag behind it, which I think we do in other parts of the world.

**How do we stay ahead of it?**

**Locklear:** The biggest enemy that the terrorists have is information. If you know about them and what they are doing, they have less of an impact and you can manage them better. I think we have to share information better. And this is not just military-to-military; this is CIA, FBI, State Department, and other elements of government. We have to ensure that we have the right communication mechanisms to allow us to alert each other when things change. Certainly in the area of proliferation and weapons of mass destruction, we need to be very careful about first of all where they are, then where they are proliferating, and how they are moving around. And we have to work together. We have our proliferation security initiative, so we are increasing the number of people we bring into that initiative. We do multinational training, in-the-air training, special operations training between these nations to be able to do interdiction, consequence management, and all the things that have to do with weapons of mass destruction. And that portfolio is growing as we try and manage it in the PACOM AOR.

**Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, used to speak about “Asian Values.” Do you give any credence to the notion that our concepts of democracy and human rights are if not parochial at least not universal in the sense that Asian countries might perceive democracy and human rights in a different way?**

**Locklear:** I have read his writings, and I respect him very much. I disagree based on my own personal perspectives. I tend to disagree that you can put a spin on liberty. Liberty is in the eyes of the individual, not in the eyes of the government in my view. We have to be careful how we define individual liberties; they are not necessarily for the good of the government. I’m not saying that he was doing that; Singapore is a great partner, and I think they do a very, very good job of managing their country. But, I would generally think that the U.S. position globally on human rights is the right thing for us to continue to pursue in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

**Some people would argue that because of our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan in the last decade that we have been somewhat discredited as a global agent of democracy and democratization. Do you think that has extended to Asia, that our currency there has been diluted somewhat?**

**Locklear:** I would say that our currency has not been diluted. First of all, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, we have been primarily the only superpower in the world and a lot of responsibility for the global security environment fell on us. In this century, other people in the world will step up and be contributors to that security environment in ways that will be beneficial to the United States as well. I won’t say that we didn’t make mistakes, but we tried at the time to deal with things in a way that would generally provide for a global, peaceful, security environment.

In Asia it worked, there hasn’t been a big war here in a long time. And the region is prospering from a peaceful security environment that has been underwritten by U.S. global
security efforts. So I do not think that the U.S. position has been discredited. I think they are interested and anxious to see if the rebalance does actually occur. I think they do recognize that we as a government, as a country, have been pulled to the Middle East. They recognize that our interests and theirs are inextricably tied together. And I think the Chinese and Indians recognize that as well. So I get no sense from any country that they want the U.S. to withdraw or to retreat from the Pacific or to pay less attention to it than we should based on its importance to us.

In the late 1990s two Chinese Air Force Colonels wrote a monograph called “Unrestricted Warfare,” in which they describe a kind of perennial and comprehensive state of conflict with the United States as the only way to overcome their technological disadvantages. Do you think they pose that kind of threat over the long-term and they view us as an inevitable adversary?

Locklear: I think inherently in all military planning and resourcing you ultimately need an adversary to plan against. Going back in history, it has been a central human phenomenon. Let me say first of all that we shouldn’t draw parallels between the Chinese today and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The world then was much more isolated, countries more isolated, blocs more isolated, and now that is no longer the case.

Today, the world is interconnected from information and economics to energy. It is not just about China. It’s about the whole world and that trend – that inter-connectedness – is escalating at an exponential rate. That interconnectedness requires us to think through what that will demand of the security environment. So, to some degree for the Chinese, after they came out of their Cultural Revolution and decided that they needed something more than a land army, and got their economy going, they became the second largest economy pretty quickly. And with that comes security interests that any nation would need to consider.

They have resource needs that require global access: fuel, energy, natural resources, minerals, food, water, etc. And so it is not unusual for them to say, "We need to build a military that can protect our interests wherever they are. That’s why we have a military." So I think we should give them credit for how far they came in a short period of time. But I think they got misguided at some point in time because of their fixation on U.S. dominance in the region since the end of WWII, and their fixation on Taiwan. Those fixations have misshaped their military. It is misshapen for where they want to go in the future.

It’s basically a military that they built for counter-intervention, which would try to keep the U.S. or others out of their local affairs. Their local affairs happen to be many of our allies’ and local partners’ affairs as well. But what happened is that they have a military that isn’t effective in supporting their other global interests. And I think that will change, so you’ll see them start to build nuclear submarines: that’s because they want to go further. I think they need to go further. They are building aircraft carriers. Aircraft carriers are an instrument of stability, not necessarily an instrument of war as many people view them. They are big stabilizers. And the Chinese recognize that. They are conducting more operations in the Middle East, where their energy supplies come from. So, even today, they have much more interest in energy from the Persian Gulf than
we do as a country. You can see them start to be concerned about it, rightly so. Will they challenge the U.S. on a global military scale? No, not in the foreseeable future. It's just not possible for them to, not militarily. But why would they? Why would they want to? And then why would we create an environment that makes them have to?

So it's for both of our interests?

Locklear: Right. It's in both of our interests. There is a fine line to walk as they come forward and move in the future. I have said this in other forums. How do we help them or help ensure that they become a net provider of security and not a net user of it? And there are some challenges, because there are areas, where not only China and its neighbors disagree, which causes friction, but there are areas that the U.S. and China don't agree. But this is the way the world is; countries disagree. The future for the Asia-Pacific region and the world is to have a security environment where those disagreements can occur. But the security regime is strong enough that it doesn’t break up during those disagreements. That may be Pollyanna-ish, but I think that is the way you have to approach it.

It's a goal.

Locklear: It’s a goal. And I think that there are things you can do to reach that goal. We always prepare for the worst case. Militaries do that in every country, we prepare for the worst case, but we don’t expect the worst case. And we should put an equal amount of energy into what we have to do to get to the good case rather than focusing only on the worst case.

What is the end game for Taiwan?

Locklear: Peace and prosperity is the end game for Taiwan. And I think it is also the end game for all of China. I keep getting asked about the U.S. policy on Taiwan and I say it’s been clear—just read the Taiwan Relations Act. I don’t think there has been any ambiguity about what the U.S. position is. We want peaceful, stable, cross-strait relationships. And we want the peoples of China to be able to be prosperous and we want them to be able to work it out. We want them to have dialogue, and we don’t want that dialogue to be done under a condition of coercion. We provide them defense articles, we provide them basically with Taiwanese confidence, to be able to move forward and ultimately determine what this relationship will look like between China and Taiwan.

Do you think that relationship might change under your watch?

Locklear: It could change and I think it is changing. I think there has been productive change the last few years. We would like to see that change continue productively. But, what we don’t want to see is either side do something that disrupts the peaceful progression that they have in place now. We are very appreciative of that. In the long run, the Taiwan issue is an issue of time. Such issues history will deal with to ensure the stability in the Asia-Pacific. PRISM
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- Develop a complex operations training and education community of practice to catalyze innovation and development of new knowledge, connect members for networking, share existing knowledge, and cultivate foundations of trust and habits of collaboration across the community
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