The Struggle for Security in Africa
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A female Burundian medical officer serving with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2013 speaks with Somali women at a free medical clinic in Mogadishu, where medical care was a lifeline for thousands of civilians who were caught up and injured during fighting with al-Shabaab. (Stuart Price/AMISOM posted by Albany Associates)
An Interview with Ambassador Princeton N. Lyman and Ambassador Johnnie Carson

What strategic interests does the United States have in Africa?

Lyman: In Africa you have a whole set of complex security and related issues. Not only the expansion of terrorism from East Africa across the Sahel and the dangers of health pandemics which pose threats to the international community, but if you combine those with the demographics and problems of poverty, development, and climate change, these will cause a tremendous migration push toward Europe and elsewhere. All of which impacts on the United States. That combination of things going on in Africa has a very direct and important, strategic importance for the United States.

Carson: The United States is part of a global community and Africa is an increasingly important member. Stability, economic growth, improved health, and greater trade and commerce in Africa contribute to global stability and thus to U.S. stability. The absence of peace is conflict; and the absence of development is poverty; the absence of good economic growth can also generate inequality, poverty, and social upheaval. We have to recognize we are better off as a country and as a global community when Africa is better off.

The problems in Africa do not exist in isolation from the United States. Conflict in Africa generally comes at a high cost to our country. The State Department, USAID, and the White House are often required to engage politically. It also costs us financially at the UN because we [the United States] have to pay the largest share of the budget for UN peacekeepers, humanitarian support and refugee assistance, and for implementing many of the organization’s political and diplomatic resolutions.

This interview was conducted by Mr. Michael Miklaucic on March 6, 2017.
What are the major impediments to peace, economic growth, and development in Africa?

Lyman: One of them is the difficulty related to creating large enough economic markets, sub-regional, and then beyond sub-regional markets in Africa so that you have economies of scale and efficiencies of production. Better and more stable governance are needed; and investment is needed. You also need a transformation in Africa from being merely suppliers of natural commodities, and natural resources—that transformation has not taken place in very many African countries. And on top of that, there is a tremendous growth in population, and the ability of Africans to manage that is still limited.

Carson: I would agree that probably the greatest impediment is the absence of good leadership, the absence of good governance, and the absence of the rule of law. There is in fact a correlation between good governance and stability. Countries that are governed well are generally more stable and peaceful. Those areas of Africa where we see the greatest instability are those areas where we see enormous deficits in the quality of leadership; where we in fact see inadequate governance, poor rule of law, and a disrespect for basic freedoms and civil liberties. Where we see the greatest attempts to strengthen good governance, rule of law, and respect for democratic values, we see less persuasive instability.

What are the origins of that deficit in governance and absence of good leadership in Africa? What are the causes of that deficit?

Lyman: There is a whole history of colonial rule, building countries within borders that were created in Europe and that did not correspond to any of the ethnic or tribal relationships in the continent. You had systems that moved basically from a chieftaincy model with all of the patrimonial linkages that entails, to a national model under the rule of state law. Some of the inherited models were essential for holding the countries together when they first became independent, but many countries never evolved into more effective and accountable systems of governance. In some cases they did; there are countries like Botswana, Kenya, Ghana, and Senegal that have evolved tremendously in terms of developing democratic norms, etc. But, you have a lot of other countries in which this remains a problem, and issues of identity, rivalry, and lack of modern governing institutions continue to constrain development.

Africa is economically one of the most dynamic regions of the world and it is also one of the regions experiencing the most dramatic urbanization. What impact will urbanization have on stability and economic development?

Lyman: There are two theories: Some people think urbanization is a very powerful force for development; particularly for industrialization and economic modernization, but also for revamping the agricultural sector into a more modern economic culture and away from subsistence farming. There is a lot of historical evidence that this is the case. But if you don’t have some of the basic political and economic infrastructure and leadership, urbanization can be a source of great instability and greater poverty. That is the challenge for some African governments.

There is a related challenge that is only beginning to be recognized—the nature of
economic development may be changing. Historically countries have moved into more modern economies through labor intensive industries such as textiles, beverages, low-level technology instruments, and then moving up the chain. But there is evidence that robots, artificial intelligence, as well as 3D printing may change the dynamic of industrialization. Africa could be left behind—it would have to find a whole new paradigm. That makes the urbanization a more worrisome prospect.

Carson: Urbanization will be an enormous challenge for Africa. Coupled with the migration of people from rural areas into urban areas, we also have to look at the enormous population growth that is occurring across the continent. The population growth plus migration into the cities will put enormous pressures on governments to provide infrastructure for housing, for schools, for roads, for electricity, and most importantly for jobs. Jobs will be critical for a continent that already has a population where 65 percent is under the age of 30. Urbanization without jobs, without infrastructure, and without planning will present enormous challenges for Africa.

African countries are already challenged by the urbanization that they have already experienced. Many of them, regrettably have not been able to provide either the planning, the infrastructure, or the jobs that are needed today. Add to that a changing economic model in which people are no longer brought into low-level, entry-level manufacturing jobs, and it compounds the problems that exist now. We see urbanization but also a proliferation of slums, increased poverty, increased unemployment, and the challenges that go along with those. We already have megacities in Africa, and some of those megacities are already enormously challenged.

Africa has the youngest population of any region in the world. It also has the fastest growing population. Nigeria, for example, currently has a population of 185 million people. It is the seventh largest country in the world in terms of population. In less than 35 years Nigeria’s population, and the urbanization that goes with it, will overtake that of the United States. By 2050, Nigeria will rank just behind India and China as the third most populous country in the world—ahead of the United States. During that time, Nigeria’s population will double. Today, already there are more children born in Nigeria every day and every week than across all Western Europe. Nigeria will need substantially more infrastructure to deal with these challenges. It will need jobs. It will need economic growth and opportunity. This is the challenge that will have to be dealt with and Nigeria is not the only country in Africa experiencing rapid population growth.

Sticking with that theme of economic growth and infrastructure, how would you assess the success of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and President Obama’s Power Africa Initiative?

Lyman: AGOA is important as an incentive. It is still just a small part of world trade, but it is an incentive to African countries to move into more efficient, more effective industrialization, as well as agriculture—though there are limits on the agricultural side. By being open to almost all of the African countries AGOA does not interfere with sub-regional economic communities; in contrast to the European Union’s bilateral...
economic partnership agreements, which are disruptive to the development of African sub-regional markets. AGOA is a much better approach to encouraging African trade and development. But not many countries have profited—a few such as Lesotho and Mauritius have benefitted, but a lot of others have not yet organized to take full advantage of AGOA. It also has offered a good forum—there is an AGOA forum every year which our U.S. trade representatives and other officials attend—and it allows for a really frank discussion of Africa’s trade policies, development policies, and future directions; so it is more than just a trade agreement. It is a vehicle for a really candid, but very productive dialogue every year.

**What about Power Africa?**

Carson: Power Africa has been one of the most important initiatives put forward under the Obama Administration. It addresses a key industrial sector that needs to be in place for Africa to realize its full economic and commercial promise and potential. Africa does not generate sufficient power to drive the commerce, the trade and industry, and the job creation that is required.

The two largest economies in Africa—South Africa and Nigeria—probably together produce less power than the states of New York and Pennsylvania, combined. In order for Africa to take the next step it needs to substantially increase its power generation at every level. Power Africa has been extraordinary in mobilizing U.S. Government resources to support the generation of more power in Africa. Power Africa has been extraordinarily important in incentivizing interested American companies in going out and looking at Africa’s potential. It has been enormously important as an advocacy vehicle for working with African governments, along with both the international and domestic private sectors, as well as with USAID and other development agencies, and with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation [OPIC], to promote electrification. And I think it has been done wisely.

Power Africa has focused on renewables. It has focused on solar. It has focused on wind and geo-thermal energy. It has focused on village-level and community access. But it has also focused on creating large solar farms and wind farms. And it has also created incentives to work with large companies like General Electric that produce substantial generation capacity on an industrial scale. It’s absolutely critical that a program like this continue. The electrification of Africa, both in its rural and its urban areas, will be critical to future economic growth; that economic growth will be critical to alleviating poverty, and the alleviation of poverty will be critical in helping to reduce conflict and political strife.

Lyman: Let me give you an example: In northern Nigeria, places like Kaduna and Kano, had a degree of industrialization twenty years ago—textiles and related small industries. But without a national power grid, most of these industries depended on their own power plant because they could not function otherwise. In an era of globalization—goods coming in from China, India, etc.—and unable to generate economies of scale, most of those industries have gone under. So, you have simultaneous population growth and de-industrialization in northern Nigeria. The unemployment problems, at a time when you have the growth of groups like Boko Haram, is just tragic.
For Nigeria, which has all of that oil and natural gas capacity, not to have developed a power infrastructure in the North, has made that area much more vulnerable. And, just seeing those industries decline—big textile industries shrinking to a third their original size, is tragic. If countries like Nigeria do not have a power grid that reaches out across the country, the ability to absorb its population in industry—even agro industry—will not be there.

Are de-industrialization and the lack of economic opportunity the culprits responsible for the growth of terrorism in Africa?

Lyman: They contribute. Boko Haram’s original argument was, “these people go to college, they come out, and then they have nothing! Western education is really giving them nothing.” Their attraction is multidimensional, but lack of economic opportunity is one contributing factor. There are others. Poor governance, the lack of good education, a lot of corruption in the past... The U.S. Institute for Peace has been developing a program with the governors of northern Nigeria to try and address some of those underlying problems—not only the economic, but also education and health—so that young people really have a future there.

Carson: I think the Obama Administration did a very good job of using programs like the TSCTP and its East African equivalent to help train African forces in counterterrorism tactics; to help improve coordination among their police, customs, military, and intelligence services; and also to help get them to work in partnership with their neighbors to fight established threats that are regional in nature rather than country-specific.

I think a lot has been accomplished. There is always room for more to be done. But the TSCTP has brought some of the nations that are now working together more closely against Boko Haram. So it’s a good program. The terrorist groups operating in the Sahel region are operating not just in northern Mali, but in Mauritania and in parts of Niger, as well as in parts of Libya; and they are a potential threat to countries like Algeria, Senegal, and Burkino Faso. Working with these countries both as individual countries and as parts of a regional grouping to improve their counterterrorism expertise and effectiveness is extraordinarily important.

Let me add that while we don’t pay as much attention to terrorist elements in East Africa, and while critics are quick to point out that Somalia is still weak and threatened by al-Shabaab, substantial progress has been made in fighting terrorism across East Africa during the past eight years. In 2006, 2007, and 2008—just before the Obama Administration came in—we heard a lot about al-Qaeda in East Africa. Today we hear absolutely nothing about al-Qaeda in East Africa. We hear about AQIM—al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb—which is responsible for the problems in northern Mali, and in southern Algeria, Libya, and parts of Mauritania. But the people who
were responsible for the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998, were part of al-Qaeda in East Africa. We no longer hear about them because they no longer exist. As part of the effort to stabilize Somalia, the United States supported the Ugandan, the Burundian, and the Kenyan efforts in the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISON). The United States can take some credit for the progress that has taken place there. For the first time in decades, there is an internationally recognized government in Mogadishu, and it controls more than just several miles of real estate. In fact, since 2008 Somalia has had three different presidents—all brought in through indirect participatory electoral systems.

The Somali government is taking control of Mogadishu and every major city in the southern part of the country. And more importantly for the United States, we have seen an end to al-Qaeda in East Africa. The United States played a key role here. Those individuals who were a part of al-Qaeda in East Africa are gone and the cell is no longer even spoken of. Fazul Harun is dead. Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan is dead. These individuals that were part of the al-Qaeda global network are no longer there.

We have also seen a sharp decline in piracy off the Somali coast. The government in power in Mogadishu and the government in power in the Puntland are both committed to the extent that they can to the rule of law and to cooperating with international efforts, and as a result we have seen a decline in piracy.

There obviously have been setbacks in the battle against terrorism in the region. There was the attack against the Westgate Mall in Kenya in 2013, and other insurgent attacks across the border. But it is fair to say that there has, in fact, been some degree of success.

It is very important that the United States remains a good partner with African states as they improve their capacity to deal with terrorism. However we should not substitute ourselves as the leaders in defending them, or in assuming the obligation to protect their countries. We should be strong partners. We should be strong collaborators. And we should be constantly there to help in the most appropriate ways, but we should ensure that African states remain in the lead and that they see this as their problem and not as an external problem, our problem.

**Lyman:** Let me just pick up on that point, and then I want to get back to the Sahel. The African Union (AU) has just gone through a reevaluation of its whole approach to peace processes—that includes remediation, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping. African countries are today putting their troops on the line in AMISOM, Mali, and a number of other operations, and suffering a lot of casualties. African deployments have not been without problems, but they are bearing the brunt of peacekeeping and peace enforcement on the continent. In AMISOM, where the Africans are providing all of the fighting capacity, there has had to be extensive support from the international community but the Africans are very much in the lead on the ground. In other cases, close UN–AU cooperation will be the most effective way to proceed. In this regard, the AU is coming up with new ways of cooperating with the UN and working with the UN to strengthen the AU’s planning, logistics, and human rights practices. The AU is also planning to make significant changes in the way it is organized, structured, and financed for promoting peace. It will need a lot of support from the UN—especially from the Security Council—because
it is the Security Council that most often calls upon African forces to undertake these tasks.

Regarding the Sahel, I would just point out a couple of other things. The TSCTP has given a lot of attention to the military side, but another program, the Security Governance Initiative (SGI), focuses on the non-military side of this—i.e. the broad management of issues that contribute to instability and terrorism. What has happened in the Sahel region, is there are a lot of semi-decentralized groups, some linked to drug smuggling, kidnapping of Westerners, other forms of trafficking, and now to terrorism. In the Sahel you also have vast, thinly populated areas that are very, very difficult to govern in which these groups operate. But the problems are even broader. The Gulf of Guinea now has the largest instances of piracy in the world, which not only deprives people of their livelihood but also contributes to the use of West Africa as a highway to traffic drugs from South America, through Africa, and into Europe. These various criminal and terrorist groups are taking advantage of weak governments in places like Guinea Bissau, Mali, and Niger. You have to deal not only with AQIM in northern Mali, therefor you must strengthen the capacity of the governments throughout the region to deal with these several problems. The counterterrorism programs and the SGI program are ones that will need to be maintained for years to come. To build the necessary capacity, and to see it grow in a multi-dimensional way that isn’t just targeting AQIM or criminal gangs, but offering opportunities for rapidly growing populations, will take broad-based regional and international efforts covering security, governance, and development.

Since the establishment of AFRICOM in 2008, military-military programs have proliferated throughout the continent. Do you believe this should be sustained since AFRICOM is focused on African militaries as opposed to these other dimensions you have discussed?

Lyman: I think establishing AFRICOM was the right decision to make even though the way it was brought into being and publicized was a public relations disaster. The fact is that you had to bring together three different commands that were working in Africa. Before you had CENTCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM all doing bits and pieces in Africa. AFRICOM began with a very broad-based soft power program but because of the problems in Somalia and the Sahel, it has become more engaged in a directly military way—and you need a command to do that.

But you can’t look to AFRICOM to do all of the soft power work. AFRICOM is a military organization that is very important but it is not going to do the work of governance building, it is not going to do economic development. AFRICOM’s security work will be very supportive of those, but to look to it to do all of that…that was one of the mistakes when it first started; it looked like AFRICOM was going to try to do everything, and people thought “What’s this? the militarization of U.S. policy?” AFRICOM has had to work through all of that. But from a purely— “How do you organize and work with militaries in Africa,” I think AFRICOM was the right decision.

Carson: AFRICOM is an important element in U.S. policy toward Africa today, but it is only one element in our policy toolkit. The consolidation of our disparate military operations under one command was
a very efficient and positive decision. It demonstrated that the U.S. is concerned and recognizes the growing importance of what is happening on the security side in Africa.

But we have to avoid the impression that there has been a militarization of our policies across Africa. We have always had military attaches and military assistance officers in many of our posts on the continent, who have done great work on behalf of the United States. Now that they are all under one command they can do that work more efficiently—and that is a very positive effect. But we also must recognize that we need a complete and holistic set of policies when dealing with Africa. And those policies should come from the State Department; from USAID and the development organizations; the Commerce Department; as well as from the Defense Department.

AFRICOM is doing some very vital and important work across Africa but it cannot be a substitute for USAID; it cannot be a substitute for the Commerce Department, or the Agriculture Department—in promoting trade and investment, or promoting agricultural trade—and it cannot be another Peace Corps, with weapons. AFRICOM has a role but it is important that it be seen as a part of a holistic policy toward Africa and not a dominant, or overarching part of that policy. For the most part the work that we do across Africa is best done by organizations that are outside of the defense and security establishment; best done by the State Department; best done by USAID or the development institutions; and best done by those organizations like OPIC or the Export-Import Bank that promote trade.

All of Africa is not in conflict. All of Africa is not being destabilized by terrorism. All of Africa is not caught up in civil war. All of Africa probably needs good defense and security forces, but they do not need the kind of high-level, kinetic engagement that some would associate with the programs in Mali or the war in Somalia. So, it’s important that we look at this holistically.

One thing that is sometimes overlooked is that we have a number of what I call heritage conflicts in Africa—conflicts that have gone on for decades, that have gone on since the independence of African states. They have been too complicated, too complex, too hard to resolve, and they have dragged on, and on, and on. But for the most part, conflict has actually declined across Africa over the past thirty or forty years; except in these heritage cases. We no longer have the conflicts of the 1970s and the 1980s. We do not have armed conflict in South Africa; we do not have armed conflict in Angola; we do not have armed conflict in Mozambique, or Zimbabwe. The wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone have ended. Where we do have conflicts today are areas that have been in conflict for decades.

The problems in the Sudan and South Sudan did not start with Darfur, they started in 1957 and have been going on since then. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the problems there did not start with the collapse of the Mobutu regime in 1997 and 1998, they started six months after independence. The first UN peacekeepers went into the DRC during the first year of that country’s independence. And today the UN force in the DRC is still the largest peacekeeping program in Africa. These most difficult places in Africa like the Sudan and South Sudan, the DRC, Somalia, and the Central African Republic, have been in conflict for
decades; these countries have long, complicated political histories—and for reasons both domestic and international, too difficult to get our heads around and to take a serious interest in trying to resolve.

Lyman: We have talked about all of these terrible problems in Africa. But one of the most positive things going on in Africa is to see the growing capacity of the new, young generation. They are very entrepreneurial; you have people in Nigeria coming up with new technologies; you see the use of technology to help fishermen to know prices in local and global markets; you see them starting businesses in Kenya, in Nigeria, and elsewhere. There is a program called the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) that has now connected thousands of young people to each other across the continent. Some of them are pushing for democracy, some of them pushing for better business opportunities. That’s a very exciting part of Africa, and if they are given a chance—if their governments are really going to open up to them and give them the international connections they need— they will be the future. And some of them are extremely impressive.

I would like to return to the issue of soft power. There is a critique that says Western style democracy might not be the most appropriate model to promote stability and economic growth and development in Africa; that there might be an Asian model, a Lee Kuan Yew style model, or a Chinese model, represented by Rwanda and President Kagame, and Ethiopia. Do you give any credence to that idea?

Lyman: We heard that in the 1960s a great deal, when dictators claimed they were going to be enlightened despots. But they weren’t enlightened, they were just despots. Today there are countries that have adopted aggressive development programs behind rather autocratic governments, like Rwanda and Ethiopia, but you also see the cracks that are growing in those countries underneath the surface. In Ethiopia, there has been tremendous unrest in the last year, which is very threatening to that country. The idea that a democratic system based on the rule of law, with regular elections, is incompatible with Africa—I remember Kofi Anan saying there is nothing Western about human rights! Ask any African father whose son has been jailed whether he thinks that is an appropriate African way of dealing with dissent.

The societies that have good, solid democratic institutions like Ghana today, or Mauritius, or even South Africa despite all its problems, in those states you see stability and growth. I think the argument that autocratic, enlightened despots are right for Africa is a myth.

Carson: There is only democracy. There is no African democracy. There is no American democracy. There is no Asian democracy. There is no Latin American democracy. Democracy represents a set of fundamental values and principles that are to be found in all democracies, wherever they are in the world, whatever the region.

We have different democratic systems. There are federal systems and unitary systems. There are parliamentary systems, presidential, and prime ministerial systems. There are mixed systems with prime minister over president, or president over prime minister. There are unicameral and bicameral democracies.

But democracy at its cores is based on a set of values and principles; multi-party
democratic rule, which allows for routine and periodic elections for people to select their leaders, leaders who respect freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of association, freedom of the press, and commit to protect civil liberties and property alike. Democracy protects the rights of citizens as well as corporate interests. These principles are universal. We do not talk about the Asian model of democracy when we describe India. Some refer to the Singapore model of Lee Kuan Yew; of course Singapore is comparatively easy to manage being that Singapore is a city-state. There is an alternative model out there. I will give it a blunt name—it is authoritarian capitalism. There is a model that you see in China—authoritarian political systems operating alongside a quasi-free market, economic system, where private ownership and property are now allowed and the state no longer controls all elements of the economy. Individuals can own and build up assets of capital, but political controls is rigid and authoritarian, and political space is restricted. That is the model that Paul Kagame in Rwanda, and others elsewhere are pursuing. But I believe that this model will be just as much a failure as the old Soviet and socialist models were, because it does not provide protections of individual civil liberties, and it does not provide protection of corporate and intellectual property.

Governments that will take a person’s rights away, will also take their factory away; will take their intellectual property away; and will take a person’s ideas away, whenever they come in conflict with the political thinking of the state. I think that democracy is absolutely important and every time we put an investment into an authoritarian state it has a higher risk of failure then if we put it into a democratic one.

**During the past 15 or 20 years China has emerged as a growing presence in Africa. There is speculation that the new Administration will impose significant reductions in the foreign assistance budget. What do you think the costs are? What warning would you give to the current Administration with respect to a decrease of support for African development and governance programs, in light of China’s growing presence? What are the risks?**

**Lyman:** It is good to have other countries contributing to the development of Africa. China has done a lot in terms of infrastructure and other kinds of investments. But China is not interested in good governance and it is not interested in fighting corruption. And it is not necessarily always playing by the same set of commercial rules.

It does allow for the United States and China to cooperate in certain areas. We have cooperated with China on peace processes in South Sudan, we both support African Union peacekeeping and peacemaking, and we cooperate in anti-piracy efforts off the coast of Somalia. But if the United States starts to play a lesser role in the broader areas of development and governance in Africa, where will be the strength and support for Africans who believe in those things?

Let me give you an example from the aid program—one of the most successful aid programs that we have in Africa is PEPFAR [President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief], which contributed to arresting the terrible disease [HIV] and gradually getting control of it. It’s expensive—it costs about $3.5 billion per year. If you cut away the overall aid
program and left only PEPFAR—because you cannot stop PEPFAR; people would die if you stopped PEPFAR, literally—but then you are cutting off all the other things, all of the other health programs, all of the governance programs, trade capacity, all of those things, you would be taking much of the best of America out of the equation. And then all of the issues we have talked about—the problems of population and terrorism, excessive migration, etc.—would not be addressed, and then they will come back and bite us in the ankle or worse later on.

If you look at security in a broad sense, these programs are all very much a part of the broad security role in Africa. And if we cut back on them in a substantial way, other countries won’t make up that difference.

Ambassador Carson what is your advice to this Administration?

Carson: Soft power is our most important asset and policy tool across Africa. It is the thing that distinguishes us more than anything else. That soft power is delivered through our development agencies and through our diplomatic engagement. And it has been extraordinarily successful in helping a number of African countries move forward. These soft power instruments have been put in place by both Democratic and Republican administrations and they have been aimed at addressing the most critical issues that face Africa today.

It has been Power Africa, to provide power to the continent that has the least amount of electricity. It has been Feed the Future—helping to create a green revolution across a continent, which is the lowest per capita producer of agricultural goods across the globe. It is PEPFAR, which has helped to stem and reverse the HIV/AIDS pandemic. It is the global health programs, in general, that allow us to work against malaria, to work against ebola, and other contagious diseases that can come into the United States as swiftly as the most direct incoming flight. It is the MCC—the Millennium Challenge Corporation—program, another started during the George Bush Administration that has been instrumental in addressing some of the key infrastructure needs of a number of African countries. It is YALI. It is also the programs of the OPIC and the EXIM Bank. These are critical. And, on a human level, it is organizations like the Peace Corps, and the thousands of volunteers who continue to go out and are, in fact, the personal, daily face of America to hundreds of thousands of Africans across the continent.

This is the array of our soft power. These are the things that give the real meaning to what America is about, and what America is attempting to do. And this is the seriousness of where we are—our soft power is the most important and significant asset in Africa and we have to remember that. While we want to address the security issues that are on the table before us, the best way to ensure stability is through stronger democratic institutions; greater and more inclusive economic development and growth; and providing opportunities for a burgeoning population; and our capacity to work with Africans—at every level, as partners in a collaborative fashion. This is best done through soft power. This is best done through working and supporting democratic institutions, and development that is inclusive, broad-based, and accessible to everyone.
In 2014, water workers survey a biomass site in Kenya as part of the USAID Power Africa initiative. (Alexa Kameru/ USAID)
Several months into the new Administration, attention throughout the corridors of Washington is understandably focused on the foreign policy priorities that will define the government’s early legacy, from Syria and Iraq to the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea. Amid the urgency of these pressing national security issues, challenges on the African continent are unlikely to enjoy the same emphasis—throughout the 2016 presidential campaign, no candidate articulated an Africa policy, and the presidential transition team did not emphasize the region among its priorities. Despite this initial lack of focus, however, Africa’s emerging geopolitical influence and increasingly transnational threats will demand significant attention. This article highlights three key aspects of the African security landscape that will become more dynamic and complex during the next four years and beyond and have far-reaching impacts on U.S. policy: the nature of near- and long-term security threats; the trajectory of African partners; and the diverse group of external actors poised to increase engagement. Throughout, I argue that a modestly-resourced but proactive and partnership-based approach would allow policymakers to temper the challenges and take advantage of the opportunities that will be presented.

Africa’s Rise

Africa’s importance on the geopolitical stage and Washington’s attention to the continent have both increased dramatically during the past two decades. This represents a marked shift from the years immediately following the end of the Cold War, when African security issues essentially...
disappeared from Washington’s radar. Political scientist Nicolas van de Walle argues that the 1990s “probably marked a low point in U.S.–Africa relations,” with the continent treated as “a national interest backwater.” A 1995 U.S. Security Strategy for sub-Saharan Africa concluded that, “ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.”

By the close of the 20th century, the number of Peace Corps volunteers on the continent was about half the level of the late 1960s, while the U.S. State Department suffered from a growing number of unfilled positions and the closure of multiple consulates.

Greater international interest in Africa and a greater African role in global affairs have heightened the complexity of the continent’s political, economic, and security environment, and many of the dynamics that defined the past two decades of U.S. policy no longer hold.

Long-held geostrategic calculations began to be reassessed soon thereafter, however, with an increased emphasis on Africa in parallel to its emerging role in global affairs. The continent is home to 1.2 billion people and accounts for more than a quarter of UN member states. It is located on key global trade routes, comprises more than one fifth of the world’s land, and is larger than Europe, China, India, and the United States combined. Africa is also economically vibrant—despite a recent downturn in global commodity prices, its economy has approximately doubled in size since 2000 and foreign direct investment has increased fivefold, surpassing official development assistance. In 2000, The Economist dubbed Africa “The Hopeless Continent;” 13 years later, the same journal ran a special report on “Emerging Africa” with the headline, “A Hopeful Continent.”

During the past two administrations—Republican and Democratic—a consensus gradually emerged that Africa’s opportunities were worth seizing and its challenges worth addressing. This commitment is evidenced by Bush Administration initiatives such as the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM); followed by the Obama Administration’s leadership on the 2014 U.S.–Africa Leaders’ Summit, the Young African Leaders Initiative, and the Power Africa initiative. Consistent throughout has been support for multiple iterations of the Clinton-era African Growth and Opportunity Act.

Africa’s increased priority is also a result of the continent that it is projected to become. Home to the world’s most youthful population, some of its most dynamic economies, and vast untapped resources, Africa is poised to experience greater change than any other part of the world over the next generation. The continent’s population will nearly double in the next 30 years and its economy, more closely integrated into the global marketplace, is expected to quadruple in size over the same period. With more than 60 percent of the world’s total uncultivated arable land, Africa could increase its agricultural production threefold by 2050.

Greater international interest in Africa and a greater African role in global affairs have heightened the complexity of the continent’s political, economic, and security environment, and many of the dynamics that defined
the past two decades of U.S. policy no longer hold. Power and influence—among both positive and negative actors—is more dispersed than at any time since the precolonial era, contributing to greater uncertainty about the region’s trajectory. Policymakers in the next four years will be forced to contend with a multi-threat, multipolar Africa, with significant dynamism and diversity in the nature of the threat, African partner capacity, and international engagement.

**A Shifting Near-Term Threat Environment**

The nature of African insecurity has undergone a fundamental shift, representing a marked departure from past conflict dynamics and challenging established policy mechanisms. The postcolonial period was typified by rebellions and uprisings, the post–Cold War years by a series of bloody proxy conflicts, and the 1998 embassy bombings ushered in a period of diffuse and persistent al-Qaeda threat. The arrival of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to Africa’s shores and the promotion of personal radicalization and foreign fighter flows via online forums present a more diffuse, irregular, and asymmetric threat than ever before and represent a new era for the African threat environment.

Immediately following independence, many new African states experienced difficulty consolidating control and were forced to contend with internal unrest, the primary security issue of the time. According to a British government report, 61 successful coups d’état took place from independence to 1990; more than 75 additional coup attempts were unsuccessful during this period. From 1960 to 2000, an African leader stood a three in five chance of being killed in office or forced into exile. Meanwhile, breakaway regions in Nigeria, Congo, and elsewhere fought (albeit unsuccessfully) for secession.

In the 1990s, cast adrift from Cold War superpower patronage, the continent experienced its bloodiest decade in modern history. A series of state-on-state, civil, and proxy wars engulfed the region, including a multi-nation central African conflict that resulted in the deaths of several million, and the 1998–2000 Ethiopia–Eritrea border war in which more than 100,000 were likely killed. In 1993–94, some 40 percent of African states were involved in serious conflict. While notable for the belligerents’ degree of predation and brutality, these hostilities generally followed the conventional outline of one armed faction pitched against another, often with control of the government at stake.

The August 1998 terrorist attacks in Kenya and Tanzania brought al-Qaeda to the attention of the American public for the first time and underscored a shift toward an asymmetric, complex, and more globalized threat. This threat was led by al-Qaeda and its affiliates, but overlapped with other illicit transnational networks already profiting from the safehaven afforded by weak institutions throughout the continent. In a departure from past eras of African conflict that were largely directed at securing or retaining the levers of governmental power, the aims of instability broadened to include the ideological and economic, rendering indigenous security responses inadequate. With large swaths of the continent effectively un- or under-governed and vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist groups, Africa emerged as a key front in U.S. efforts to combat violent extremism. This new generation of African
conflict is simultaneously localized and globalized and, because it leverages international networks and occurs in an ever more interconnected world, has a greater potential impact on U.S. security (and U.S. security strategy) than bloodier but isolated conflicts of the past.

Nearly two decades after the embassy bombings, the al-Qaeda threat on the continent persists. In 2015, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its affiliates laid siege to a hotel in Bamako, Mali; the next year, the group mounted similar attacks against targets in Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire. Across the continent in the Horn of Africa, al-Shabaab remains a potent threat to Somali security and continues to plot and campaign against regional contributors to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Three years ago, however, al-Qaeda lost its monopoly on transnational terror in Africa, with ISIL establishing provinces in Libya and Algeria; one year later, a faction of the Nigeria-based Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the group. ISIL’s arrival on the continent coincides with an overall diffusion of the violent extremist organization environment in Africa and across the globe, and constitutes a new chapter in African security threats. While al-Qaeda and ISIL will continue to vie for influence and adherents, both organizations are likely to become more decentralized. They will also become progressively more closely intertwined—or “marbled”—with indigenous grievances and groups, making it increasingly difficult to disaggregate localized concerns from the more far-reaching ambitions of these transnational terrorist organizations. AQIM, al-Shabaab, the ISIL affiliates on the continent, and organizations like Boko Haram to varying degrees, all fuse local secular grievances with global terrorist ideology and prey on marginalized individuals and subgroups in their recruitment.

In Africa, as in other parts of the world, terrorist and other illicit organizations are conducting much of this outreach by expanding their presence in the cyber domain. Faced with challenges to its territorial control in Libya and in the Middle East, ISIL has opened another front amidst the safe haven of the “virtual caliphate.” While remaining committed to holding physical ground, its online presence allows the group to maintain legitimacy, gain support, and coordinate actions globally. ISIL and al-Qaeda affiliates have used this virtual presence to foster their narratives and provide a sense of membership to aspirants across the world; increasingly, the cyber domain has also allowed groups to utilize propaganda in the pursuit of more tangible aims. ISIL leveraged online forums to encourage African foreign fighters to travel to the Middle East and, later, to Libya. In November of last year, issues of both al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s Inspire and ISIL’s Rumiyah—both English-language propaganda magazines—called for lone wolf-style attacks against Western targets. The Rumiyah article provided specific guidance on vehicular attacks modeled after the July event in France, and likely informed the Christmas market attack in Berlin, Germany. African nations’ limited cyber and information operations capability, coupled with rapidly increasing rates of internet access and a vulnerable population, make this a particularly potent threat for the continent.

Underlying and intermingled with these transnational threats, internal instability in
many African states fuels what Africa analyst Andre Le Sage refers to as "a vicious cycle: Africa's irregular threat dynamics sustain black markets directly linked to state corruption, divert attention from democratization efforts, generate or fuel civil wars, drive state collapse, and create safe havens that allow terrorists and more criminals to operate." African nations account for 27 of the 38 most vulnerable countries in The Fund for Peace's 2016 Fragile States Index, and destabilizing events often occur suddenly and unexpectedly, provoking an international response that can take years to address. Recent political violence in Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, and elsewhere raised fears of mass atrocities. Elections, often a flashpoint for instability, are scheduled to take place this year in Angola, Kenya, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, and possibly the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

The Challenge of Long-Term Megatrends

Drivers of the aforementioned security challenges, such as weak governance, limited economic opportunities, and a more connected populace, will be magnified in the coming decades as near-term challenges intersect with long-term megatrends. Three related dynamics in particular—demographics, urbanization, and resource competition—will begin to reach a tipping point. By the end of this decade, these issues will cease to be abstract challenges of the future; instead, they will have a tangible, daily impact on Africa's physical and economic security.

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some of Africa's poorest and most densely-populated regions and areas that are already experiencing significant security issues.

Countries with more than 60 percent of the population under 30 are four times as likely to experience conflict; Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Uganda, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and many other African countries are among those nations facing such a youth bulge. At present, two of three Africans lack access to reliable power and an estimated nine out of ten workers are in the informal economy—rapid population growth will strain systems that are already stressed and could drive marginalized populations toward illicit and terrorist activity. Nigeria, the fifth-most
A populous Christian country and the fifth most populous Muslim country in the world, has a population approaching 200 million. It is expected to pass the United States as the third most populous country in the world before 2050 though, at the market exchange rate, Nigeria’s 2017 budget amounts to $15 billion, about the same as the U.S. state of Utah (population: 3 million).

Population growth without commensurate economic opportunities is also a driver of mass migration, an emerging transnational challenge that is likely to increase amid mounting demographic stresses in Africa. While the debarkation points on Libya’s Mediterranean coast get the most attention, trafficking networks and points of origin further upstream in the pipeline are all exploited by criminal groups and corrupt government officials. More than 180,000 migrants crossed the Mediterranean into Italy last year; the top nine countries of origin are all east or west African and together account for more than 134,000 migrants. Estimates of the illicit cash flow related to this movement vary widely, but it likely accounts for an estimated three to six billion dollars per year. The German Economic Minister recently warned that “if the youth of Africa can’t find work or a future in their own countries, it won’t be hundreds of thousands, but millions that will make their way to Europe.”
Concurrent with this demographic growth is the continent’s increasing urbanization. While Africa currently has the lowest percentage of city dwellers, it is by some measures the world’s fastest urbanizing continent. The number of Africans living in towns and cities is expected to increase from under 500 million today to more than 1.2 billion in the next 30 years. By 2050, 55 percent of Africans will live in urban areas; twice the proportion in 1990. In the next two decades, at least six megacities—Cairo, Dar es Salaam, Johannesburg, Kinshasa, Lagos, and Luanda—will have a population exceeding ten million and an additional dozen cities will have between five and ten million residents.

Like demographic growth, African urbanization offers both promise and pitfalls. Historically, movement to cities facilitates a transition toward a more innovative manufacturing- and service-based economy; cosmopolitan urban centers can also foster a shift away from divisive regional and ethnic-based politics. At the same time, this movement places extraordinary demands on city- and national-level policymakers, many of whom lack urban planning expertise or resources. Nearly two-thirds of African city dwellers are estimated to live in slums without access to basic services, and it is doubtful that infrastructure development will be able to keep up with cities’ rapid population growth.

Coupled with increased access to global press outlets, the internet, and social media, this urbanization is also likely to drive increased engagement from the “African street.” The continent’s public is demonstrating and engaging in unprecedented numbers to demand better government accountability and responsiveness, and elites unwilling to cede or share power are less likely to be tolerated by a population that is both better-informed and more capable of mobilization. Capitals from Burkina Faso to South Africa to Ethiopia experienced mass protests last year, and the pattern is unlikely to abate. This mobilization will be facilitated by better and more available communications technology—mobile phone ownership has increased from 15 million in 2000 to 760 million in 2014, and Africa will likely have the highest mobile data growth rate in the world during the next several years.

Finally, there is likely to be a shift in the nature of resource competition. The exploitation of Africa’s resource base for illicit profit has been much-publicized—“blood diamonds,” “blood minerals,” “blood oil,” and the like have all entered the popular lexicon. The African continent is estimated to hold 37 percent of key global natural resources, and easier access to markets will likely increase competition and could fuel instability. Future resource-based conflict, however, will likely shift toward a struggle for basic necessities and will be magnified by pre-existing grievances such as political exclusion and economic marginalization. More than 200 million Africans already suffer from water stress, and projected increases to rainfall variability and sea levels will strain both agricultural and urban communities.

Ongoing conflicts in the Sahel and Darfur have each been granted the ignominious title of “First Climate Change War,” and the already unstable swath of Africa between 10°N and 20°N will likely bear the brunt of the climactic changes to come.

**Evolving Partnerships**

At the same time that threat dynamics on the continent are becoming more complex and
diverse, so too is engagement with African partners—a new dispersion of power constitutes the second great challenge facing today’s policymaker. In recent years, an internal African multipolarism has emerged, with power and influence increasingly dispersed away from a handful of key “anchor states” and toward a collection of smaller regional influencers. Meanwhile, the very notion of bilateral, state-to-state engagement has also been diluted, with multinational and sub-national organizations playing a greater role on the African stage. While the complexity of this new, more multipolar reality requires more varied and advanced engagement mechanisms, a more flexible and inclusive outreach effort could also allow Washington to weather isolated and often unpredictable events.

Entering into the 21st century, Africa’s traditional anchor states—Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa—stood as continent-wide hegemons and monopolized international engagement. With strong economies, capable militaries, and a level of internal stability, these nations were able to serve as key intermediaries and leaders in times of crisis. Nigeria’s significant financial and personnel investment in the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group, for example, facilitated an African-led response to conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. South Africa continued to make democratic strides as the presidency of the post-apartheid government peacefully transferred from Nelson Mandela to Thabo Mbeki. In East Africa, the Ethiopian and Kenyan economies were in the midst of an unprecedented boom, with each country’s GDP increasing nearly four-fold in less than a decade.

Today, the anchors’ regional influence is fading as domestic demands mount. Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nigeria are ranked among the 25 most fragile countries in the world, according to The Fund for Peace, and their stagnation or decline will have dramatic impacts on the security landscape. Beset by unprecedented internal protests last year, Ethiopia declared a state of emergency and recalled some of its forces deployed in Somalia. Its neighbor to the south, Kenya, is focused on President Kenyatta’s 2017 reelection campaign and security commitments in Somalia. Nigeria and South Africa, which together account for more than half of sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP, have seen their economies slow due to declining petroleum and commodity prices. Dependent upon crude oil sales for 70 percent of government income, Nigeria—home to one in six Africans—saw its economy contract by 1.7 percent in 2016, and is only expected to grow by 0.6 percent in 2017. Abuja is also consumed by internal security challenges, including ISIL–West Africa/Boko Haram in the north, inter-ethnic violence in the Middle Belt, and instability in the oil-rich Niger
Delta. In January 2001, Nigeria was the leading contributor to UN peacekeeping operations in the world; today it is 14th, below countries like Burkina Faso and Indonesia, and has been tarred by allegations of misconduct.

South Africa, the largest economy on the continent until it was overtaken by Nigeria in 2014, faces mounting political unrest that will likely increase as President Zuma approaches the end of his tenure as President of the African National Congress (ANC) in December 2017. Zuma is beset by corruption allegations, a revolt within the governing ANC, and declining popular support. The South African military, long a regional and continental power, has also experienced a steady decline. In 2013, 13 South African soldiers were killed by rebels in the CAR—it was Pretoria’s most significant military loss since apartheid, and reports indicate that the force lacked adequate supplies, armor, air support, and intelligence.

The vacuum left by these fading hegemons has to a large extent been filled by a more diverse group of medium-sized countries, with medium-sized economies, populations, and militaries. Nearly three quarters of all African peacekeepers originate from these non-anchor states; as do five of the six nations that Washington selected for African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership support. In North Africa, Tunisia has emerged from its own internal, post–Arab Spring challenges to become a key security partner and important intermediary on Libya. In the east, Uganda and Tanzania serve as important peacekeeping contributors—the former is the largest participant in AMISOM, the latter is now the 13th largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, with more than 2,000 personnel deployed to six UN
missions. In central and southern Africa, Rwanda has a strong economy and well-regarded military, while countries like Namibia and Zambia are experiencing some of the strongest economic growth in the world.

In West Africa, the trend toward multipolarity is most apparent. Faced with the transnational threat emanating from their far wealthier neighbor (Nigeria’s GDP is nearly ten times larger than the combined GDP of the countries that it borders), Lake Chad Basin countries Cameroon, Chad, and Niger have mustered limited resources to contain Boko Haram. Peacekeeping stalwarts Ghana and Senegal maintain strong contributions to the UN, with more than 6,500 currently deployed to a dozen missions. Meanwhile, countries like Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire continue a tenuous recovery from recent political uncertainties, bolstered by strong 2016 economic growth rates of 5.2 and 8 percent, respectively.

Given the globalized nature of the current African threat environment, the overall importance of state-to-state engagement—whether with anchor states or otherwise—is likely to continue its downward trajectory. The cross-border nature of terrorist, trafficking, and other threats and the desire for efficiencies highlights the potential for an internationalist approach on the continent that stresses engagement with alliances such as the African Union (AU) and regional groupings like the Economic Community of West African States, Southern African Development Community, and others. The 2014 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review observes that “multilateral peace operations under the aegis of the United Nations, African Union, and sub-regional organizations are playing an increasingly prominent role in maintaining and restoring international security, including through prevention and mitigation of mass atrocities in threat environments that previously would have deterred multilateral action.”

A host of peacekeeping training centers has been established on the continent and the AU has deployed forces to Burundi (2003), Darfur (2007–), and Somalia (2007–); while such missions have been far from ideal, they nonetheless represent a potential multinational African solution to the continent’s problems. Similarly, support to planned regional AU standby brigades could improve response time, lessen the peacekeeping burden of non-African nations, and increase interaction between the continent’s forces. Regional civilian cooperation, such as that provided at Botswana’s International Law Enforcement Academy also promises to improve multinational security efforts.

While multinational responses and partnerships have made steady gains in recent years, there is also an emerging trend toward engagement at the sub-national level. As Europeans engage with the governments of
Scotland and Catalonia, and Americans turn to their state capitol before Washington, so too do many Africans look to the closer and more familiar center of power. This course of action has been practiced most notably in Somalia, where the semiautonomous administrations of Somaliland and Puntland exert greater control of their regions than the Mogadishu-based Federal Government. In Libya, international actors have balanced engagement with the UN-brokered, Tripoli-based Government of National Accord and the militarily-stronger eastern-based House of Representatives. Below the regional level, as anchors weaken, their economic capitals—Lagos, Addis Ababa, Johannesburg, and Nairobi—are expected to see steady economic growth and infrastructure improvements. These and other African “city-states” are likely to become more autonomous in their interactions with foreign governments and the private sector, standing as cosmopolitan development models even as the country around them remains undergoverned and underresourced.

**Broadening External Engagement**

The increasing dynamism and complexity of the threat environment and partner engagement in Africa is paralleled by the third challenge facing the Africa policy community—the growing number of international actors that have prioritized the continent in their diplomatic, economic, and military outreach. A decade of remarkable economic growth and relative peace, coupled with the continent’s prime geostrategic location, has drawn interest from emerging powers outside of Europe searching for resources, markets, and allies. This has reduced the leverage of any one state, including the United States, and has in many circumstances shifted international engagement from a seller’s to a buyer’s market, fostering a more self-confident Africa with leaders diversifying their outreach portfolios beyond established partners.

The legacy of the past two centuries has meant that the former colonial powers and the United States were the primary external influencers in the region. These ties differ from nation to nation but generally remain strong, with 28 African nations represented in the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, 18 in The Commonwealth, and six in the Community of Portuguese Language Countries. Nonetheless, the

**While engagement from India and Brazil represents the expansion of long-established partnerships, the dramatic uptick in interest from majority-Muslim nations—to include Turkey and several Gulf States—will have a profound impact on Africa’s security and economic environment for years to come.**

The Euro–American monopoly on influence has dissipated during the past decade, and will likely continue to do so in the coming years.

China was among the first new powers to recognize Africa’s potential and, while much has already been written about Sino–African relations, the relationship continues to evolve. China overtook the United States as Africa’s leading trading partner in 2009, and its trade with the continent topped $200 billion in 2013. While initially focused on access to raw materials, Beijing’s economic
engagement has matured in recent years—today, more than half of China’s foreign direct investment is outside of commodities; including services, banking, construction, and manufacturing. Beijing’s security interests on the continent have also shifted. While it remains a key no-strings-attached arms supplier to Africa, Beijing has also taken a more hands-on approach to defense engagement. More than 2,200 of China’s 2,600 personnel on UN peacekeeping missions are stationed on the continent, including its first-ever peacekeeping infantry battalion in South Sudan. In 2008, China deployed its first warships to antipiracy patrols off the Horn of Africa. Beijing is also building its first overseas military outpost in Djibouti, approximately eight miles from Camp Lemonnier, the only permanent U.S. military base in Africa. While the Sino–African relationship continues to evolve, it is not without its challenges. Critics have highlighted Beijing’s focus on elite-to-elite engagement, its lack of commitment to building vocational skills among African employees, and the poor quality of the goods that it imports—in the DRC, Lingala speakers coined the adjective nguanzu, derived from the Chinese city of Guangzhou, to mean “unreliable” or “flimsy.”

Following in China’s footsteps—and learning from its missteps—India and Brazil continue to deepen their engagement. India has dramatically increased its trade ties with the continent, from $1 billion in 1995 to $75 billion two decades later. New Delhi’s investment in the India–Africa Forum Summit, held for the first time in 2008 and again in 2011 and 2015, underscores India’s commitment to enhancing business ties with the continent and was reinforced by Prime Minister Modi’s visit last year to East Africa—his first to the African mainland. While maintaining an interest in oil and gas concerns, India has also pursued a softer power approach—the so-called “pro-people model”—that prioritizes education, healthcare, and smaller-scale economic development projects. Leveraging large ethnic Indian communities in East and Southern Africa, Indo–African economic interaction has largely been driven by the private sector. In the security realm, India has focused its defense ties on the same regions, prioritizing Indian Ocean security and UN peacekeeping support.

Home to the largest African population outside of the continent, Brazil has taken advantage of its proximity to West Africa and ties to Lusophone African nations to expand its outreach. With economic engagement focused on mining, oil, gas, and infrastructure projects, trade has increased from $4 billion in 2000 to $28.5 billion in 2013. Like India, Brazil has prioritized vocational development and knowledge sharing and the more than 500 Brazilian companies that have set up a presence in various African countries seek to utilize local workers. This partner-focused engagement, coupled with the influence of Brazilian media in Portuguese-speaking Africa, has earned Brasilia considerable goodwill—it now has 37 embassies on the continent, and 33 African nations have embassies in Brazil.

While engagement from India and Brazil represents the expansion of long-established partnerships, the dramatic uptick in interest from majority-Muslim nations—to include Turkey and several Gulf States—will have a profound impact on Africa’s security and economic environment for years to come. Generally speaking, these nations are less
focused on resource extraction; instead, they have prioritized the development of markets, security assistance, and diplomatic engagement.

Turkey has considerably increased its diplomatic, economic, and security engagements on the continent, and has more than doubled its number of embassies in Africa. Ankara provides extensive assistance to Somalia in particular; it has donated hundreds of millions of dollars, signed a military training agreement with the Somali government in 2012, and in July of last year opened its largest embassy in the world in Mogadishu. Turkey has maintained a longstanding commitment to antipiracy patrols off the coast of Somalia and, in May 2009, a Turkish admiral became the first non-American to command the multinational Combined Task Force-151 in the Gulf of Aden.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia have also focused on East Africa, primarily as a springboard for counter-Houthi operations in Yemen. Since 2015, they have based thousands of troops, with aircraft and naval vessels, at the Eritrean port of Assab, upgrading the facility to a modern expeditionary airbase, deep-water port, and training installation supporting coalition operations in Yemen. Emirati forces have also trained Somali troops, and the UAE has made significant commercial investments in East Africa and the Indian Ocean island states. Dubai Ports World operates facilities in five
African countries and, in May of last year, won a 30-year contract to manage the port of Berbera, Somaliland and expand it into a regional logistics hub with a possible UAE naval presence. Meanwhile, Riyadh is working to secure basing access in Djibouti and has taken a leadership role in Yemen operations.

Gulf State engagement will continue to shape events in North Africa as well. Emirati security engagement in Libya has steadily increased since the fall of Qadhafi, with Abu Dhabi focusing its military assistance—to include advisory support, light attack aircraft and UAVs—on the eastern-based House of Representatives government and its Libyan National Army. The Emirates’ Gulf rivals, the Qataris, have focused their support on western Libya; the Qataris have also increased their influence continent-wide via the Doha-based al-Jazeera.

A final external actor, and one that is poised to become an ever-more significant external actor for Africa, is the diaspora. More than 15 million African migrants currently live in Europe, North America, and Asia. These individuals annually send home $65 billion in officially-recorded remittances (and likely much more informally)—the largest source of external capital flows into Africa. Leveraging their economic influence and improved communications links to home nations, these individuals will likely play a greater role in lobbying their host governments, supporting political movements on the continent, and investing in economic growth in their countries of origin.

**Novel Approaches for a Complex Environment**

A new threat landscape, new partnership paradigms, and new international players in Africa demand innovative policy approaches that can translate modest investment into lasting positive effects. A proactive effort that leverages all instruments of national power—from military engagement and diplomatic outreach to NGO support and private sector investment—and shares the burden with international partners is necessary to seize the opportunities and meet the challenges posed by today’s Africa. This comprehensive “whole-of-nation” approach calls for new efforts at the individual level, within the U.S. national security apparatus, and beyond.

**Use Expertise as a Force Multiplier**

At the individual level, this entails fostering greater Africa expertise in the civil service, military, and private/non-governmental sector. Africa is likely to remain the quintessential “economy of force” mission but, as one scholar notes, “a light footprint cannot be synonymous with insufficient local knowledge.” The number of African Studies programs at U.S. universities falls well behind those that concentrate on the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Focused hiring from these departments and, ideally, an expansion in the number of these programs would promote greater depth of experience and cultural understanding. In the U.S. military, while the standup of AFRICOM represents a strong commitment to Africa, an increase in the number of Foreign Area Officers—particularly outside of the Army, which has already invested considerably in developing Africanists—would provide greater continuity and understanding of the human terrain. An “Africa Hands” program, modeled after similar U.S. military efforts to enhance cultural expertise in Afghanistan–Pakistan and the Asia–Pacific region, could...
support this endeavor. Throughout the government, official encouragement of French, Arabic, Somali, Swahili, and other basic language skills would facilitate the cultural expertise necessary for positive engagement. On the ground, leaders should encourage longer tour lengths and repeat deployments to build skills and relationships; avoiding a dynamic in which frequent turnover ensures a loss of institutional and cultural knowledge.

**Understand that Security Solutions are not Always Military Solutions**

As the shifting nature of the African threat environment demands a holistic U.S. Government response, so too does it demand an approach that takes into account the full range of African security services. Currently, U.S. security assistance is heavily weighted toward the continent’s military forces. Addressing a new era of challenges, however, “means balancing emphasis on professionalizing Africa’s military forces with an equally serious long-term commitment to modernizing law enforcement, civilian intelligence, and border security agencies.”

The continent presently has the lowest per capita ratio of police officers (only 180 per 100,000 citizens) and judges of any region in the world, and these professions are often direly under-resourced and vulnerable to corruption—according to Transparency International, the police are perceived as the single most corrupt institution in Africa and are the most often bribed, followed by the judiciary.

The Security Governance Initiative, a joint endeavor between several U.S. government departments and six African partner nations, offers a promising template for such engagement—SGI programs focus on building the institutional capacity of both civilian and military institutions, increasing security and rule of law.

**Recognize That “One Pole Cannot Support a House”**

Looking more broadly, the increased complexity of African security issues demands an approach that pays heed to the Swahili proverb *kijiti kimoja hakisimamishi jingo*, or “one pole cannot support a house.” Within the government and beyond, interagency leaders must synchronize and more clearly delineate U.S. priorities and realistic long-term objectives on the continent, aligning ends with limited means and ensuring that the many “poles” at their disposal—to include government agencies, the private sector, and international partners—are leveraged to their greatest effect. U.S. security engagement with Africa remains, according to Ambassador William Bellamy, “a fragmented mosaic of loosely connected initiatives covering many countries and addressing many diverse issues in a generally superficial fashion.”

The current emphasis on year-to-year funding with a country-by-country focus does not reflect the complexity on the ground; multiyear funding with a regional focus is required for more coordinated and strategic solutions. Additionally, allied partners need to be brought more closely into the policymaking process—as another former ambassador, Princeton Lyman, argues, “Given the scope of Africa’s problems, mobilizing the maximum amount of cooperation from all external actors would be in the U.S. interest.”

**Conclusion**

Nearly two and a half millennia ago, Aristotle observed that “there is always something new
coming out of Africa.” These words remain resonant today, with new and more diverse threats, partners, and external actors all adding to the complexity of the African security environment and complicating U.S. policy responses. By building a base of expertise on the region, diversifying security engagement, and leveraging all of the foreign policy tools at its disposal, Washington will be postured to meet the challenges and seize the opportunities presented by a dynamic Africa, in this Administration and beyond.

Notes

3 Van de Walle, “U.S. Policy Towards Africa,” 5. By 2008, the State Department’s vacancy rate in Africa posts was approximately 30 percent.
7 Robert Muggah, Armed Violence in Africa: Reflections on the Costs of Crime and Conflict (Geneva: United Nations Development Programme, 2007). Casualty rates are difficult to ascertain with any certainty; particularly with regard to Central Africa. Many scholars consider the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in which an estimated 800,000 were killed, as part of the central African war, and its toll is included in casualty estimates.
13 EUROPOL, Migrant Smuggling in the EU (The Hague: Europol, 2016), 2.
15 Jérôme Chenal, “Habitat III: What is the Agenda for African Cities?” in Sy, ed. Foresight Africa: Top


19 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, October 2016; Subdued Demand: Symptoms and Remedies (Washington, DC: IMF, 2016), 2.

20 Senegal, Ghana, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. Ethiopia is the sole “anchor state” represented among APRRP partner nations.


A Burundi soldier posts security at the Bangui Airport, Central African Republic (CAR) in late 2013. In coordination with the French military and African Union, the U.S. military provided airlift support to help enable African forces to deploy promptly to prevent further spread of sectarian violence and restore security in CAR. (Erik Cardenas/U.S. Air Force)
Continuity and Change in War and Conflict in Africa

BY PAUL D. WILLIAMS

Since the end of the Cold War, Africa has experienced a disproportionately large number of armed conflicts. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), there have been an estimated 630 state-based and nonstate armed conflicts on the continent between 1990 and 2015.¹ Explanations for this glut of armed conflicts in Africa remain the subject of debates.² Nevertheless, between the early 1990s and the late 2000s, Africa underwent a period of significant progress in reducing the number and intensity of armed conflicts.³

Since 2010, however, the continent has witnessed some disturbing upward conflict trends. Specifically, there have been significant reversals in the decline of state-based armed conflicts and deliberate campaigns of violence against civilians; religious and environmental factors have played increasingly significant roles in a wide range of armed conflicts; there has been a dramatic increase in the levels of popular protests across the continent; as well as an exponential rise in the use of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks and suicide bombings. International efforts to respond to some of these developments by deploying more robust and militarized forms of peace operations and interventions have met with at best only limited success.

This article focuses on the major patterns in armed conflict in Africa since 2010. Although there are significant elements of continuity with earlier periods, policymakers and analysts alike

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need to understand and adapt to the ways in which the character of armed conflict on the continent has evolved if they are to develop effective responses. To address these issues the article proceeds in three parts.

The first section sets the scene by summarizing the political context in which organized violence is occurring. It focuses on issues related to incomplete and contested data collection on this topic; the important distinction between state-based and nonstate armed conflicts; the complex array of often incoherent belligerents involved in armed conflicts in Africa; trends in governance, notably backsliding on democratic reforms; as well as more assertive peace operations deployed by the UN and regional organizations within Africa.

The second section analyzes the key elements of continuity in armed conflicts in Africa, focusing on the importance of understanding repeat civil wars and other protracted forms of organized violence; contested government transitions rooted in problems of democratic deficits and often minority rule; continuing forms of interstate contestation and practices of mutual destabilization; as well as the consistently high levels of nonstate armed conflicts, especially when compared to the rest of the world.

The final section highlights some of the more novel patterns since 2010, notably the rise in state-based armed conflicts; growing levels of popular protests; the increased significance of religious (especially Islamist) factors in state-based armed conflicts on the continent; the likelihood of more intense livelihood struggles exacerbated by environmental change, especially among some nonstate actors; and the growing use of remote forms of violence, especially IEDs and suicide bombings. The conclusion reflects on the challenges these developments pose for orthodox approaches to peacemaking on the continent and the more militarized forms of peace operations deployed by both the UN and African Union (AU) involving elements of counterinsurgency, stabilization, and even counterterrorism.

**Context**

The political context in which the current armed conflicts occur exhibits several notable characteristics. The first point is that despite some important recent advances in data collection—most notably in generating geo-referenced data—our collective knowledge about armed conflicts in Africa still rests upon weak foundations. Debate continues among the leading databases over what exactly should be counted as a relevant indicator of armed conflict, including whether to include nonviolent episodes or just events that produce fatalities. There is also the difficult problem of how to collect accurate and comprehensive information about organized violence on the continent, much of which takes place in extremely remote locations. While the analytic community working on these issues has improved its ability to catalogue events by engaging local reporters, field research can be difficult and dangerous, media outlets are unable to report on all relevant conflict events, nongovernmental and international organizations are not uniformly present across the continent, nor are governments there able to provide accurate data, not least because many of them lack stable and effective bureaucracies to act as repositories of such knowledge. Data about casualty figures remains particularly unreliable. This is connected to a third problem of
interpretation: the fog of war is as difficult to penetrate in contemporary Africa as elsewhere. Whose interpretation of events should be treated as authentic? Taken together, analysts and policymakers alike should start from the assumption that our knowledge of this topic is incomplete and contested.

Second, armed conflicts today occur in two distinct “worlds”—those rooted in the African state system that involve governments and their challengers, fought principally over access to state power; and those armed conflicts that occur on the margins or outside of the society of states, fought for reasons other than acquiring state power by a range of nonstate actors including warlord factions, clans, tribes, and various types of militias. Whereas traditional civil wars and interstate conflicts are waged by actors directly connected to Africa’s society of states and seek to improve their status and power within it, the weak states on the continent have also facilitated a world of nonstate armed conflicts fought by actors who are excluded from the state system or exist in its peripheries and fight for other reasons. By failing to control all of their territory, tolerating or sometimes even encouraging unprofessional security forces, or weakening traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, governments in some of the weak states have facilitated the prevalence of such nonstate armed conflicts. As discussed further below, most of the nonstate armed conflicts in Africa revolve around struggles to secure local sources of livelihood, notably issues connected to water, land, and livestock. These “two worlds” have distinct drivers and dynamics although they can occur in the same geographical spaces and sometimes influence one another.

A third notable characteristic of the current political context in Africa is the prevalence of incoherent conflict parties. Most of the state-based armed conflicts on the continent involve a multitude of stakeholders and armed groups, including government forces, paramilitary fighters, militias, as well as opportunistic criminal gangs. Many of these groups are incoherent inasmuch as they lack a single, unified chain of command but operate instead as relatively decentralized entities with their constituent parts retaining significant autonomy. Some of them also lack or fail to articulate clear and coherent political agendas. Engaging with this variety of incoherent conflict parties has posed considerable challenges for peacemakers and peacekeepers trying to manage local consent and retain their impartiality and legitimacy.

A fourth notable characteristic of Africa’s contemporary political landscape is the regression of various forms of governance indicators across parts of the continent. During the past decade or so, governance indicators across Africa were mixed, with some areas showing improvement and others
backsliding. They also vary according to the institution measuring them. The Mo Ibrahim Index on African Governance (IIAG), for instance, reports a slightly increased average governance score across the continent from 2006–15. In contrast, the overall IIAG category of “safety and rule of law” saw a negative trend during that decade, affecting nearly two-thirds of Africa’s citizens.

Similarly, 33 African countries regressed in terms of corruption and bureaucratic effectiveness, with 24 of them registering their worst recorded scores in 2015. Somewhat ominously, two-thirds of African countries (representing 67 percent of Africa’s population) experienced deterioration in levels of freedom of expression during the past decade. This latter finding is confirmed by Freedom House’s work tracking trends in political rights and civil liberties. This shows that annual scores across the 49 countries in sub-Saharan Africa reached a peak of freedom in these areas in 2006 and 2008. Since then, the region’s average scores have gone backwards. By 2016 Freedom House identified only nine sub-Saharan African countries as “free” (representing just 12 percent of the region’s population), 20 as “partly free” (representing 49 percent of the region’s population), and 20 as “not free” (representing 39 percent of the region’s population). In 2008, 11 were identified as “free,” 23 “partly free,” and 14 “not free.” The backsliding of six African countries into the “not free” category is particularly notable when one considers the overall risk of intrastate armed conflict is lowest in democratic countries, highest in anocracies, and the risk rises during periods of contested regime transitions.

Finally, the increased willingness of the UN and Africa’s regional organizations to engage in more robust and militarized forms of peace operations has influenced conflict dynamics in some parts of the continent. Peace operations since 2010 have come close to warfighting or crossed the line against particular “spoiler” groups in the Central African Republic (CAR), Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, and Somalia, as have the multinational forces deployed in Central and West Africa against the Lord’s Resistance Army and Boko Haram respectively. Record numbers of peacekeepers have deployed across the continent in recent years with a range of mandates to use deadly force beyond self-defense, usually to protect civilians, degrade spoiler groups, or extend and consolidate state authority. Many of these operations would not have been possible without a range of international partnerships, including unprecedented levels of cooperation, particularly between the UN and AU.

Continuity

Although the character of Africa’s current armed conflicts has changed in some significant respects, there are also important elements of continuity. This section briefly summarizes four such elements: the preponderance of repeat civil wars and other protracted forms of violence; contested government transitions rooted in problems of democratic deficits and often minority rule; continuing forms of interstate contestation and practices of mutual destabilization; as well as consistently high levels of nonstate armed conflicts, especially when compared to the rest of the world.

First, it is important to recall that most of Africa’s recent state-based armed conflicts are “repeat civil wars.” This phrase was used by
renowned political scientist Barbara Walter to describe “old wars restarted by the same rebels after a period of peace.” This repetitive trend is not confined to Africa but is clearly apparent on the continent. Walter’s study noted that by the 2000s, 90 percent of all civil wars worldwide were repeat civil wars, most of which occurred in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. Incredibly, every civil war that started since 2003 (with the exception of Libya) has been a continuation of a previous civil war. A key policy challenge thus revolves around how to break the cycle and permanently end existing wars and understanding why orthodox approaches to peacemaking in Africa have failed.

As Walter also correctly observed, civil wars “are much more likely to repeat themselves in countries where government elites are unaccountable to the public, where the public does not participate in political life, and where information is not transparent.” It is not democracy or poverty per se, “she concluded, “but very specific accountability mechanisms that make countries more or less likely to experience repeat war.”

This focus on governance leads to the second major element of continuity visible in many armed conflicts across Africa: the importance of contested government transitions stemming from problems of democratic deficits and often the dynamics of minority rule. The roots of contested government transitions lie in the deficit in democratic governance, the increasing militarization of Africa (most notable in rising defense budgets since 2002), the growth in political militias and various manifestations of presidential praetorian guard units, the suffocation of free and fair electoral processes, and the willingness of populations to participate in organized protests against their governments. Such transitions have taken the form of coups d’état as well as other forms of armed conflict.

A third area of significant continuity is that it remains misleading to view most of Africa’s state-based armed conflicts as “internal.” Despite often being classified as “intrastate” or “internal” armed conflicts, they are rarely confined to the territory of just one state and they are all influenced, to a greater or lesser degree, by dynamics and processes at the local, national, regional, and global levels. Moreover, these levels interrelate in fluid ways. As a consequence, it has been relatively common to view modern Africa as lacking many interstate armed conflicts. The problem with this approach is that it ignores the ways in which state-based conflicts in Africa have frequently involved interstate contestation and mutual destabilization. As a recent study by the World Peace Foundation concluded, most so-called intrastate armed conflicts in Africa could be more accurately labelled as “internal conflicts with important internationalized political and military components.” Interstate contestation is much more common than often assumed. It remains evident in persistently high levels of clandestine cross-border military operations and various forms of (sometimes covert) support to proxies by neighboring countries across Africa.

Finally, as noted above with reference to the “two worlds” of Africa’s wars, nonstate armed conflicts remain a prevalent feature of the contemporary landscape. Since the end of the Cold War, data collected by the UCDP has identified Africa as the global epicenter of nonstate armed conflicts, with the continent being home to more than 75 percent of the
global total between 1989 and 2015. During this period, UCDP identified more than 500 nonstate armed conflict dyads in approximately thirty African countries. On average, each of these conflicts has killed an estimated 160 people in battle-related incidents, totaling more than 80,000 battle-related deaths. About three-quarters of these conflicts have occurred in just seven countries—the DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and the Sudan. There are no obvious patterns in the number of nonstate armed conflicts in Africa during this period, although overall there has been a slight increase since the early 1990s with a peak in 2000. Most nonstate armed conflicts stem from localized disputes over sources of livelihood, often related to environmental issues such as access to land and water.

**Change**

To what extent is the character of armed conflict in Africa changing? This section summarizes some of the most significant novel trends since 2010. It focuses on the recent increase in state-based armed conflicts; rising levels of popular protests; the growing significance of religious (especially Islamist) factors in Africa’s state-based armed conflicts; the likelihood of more intense “livelihood” struggles exacerbated by environmental change, especially among some nonstate actors; and the growing use of remote forms of violence, especially IEDs and suicide bombings.

First, having declined considerably from the early 1990s until 2010, the number of state-based armed conflicts in Africa has recently increased. Among the most notable examples of this reversal are the wars centered on northern Nigeria involving Boko Haram, the civil war and NATO-led intervention in Libya, the resurgence of Tuareg rebels and various jihadist insurgents in Mali, the series of revolts and subsequent attempts at ethnic cleansing in the CAR, the spread of the war against al-Shabaab across south-central Somalia and north-eastern Kenya, and the outbreak of a deadly civil war in South Sudan. Not only were these some of the most deadly wars of the 21st century, most of them reflected the repetitive tendencies discussed above. All of them generated new or reinforced peace operations or other forms of external military intervention. They also exhibited important elements of interstate contestation (noted above), where external states, particularly those from the immediate neighborhood, were directly involved politically or militarily or both.

Sadly, these new and intensifying state-based conflicts brought with them an upsurge in the deliberate targeting of civilians by a range of belligerents, including governments, rebels and other nonstate actors. Although the numbers of African civilians killed in these deliberate campaigns of one-sided violence are much fewer than during the mid-1990s, they represent a worrying reversal of the subsequent decline in these episodes that occurred between 1997 and 2010. Any deliberate targeting of civilians represents a failure by the perpetrators to respect contemporary laws of war, international humanitarian law, and hence the fundamental distinction between combatant and noncombatant. But it is notable that some of the existing belligerents in Africa explicitly reject the whole edifice of the modern laws of war, perhaps most notably those groups claiming inspiration from a warped version of religious beliefs. The
deliberate targeting of noncombatants has raised enormous challenges for peacekeepers mandated to protect civilians and for peacemakers who have usually operated on the presumption that the conflict parties will eventually be willing to respect such international norms and legal standards.

A second important development since 2010 has been the large spike in popular protests across Africa. Of course, popular protests in Africa are not new per se but their number has increased significantly since the mid-2000s and especially after 2011 following the Arab Uprising. These protests have emerged from various forms of grievances and frustration driven by unmet popular aspirations for change and the inability or unwillingness of many African governments to respond effectively. As Africanist scholar Valerie Arnould and her colleagues have pointed out, such protests have assumed distinct but related forms:

- They include street demonstrations against rising food prices and the cost of living (Chad, Guinea, Niger), strike actions over arrears in wage payments and labor disputes (Botswana, Nigeria, South Africa, Zimbabwe), protests over rigged elections or attempts by leaders to extend their constitutional term limits (Burkina Faso, Burundi, DRC, Gabon, Togo, Uganda), student protests (Uganda, South Africa), and outbreaks
of unrest over police violence, extortion, corruption and impunity (Chad, Kenya, Senegal, Uganda).

Most of these protests have not developed directly into civil wars or stimulated the formation of insurgencies, but nor are they always completely disconnected from such processes, as the cases of Libya and to a lesser extent Burundi demonstrate. Although unlikely to lead directly to regime change, popular protests are important barometers of the likelihood that the country in question will go through a contested government transition, with all the risks those entail (noted above).

A third source of contemporary change revolves around the impact of environmental change on patterns of armed conflict across at least some parts of Africa. Specifically, what renowned political scientist Scott Straus dubbed “livelihood” struggles, most of which are connected to issues of access to water and land, are likely to increase in number and intensity. Their intensity will probably increase as a result of the availability of cheap but deadly small arms and light weapons. Their number will likely rise because increasingly significant changes in the climate will increase the risk of the outbreak of armed conflict, especially in those parts of Africa that are already suffering the consequences of these global processes more intensely than most regions. To be clear, altered weather patterns are not directly causing more armed conflicts in Africa. Specific wars are always the result of the conscious decisions of groups of humans, not the weather. As a contextual factor, how humans respond to climate change is therefore always politically open-ended. But in contexts of poor governance and already existing conflicts that proliferate across at least a dozen African countries, environmental concerns can be a threat multiplier or exacerbating factor. These effects will not be uniform across entire countries. Rather, they will be felt unevenly and most intensely in particular local settings. It is thus likely that environmental issues will be most relevant to understanding some of Africa’s nonstate armed conflicts rather than interstate contestation and state-based armed conflicts.

A fourth element of change is the growing significance of religious factors in the dynamics of state-based armed conflicts across Africa. In particular, since 2010, varied groups espousing a warped version of Islamic theology to justify their militancy have become more prominent actors in Africa’s conflict landscape. These developments have intensified rising levels of violent extremism, most notably across northern Africa, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa. To be clear, as Caitriona Dowd, a scholar of violent Islamist movements, has persuasively argued, organized violence connected to these groups is not unique but directly comparable to other forms of political violence. Violence connected to groups that claim Islamist credentials such as al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) occurs in areas with high levels of economic, political, and institutional grievances among Muslim populations; a history of pre-existing
violent conflict in other forms in the area; and where such Muslim marginalization has been expanded and intensified through key triggering events in the respective country. Evidence from Africa does not therefore support the thesis that the nature of Islamist violence is global and interconnected. Instead, ideologues and militant leaders piggyback on local grievances against marginalized Muslim populations. Hence, like environmental factors, when religious beliefs have been connected to the outbreak of armed conflict in Africa, it has been when particularly absolutist and divisive groups of political elites have used religious institutions to promote their exclusivist agendas by disseminating an official "script" for violence that contains appeals to a particular interpretation of religion.30

Finally, a fifth set of relatively novel developments concerns the increasing use of "remote violence" in some of Africa’s armed conflicts.31 Especially significant are the more frequent use of IEDs and suicide bombings by a variety of nonstate actors. The use of remote violence across Africa has grown exponentially during the past decade, accounting for 8.93 percent of recorded conflict events in 2014, up from 0.95 percent in 2005.32 With regard to suicide bombings, a database compiled at the University of Chicago has noted similarly rising trends in the use of such tactics. Specifically, it catalogued suicide bombings in 16 African countries, the first of which took place in 1995. Since then, 465 of...
the 483 suicide attacks in Africa recorded up until June 2016 occurred since 2007. They killed 4,822 people and wounded more than 9,000.\textsuperscript{33} Six African countries have suffered most from such asymmetric tactics—Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, and Somalia.

Conclusions

In 2013 African Union leaders celebrated the 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Organization of African Unity by articulating their vision of a continent free from warfare by 2020, encapsulated in the slogan, “Silencing the Guns.” It is important for organizations like the African Union to set and work toward ambitious targets and establish clear visions of their preferred political future. But the developments analyzed in this article should illustrate why this goal and deadline will not be met. Indeed, the elements of both continuity and change currently shaping the character of armed conflict in Africa pose serious challenges to international peacemaking and peacekeeping initiatives. Both of these instruments will need to change quite dramatically if they are to stand a chance of “silencing the guns.”

With regard to peacemaking, the orthodox approach in Africa since the end of the Cold War has been for external mediators to persuade and incentivize local belligerents to accept transitional governments of national unity with power-sharing formulas adopted until a new constitutional order can be agreed. This approach has a mixed record at best, in part because international actors have frequently attempted to conduct these initiatives on the cheap, in a rush, while excluding most representatives of civil society, and by parachuting in senior external mediators who demand a deal is signed by some arbitrary, unrealistic deadline.\textsuperscript{34} Not only have international peacemaking initiatives tended to focus almost exclusively on tackling the larger state-based armed conflicts in Africa—representing just one of the “worlds” of conflict on the continent—they have tended to overlook the political economy dynamics that have often proved crucial to the real negotiations between the conflict parties.\textsuperscript{35}

The rise of extremist groups such as al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and AQIM pose an additional challenge to this model. The unwillingness of governments and these groups to engage in genuine dialogue or, in the latter case, to clearly espouse coherent political agendas beyond vague demands for “Islamic rule” is sorely testing the stated preference of African institutions for inclusive forms of peacemaking.\textsuperscript{36} Indeed, it is notable that the African Union has refused to negotiate with these groups and instead authorized enforcement missions to defeat them. Not only has this development rendered defunct the old peacemaking endgame of transient power-sharing arrangements, it has also made it difficult to engage in peacebuilding activities in territory under the control of such groups.

The limitations of peacemaking through power-sharing have also had important consequences for the record numbers of peacekeepers deployed to Africa in recent years. As noted above, the changing character of armed conflict on the continent has stimulated the deployment of heavily militarized forms of peace operations and military intervention by both the United Nations and African Union that involve elements of warfighting, counterinsurgency, stabilization, and even counterterrorism.
These missions require capabilities that cost more money than traditional peacekeeping but they are also facing serious doctrinal challenges that are undermining their effectiveness.

First, being regularly deployed to active war zones where there is no peace to keep has forced several missions to stretch seemingly to breaking point the traditional notions of impartiality upon which United Nations peacekeeping is based.37 Second, mandates to protect civilians and build state institutions in some of the world’s most protracted and intense crises is a recipe for deploying missions without end. Without a viable peacemaking strategy, even well-resourced, well-prepared, and well-trained peacekeepers face the prospect of treading political water and conducting an exercise in damage limitation without an obvious exit strategy. For underresourced and unprepared peacekeepers the results can be disastrous. Third, peace operations as currently designed have usually focused on addressing national level political dynamics and only secondarily on some local level issues. They are also ill-suited to deal with the localized dynamics driving most of the continent’s nonstate armed conflicts, and which often affect larger state-based wars.38

Finally, it is unrealistic to expect that peacekeeping contingents deployed in archipelagos across one country can effectively deal with transnational actors, regionalized pressures, or globalizing institutions and processes, from the trade in small arms and light weapons to the spread of radical ideologies that affect conflict dynamics in their theater of operations. Indeed, most African-led operations have utilized states from the immediate regional neighborhood as troop-contributing countries, with all the predictably contradictory effects this entails. As far as transnational dynamics are concerned, take the example of organized criminal activities, which are deeply intertwined with many of the conflict parties in African theaters where peacekeepers are deployed. Many of the attacks directed at peacekeepers in Mali, for instance, are linked to organized criminal activities. Yet neither the African Union nor United Nations mandated or equipped their missions to counter organized crime. In some cases the central problem confronting peacekeepers is more akin to dealing with mafia organizations than rebels fighting for a national cause. In the DRC, the government and the UN peacekeepers are said to be “no longer dealing with a political insurgency” but “facing criminal groups with links to transnational organized criminal networks involved in large scale smuggling and laundering.”39 How can peacekeepers fundamentally alter such dynamics when they have not been mandated or appropriately resourced to analyse let alone effectively counter illicit networks and organized criminality?40

Unless policymakers understand and adapt their peacemaking and peacekeeping operations to the shifting character of armed conflict across Africa, international efforts to “silence the guns” will remain ineffective.
Notes

1 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), available at <http://ucdp.uu.se/>.
4 For an overview and comparison of how different organizations collect such data, see Williams, War and Conflict in Africa, chapter 1.
5 Among the most useful continent-wide databases are those produced by the UCDP, available at <http://ucdp.uu.se/>; as well as the Armed Conflict Event and Location Data Project (ACLED), available at <www.acleddata.com>; and the Social Conflict in Africa database, available at <http://ccaps.strausscenter.org/scad/pages/sp-using>.
6 Williams, War and Conflict in Africa, 2.
7 The UCDP defines nonstate armed conflict as the use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. UCDP, available at <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/>.
15 Walter’s research is reminiscent of why the Political Instability Task Force included the concept of “complex events,” defined as being “made up of two or more temporally linked wars and crises … where subsequent flare ups of events are considered continuations.” See endnote 2, “Consolidated State Failure Events,” available at <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/consolidated-state-failure-events>.
17 Ibid., 1263.
19 There have been 13 successful coups in 11 African countries since 2003, most of them in West Africa (CAR, Togo, Mauritania, Guinea, Madagascar, Niger, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Egypt, Lesotho and Burkina Faso).
20 See Williams, War and Conflict in Africa, chapter 2.
26 Straus, “Wars do End!” These would also include pastoral conflicts. See Williams, War and Conflict in Africa, 109–12.


28 Williams, War and Conflict in Africa, chapter 7.

29 Caitriona Dowd, “Grievances, Governance and Islamist Violence in sub-Saharan Africa,” Journal of Modern African Studies, 53:4 (2015), 505–31. Dowd adopts a broad definition of “Islamist” to refer to groups that proactively promote or enforce Islamic ideologies, laws, policies or customs in the state and/or society (507).

30 Williams, War and Conflict in Africa, chapter 7.


32 ACLED, “Political Militias.”


34 Williams, War and Conflict in Africa, chapter 9.


36 The authors of African Politics, African Peace claim that inclusivity is a traditional characteristic of African approaches to peacemaking, paras. 9, 55, 58.


38 For example, Severine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).


40 See, for example, Wibke Hansen, Interfaces Between Peace Operations and Organized Crime (Challenges Forum, Policy Brief 2015).
The Kibera slum in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, is one of Africa’s largest slums with an estimated one million residents. The slum lacks sanitation, trash removal, drainage, safe drinking water, electricity, roads, and other public services. (Trocaire/FLICKR)
Strategic Dilemmas

Rewiring Africa for a Teeming, Urban Future

BY GREG MILLS, JEFFREY HERBST, AND DICKIE DAVIS

Western Powers Take Note—Africa Is Changing Fast

Africa’s population is expanding at rates never seen before. Between now and 2050 it is predicted to double. Most of that growth—80 percent—will occur in urban areas. In the past decade alone, technology—especially mobile phones—has transformed the way Africans communicate and do business. Politics is also changing rapidly. Multiparty elections and popular support for democracy are the norm, even though the record across the continent is uneven and numerous countries have reversed course in recent years.

International and historical experience suggest that mega-trends around population and urban growth are often a double-edged sword: they will amplify the effects of both good and bad policy choices. Hence, if African governments get the policy instruments right and succeed in implementing them, the payoff in terms of economic growth, innovation, and job creation could generate massive development gains for the whole continent. Conversely, if bad policies are followed or good policies are not implemented, the result will be massive instability, joblessness, and “slumification.” In the upcoming decades, much will depend on the quality of governance in Africa and the way new technologies are harnessed.

This article examines the broad strategic implications of these potential paths in Africa. Increased migration pressures and border security are already a significant concern, but they will become exponentially more acute if the more negative scenarios eventuate. The risk, too, of escalating extremism and terrorism, as more and more jobless in Africa are drawn to malign

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ways of supporting themselves and finding meaning in their lives, clearly exists. At the same time, a better governed, more stable Africa with great economic clout would be likely to push for a much greater role in the international system, not least in its security structures so long dominated by the major powers. An Africa more politically secure is likely to find new and more innovative ways to tackle some of the security challenges which Western forces have struggled to mitigate, such as those in Somalia and in parts of the Sahel.

**Microcosm of Challenges: Nigeria**

Nigeria, says its former President Olusegun Obasanjo, comprises three countries. There is one, in the south, where quality of life indicators classify that area’s status in middle-income developing terms. Then there is the average for the whole country; a low-income developing country. And then there are the statistics for the north, wobbling somewhere between a fragile and a failed state.

Such differentiation is linked to the country’s security challenges. President Obasanjo in 2015 said, in explanation of the origins of the militant Islamist group Boko Haram, that “the fundamental issue is social and economic development, a lack of opportunity” which has caused its followers literally, in the terms of its name, “to reject Western education because it has given them so little. Its origins are from the absence of employment” and that, he stresses, is related to education. “In the southeast,” says Obasanjo, literacy is 78 percent, “and in the southwest it is 79 percent. But in the north-east,” where Boko Haram is concentrated, “it is 19 percent.”

He is not alone in expressing such concerns. Kashim Shettima is governor of Borno State, the epicenter of Boko Haram. First elected in 2011, he does not hide his obvious frustration or mince his words about the challenges faced. “Underneath Boko Haram,” he says, “is the cause of extreme poverty, all of this born out of economic deprivation.” The poverty has been aggravated by the high rate of population increase. From an official 177 million today, “By 2020,” he notes, “Nigeria will be at 210 million people; by 2030, 270 million; and, by 2050, 440 million—the third most populous country in the world.” By then, he states, “70 percent of Nigerians will live in northern Nigeria,” with its “cocktail of desertification, youth unemployment, and low output. There is no part,” he reminds, “of the north immune from this madness.”

The road to Jaji, north from Nigeria’s capital, Abuja, offers plenty of evidence of the scale of the challenge. Stores line the highway, selling plastic bottles of red palm oil, guinea fowl eggs, corn, and soil-encrusted yams. In one of the “tanker towns,” more than 100 fuel-tankers take refreshments, says our guide, “of various sorts.” Small businesses operate ceaselessly in the heat and amidst the dust, cooking and selling food, making furniture, changing and patching tires, and repairing cars, trucks and motor-bikes.

Indeed, the chaotic roadside scenes remind of the strength of the human spirit, the seemingly irrepressible ingenuity of Nigerians, and the costs of weak governance. An agricultural economist by training, Shettima rattles off statistics illustrating their plight. "While we import potatoes from South Africa, tomato paste from China, and cabbages from the United States which are
repackaged in Dubai, 70 percent of our farmers are in the drudgery of subsistence agriculture. Whereas our cows produce a litre of milk per day, Europe can do forty times this amount. While entrepreneurial capitalism is embedded in the very psyche of Nigerians,” he laments, “we lack the technical skills and organisation.”

Thus, despite its rich soils and plentiful rainfall, Nigeria is a net food importer. Even though agriculture employs two-thirds of the labour force, the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation calculates that during the past 20 years, value-added per capita in agriculture has risen by less than one percent annually. It estimates that Nigeria has forfeited $10 billion in annual export opportunity from groundnut, palm oil, cocoa, and cotton alone. Nigeria consumes five million tons of rice a year, at least three million of which are imported. Though it is the largest producer of cassava in the world, the average yield is estimated at just under 14 tons per hectare against potential yield of up to 40 tons. Equally, productivity on other cereals remains low, around 1.2 tons per hectare compared, for example, to South African farms which average three times this yield.2

The reasons for the poor agricultural performance include high interest rates and resultant lack of investment, the lack of large-scale commercial plantations, scant use of fertiliser, and an absence of extension services. An underlying issue has been the dominance of crude oil as a source of national revenue and the lack of will to diversify as long as the price was high.

Nigeria’s cities will, however, be the likely site where these strains play out. For example, Lagos is now Africa’s most populous city, surpassing even Cairo, the previous leader. In 1970, its population was 1.4 million. This increased to five million in 1991, and today it is estimated to be more than 20 million, and is estimated to double by 2030. The city generates a quarter of Nigeria’s total GDP. While there are numerous wealthy in the city (that is estimated to have the second largest number of “millionaires” in Africa behind Johannesburg), two thirds of the population live in slums.3 The juxtaposition of such dearth and excess could have a political dimension, given that city dwellers can be much more easily mobilized into mass movements (witness the events in Cairo in January 2011), a feature largely absent in Africa’s post-colonial political history.

Nigeria’s acute internal differences are a metaphor for Africa. The continent’s states are increasingly differentiated in terms of their economic bases, both between each other and within their borders. Regardless, they do share commonalities around politics and governance. This article highlights a number of these common threads and suggests ways in which they might evolve.

**Drivers of African Insecurity**

Four factors will shape patterns of African development and conflict. The first is people. Africa’s share of the world’s population is projected to double to 25 percent by 2050, and to reach 39 percent in 2100. Of the additional 2.4 billion people estimated by the United Nations to be added to the global population by 2050, around 1.3 billion will be born in Africa.4 As the statistician Hans Rosling has noted, “The reason the population is growing in Africa is the same reason that [saw] population growth first in Europe, then in the Americas, then in Asia. It’s when the population goes from a phase where you
have many children born and many who are dying. Then the death rate goes down and [some time later] the birth rate follows."\(^5\)

As table 1 illustrates, most African countries will grow by at least 37 percent during the next twenty years.\(^6\)

All of the major countries get much bigger except for South Africa,\(^7\) which begins to fall out as one of the demographically largest African countries, with possible significant implications for its standing on the continent. In turn, Tanzania—currently one of Africa’s more populous states but not thought of as a giant—will become a notable state on a continental level because its fertility is high even by African standards.

At the same time, Nigeria’s large population and significant growth will mean that on the world stage it will become one of the most demographically significant nations. By 2050, it will surpass both the United States and Indonesia in population, making it third behind India and China—the global giants. As a result, what happens in Nigeria, for good and bad, will only be magnified over time because it will increasingly be the site of one of the world’s largest concentrations of people.

The International Monetary Fund in its April 2015 Sub-Saharan Regional Outlook estimates that in order to maximise on this population dividend, the region will need to

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**Table 1. Percent Increase in Population, 2015–2035**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percent Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>87</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>86</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>58</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>Gambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>75</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
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<td>Ghana</td>
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<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
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<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>57</td>
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<td>Namibia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
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<td>Burundi</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>Senegal</td>
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<td>Congo</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The International Monetary Fund in its April 2015 Sub-Saharan Regional Outlook estimates that in order to maximise on this population dividend, the region will need to

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produce an average of 18 million high-productivity jobs per year until 2035. This is an extremely rapid, possibly unprecedented, rate of growth. It also notes that during this period policies are required to gradually transition jobs from the informal sector, which accounts for about 90 percent of the 400 million jobs in low income sub-Saharan African countries, to non-agricultural formal sector employment, another extremely challenging goal.8

To date job creation has not kept up with existing birth rates. The African Development Bank’s African Economic Outlook 2015, for example, finds that only seven percent of the continental population aged 15–24 in low-income countries had a decent job. In middle-income countries this figure increased marginally to ten percent.9 Underlining this challenge, in 2015 the World Bank forecast that, by 2030, despite major efforts, some 19 percent of Africa’s population will still live in poverty. Those 300 million people will then represent 80 percent of the global population living on less than (the 2005 equivalent of) US $1.25 a day.10

The second driver is where they are going to be living. The UN projects Africa to be the most rapidly urbanizing region, with the percentage of people living in its cities rising 16 percent to 56 percent by 2050.11 During this period, an expected 2.5 billion people will be added to the urban population world-wide, with almost 90 per cent of this increase occurring in Asia and Africa. India, China, and Nigeria are expected to account for 37 percent of the projected growth, with India alone adding 404 million urban dwellers, China 292 million, and Nigeria another 212 million. Africa’s urbanization will far outpace the historical urbanization of developed regions. While the population of London, England grew at two percent annually from 1800 to 1910, doubling every 25 years, Kigali, Rwanda grew at rate of seven percent annually from 1950 to 2010, doubling every 10 years.12 Even the rapid expansion of Asia’s population pales in comparison: it will have grown by a factor of 3.7 between 1950 and 2050, while Africa’s equivalent rate is predicted to be 5.18 from 2000 to 2100.13

So far African urbanization does not seem to have led to industrialization on a similar scale to that experienced in Europe or Asia. Migrants have largely moved from low productivity jobs in rural communities to equally low productivity jobs in urban areas, and thus are not gaining the economic benefit of urban agglomeration, through the availability of labour and concentration of skills it brings.

Cities are predicted to account for 80 percent of global economic growth in the future, a function of efficiencies and economies of scale of people and infrastructure. Realising such growth will, however, require suitable housing, water and sanitation, electricity, and public transport; and these aspects demand, in turn, government planning and delivery of infrastructure, services, and the expansion of the mortgage market beyond the current African level of just three percent.14 When demanding redress, city dwellers can physically threaten the state more directly than peasants because urbanization (plus the spread of technology) facilitates more easily the mobilization of mass movements.

At the same time, urbanization can potentially be positive (for the state) because it is in the cities where the state is strongest
and, at least in some countries, is the only place that it exists. Thus during the next twenty years, many people will be moving to the strongest part of the state, reversing the traditional African pattern of escaping—often because of repression by central authorities—to areas where the state’s “footprint” is lightest. Very little productive economic activity is possible in weakly—or ungoverned spaces because it cannot link into value-chains or national infrastructure. In contrast, those who move to the loci of state power—i.e. cities—seeking greater opportunity and better living conditions will inevitably demand more government accountability and transparency. Greater pressure may stimulate additional investment in infrastructure and administration. Perhaps the greatest irony of politics in Africa is that the most powerful force strengthening states has nothing to do with the actions of governments, but is caused by the independent reproductive and locational decisions of millions of people. Even in as weak a state as Malawi, people will be flooding the cities and there could be more people in the urban areas in 2050 than there are in the entire country in 2016.

This leads to a third major driver: technology. Once the cut-off continent, mobile phones have transformed African connectivity. In the mid-1990s, sub-Saharan Africa connectivity was estimated to be just 0.5 lines per 100 inhabitants (compared to a global average of 15/100), with a waiting list of 3.6 million for fixed lines.15 Half of African countries had no connection at all to the internet in 1995.16 Spurred by greater openness to foreign capital through privatizations and regulatory changes, this situation has transformed. By 2019, it is predicted that voice call traffic in sub-Saharan Africa will increase to 930 million from its current (2015) number of 653 million subscriptions. Similarly, mobile data usage will increase an estimated 20 times between 2013 and 2019, twice the anticipated global expansion, when three in four mobile subscriptions will be internet inclusive. This increase is in line with the global increase in mobile usage, from just 11.1 million users in 1990 to around four billion in 2015, half of whom are using smart phones.

The increase in connectivity has and will continue to significantly reduce the cost of doing business in Africa. African mobile banking platforms have been global leaders, such as MPesa in Kenya. The spread of the communications will also invariably assist in improving transparency, to which there is a political dimension: young people are the ones most likely to be early adopters of technology. This tech wave may well lead to new social movements, or at least new methods of political organization.17 At the very least it will provide greater awareness of what the world outside has on offer.18

The fourth major trend is that of political and economic governance and the implications for growth. African economic growth in the post-independence era can be divided into three periods. After independence came to most countries in the early 1960s, per capita income growth was steady, hitting a high of approximately $943 (in 2005 dollars) in 1974. Then there was a long decline due to weaknesses in commodity markets, poor government policy in many sectors in most countries, and the unrelenting increases in population that made per capita gains very difficult to sustain. Africa as a whole hit bottom in 1994 when per capita income (in constant dollars) was $732, a 22 percent decline from the high in 1974.
Since that low point, per capita incomes have increased because of improvements in commodity markets, higher (notably Chinese-led) levels of investment, the decline of conflict, better government policies, and the boom brought about by the advent of cellular technology. However, many of the gains since 1994 have had, inevitably, to be devoted first to what was lost in the previous period. Thus, it was not until 2007 that Africa again reached the high point in per capita income achieved in 1974. In one sense, the continent as a whole has, from a macroeconomic perspective, nothing to show for 33 years of effort. Since 2007, new records in per capita income have been set almost every year. Per capita income in 2013 is estimated to be (in constant 2005 dollars) $1,018, a gain of 39 percent since the low point in 1994.

There has been a long debate about the relationship between political and economic liberalization. Some have argued that political and economic reform are mutually enhancing. Others, especially in light of the Asian experience, have suggested that economic reform should come first as simultaneous reform is too difficult (especially in very poor countries) and because democratic reform is more probable in richer countries. The debate has intensified because of China’s increasing role in Africa and given Beijing’s well-known view that economic reform should occur in an authoritarian setting. Some have speculated about the emergence of a “Beijing Consensus” in Africa as China’s role grows. Indeed, the success of Rwanda—with a relatively open economy and an authoritarian government—has been widely noted, and many African leaders speak enthusiastically of hoping to duplicate the post–1994 Rwandan experience of stability and efficiency (as well as job security for the incumbent).

The Heritage Foundation in its Index of Economic Freedom from 2015 evaluates almost every country in the world according to governance in a wide variety of areas, including protection of property rights, regulatory efficiency, corruption and openness of markets. In the Index, Mauritius is the top-rated African country and is 10th worldwide, and the only one judged to be “mostly free”—the category that the United States and Canada also are listed under. Table 2 lists almost all African countries by category.

There is not an immediate, obvious association between governance and economic performance. For instance, both Angola and Equatorial Guinea have high economic growth rates despite being labelled “repressed,” because of significant hydrocarbon reserves. However, over the medium- to long-term, governance does matter since commodity prices are cyclical and good governance is necessary to garner investment. While there have been improvements in economic governance across Africa, the overall record is still relatively poor. A significant majority of African countries are in the lower half of the world rankings (including all those in the “mostly free” and “repressed” categories), suggesting strongly that even the improvements in governance that some African countries have undertaken are not enough to move the region as a whole forward.

Political reform began with the end of the Cold War. Before then, only two countries had what could be considered institutionalized democratic systems (Botswana and Mauritius). Between 1990 and 2005, there was a dramatic increase in the number of
Table 2. Economic Freedom of Sub-Saharan Africa, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mostly Free</th>
<th>Moderately Free</th>
<th>Mostly Unfree</th>
<th>Repressed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>São Tomé and Príncipe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>Togo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
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<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

countries considered “free” by Freedom House, from three to eleven, however this improved number still only represents 23 percent of all African nations.

Arguably the bigger movement was from the countries labelled “not free” that were 70 percent in 1990 but only 33 percent in 2005. Most of the countries that moved out of this category migrated to the “partly free” category which went from 24 to 44 percent in 2005. The movement from authoritarian regimes to a more mixed political picture is not surprising. The major change across the continent was that regularly scheduled multiparty elections became almost universal. However, these elections varied enormously in quality. Other democratic institutions (parliaments, courts, constitutional protections) were established but these were nascent and often weak because it is very hard to create such structures. All told, the first fifteen years of Africa’s democratic experiment (1990 to 2005) saw more progress than might be reasonably expected.

While there have been democratic reversals, it is important to note that African citizens continue to support democracy. For example, the Afrobarometer—a pan-African Survey of more than 30 countries—“Index of Demand for Democracy” climbed 15 points in 16 countries surveyed from 2002–12, from 36 percent to 51 percent. Seven out of ten Africans in 34 countries surveyed preferred democracy to “other kinds of government” by 2013. Africans also see elections as the best sign of a democratic regime.

Since the end of the Cold War, too, the frequency in the number of military regimes and coups has declined significantly. Throughout the 1960s–80s much of the African continent had become militarised. Relatively few states avoided military coups, and those that did had to find some accommodation with their armed forces. As one indicator, from 1960–2004 there were 105
violent overthrows of African regimes, more than half the total of regime changes in this period. However, the rate of coups has more than halved since 2000. Even though there has been a revisionist literature on the impact of “good coups” in Africa, the record of economic management and political violence of the “coup era” speaks for itself, as African militaries have as a norm been worse at managing countries than their civilian counterparts.\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{Assessing Responses}

During the past decade, while most African countries were able to enact relatively modest reforms in governance, they were able to grow because regulatory improvements changed perceptions of investors. In addition, the commodity boom and the cell phone revolution routinely promoted growth so that most countries saw around five percent annual increases in the size of their economies.

Such growth is impressive given the region’s history, and has had a positive impact. Between 2011–13 and 2014–15, for example, recent data suggests that “lived poverty” fell in 22 of 33 sub-Saharan countries polled. But poverty remains widespread, with the highest percentage recorded among the people of central and western Africa. On average, in 2014–15 more than 40 percent of African people reported being without food and drinking water, at least once or twice in the past year, while 49 percent were without medical care, 38 percent without fuel, and 74 percent without a monetary income.\textsuperscript{23}

As a result, five percent growth will not be enough to prepare for the coming population increases. Moreover, during the next five years, commodity prices are unlikely to be high, especially as demand from China cools. Thus, governance will become an increasingly important differentiator and relatively well-functioning administrative and regulatory processes will become absolutely critical to assuring even moderately high growth rates. Well-governed countries will also have a better chance of addressing resource shortages that are bound to occur given enduring poverty and the population increases that African countries will experience.

During the commodity boom there was considerable optimism that African economies were changing and that they were no longer dependent on raw material exports. The McKinsey Global Institute claimed that, “[The] commodity boom explains only part of Africa’s growth story. Natural resources directly accounted for just 24 percent of Africa’s GDP growth from 2000–08.” Rather, McKinsey argued that, “the key reasons behind Africa’s growth surge were improved political and macroeconomic stability and microeconomic reforms.”\textsuperscript{24}

As China slows down, it is now clear that the prediction about rising demand was flawed. That makes the observation that African countries had improved their governance even more critical because, if accurate, economic reform would both buffer countries from the shock of declining commodity prices and help with diversification.
Many African states remain riven by fault lines, around ethnicity, religion or race. As noted above, many have weak governance regimes, with a poor record on tackling corruption. Their leadership often centers on individuals rather than institutions, making access difficult for those on the outside, whether these be locals or foreigners seeking a way into the economy. At their operational core, many African states remain networked around “big men” (and a few women), where the terms of engagement are subject to the vagaries of relationships, an environment which breeds corruption and ensures policy unpredictability. There are only a limited number of countries that have been able to break out of the governance trap. They tend to be small, although Ghana is an example of a middle-size country that has performed relatively well.

There are thus grounds for considerable concern given current and potential conflicts and slowing continental economic growth. The International Monetary Fund Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa from October 2015 notes: “Acts of violence by Boko Haram and other insurgency groups have increased in a region spanning Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, but also in Kenya and Mali. . . . These acts of violence weigh on economic activity, strain fiscal budgets, and diminish the prospects for foreign direct investment.”25 For the poorest countries it can become a vicious circle, as research shows that civil war is more likely in low income, low growth countries, and that civil war in turn tends to reduce growth by an average of 2.3 percent per year. Furthermore the characteristics of those most likely to engage in political violence are: being young, being uneducated, and being without dependents—the very section of the population that is set to grow in the poorest African countries during the next 30 years.26

In these cases, the political-economies embody a pressure cooker, where politicians resort to short-term redistributive measures to manage key constituencies and high expectations. Institutional structures, such as Nigeria’s 36 states, are constructed more to ensure the flow of such largesse than to deliver the benefits of decentralised management. These are post-modern places of hardship and hard edges of violence and its corollary of insecurity, where, as the author Paul Theroux observes, its people are “not indestructible ... but badly in need of rescue.”27 They include the touts risking life and limb to sell bootleg books while dodging manic traffic on the highways through Lagos, the gloowering youths loitering on Monrovia’s street corners with little to do, the prostitutes loitering under Abidjan’s street lights beneath the hotel window, some painfully young, haggling and hassling their way through the night, or the great human waves making their way into Kinshasa’s mega-city in the morning to look for work, and drifting back, bobbling spots in the moving dust, mostly empty-handed come sundown.

This is then an Africa not benefiting from rapid urbanization, the demographic dividend, and the density of nascent mega-cities, but a continent where, already, 200 million live in slums, the highest of any continent. These urban areas are in this scenario not promising nodes of development, but suffocating situations of disorder and decay, futureless and hopeless, of endemic unemployment and fragmentary education, where services, where they exist, were designed for a fraction of the current population.
This is the African antidote to the euphoric private equity fund or consultancy trying to sell an upbeat vision of the continent along with its services, or a fund talking up prospective returns on investment. This is not the romantic Africa, but one of rutted and potholed roads, ubiquitous evidence of a lack of investment and maintenance regimes and of a failure of governance. It is the Africa where people have made a plan in the absence of their governments having one; where digital technology remains, cell phones aside, tantalisingly out of reach, but where the old analogue ways no longer work for spares, skills, or systems. This is the Africa of people risking everything and staking their small fortunes on getting to Europe by whatever means possible. But this is not the only way in which Africans have, and might, respond.

**Increasing Challenges Around Poor Governance**

In line with its changing democratic environment and, perhaps, its media penetration and economic circumstances, Africa has seen a 2.5 times increase in the numbers of public protests since 2000. The top drivers of public protests continue to be employment-related claims for wage increases and better working conditions, followed by demands for better public services. As illustrated in the chart, there has also been a rise in different motives, including political divides among citizens. 28

At the other end of the spectrum exists armed conflict and even state failure. Even in the latter case, however, seldom is collapse or failure not in the interests of one group or another—and it can even be a choice, a course of action deliberately and frequently assiduously pursued regardless of the consequences for many citizens. This is a short-term game; while this environment may benefit different groups, the transaction costs are ultimately as ruinous for the privileged elites, if they did but know it, as they are for the nation.

For example, the remnants of those responsible for the Rwandan genocide fled

### Reasons for Public Protest as Percent of All Protests in Africa, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demand for Salary Increase</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Conditions</td>
<td>18%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quality of Public Service Delivery</td>
<td>11%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Divides Including Identity</td>
<td>9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reactions to Executive Overreach</td>
<td>7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demand for Dissolution of Government</td>
<td>5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political or Legal Reforms</td>
<td>4%</td>
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<td>Unpaid Salaries</td>
<td>4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Election Results or Procedures</td>
<td>3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>International/Global Matters</td>
<td>3%</td>
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into what was then Zaire in 1994. About 6,000 remain in the Democratic Republic of the Congo today, grouped into the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), occupying a chunk of the province of North Kivu where Congolese Tutsi, among others, have become a proxy-target for their far-fetched schemes to one day again capture Kigali. This is only part of the reason, however, that war has continued to rage in the Congo. It is an example of the wars that never end, otherwise termed by Jeffrey Gettleman as the “forever wars,” wars not fought over national interests, grievances or even over resources and greed, but those that have their own tautology, where groups fight as a way of life, precisely because there is no state.29 Sub-Saharan Africa is home to the bulk of those countries denoted as “fragile” or “failed.” According to the Foreign Policy/Fund for Peace’s 2015 Failed States Index,30 for example, this includes all of the four in the (top) “very high alert” category (South Sudan, Somalia, Central Africa Republic, and the Sudan), six of the following 11 (Chad, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, Guinea, Haiti, Iraq, Pakistan, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, and Zimbabwe) in the “high alert” category, and a further 13 of the next 22 in the “alert” category.

Yet the threads of fragility—of governance, economics, politics, and society—intersect and play out differently, depending on the local conditions. Until now, the role of African guerrilla movements has been either to overthrow the state, precisely because of all of its inadequacies, or to establish alternative centers of informal control, best described as warlords. But the rise of first al-Qaeda, then al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, and now the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) give cause for reflection.

First they have, in Africa, exploited weak governance and economic disadvantage, particularly lack of employment, to gain support for their organizations. This combined with their strong brand of ideology and resulting robust individual commitment to the cause has allowed for rapid mobilization of support and the creation of forces with a real motivation to fight. Second they have regionalised their conflicts exploiting boundaries and weak international cooperation. Third they have all exploited modern communications to communicate with a global audience. Finally they have begun to engage in state creation rather than just state overthrow. ISIL appears to be aiming to create a new state carved out of several areas according to a different ideology; it is not simply terrorism. This approach may encourage some in those areas of Africa where governance by the state is weak to adopt a similar tactic.

A comparison between north-eastern Nigeria and Zimbabwe is thought provoking. Why despite high unemployment, rising food insecurity and a very weak economy has there not been more unrest in Zimbabwe? The answer would appear to be that no opposition movement has yet been able to tap into the resentment that such conditions breed and motivate people to take the personal risks that change will require. The tough approach taken by the Mugabe regime to internal security and tribal loyalties has so far provided an adequate repressive force. In north-eastern Nigeria, where the conditions are not dissimilar, it is radical Islam that has been the mobilising factor.
What are the means available to deal with such insecurities?

Cementing Long-Term Security: Three Key Elements

Solutions to the endemic and chronic crises of insecurity are articulated, often, in terms of more money or greater technology. A Marshall Plan is the most frequently invoked solution, forgetting that even at that troubled point in Europe’s history, the aid to GDP ratio was lower than it is today across sub-Saharan Africa.

The answer is, as always, less dramatic, reliant more on perspiration than inspiration during a very long term. Three aspects stand out. First, as Borno State’s Governor Shettima argues, there is a “need for a holistic approach. We can,” he says, “accomplish very little without a wider strategy which involves more than just the military.” His argument is that insecurity is a symptom not a cause, and that for healing to occur the underlying drivers of the conflict must be addressed.

This is easier said than done. The causes of such crises as the current one in north-eastern Nigeria have often built up over a considerable period of time and are frequently the result of the partial exclusion from society and/or a mismatch of aspirations of groups of people within a country. Resolution is not a quick business; the period of economic recovery is generally at least as long as the period of decline. Achieving quick meaningful progress is, thus, very challenging and most often achieved through improvements in physical security, which in turn removes some of the urgency for wider change. But these improvements are undermined if simultaneous action is not taken to address the political and economic causes.

When the late Mohammed Yusuf, the former leader of Boko Haram, instructed some unemployed students to rip up their university certificates because “western education had given them nothing,” he was making a much wider point than one simply about education; he was criticising the whole western approach to civilisation and advancing a radical Islamic alternative. Thus, a strategy for north-eastern Nigeria must not only address physical security but must also address issues of economic disadvantage (employment, infrastructure, services, education), weak governance, political inclusion, and of what it means to be Nigerian.

In addressing the economic causes the tendency is to redistribute from central government (or foreign taxpayer) coffers to assuage restive populations. More important is to set the macroeconomic policy and regulatory framework, and avoid the temptation for overt political interference in economic policy making. The scale of job creation required is so large that there must be a conscious effort to harness the power of the private sector at every level. Nigerians know how to do business, what they need are the economic policies and infrastructure to allow their potential to be realised. They need outsiders to invest, and what long-term investors crave is stability and certainty.

In tackling the political causes of such crises a genuine attempt has to be made to improve the political culture. To move away from the worst excesses of a rent-seeking elite, where being in government is seen as a means to acquire personal wealth and to protect patronage networks at the expense of others, toward a more inclusive approach that focuses on delivering services for the benefit...
of all, a meritocratic approach. In this respect Nigerian President Buhari’s recent attempts to crack down on corruption and prosecute those responsible for the worst excesses are an encouraging start. But such change cannot just be driven top down: people have to be encouraged to engage in such cultural change bottom up; not to vote, for example, on just tribal or ethnic grounds. Changing culture on this scale takes considerable time, the right incentives, and long-term, cross regime commitment. Such an approach must also include dialogue with all parties in the conflict, an approach long argued for by Governor Shettima.

Thus, the crisis cannot just be left to the security forces to solve; a comprehensive approach requires whole-of-government attention and “skin in the game.” Finally, it needs to be underpinned by a common narrative which succinctly explains why the current situation has been arrived at, what needs to be done to sort the situation out, and how these actions are going to be achieved.

The second, or perhaps first equal, aspect is the requirement for large dollops of hands-on local leadership concerned with the detail of implementation. The challenges have to be locally owned as do the solutions. Outsiders just cannot do this and it spells trouble if the outsiders want the problem fixed more than the locals. Governor Shettima notes that “[President] Buhari has brought something remarkably un-Nigerian: integrity along with austerity.” This is required since, as the governor puts it, “corruption has become intolerable. While there are tolerable and intolerable levels of corruption, today it has become the aim on its own, which is unsustainable.”

This relates to the nature of institutions and their interplay with hierarchy and networks. “It is in our enlightened self-interest to work for the interests of the people,” says the Governor. “People hate Nigeria’s leadership with a passion. They are contemptuous about it. We need a much more realistic approach to solving problems.” Doing so will demand strong leadership to challenge the system of spoils based largely on ethnicity, religion and geography, and supplant it with a meritocracy. It is here that personal example and transparency will be key. It was interesting to learn that President Buhari owns two mud huts and some 270 head of cattle; but the fact that he put his assets on public record sent a much wider message. It will be far more interesting to see if his ministers also publically declare their assets, and just how many corrupt officials are brought to trial during the next few years.

Such leadership requires governments that are symbolically and materially attentive to the needs of their citizens. Furthermore the leadership needs to be underpinned by a system that can deliver what its leader wants. It is here that the civil service has a vital role to play; for if the civil service, as an institution, does not work people will fall back on other networks to “make stuff happen.” Thus, ensuring the civil service is both trusted and effective needs to be high up the agenda. In the war in Afghanistan this was left much too late and has seriously hampered the governments’ ability to operate.

The advantages are clear despite the manifest short-term threats in so doing. General Charles de Gaulle noted that France vacillated between the woes of a people divided and the fruits of unity. It is crucial in this regard for leadership to create a common
national narrative, not least by delegating power to institutions and ensuring equal opportunities through education.

Finally the first step in a holistic approach is to restore security, thus ensuring that the security forces (the intelligence services, the armed forces, and the police) have the capability to deliver needs to be high on the agenda. Here the focus often tends to be on high-end equipment when in fact a much broader view needs to be taken. It is about numbers of people and how they are trained, distributed and supported. In equipment terms this is less Apache helicopters and fast jets than good boots, clothing, training, light transport, ammunition supply, counter-IED capacity, sound intelligence collection and fusion, and, perhaps more than anything, food. “Most African militaries,” says one foreign observer based in Nigeria, “have an acute logistics problem. The Nigerians have four different types of helicopters, and they yet struggle to feed or resource their army properly. They need a pick-up truck yet they want a Ferrari.” The solution is often more about “thinking” than it is about “things.”

Outsiders can help develop security capacity, but what they can do has big limitations. As Napoleon highlighted in his maxims for war, “moral is to physical as three is to one;” outsiders can help with the physical—supplying equipment and training—and with the conceptual—the “how to fight,” but in motivating an armed force to actually fight there is comparatively little that they can do; this is a national issue. This has been aptly demonstrated in the shortcomings exposed in the Iraqi Army’s performance against ISIL in 2014–15, despite huge amounts of physical assistance from the United States.

In sum, the path of reform and to stability and prosperity is less dramatic than its alternative—collapse. It centers on conservative, carefully orchestrated and telegraphed policy actions, dependent on consistency, strong leadership and long-term application; around governance more than fancy technology.

Save such actions, does Boko Haram or al-Shabaab represent a likely future for some African states? Certainly sub-Saharan Africa is ready-made for guerrillas. Large numbers of marginalised, unschooled and angry youth, and weak government services offer an attractive recruiting sergeant. Failing an appropriate government response, not only could the outcome end up as “wars without end,” but may also, ISIL-like, ensure the conditions and provide the necessary motives for attempts to create alternative methods of control in the form of new states. If demographics, where people will be living, and the impact of technology can be denoted as “certainties,” the variables are the ways—principally through policy, planning, and execution, in a word governance—in which governments respond to these changes. The differences in response will inevitably lead to greater differentiation between countries, where these drivers serve to improve or worsen the prospects for stability.
The discussions with former President Obasanjo and Governor Shettima were had in Abuja, Nigeria in September and October 2015, respectively.

1 United Nations, World Population Projections, the 2012 Revision.


3 AfrAsia Bank and New World Wealth reports that Johannesburg is home to 23,400 millionaires, 30 percent of the African total, with Egypt second on 10,200, Lagos third with 9,100, Cape Town with 8,900, and Nairobi with 6,200.


6 We are grateful to Paul Collier for this insight.


10 Only Hong Kong, Singapore, and New Zealand are considered “free.”


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6 United Nations, World Population Projections, the 2012 Revision.


10 Ibid., xiv.


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View of a transit camp near the Tunisian border with Libya, March 4, 2011. (UK Department for International Development)
The Security Governance Initiative

BY JULIE E. CHALFIN AND LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD

It is estimated that from 2009–14, U.S. assistance to militaries and police in sub-Saharan African exceeded $3 billion. Of this, the United States spent approximately $900 million on peacekeeping efforts alone. The U.S. Government also provided an estimated $90 million in foreign military financing and sold more than $135 million worth of arms. Despite these substantial expenditures and investments, the ability of African states to address their security challenges remains insufficient. Some African peacekeepers are falling short in peacekeeping performance; terrorism and other transnational threats impede human development in several parts of the continent; and African citizens often mistrust their police and military forces. When the fundamental responsibility of the state for the security and justice needs of its citizens is inadequately executed, the result is often increased insecurity and de-legitimization of the government.

Based on years of security assistance delivery, the U.S. Government has concluded that if the aim has been to develop sustained and effective African capacity to tackle security and justice challenges, then the traditional approach for providing security assistance has been incomplete. President Obama in 2014 introduced the Security Governance Initiative (SGI) to respond to this quandary. The Initiative seeks to align partner priorities with U.S. national interests, resources, and expertise to enhance the management, oversight, and accountability of the security and

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Justice sectors. SGI also offers a more comprehensive, effective, and efficient approach for partners addressing security challenges, and for the U.S. Government in providing security assistance. Though still in its infancy, the SGI has ongoing programs in six countries.

**African Security and Justice Sector Challenges**

Security and justice sectors that are weak, poorly managed and coordinated, and degraded by corruption, present significant impediments to sustainable development, democracy, stability, and peace across Africa.

*Governments are more effective in the delivery of services to their population—and are better partners for addressing shared security interests—when they can communicate priorities, capabilities, and requirements, and can efficiently and transparently manage human, material, and financial resources.*

Decades of imbalances in power between military and civilian security institutions, including allocations of resources that heavily favored the military and, more specifically, military operations, have left many African countries with anemic civilian security institutions that lack the capacity or confidence to carry out core functions. This imbalance has further perpetuated an over-reliance on the military. The dynamic created has led to security institutions that do not trust one another and a stove-piped approach for planning and budgeting for security requirements. This paradigm inhibits governments from meeting the demands of complex security challenges that require a whole-of-government effort. The stove-piped approach also leads to redundancies, confusion of roles and responsibilities, and wasteful practices.

While the mismanagement of personnel and resources can lead to inefficiencies in the security sector structure, the lack of oversight and accountability within the entire security system allows corruption and abuse to thrive. Tolerance for corruption and abuse not only erodes security capabilities, but also the trust of the population in the government and its security services. The U.S. Government recognizes that professionalism and sustainment challenges are faced by security institutions around the globe, not just in Africa. However, given that African states are earlier in their state formation process and continue to be dominated by problematic relations between populations and government security forces, the African continent was selected first for this initiative. It is likely that the SGI approach will expand to other parts of the globe as demand for such partnership grows.
Similar problems plague African judicial sectors, which have frequently been marginalized or otherwise neglected by the continent’s strong, executive-centric governments. Conceived of as the formal institutional mechanism that ultimately holds individuals—including government representatives—accountable for civil and criminal infractions, judiciaries are an integral part of the security sector apparatus. Without effective, independent courts that are able to hold security actors accountable, there is nothing to assure citizens that predatory acts will be punished. While traditional justice systems will continue to play an important role in mitigating conflict and meting out justice for Africans, SGI focuses on strengthening modern systems wherever possible, and establishing citizen confidence in the justice process.

The Initiative is distinctive in the broad scope of its institutional mandate which includes armed forces, civilian oversight agencies, police and other internal security organizations, legislatures, and civil society, reflecting a holistic understanding of security. SGI emphasizes collaborative processes and U.S.–host country partnership in pursuing shared national and international security goals.

U.S. Government Assistance

For more than a decade, the U.S. Government has supported security sector reform and defense institution building efforts in Africa,
primarily in countries transitioning from conflict, such as Liberia and South Sudan. In Liberia, the U.S. Department of State (DOS) led the early planning and execution of the reform of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) beginning in 2004. The DOS led policy formulation and played the lead role in implementing defense institute building (DIB) within the fledgling Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) of southern Sudan and eventually South Sudan. These major attempts at reform produced results that were both positive (Liberia) and mixed (South Sudan), which are worthy of close study for DIB practitioners operating in post–conflict contexts.

The commitment by the Liberian political and security leadership to the defense reform process, supported by significant U.S. assistance, resulted in the formation of a professional, competent, and civilian-led Liberian defense force. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) joined with DOS in reform efforts early on, playing a significant training and mentoring role for the AFL, alongside efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and other international partners. U.S. assistance and Liberian political will were instrumental in disbanding the entire existing defense force and re-constituting it from scratch. This fresh start allowed the government to establish institutional norms, infuse national purpose in the AFL, and undertake necessary reforms that would have been resisted by personnel from the AFL serving under the former head of state Charles Taylor. Liberia’s Defense Ministry drew from shared U.S. best practices, such as the recruitment of personnel from across Liberia’s regions and the establishment of and adherence to military induction standards.

Alongside this AFL rebuilding effort, the Liberia National Police (LNP) was maintained and was able to provide public order in coordination with the United Nations (UN) Mission in Liberia so that the AFL development could advance without distraction. The increasing competence of the AFL, and Liberia’s demonstrated ability to protect its people and borders permitted the UN to draw down its peacekeeping mission and plan for its complete withdrawal within the next few years—the mark of a successful exit strategy for U.S. security sector reform efforts. This relatively successful endeavor took place in conjunction with LNP reform, economic progress, and other post–conflict reconstruction efforts that have buoyed the Liberian body politic and placed the country on a solid reconciliation path.

In South Sudan, U.S. assistance began following the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, with a focus on transforming the SPLA from a largely guerrilla force to a professional military, respectful of the rule of law and civilian control. These efforts occurred along with similar work to improve South Sudan’s police and justice systems. In addition to building headquarters and unit infrastructure, and supporting the development of tactical and operational capabilities, U.S. assistance focused on enhancing the command, control, and administration of the force, as well as the establishment of policies, strategies, and procedures to guide the transformation process. Partly owing to the lack of DOD personnel resources and a permissive security and political environment, DOS led the defense institution building mission using
training and advisory teams composed primarily of retired U.S. military personnel embedded in the offices of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army leadership. Later, a second U.S. team was embedded within the offices of the South Sudanese Ministry of Defense directorates.

Despite some initial progress, a number of challenges stymied the overall military professionalization and the DIB effort in South Sudan. These included: 1) a lack of sufficient South Sudanese buy-in as indicated by a lack of resources invested in the sustainment of the force; 2) a lack of coherence with the wider budget and immature public financial management; 3) the inability of leaders to delegate responsibilities; 4) the lack of a human resource management system to strategically vet, develop, and employ personnel; 5) entrenched antagonism to civilian control, even within the Defense Ministry; and 6) the preoccupation of South Sudanese leadership with ongoing conflicts and other political priorities.

As these starkly different outcomes illustrate, certain conditions are necessary for successful institutional reforms to endure. Without political will, absorptive capacity, credible and effective institutions, willingness to independently manage U.S. and other international donor investments, an equal stake in the success of security sector initiatives, and policy commitment to security sector reform, governments will not sustain long-term reforms undertaken with U.S. assistance. In addition, it is imperative that civil society engagement and parliamentary oversight be strengthened to ensure that the security system has checks and balances, and eventually can produce increased government legitimacy.

In 2013, Presidential Policy Directive 23 on Security Sector Assistance (PPD–23) endorsed a comprehensive U.S. strategy for building sustainable partner security sector capacity. PPD–23 provided a framework for the U.S. Government to coordinate efforts and ensure transparency and consistency in security sector assistance delivery. The policies and guidelines offered in PPD–23 also provided the foundation for developing a whole-of-government approach to address the governance obstacles that threaten the sustainability of security sector assistance. Defense institutional capacity building is crucial to these general security assistance management efforts since defense institutions play a pivotal role in the governance of a major component of the security sector. For greatest impact, these efforts must be jointly planned and monitored by the DOS, DOD, and other relevant agencies.

A New Approach

President Obama launched the SGI at the August 2014 United States–Africa Leaders Summit, offering a new approach to improve security sector governance and capacity in Africa. SGI is a coordinated interagency process that promotes inclusivity and partnerships. The Initiative is informed by consultations with a broad audience, including U.S. Government experts, civil society, international donor partners, and other international nongovernmental organizations. This approach is to ensure a thorough understanding of issues and efforts to address security sector governance challenges.

Through SGI, the United States partners with countries to undertake strategic and institutional reforms required for governments to tackle key security challenges, both
in regard to the mission of protecting state institutions and assuring citizen security. The Initiative calls for high-level, bilateral commitments. A foundation based on shared goals and commitments ensures appropriate management, coordination, and prioritization of efforts undertaken under SGI. The SGI focus is intended to foster resiliency within partner governments to not only address short-term disruptions in the security environment, but also to be better able to make strategic choices about their future security posture. SGI also emphasizes productive dialogue with civil society stakeholders.

**Despite good will and intentions, partner institutions might lack skilled human capital to receive assistance, and governments might not have the resources readily available for reforms to which they have committed.**

The SGI approach applies well-known development principles to ensure the commitment of governments and the sustainability of good security sector governance. These principles include: promoting partnership and collaboration; coordinating interagency and inter-ministerial efforts; and adopting a flexible and adaptable approach based on the needs of the SGI partner and the evolving environment.

**Partnership and Collaboration**

The SGI process is based on the premise that sustainable solutions to security sector challenges must come from within the partner country. Through SGI, the U.S. Government launches a dialogue with the partner to identify opportunities to tackle urgent and emerging threats. After securing senior level commitment to the SGI approach, U.S. Embassies facilitate consultations between the SGI interagency teams and other stakeholders, such as representatives from parliaments, local nongovernmental organizations, academics, and other international donors. Consistent diplomatic engagement provides the opportunity for the United States and partners to manage expectations and proceed at the pace in which reforms can occur. Despite good will and intentions, partner institutions might lack skilled human capital to receive assistance, and governments might not have the resources readily available for reforms to which they have committed. The United States and its partners must consider the absorptive capacity to take on the reforms and present a realistic timeline to set up the government for success. SGI design is, therefore, founded on an inclusive developmental approach to help manage expectations and undertake the appropriate efforts at a tempo that does not place undue burden on the partner government.

Based on priorities and requirements articulated by the partner country the U.S. Government will propose specific focus areas for SGI engagement. Focus areas not only reflect partner-country interests, but are selected to draw on a range of available expertise and experience from the U.S. interagency, present options for improving systems to sustain and complement other U.S. security assistance, and provide opportunities for addressing underlying governance challenges that prevent partners from meeting their security objectives. Focus areas proposed should of course also align with U.S. national interests.
Several partners identified defense institution capacity building as a priority area of focus, including Mali, Niger, and Nigeria. Partner countries expressed a desire to improve resources management in particular. In Niger, for instance, a main component of SGI programming is improving the defense sector’s human, material, and financial resource management. Enhancement in these areas not only helps countries to overcome their own security challenges more effectively, but also makes them more capable and sustainable long-term partners for the United States, with the ability to contain local conflicts and prevent them from rising to a threat level that could more directly threaten U.S. interests.

Best practices and lessons learned can be shared through sustained, high-level engagement and through the process of conducting joint analyses in which government officials are more likely to openly discuss any capacity gaps and root causes of security sector challenges. Consultation teams have been able to build a rapport with officials in partner countries, which has facilitated honest and open exchange. This process also establishes a common understanding of the current environment and allows the U.S. Government to offer better informed and targeted assistance to address the systemic issues unique to the partner’s context. Hence, the final Joint Country Action Plan (JCAP) presented to U.S. and partner leadership, upon which an SGI program is based, is the product of in-depth consultations between partner and U.S. government subject matter experts.

SGI activities are developed and implemented using the JCAP as the roadmap. A senior-level SGI Steering Committee comprised of U.S. representatives and senior officials from the partner country, including ministers, deputy ministers, and representatives from the Office of the Presidency, meets regularly to review progress made on the focus areas and intermediate objectives outlined in the JCAP.

**Interagency and Inter-ministerial Coordination**

Interagency coordination and collaboration both within the U.S. Government and with the partner is a hallmark of SGI. The Initiative applies a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach for addressing complex and emerging security challenges. Liaisons from the relevant U.S. government agencies and departments are detailed to the SGI Coordination Office in DOS in order to maintain a constant flow of information between home agencies and SGI planning.

The SGI approach adopts the premise that governments that have a comprehensive understanding of their security sector capabilities, gaps, and deficiencies can more efficiently align resources to address security priorities, and that well-developed policies, systems, and processes allow governments to more effectively manage their security and justice sectors. For some countries however, inter-ministerial coordination can be especially challenging. Often, partner governments need to overcome years of mistrust and rivalry between ministries, and systems that perpetuate stove-piped decision-making processes. The lack of reliable and practical information-sharing between security sector organizations can undermine the effectiveness of each organization. The majority of SGI engagements identify, organize, and call together inter-ministerial representatives to discuss shared interests and challenges.
Repeated interactions over the course of an SGI project, which is expected to be several years, can create and cultivate important intra-governmental relationships.

Despite existing hurdles, SGI countries have voiced a desire to attain the benefits of this approach, recognizing that inter-ministerial coordination and a whole-of-government approach to security builds resiliency and efficiencies into the security sector. Clearly defined roles and responsibilities of each organization, as well as systems for sharing information help to reduce redundancies, ensure a common mission, and institute a process for ministries to hold one another accountable. For example, in Kenya SGI has encouraged improved border management by breaking down stovepipes and providing opportunities to communicate between agencies.

**Flexible and Adaptive**

As threats evolve, priorities shift, and a better understanding of the environment emerges, SGI endeavors to be flexible and to adapt to changing requirements. The SGI Steering Committee within each participating country provides a forum for the U.S. and partner leadership to assess progress and determine whether the objectives presented in the JCAP reflect the evolving environment. For SGI to remain relevant to the partner and, at the same time, satisfy U.S. interests, modifications to the JCAP are open for discussion and must be mutually agreed upon by both the U.S. and partner senior leadership.

**Defense Institution Building**

While SGI is not solely focused on capacity building within defense institutions, there are direct and indirect contributions that SGI makes to enhance the governance of those institutions. There are also many lessons learned from U.S. Government experience in undertaking institutional capacity building efforts in Africa that have informed the SGI process, most importantly, that success depends on the partner’s political commitment and embrace of institutional reform.

Through SGI, mechanisms for information sharing and coordination between ministries are being established, new relationships between the defense sector and other security agencies are being formed, and the distinct roles and functions of the various security agencies are becoming more clearly defined and understood. These outcomes have the potential to result in militaries relinquishing some of the de facto responsibilities they inherited from their colonial legacies or might have acquired over time, and allow ministries of defense to more effectively and efficiently target their efforts and resources to fulfill their primary defense functions.

In some cases, such as in Mali and Nigeria, partners specifically identified the enhancement of defense institution systems as a priority. For example, defense human resource development and management was selected for Mali, and the enhancement of defense procurement and acquisition processes were selected for Nigeria. Although activities to support these areas primarily focus on and benefit the defense sector, the holistic SGI approach encourages the partner to consider institutional capacity building in one sector in relation to broader security priorities and public budget resources.

**Progress**

The U.S. Government selected SGI partner countries based on existing relationships, a
commitment by the governments to the guiding principles of the initiative, and an expressed desire to undertake necessary security sector reforms. Kenya, Niger, Mali, Ghana, Tunisia, and Nigeria are the six initial SGI partners. Since the August 2014 launch, SGI has enjoyed modest successes, and the approach to SGI implementation has been well received.

Kenya

Kenya is the most advanced in SGI implementation. The Government of Kenya was the first of the SGI countries to: receive an interagency consultation team; finalize a JCAP, which was signed on the margins of President Obama’s visit to Nairobi in July 2015; appoint a senior representative as the primary SGI point of contact; and host SGI Senior Steering Committees. The SGI engagement with Kenya has informed the SGI process, including validating the importance of sustained high-level communication and feedback. Progress made to date is mainly due to excellent bilateral collaboration at the senior and working levels, and proactive steps taken by Kenya to meet desired SGI objectives. An example is the development of a plan and process to establish a new Kenyan Customs and Border Protection Agency to integrate border management capabilities and capacities. Without the support of senior Kenyan leadership, working-level officials would not have been empowered to propose the new structure and offer innovative ideas for advancing an integrated border management framework.

The three mutually agreed areas for SGI–Kenya focus on enhancing and coordinating internal security processes and responses. In addition to establishing a holistic approach to border management, which involves elements of the defense sector, SGI is working to enhance police human resources management and the administration of justice. An overarching goal of SGI, and a national security priority for the Government of Kenya, is to foster greater public confidence in security and justice institutions, and prevent the marginalization and radicalization of segments of Kenya’s population. Building institutional capabilities—beyond the defense sector—to detect, deter, prosecute, and eliminate terrorists and violent extremists, will ensure a comprehensive approach for addressing threats that require more than a military response.

Niger

Niger is a country with significant security challenges, including fighting a three-front battle against extremists along the Malian, Libyan, and Nigerian borders, and facing major budgetary challenges as one of the least developed countries in the world. The country has a relatively small military (estimated 12,000) to handle these difficult tasks. SGI seeks to assist the Nigerien Armed Forces and has a large capacity building component. Two of the SGI focus areas, while not dedicated solely to supporting the defense sector, require inputs from the Ministry of Defense and seek to enhance defense institution capacity. Specifically, focus areas are aimed at improving decision-making processes that determine the allocation of human, materiel, and financial resources for security sector requirements. SGI work to date with Nigerien defense institutions includes reviewing processes for managing military personnel, logistics, and budgets, and establishing systems for multi-year planning to more
effectively anticipate and respond to current and emerging threats. For example, SGI is supporting the Defense Ministry to enhance human resourcing procedures, including ensuring consistency in job qualifications and developing a merit-based promotion system. As a result of active participation by senior level defense officials in SGI activities, the government has already begun to institute several of these reforms.

**Mali**

Mali, once held up as an exemplar of successful, democratic development, has been in a crisis since the coup and collapse of the government in 2013, and the subsequent routing of the military by terrorists. This catastrophe weighs heavily on the country today as it simultaneously works on the peace process, institutes systematic security sector reform, and conducts limited counterterrorist operations. Mali’s security institutions, including its defense sector, are addressing several challenges as they work to consolidate and build on the 2013 restoration of democracy and implementation of the 2015 Algiers Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. SGI has provided a forum for the Government of Mali to engage in inter-ministerial discussions on security sector governance priorities, and the opportunity to explore innovative reform options outside of the current system of governance. Through SGI, the U.S. Government has facilitated discussions with Defense Ministry officials to strengthen internal decision-making processes and improve systems that manage the budget, human and materiel resources, strategy, and policy.

Enhancing its defense institutions’ human capacity and budget management will allow the Government of Mali to be more efficient in directing defense resources and governing the defense sector. Establishing processes for managing defense logistics and matching resources to identified needs will enhance the effectiveness of defense efforts and assist the Government of Mali in rebuilding defense institutions that address its national security, and enhance citizen security throughout the country. This foundation will allow the Malian military to better address the requirements of the peace process, as well as the fight against terrorism, in a more sustainable way, which is certainly part of the exit strategy for the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

**Ghana**

As a partner with arguably stronger democratic institutions and a closer connection between the security institutions and the state, Ghana does not have the severity of security challenges faced by some of the other partners. Still, Ghana contends with increased threats along its maritime and land borders, and must continue to be an able contributor to UN and regional peacekeeping operations. The SGI focus in Ghana is to develop and implement comprehensive strategies that address key security sector challenges, which include maritime security, border management, and cyber-crime and cyber security. At the same time, SGI seeks to improve the administration of justice within these domains.

Enhancing defense systems to more effectively coordinate and communicate with other maritime and border-related agencies is a component of SGI in Ghana. Through SGI support, the roles, responsibilities, and legal authorities of the various agencies involved in
maritime and border security will be clearly defined. For example, to protect the future of oil production and the fisheries, both of which are important for state revenue generation, the Ghanaian Navy must engage with civilian security entities. SGI is working to improve the ability of Ghanaian defense institutions to coordinate policies and procedures with other agencies responsible for providing maritime security, and to respond more effectively and efficiently to maritime threats. A clear definition of roles will ensure that suspects and evidence are properly gathered and handled following a maritime event, such as piracy, armed robbery at sea, human trafficking, or illegal fishing. Demonstrating its commitment to SGI, the Government of Ghana has established inter-ministerial working groups to support the implementation of SGI activities.

**Tunisia**

In the wake of the Arab Spring, Tunisia has had to contend with a major political transition, following free and fair elections and the establishment of a new government with high public expectations. SGI in Tunisia focuses primarily on enhancing the legitimacy, capacity, and transparency of the civilian security and justice sectors. Specifically, through SGI, the U.S. government will work with the Government of Tunisia to improve police policies and procedures, particularly with respect to community engagement, and strengthen the judiciary and law enforcement agencies to...
address key drivers of radicalization. Defense institution capacity building will be addressed in Tunisia through the SGI focus on integrating Tunisian border management functions. SGI aims at defining the roles and responsibilities, and coordination and decision-making mechanisms for all border-related agencies, including the military. The coordination and communication between defense institutions and other border-related agencies is critical to stem the flow of extremists, weapons, and illicit goods in and out of Tunisia and, at the same time, facilitate trade and the safe movement of people across the borders.

Nigeria

Following the corrupt and poorly run administration of President Goodluck Jonathan, Nigeria under President Muhammadu Buhari faces major challenges and opportunities. Popular expectations are high and the country must contend with significant security challenges, from militias and oil bunkering in the Delta region to the terrorist group Boko Haram in the northeast of the country. The Nigerian military has significant operational missions with which to contend and still requires significant reform to maximize its capacity to protect Nigeria’s citizens.

Corruption has long diverted resources away from development and governance in Nigeria, fueled instability and violent extremism, and hindered military readiness and effectiveness on the battlefield. The enhancement of defense procurement and acquisition procedures and processes is one of the SGI focus areas for Nigeria. SGI aims to improve the Defense Ministry resource management systems through targeted reforms to procurement and acquisition processes. Established and transparent procedures for needs identification, management, and accountability of defense materiel acquisitions could improve the performance and morale of Nigeria’s defense services by ensuring that service members have the equipment they need and that equipment is maintained and replaced on an appropriate schedule. Systems that ensure that budgetary resources for military acquisitions are used effectively also establish safeguards that can deter corruption.

SGI activities will also contribute to the development of Nigeria’s nationwide emergency response planning and coordination, and the reestablishment of civilian security and justice in Northeast Nigeria. While these two areas primarily focus on determining the roles and capacity of civilian agencies to address these goals, current and future defense sector roles and responsibilities must be reviewed and considered in these plans. Establishing a plan for transitioning civilian responsibilities from the military to civilian agencies, and mechanisms for defense institutions to effectively communicate and coordinate with civilian agencies, especially in the event of an emergency, will be essential for either of these two focus areas to achieve their objectives.

Conclusion

The comprehensive approach that the United States is pursuing with SGI is the culmination of years of lessons learned through providing security sector assistance to African countries in a range of developmental and fragility settings—from extremely poor to institutionally solid, and from post-conflict to steady state. The DoS prioritizes good governance
and has learned that the solutions to Africa’s security challenges rely on both the political will of the partner and its adherence to good governance policies and practices. SGI is helping the U.S. Government to avoid past disappointing results from earlier “train and equip” efforts that were not founded on a solid political and governance dynamic.

SGI provides a blueprint for linking democracy and governance programs and objectives with security assistance to improve the management, accountability, and oversight of the security and justice sectors. Involving a multi-year approach and an active system for monitoring impact, SGI is poised to assist partners in developing security sectors systems that more effectively and efficiently respond to contemporary security challenges, while also supporting African countries’ need for greater transparency and accountability of their institutions. This new approach SGI offers also increases the likelihood that U.S. assistance will be responsibly used and sustained.

The whole-of-government approach to providing security sector assistance allows the U.S. Government to better coordinate interests and assistance, apply our collective understanding to designing programs, and present to partners the wide range of expertise and experience our government has to offer. Engagement with multiple stakeholders, including incorporating the voice of civil society into the process, allows SGI to support a path for greater accountability of security institutions, and enhanced legitimacy of African governments.

Notes


6 SGI is not intended to replace training and equipping assistance programs. Rather, SGI’s central objective is to complement these other efforts, and enable countries to develop policies, institutional structures, and systems that allow them to more efficiently, effectively, and responsibly deliver security and justice to their citizens.


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Tuareg independence fighters advancing toward Mopti, Mali. (Magharebia, 2012)
Brothers Came Back with Weapons

The Effects of Arms Proliferation from Libya

BY NICHOLAS MARSH

In November 2011, Mokhtar Belmokhtar of the North Africa-based al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) told the Mauritanian news agency ANI that “We have been one of the main beneficiaries of the revolutions in the Arab world…As for our acquisition of Libyan armaments that is an absolutely natural thing.”1 His statement summed up the fears expressed by many commentators—to include the author of this article—that large quantities of arms within Libya were left in unsecured stockpiles and would be proliferated to terrorists and insurgents around the world.2 Most vividly, in 2013 the UK’s Daily Mail newspaper, noted “spy chiefs” claim that Libya “has become the Tesco [supermarket] of the world’s illegal arms trade.”3

Large quantities of arms from Libya were illicitly trafficked to Gaza, Mali, the Sinai, and Syria. In Mali and Sinai transfers from Libya qualitatively enhanced the military capacity of nonstate opposition groups by supplying military weapons that had previously been unavailable or in short supply. Large quantities of arms were shipped to Gaza and Syria, but alternative sources of supply mean that Libyan weapons probably did not give groups there new capabilities.

The proliferation of arms from Libya abated after 2013. Since then a combination of national and international initiatives to prevent trafficking, and an upsurge in fighting in Libya have likely reduced illicit arms flows from Libya. Significant quantities of arms have not proliferated from Libya outside North Africa, Syria, and Gaza. Hitherto, proliferation of arms from

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Libya has been a regional problem that has partially been managed by states, and it has not been as destabilizing as feared.

**Stocks of Arms in Libya Prior to the 2011 War**

Prior to 2011 Colonel Qadhafi created arms and ammunition depots throughout Libya. This approach was likely intended to employ a “people’s war” strategy where after an invasion arms would be distributed to the militias and the general population (in 2010 the Libyan armed forces were relatively weak with an estimated 76,000 regular personnel).\(^4\) The government had 400,000–1,000,000 firearms (mostly Kalashnikovs) under its control at the start of the war, according to a 2015 assessment by a Senior Researcher at the Small Arms Survey; and firearms in civilian possession were rare before 2011.\(^5\) Weapons were also supplied to opposition groups by states intervening in the 2011 war. It is likely that given the large stocks of infantry weapons amassed by the Qadhafi regime the external supplies were only a minority of the arms and ammunition circulating in Libya at the end of the 2011 war.

**Trafficking from Libya**

The Libyan civil war started in February 2011 and ended remarkably quickly in October. It featured widespread loss of state control over arms depots that were appropriated by opposition forces. According to the UN Security Council (UNSC) panel of experts, “The western borders of Libya, from Tunisia in the north to Niger in the south, were the focus points for illicit trafficking from Libya quite early on in the uprising, with Algeria reporting its first seizure of weapons coming from Libya in April 2011.”\(^6\) Trafficking out of Libya mostly occurs in environments that are difficult for governments to monitor and control and there is a long history of smuggling goods across the Sahel.\(^7\) Trafficking routes are located in remote areas “which generally lack any kind of border control or institutional presence on the Libyan side and have generally weak control measures on the side of its neighbours.”\(^8\) Porous borders can be found throughout the region, the UNSC panel notes that most “regional State border control capacities are limited; the few official entry points are incapable of regulating the traffic and are therefore easily bypassed by illicit traffickers” and “cross-border security cooperation between these states remains very limited.”\(^9\)

Press reports in English on 75 arms caches seized by government agencies in Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Libya, the Sudan, and Tunisia (the great majority from Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia) provide an overview of trafficking from Libya.\(^10\) Overall, the annual volumes of seized caches presented in Table 1 supports the conclusions highlighted later that the largest outflow of arms and ammunition from Libya occurred in 2012 and 2013; and the importance of transfers of light weapons such as antiaircraft guns or rockets.
THE EFFECTS OF ARMS PROLIFERATION FROM LIBYA

Table 1. Identified Reports of Illicit Arms Seized Annually by Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Libya, the Sudan, and Tunisia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Caches</th>
<th>Firearms</th>
<th>Light Weapons</th>
<th>Ammunition Rounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>248,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>3,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>43,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>330,636</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources

This article is based upon an analysis of published research carried out in the region by UNSC panels of experts investigating sanctions violations, journalists, and research organizations such as Armament Research Services, Conflict Armament Research, and the Small Arms Survey; and from analysis of media reports of arms caches seized by states. Much of the information is directly based upon interviews and fieldwork carried out by people researching arms proliferation, and this has been augmented by use of secondary sources—mainly press reports of arms seizures and Israeli assessments concerning Gaza, that provide insight where little or no fieldwork has taken place (such as Egypt and Algeria). Information from press reports should be used with caution since it may be biased—both whether the seizure was declared by the government; and whether it is subsequently reported in the media. In addition, details of the weapons seized may be misreported by those making a seizure or by a journalist, who did not always identify the numbers of weapons seized. Similarly, assessments by officials based outside an area should be treated with caution, especially as they have not provided an account of methods and sources used. Use of secondary sources provides additional pieces of a jigsaw puzzle that would otherwise be missing, but they are less reliable than research based upon fieldwork.

Effects of the Proliferation of Weapons from Libya

Proliferation of arms from Libya has had an important effect upon conflicts in Mali and Sinai, significant quantities were sent to Gaza and Syria, and arms have proliferated into the hands of nonstate groups in North Africa and beyond. A Malian Taureg spokesman summed up one of the origins of the 2012 rebellion when he stated that “The Libyan crisis shook up the order of things [...] a lot of our brothers have come back with weapons.” The 2015 UNSC panel report similarly concludes that “arms originating from Libya have significantly reinforced the military capacity of terrorist groups operating in different parts of the region, including in Algeria, Egypt, Mali, and Tunisia in particular.”

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of arms from Libya are assessed in the remainder of this article.

Mali and Niger

Mali

Mali offers the most clear-cut case of weapons proliferation from Libya having an effect upon conflict.\(^{14}\) Hundreds of ethnic Tuareg fighters left Libya during and after the 2011 conflict and drove across the desert to northern Mali, and took with them arms that had not previously been common such as anti-tank weapons, mortars, and heavy machineguns.\(^{15}\) They joined with local Tuareg separatists and in January 2012 started a rebellion. Within three months the government had lost control of large areas of northern Mali.\(^{16}\)

The Malian armed forces were said to have been surprised by their opponents’ armaments.\(^ {17}\) An assessment by the Small Arms Survey in 2015 states that trafficking from Libya overcame a previously observed scarcity of heavy machineguns, 23mm canon, and associated ammunition, and the Malian Foreign Minister explained that “All of a sudden we found ourselves face to face with a thousand men, heavily armed.”\(^ {18}\) As found in other conflicts, 14.5mm heavy machineguns mounted on all-terrain vehicles formed a potent insurgent weapon that combined mobility and firepower.

Weapons continued to be transported from Libya to Mali. In 2012 a Malian official claimed that Mokhtar Belmokhtar had “been in Libya for several weeks, notably to procure arms” as AQIM prepared to expand its influence in Northern Mali.\(^ {19}\) The 2014 UNSC panel report documents a “wide range of Libyan materiel” including rifles and two SA–7b antiaircraft missiles that had been definitively traced to prior exports to Libya, and rockets and ammunition that were assumed to have come from Libya based upon similar equipment found there.\(^ {20}\)

Arms were reported to have been trafficked into Mali via Niger; via Algeria; and via Tunisia and then Algeria.\(^ {21}\) In addition to dedicated arms traffickers, criminal groups engaged in smuggling drugs and other contraband were also reported to be involved in smuggling Libyan arms.\(^ {22}\) The Tunisian army intercepted several convoys transporting military material reported to be destined for Mali; as did authorities in Niger and Algeria.\(^ {23}\) Libyan arms played an important role in the initiation of the fighting in 2012, but the role later should not be over stated. International intervention in 2013 most likely reduced trafficking from Libya. It also appears that arms from Libya were not the most important source sustaining the conflict after January 2012. Analysis of tons of material seized by French troops based in Mali shows that the main source of arms and ammunition for opposition fighters was from the Malian armed forces.\(^ {24}\) The initial defeat of the Malian army allowed the opposition forces to seize arms depots abandoned by fleeing soldiers, and this started a cascade, whereby each capture of weapons and ammunition strengthened the fighters and allowed them to capture more depots.

Fearing that opposition groups were in a position to threaten the Malian capital Bamako, in January 2013 France launched Opération Serval.\(^ {25}\) At its height the operation involved 5,000 French troops, plus aircraft, and armoured vehicles. The 2014 UNSC panel states that as a result of French and Malian military operations in 2013, "Arms
flows to northern Mali have been destabilized by those operations but have not disappeared.” In 2014 Opération Serval was replaced by Opération Barkhane, an ongoing anti-insurgent operation in the Sahel and based in Chad, which as of last January had 4,000 French troops, and cooperates with other UN and international forces in the region; one objective is to disrupt arms trafficking networks.

A 2014 analysis identified three chronological waves of arms acquisition: first of small arms and light weapons from Libyan stockpiles; the second wave of Malian army equipment from captured bases; third, after the French intervention limited further base captures and interdicted trafficking from Libya, fighters raised funds and purchased arms via illicit regional markets (including from Nigerians, Chadians, and Libyans). The 2015 UNSC panel states that arms from Libya “destined for terrorist groups in Mali” was seized or destroyed on several occasions in 2014 in Niger by the French-led Opération Barkhane.” Similarly, the 2016 UNSC panel report states that “transfers of arms from Libya to Mali and the Niger have decreased in intensity thanks in large part to Opération Barkhane” though seizures continued. As well as preventing trafficking, it is likely that the French intervention prompted traffickers to use smaller convoys that are harder to detect.

Niger

Niger has been affected as a transit route from Libya to Mali, and by weapons proliferating in the country. In particular, during September 2011 three convoys containing former members of the Libyan government and large quantities of arms were seized by Nigerien authorities. The Nigerien army reported seizures during 2012 of 180 weapons and ammunition that were thought to have originated in Libya.

In October 2014 French troops in northern Niger intercepted a convoy bound for Mali of six all-terrain vehicles that had started their journey in Libya carrying several tonnes of weapons and ammunition, including antiaircraft missiles, 23mm cannon, machineguns, ammunition, and 100 anti-tank rockets. A Conflict Armament Research report summarizes reports of six known convoys carrying arms passing through Niger on a traditional smuggling route between Libya and Mali during 2014–15. It is very likely that arms trafficking from Libya to Mali continued through last year.

A suicide attack took place in Niger in 2013, and one of the rifles was identified as likely coming from Libya. There are also reports of criminals having obtained weapons from Libya, for example the 2012 UNSC report states that “cases of armed robbery have recently dramatically increased, particularly in northern Niger and northern Mali. Criminality is apparently rising in parallel with the influx of weapons.” The 2014
UNSC report also notes complaints from Nigerien officials that weapons from Libya were obtained by civilians.\textsuperscript{38}

### Tunisia and Algeria

#### Tunisia

In 2015 authorities in Tunisia stated that “most military material used in terrorist attacks comes from Libya.”\textsuperscript{39} A researcher for the Small Arms Survey who conducted field research in Tunisia suggests that the initial instances of trafficking occurred during the 2011 war when refugees from Libya sold personal possessions, including Kalashnikovs, after they arrived in Tunisia.\textsuperscript{40} In particular, troops loyal to Qadhafi who left Libya with their families have been identified as a key source of arms smuggled into Tunisia during the civil war.\textsuperscript{41} Arms trafficking into Tunisia increased after 2011; but limited demand for illicit weapons in Tunisia means that there were probably fewer instances of trafficking compared to Algeria, Egypt, Mali, and Niger.\textsuperscript{42} The UNSC panel highlighted two large caches located by Tunisian authorities in 2013, one containing eight complete SA–7b portable antiaircraft missiles, which originated in Libya.\textsuperscript{43}

A summary of press reports of seizures of 11 caches in Tunisia from 2011 to September 2016 is presented in Table 2. Two of the caches were associated with smugglers, and two with opposition groups.

Analysis of reports of seizures supports findings from fieldwork that trafficking into Tunisia was limited (at least compared to other destinations such as Egypt or Mali).\textsuperscript{44} The most likely explanation is a lower level of demand in Tunisia (related to lower levels of criminal and political violence) and Tunisian government attempts to prevent trafficking.

#### Algeria

Algerian government officials and media sources claimed that weapons from Libya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Caches</th>
<th>Items Included</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identified as from Libya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>&gt; 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kalashnikovs</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspected to have come from Libya</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>&gt; 20,000 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kalashnikovs</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RPG launchers</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near the border with Libya</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>&gt; 24,864 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-tank mines</td>
<td>&gt; 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kalashnikovs</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rockets</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RPG launchers</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(along with Libyan uniforms and vehicles registered in Libya) had been used in a January 2013 crisis which involved hundreds of workers being held hostage at a desert gas facility, though the origin of the weapons was not confirmed. The 2013 UNSC panel report published summary statistics of seizures by Algeria of arms originating from Libya during April 2011 to March 2012, which included 103 Kalashnikovs, 63 machineguns, 17 other firearms, 510 rockets, and 3 rocket propelled grenades. The Algerian authorities reported to the UNSC panel that trafficking was carried out by both petty criminals and also “organized terrorist and criminal networks.”

Press reports from Algeria on arms seizures show a similar pattern and are summarized in Table 3.

Three caches were identified as being en route to Mali—two in 2012 and another in 2014. Six caches were associated with armed opposition groups, three with smugglers or criminals, and one with an individual. More weapons were reported to have been seized in Algeria than in Tunisia, one explanation being that Algeria lies on a direct route between Libya and Mali.

**Egypt, the Sinai, and Gaza**

*Trafficking into and through Egypt*

Weapons have been smuggled overland through Egypt to the conflicts in the Sinai and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Caches</th>
<th>Items Included</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identified as from Libya</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>&gt; 49,104 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Antiaircraft gun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Antiaircraft missiles</td>
<td>&gt;= 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-tank missiles</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RPG launchers</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspected to have come from Libya</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Explosive belts</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Guns</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Heavy arms”*</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shoulder fired missiles</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Surface-to-air missiles</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RPG launchers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near the border with Libya</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Landmines</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rocket launchers</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Summary of Reported Seized Arms Caches in Algeria, 2011–16
Gaza. Widespread firearm ownership and smuggling by Bedouin through Sinai toward Gaza and Israel has long been reported; but it intensified with Libyan weapons after 2011. According to an Egyptian author, between February to August 2011 “It became clear that Egypt’s poorly secured western border had turned from an amateur 9-millimeter pistol market into a fully-fledged arms trafficking hub” and two border crossings that had previously been “known for drug smuggling operations across North Africa, became the floodgates of heavier weapons including high-caliber antiaircraft guns, rocket propelled grenades, and surface-to-air missiles.”

The smugglers avoided detection by transporting weapons through unpopulated desert areas. Concerning political violence outside of the Sinai, the 2015 UNSC panel stated that “Libya is a pre-eminent source of arms used in criminal and terrorist activities in Egypt. Groups including Ansar Beit el Makdess receive support from some Libyan actors, including military material.”

Seizures of arms reported by Egypt corroborate the above picture. The 2013 UNSC panel report states that Egyptian authorities had seized “hundreds of small light and heavy weapons systems, hundreds of rounds of ammunition for heavy weapons systems and hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition for small arms and machine-guns.” Similarly, in October 2011 an Egyptian Brigadier General was quoted as stating that in the Sinai “We’ve intercepted more advanced weapons, and these weapons aren’t familiar to the Egyptian weapons markets; these are war weapons.”

Analysis of press articles from 2011 to September 2016 shows reports of Egyptian authorities having seized 30 arms caches, of which six were reported to have been intercepted in transit on their way to Gaza, and two to the Sinai (see Table 4). The Egyptian response in 2011 to these arms flows was hampered by provisions of the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, which imposed restrictions on Egypt’s deployment of armed forces in parts of the Sinai. In addition, Egyptian police stationed in Sinai were reported to have fled their posts during the 2011 demonstrations that ousted Mubarak. As the insurgency unfolded Egypt deployed personnel and major weapons to central Sinai in 2012 (resulting in an Israeli protest that the deployment into the demilitarized zone had not been coordinated) and it appears that overall Tel Aviv has accepted a de facto remilitarization of the Sinai.

In August 2012 Egypt took action to stop arms smuggling into Gaza (partly in order to also restrict supplies to the war in the Sinai), and a component of the 2012 ceasefire agreement that ended the brief war between Israel and Hamas was that Egypt would
prevent arms smuggling into Gaza.59 One action was that in February 2013 Egypt flooded tunnels used to smuggle goods under the border to Gaza.60 The 2014 UNSC panel report states that Israeli authorities noted that arms transfers from Libya to Gaza occurred, but “the shipments had slowed with an increased effort by Egypt to track and seize weapons.”61 It is likely that the largest arms supplies from Libya were delivered in 2011 and 2012.

**Effects of the Trafficking in the Sinai**

There have been several reports that trafficked weapons led to Egyptian security forces being “outgunned” in Sinai.62 For example, fieldwork conducted in the Sinai in 2011 showed that:

> Some clans reportedly smuggled 14.5mm antiaircraft guns and multi-barrel rocket launchers via Egypt’s Salloum crossing and, as in Libya, mounted them on the back of pick-ups. By mid-2011, tribal leaders claimed they had amassed sufficient weaponry—medium-range as well as light arms—to out-gun the army.63

The disadvantage experienced by the Egyptian army appears to be partly due to the restrictions on deploying major weapons in parts of the peninsula.64 One Egyptian intelligence official is reported as stating that opposition forces “are not better equipped than the army, but they are equipped well enough to provide effective resistance.”65 Examples include using a 14.5mm calibre machine gun to hit an army helicopter, mounting the guns on Toyota all-terrain vehicles and attacking army truck convoys, or using anti-tank missiles against army vehicles.66 Lightly armed multinational observer forces deployed near the Egypt–Israel border have also described themselves as being “outgunned,” and mortar attacks on bases prompted a withdrawal last year.67 The arms flows are also reported to have increased the lethality of intra-tribal clashes in the Sinai.68

The most important economic demand for illicit arms was, and is, from Gaza where people were willing to pay high prices for smuggled Libyan weapons.

**Effects of Libyan Arms in Gaza**

There is little direct information from Gaza on the types and quantities of arms from Libya that were smuggled into the territory. Groups in Gaza have displayed two models of rifle, a Belgian made FN 2000, and a Russian made AK 103, that were “quite specific to Libyan arsenals.”69 However, research by Armament Research Services indicates that only a handful of FN2000s have been identified in Gaza, and only 57 AK 103s have been documented in the hands of Palestinian organizations.70

Assessments by observers based outside Gaza (particularly by Israelis) have highlighted the importance of transfers of Libyan rockets and missiles to Gaza.71 In August 2011 Israeli officials claimed that “Palestinians in Gaza have acquired antiaircraft and anti-tank rockets from Libya” and that they had “detected an inflow of SA–7 antiaircraft missiles and rocket-propelled grenades.”72 In May 2012 the commander of the Multi-national Force and Observers monitoring the
Egypt–Israel border stated that Russian made antiaircraft missile systems that had been exported to Libya were being smuggled into Gaza through Egypt. In 2013 SA–7 launch units were displayed in a parade in Gaza, though the origin of the equipment could not be confirmed. In particular, an Israeli intelligence assessment summarising activity in 2012 states that hundreds of anti-tank and antiaircraft weapons and “long range rockets” were smuggled into Gaza from Sudan and Libya. It has been claimed that “many of the rockets fired into Israel from Gaza [in 2012] were Grad rockets obtained from Libyan sources.”

Reports of Israeli assessments suggest that it is unlikely that arms from Libya led to a decisive qualitative improvement as Hamas already possessed the types of arms believed to have been trafficked from Libya. Prior to 2011 Hamas and other groups in Gaza already had the capacity to fabricate rockets in workshops located in Gaza, and more importantly had long been the recipient of military weapons smuggled in from outside, especially via Iran and Sudan.

### Syria

Large-scale transfers of arms are reported to have been sent from Libya to opposition
forces in Syria, which appear to have been motivated by a combination of high prices paid for munitions by the Syrian opposition, and (at least in 2012–13) sympathy in Libya for opposition fighters in Syria.\textsuperscript{79} Two ships are reported to have attempted to transport hundreds of tons of arms from Libya to Syria; and it is likely that there were more.\textsuperscript{80} The main route is said to be by sea or air to Turkey and then overland to opposition groups in Syria.\textsuperscript{81} Weapons identified as being sent from Libya to Syria included anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, and known shipments appear to be mainly made up of ammunition for small arms and light weapons.\textsuperscript{82} A Russian made Konkurs-M anti-tank guided missile system documented in Idlib Governorate in Syria had previously been exported to Libya in 2000; and photographs from Syria showed crates of Belgian NR 160 106mm recoilless projectiles with markings showing that they had been exported to Libya.\textsuperscript{83}

Importantly, the UNSC panel noted in 2015 that “While the Syrian Arab Republic was a significant destination for Libyan arms during the first two years of the conflict that trend appears to have faded in the past 12 to 24 months,” and a year later the panel stated that it “found no information relating to recent transfers.”\textsuperscript{84} The shipments from Libya were unlikely to have led to a qualitative improvement in the weapons possessed by the Syrian opposition. Opposition forces in Syria had access to significant alternative arms supplies from defecting soldiers, capture of Syrian army arms depots and at least after mid-2012 significant donations from abroad.\textsuperscript{85} However, opposition groups in Syria were described as facing shortages of military material, especially ammunition.\textsuperscript{86} So the quantity of ammunition supplied in particular would likely have enhanced their military capacity. However, it is not possible in this article to disaggregate the effect of supplies from Libya compared to supplies from other sources.

**The Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Somalia, and the Sudan**

There are also reports of proliferation of arms from Libya into the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Somalia, and the Sudan. With the exception of Chad, there have been few, if any, confirmed instances of arms from Libya having been smuggled in after 2011. A report by Conflict Armament Research last year shows that Polish-made Kalashnikov rifles with Arabic markings that are of the same type as rifles found in Libya had been identified in the CAR (2), Chad (3), Côte d’Ivoire (3), and in Mali (3).\textsuperscript{87} A Libyan origin for the rifles is likely but has not been proven. In all five countries there are important alternative sources of munitions so any trafficking from Libya would have been unlikely to qualitatively enhance recipients’ military capacities.

**The Central African Republic**

North Korean-manufactured rocket propelled grenades and Yugoslav made mortar bombs that had very likely been previously exported to Libya were found in the CAR.\textsuperscript{88} However, it is not certain that they were trafficked after the start of the 2011 war (as opposed to having been supplied by Qadhafi at an earlier date). Nevertheless, the effects of trafficking from Libya appear to be marginal, as Conflict Armament Research puts it, “Materiel from Qadhafi-era Libyan stockpiles does not
appear to account for a significant proportion of weapons or ammunition used by the former Séléka coalition* in the CAR.89

**Chad and the Sudan**

Chad is reported to have been a route through which arms transited, especially in 2011 and the first half of 2012.90 Authorities in Chad seized arms being trafficked from Libya during 2011 and 2012; however, the trade is reported to have diminished since then.91 Material trafficked into Chad is reported to include assault rifles, heavy machineguns, antiaircraft missile systems, recoilless 106mm guns, mines, and ammunition.92 The 2013 UNSC panel noted information that officials in Chad had located 30 antiaircraft missile systems.93 Arms have also been reported to be trafficked through Chad and into Sudan, or directly into Sudan from Libya.94

**Nigeria**

There were several reports from 2013 and 2014 that arms from Libya had been trafficked to Boko Haram in Nigeria via Niger and Chad.95 However, it is notable that the reports from Nigeria have not highlighted the seizure of weapons confirmed to come from Libya. For example the UNSC panel has stated that it was unable to verify media reports of such trafficking, nor was it able to examine arms seized in northeastern Nigeria to assess whether any were of Libyan origin.96 Given the extensive trafficking networks in the region it is possible that Boko Haram received some arms that came from Libya, but the quantities remain unknown. There is though clear evidence that Boko Haram captured very large stocks of weapons and ammunition from the Nigerian police and army, so any trafficked arms from Libya may well not have decisively enhanced its military capacity.97

**Somalia**

The UNSC panel received evidence of ammunition crates discovered in Somalia that had originally been delivered to Libya in the 1970s–80s.98 However, the period during which the transfer from Libya took place is unknown and given Qadhafi’s propensity to supply arms across Africa the ammunition could have left Libya prior to 2011.

**Of Particular Concern—MANPADS**

Man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) have long been a key proliferation concern for the United Nations, national governments, and civil society, and after the onset of the Libya war in 2011, many commentators were alarmed at the prospect of MANPADS being smuggled out of Libya and used to shoot down a civilian airliner.99 An authoritative review published by the Small Arms Survey in 2015 indicates that prior to 2011 Libya had imported an estimated 18,000 short-range surface-to-air missiles (most likely several missiles per launcher), nearly all of which were Soviet models produced in the 1970s–80s.100 A frequently misquoted U.S. assessment from 2011 estimated that after the war there were around 20,000 major components of portable antiaircraft missile systems in Libya—e.g. missiles, launch tubes, batteries, and gripstocks used to fire the missile.101 The number of potentially complete missile systems would then be many fewer.

A 2015 Small Arms Survey assessment of seized missiles and components of launchers confirmed by the UN panels as having come from Libya shows that 64 items were seized
during 2011–14 in the CAR, Lebanon, Mali, and Tunisia. Importantly, the seized items were mostly of a variety of components rather than complete systems: 24 launch tubes (that may have contained missiles), 29 batteries, 4 gripstocks, and 8 missiles (that were not seized with the launch tubes). Similarly, the 2013 UN panel report notes that a seized shipment to Syria contained “SA–7b man-portable air defence systems without batteries.” There have also been unconfirmed reports of Libyan missiles or launchers in Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Gaza, Lebanon, Niger, and Syria. A separate Conflict Armament Research analysis of the manufacture year and of production lot numbers similarly suggests a common origin of missile launch tubes found in Lebanon, Libya, and Mali.

The worst fears of large numbers of usable MANPAD systems proliferating out of Libya evidently have not been realized. It is likely that by October 2011 there were far fewer working missile systems than had originally been imported because of: possible transfers out of Libya or use of missiles prior to 2011; attrition because of systems exceeding their expected service life and poor storage; and airstrikes and other damage to arms depots during the 2011 civil war. Multinational teams operating in Libya after the 2011 war collected an estimated 5,000 missiles and components. Guidelines suggest that gripstocks should be stored separately from other components to make it more difficult to obtain a complete system; and a journalist who examined arms bunkers in Libya during July 2011 found that launch tubes, missiles, and batteries were stored together in crates but gripstocks were not present.

Summary: The Effects of and Decline in Arms Proliferation from Libya

Arms trafficking from Libya, especially during 2012–13, significantly enhanced the military capacity of armed opposition groups in Mali and Sinai by providing them with types of weapons that were previously rare or unavailable. Significant supplies of arms and ammunition were transferred to Gaza and Syria, but groups in both were already able to obtain large quantities of weapons from other sources and so supplies from Libya augmented their military capacity but probably did not represent a qualitative improvement. Trafficking from Libya provided arms to smaller nonstate groups in Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Niger, and Tunisia. Weapons from Libya have been transported further afield, for example to the CAR, but those supplies are unlikely to have significantly improved the recipients’ military capacities.

Overall, Libya has not lived up to the fears that as a “Tesco [supermarket] for Terrorists” countries near and far from its borders would be flooded with arms. Arms trafficking from Libya has abated. The summary of seizures and above mentioned assessments on arms flows to Mali, Gaza, Sinai, and the Syria all point to weapons trafficking from Libya having declined after 2013. Libya is also not the only source of weapons trafficked in the Sahel, or into Gaza, the Sinai, or Syria. A 2016 fieldwork-based report on arms trafficking in the Sahel by Conflict Armament Research finds that:

Illicit weapon flows in the Sahel since 2011 have not stemmed exclusively, or even predominantly, from Libyan sources.
The profile of illicit weapons in the region reflects the consequences of other state crises, particularly in Mali, and of weak control over national stockpiles in the Central African Republic and Côte d’Ivoire.

It has not been possible to locate evidence of significant flows of arms from Libya beyond its immediate neighbours, and to Gaza, Mali, and Syria. Despite the existence of large numbers of people being smuggled from Libya into Europe, significant flows of arms from Libya across the Mediterranean have not been detected. In spite of its proximity to Libya, trafficking into Tunisia appears to have been relatively limited. Reports of Libyan arms in Somalia, Nigeria, and the CAR concern few weapons, some of which may not have proliferated from Libya after 2011, or unconfirmed reports. While small-scale movements of arms are always possible, there is no evidence of significant flows of arms from Libya into conflicts further afield; in West, Central, and East Africa; and in Yemen. Surface-to-air missile systems from Libya have only been used in a few conflict zones.

The potential for further proliferation from Libya remains; especially if a future reduction in violence releases new arms supplies to cross-border traffickers. It is important that, as has occurred elsewhere, future peace agreements between armed factions in Libya should include elements of disarmament and small arms and light weapons management, including the safe storage and disposal of surrendered weapons. States and organizations involved in enforcing the arms embargo on arms transfers to and from Libya, and bringing peace to the country, need to continue to prioritize preventing arms trafficking.

Explaining the Decline in Trafficking from Libya

There are two explanations for proliferation from Libya being less of a problem than feared in 2011. First is that neighbouring governments and a wider community of states and international organizations took action to prevent trafficking from Libya—initiatives ranged from teams in Libya collecting portable antiaircraft missiles, through to deployment of troops into the Sahel (see the earlier discussion on international intervention in the section on Niger) and naval patrols in the Mediterranean. The concentration of illicit arms trafficking from Libya into a few countries is in line with previous research that emphasizes that arms trafficking is embedded in regional and local networks and conflict economies.

Second, in Libya there was a lull in violence during late 2011 to 2013, but fighting increased from 2014 onwards. The increase in fighting in Libya led to greater demand for arms and ammunition within the country by parties directly engaged in the fighting, and by other members of society obtaining arms for self-protection. In 2016 researchers monitoring gun prices traded online and bought and sold in Libya noted relatively high prices of $1,300 for a Kalashnikov, $5,900 for a heavy machinegun, and $4,000
for a recoilless gun.\textsuperscript{113} Such prices are not indicative of Libya being affected by a glut of weapons (instead arms available after the 2011 war were likely absorbed by Libyans who anticipated needing to use them).

Libya has imported large quantities of weapons. European authorities have intercepted several large-scale shipments of arms being smuggled into Libya; for example, in December 2015 Greek authorities seized a shipment of 5,000 firearms and 500,000 rounds of ammunition, and in October 2016 Spanish authorities seized 11,400 firearms and over a million rounds.\textsuperscript{114} States also notified the United Nations that prior to August 2014 they had lawfully supplied Libyan authorities with “60,000 handguns, 65,000 assault rifles, 15,000 submachine guns, and 4,000 machine guns of various calibres, as well as more than 60 million rounds of ammunition for small arms and machine guns.”\textsuperscript{115} The large-scale imports by Libya and reports of high prices paid in the country suggest that domestic stocks of arms were insufficient to meet domestic demand, making illicit exports less attractive.

Notes


\textsuperscript{3} Ian Drury, “Don’t Turn Syria into a ‘Tesco for Terrorists’ like Libya, Generals tell Cameron,” Daily Mail, June 17, 2013.


\textsuperscript{8} UNSC 2013, 26.


\textsuperscript{10} The author of this article runs a project that systematically monitors international media for report on arms trafficking. All of the sources are available in an online archive, and the summary table is available on request. The media articles are archived at <http://
nisat.prio.org/Document-Library/>. Information for the other tables in this article was collected from media reports; lack of number does not imply lack of arms seized, and some reports (especially for 2011 and 2014) only stated the type of arms seized and not the number of units; available at Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, <http://nisat.prio.org/Document-Library/>. In this article, the term firearms concerns hand held weapons that use an explosive charge to fire a projectile from a barrel. The term light weapons refers to crew served weapons that are man-portable or can be mounted on a light vehicle, such as anti-tank rocket or missile launchers, heavy machineguns, grenade launchers or mortars. The term heavy arms was not defined in the source for Table 3 but given the context it likely concerned what are identified as light weapons elsewhere in this article—e.g. mortars. Heavy arms was likely used to distinguish the equipment seized from firearms.

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UNSC 2013, 31; UNSC 2013, 27.

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UNSC 2015, 48.


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Holger Anders “Expanding Arsenal Insurgent Arms In Northern Mali,” 175.


UNSC 2014, 37.

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Ibid., 80.

UNSC 2015, 128.

Mohannad Sabry, Sinai: Egypt’s Linchpin, Gaza’s Lifeline, Israel’s Nightmare, 80.

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UNSC 2013, 34.


See Egypt and Israel "Treaty of Peace 1 (with annexes, maps and agreed minutes). Signed at Washington on March 26, 1979" Annex 1, Article II.


UNSC 2014, 41.


Alastair Beach, "In the North Sinai, Jihadis Stand Down the Egyptian Government.”

Erin Cunningham, “Egypt’s army outgunned by extremists in Sinai”.


Nic Jenzen-Jones, A Tale of Two Rifles, 22.

See for example: Mohannad Sabry, Sinai: Egypt’s Linchpin, Gaza’s Lifeline, Israel’s Nightmare, 83.

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79 UNSC 2014, 42–43.
80 UNSC 2013, 36–39.
81 UNSC 2014, 47.
82 UNSC 2013, 77.
83 UNSC 2014, 43.
86 UNSC 2014, 43.
90 Ibid., 22.
93 UNSC 2014, 37; UNSC 2013, 32.
96 UNSC 2014, 37; UNSC 2013, 32.
98 UNSC 2014, 40.
101 Ibid., 4.
102 Ibid., 7.
103 UNSC 2013, 38.
107 Ibid.
114 UNSC 2016, 32; Agence France-Presse (AFP), “Spain seizes drugs shipment to Libya in global operation,” October 11, 2016.
115 UNSC 2015, 29.
The Trump Administration takes office in a time of great complexity. The President faces a national security environment shaped by strong currents: globalization; the proliferation of new, poor, and weak states, as well as nonstate actors; a persistent landscape of violent extremist organizations; slow economic growth; the rise of China and a revanchist Russia; a collapsing Middle East; and domestic policies wracked by division and mistrust. While in absolute terms the Nation and the world are safer than in the last century, today the United States finds itself almost on a permanent war footing, engaged in military operations around the world.

This book, written by experts at the Defense Department’s National Defense University, offers valuable policy advice and grand strategy recommendations to those senior leaders who will staff and lead this Administration in national security affairs. The President and his staff, Members of Congress, and the many leaders throughout government concerned with the Nation’s security interests should find this book valuable. Their task is not an easy one, and this volume’s insights and reflections are offered with an ample dose of humility. There are no silver bullets, no elegant solutions to the complex problems confronting America and its leaders. This volume provides context and understanding about the current national security environment to those in the Administration as they prepare to lead the Nation during challenging times. To those senior leaders who bear the heaviest responsibilities, these policy insights may chart a course forward.

The lessons encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq at the strategic level inform our understanding of national security decisionmaking, intelligence, the character of contemporary conflict, and unity of effort and command. They stand alongside the lessons of other wars and remind future senior officers that those who fail to learn from past mistakes are bound to repeat them.

Available at <ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Books/charting-a-course/>.
Burundi soldiers in 2013 prepare to load onto a C-17 at Bujumbura Airport. In coordination with the French military and the African Union, the U.S. military provided airlift support to transport Burundi soldiers, food and supplies in the CAR. (Erik Cardenas/ U.S. Air Force)
The Armies of the Great Lakes Countries

BY GÉRARD PRUNIER

Precolonical Africa was a rather special part of the world because durable state structures were extremely rare. Local chiefdoms or large (but transient) multi-ethnic empires—yes. Tight nation-states—hardly. Except in a rather limited geographical area to the east of the continent, a cluster of sacred monarchic states grew, expanded, and fought each other around the shores of the Great Lakes in Africa. There are no written records, so we can only fathom the historical depth of these monarch states through oral traditions, and these date to the 10th century.

The basic reason why these small nation-states appeared around the central Great Lakes—Tanganyika, Kivu, Edward, Victoria, Albert, and Kyoga—is ecological. This is an area of mild climate, high precipitation, and fertile soil that is mostly free of the dreaded TseTse fly. These favorable ecological factors led to a dense demography, which in turn led to more intense economic exchanges and the capacity to raise large armies.

The link between the favorable natural conditions and the more recent military-economic ones was mystical, with the appearance of political systems where the King was perceived as being of supernatural origin. Beyond the oral traditions is the memory of a primal mythical empire, Bacwezi. All modern kingdoms—to include Buganda (presently Uganda), Rwanda, and Burundi—are descendants of Bacwezi, whose founders are believed to have returned to the heavens after their creation of secular states on earth.

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Behind the myth lies a reality—the cluster of states centered on the central Great Lakes have grown into the most impressive politico-cultural network of permanent states on the African continent. Complex administrative structures that were centered around the sacred monarchy allowed for effective taxation, military control, and a growing civil society. Unfortunately they also fostered enterprises of war and conquest that led to state growth, as with Buganda (presently Uganda), as well as state destruction and fragmentation, as with Buhuya in Karagwe (presently Tanzania).

Eastern Africa—in particular the Great Lakes region—is a unique part of the continent given the long precolonial existence of the state tradition. The military dimension of state power in this region since decolonization has produced extremely violent consequences.

Although the Great Lakes region constitutes a geographically and humanly coherent area, its history has developed along fairly diverging perspectives since independence. This is why it is best to analyze these armies country-by-country before venturing into any type of generalization.

The Armies of Uganda

The nucleus of the Ugandan army can be traced to the 4th Battalion of the King’s African Rifles (KAR), the colonial force that Great Britain raised locally with British officers in the early 1900s to defend and police its possessions in the African Great Lakes Region—the Kenya Colony, the Uganda Protectorate, and the Tanganyika Mandate (now the semi-autonomous region of Zanzibar in Tanzania). The KAR were highly professional and even fought outside the region during World War II, in Burma against the Japanese and in Somalia against the Italians. By 1964 portions of this force demanded pay increases and the establishment of an African officer corps. Their mutiny that January in Tanganyika led to the decolonization of the armies across all of Great Britain’s possessions in the Great Lakes. This reorganization was, in many ways, a step forward—the armed forces were Africanized and became part of the new nations that had just gained independence from Great Britain. In Tanganyika, where the political landscape rapidly cleared after the mutiny, this had positive consequences. But in Uganda the ethnicization of the army grew at pace. Since the Prime Minister of Uganda, Milton Obote, came from the Lango northern ethnic group that had been marginalized by the British, while the President was Mutesa II, ruler of the Buganda kingdom whose Bagandan population had been favored under colonial rule, the
army was soon at the center of a sharp power struggle.

In May 1966 Army Chief of Staff Colonel Idi Amin overthrew the President-King and installed Prime Minister Obote as President. President Obote immediately started to persecute the Baganda who were mourning their deposed King. The army was at the heart of the process since each tribal faction had tried to recruit from within to fill units, which resulted in competition not just between the southerners (Baganda) and the northerners, but even among the pro-Obote northerners (Acholi and Langi) and those loyal to Colonel Amin (West Nile tribes such as Kakwa, Lugbara, or Madi). In January 1971, Colonel Amin overthrew Obote and took power. Colonel Amin’s dictatorship lasted slightly more than eight years and was an unmitigated disaster that deeply compromised the military. In October 1978 Colonel Amin, unable to pay his soldiers, ordered the invasion of neighboring Tanzania, and gave his men a green light for massive looting. The Tanzanian army, denied any help from the African Union, counterattacked and went all the way to Kampala and overthrew Amin in April 1979. This was not sufficient to re-establish law and order in what was by then a deeply fragmented polity. There was no obvious legitimacy and Tanzanian President Nyerere, who had a weak spot for his old friend deposed Ugandan President Obote, allowed the Tanzanian army to tip the scales in Obote’s favor.

The provisional government renamed the Uganda National Army as the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) and, although it had liberated the country, it was far from united. In fact it was a Langi/Acholi army which had kicked out a West Nile army.

Obote rigged the December 1980 elections and took power in a vengeful mood. His enemies were the Bantu tribes that represented almost 70 percent of Uganda’s total population and all of the country’s southern region. Those marginalized and pushed aside by the December elections—largely the Bantu speakers—started guerilla operations against the government troops, which were 90 percent Nilotic speakers. The entire country then floundered into a pan-military situation, where all communities had arms but no one faction had more legitimacy than any other.

The war lasted five years with only a limited sliver of territory affected at first—the immediate region abutting the capital Kampala, and very far in the northwest, in the west Nile, and on the Sudan border. The early years of the conflict were studded with periodic massacres of civilians that surpassed those atrocities committed during Colonel Amin’s dictatorship. The “democratic” government of President Obote, supported by the international community, unleashed its troops on the civilian population in the south since they were of the same tribe as the guerillas. The conflict eventually spread and toward the end covered an estimated 30 percent of Uganda. When the war ended in January 1986 Uganda was in ruins, physically and morally. Unfortunately post-war “peace” was only relative.

The army, renamed the National Resistance Army (NRA) and then later the Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) was a political, tribal, and social extension of the victors of the war, the westerners—the Banyankole and Bakiga—who in victory had settled the conflict between the northerners and the southerners.
Uganda was the first—and in many ways the model—of what Italian political scientist Marina Ottaway would later call “illiberal democracies.” Uganda would in the next few years be joined in that position by Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Rwanda—each led by men who, like current Ugandan President Museveni, were former leftists who gave up socialism to embrace a form of militarized authoritarian state-controlled “democratic” capitalism.12

In many ways the ensuing 1996–2002 “Africa World War” was their war and although the war failed to triumph with ideology it succeeded in practice. All of the models of illiberal democracy are now in crisis, either openly—Ethiopia—or latently—Uganda and Rwanda.13

The first serious military problem following the end of the war was the northern insurrection of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) beginning in 1986. Contrary to the civil war during which the Nilotic speakers in the North largely had been spared by the fighting, the Lango and Acholi regions were thrown into the heat of battle with the LRA.14 The rebels and the counterinsurgency commandoes were drawn from the same tribal background while the higher levels of the officer corps were Banyankole. But with time good fighters from the vanquished ethnic group started to climb the ranks, introducing a measure of mixing in what had been at first a nearly mono-ethnic army.

Given the violence of the LRA and its odd ideology, its more logical aspect—the revolt of a previously dominant ethnic group that had been expelled from power—was often overlooked. The “war in the north” through the 1990s was in many ways the “big” civil war in reverse only with a lesser impact because it did not affect the economically vital parts of the country.15 The gradual extinction of the “war in the north” as the LRA fled further and further away from Uganda opened the period of what some observers have called “the export UPDF” or at times “soldiers without borders.”16 Since the late 1990s the UPDF has fought in a variety of places—to include in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and with the Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), but never in Uganda.17 As a private joke, Ugandan President Museveni will say: “Amin and Obote brought war to Uganda; me, I took it away from our borders.” UPDF participation in foreign operations, particularly with
AMISOM, has become a stock-in-trade element of Ugandan diplomacy vis-à-vis the international community.

The Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) in the Wake of the Genocide

The Rwandan army is probably the least typical and historically grounded military force on the continent. Most African armies have a strong link to the old colonial forces who bequeathed them a certain spirit, a set of procedures, and an implicit history. The Kenyan army probably was the most “British” of all the African armies and the same could be said, in another geographical frame of reference, of the link between the Senegalese army and its French traditions. There is no trace of this in the RDF or its predecessor, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). The Belgian colonial heritage was present in the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR), the old Hutu-run, post-colonial army that fought against the RPA from 1990–94 and was tainted by the genocide, but the RPA represented a definite break with this post-colonial tradition and led to the adoption of a radically different approach to shaping the role of the Army. This alternative tradition was a product of the RPA’s Ugandan origins. One hundred percent of the Ugandan men (and some women) who invaded Rwanda in October 1990 were former NRA soldiers. The explanation for this dates back to the persecution of the Rwandan refugees by Obote’s government in 1982.

There was a direct symbiosis between the core network of the Ugandan guerilla and the

In 2014, a Ugandan soldier serving with AMISOM rests in advance of an AU and Somali National Force operation to liberate the Somali town of Barawe from the extremist group al-Shabaab. (Tobin Jones/AMISOM)
young Rwandan refugee population, reflecting the ethnic proximity between the Ugandan Banyankole and the Rwandan Tutsi; the deep social (and matrimonial) embedding of the Rwandese Tutsi refugees in western Uganda; and how then NRA guerilla leader Museveni was himself a Munyankole.20

The guerillas and refugees had decided to die fighting rather than to accept internment by the Ugandan Secret Police. Rwandan President Kagame was one of the first fighters of the Ugandan NRA in February 1981. By the end of the Ugandan civil war in 1985, an estimated 30 percent of the NRA was made up of Rwandese refugees, most of whom were born in Uganda after the 1959 Hutu revolution in Rwanda and ensuing waves of exile. The Rwandan presence within the Ugandan army during the late 1980s progressively developed into a major political problem in the country and it was one of the factors leading to the creation of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1988 and to the decision to prepare a military invasion of Rwanda in 1990.21

In many ways, this guerilla ancestor of the present day Rwandan army went far beyond a purely Rwandan structuring of available insurgent forces. After the October 1990 RPA attack on Rwanda (purely from within Ugandan territory), large numbers of young Tutsi came to the battlefield. First from Burundi (which was in a state of pre–civil war) and later from the Kivu Province of Zaire (presently the Democratic Republic of the Congo) where the Tutsi-Hutu conflict had developed ominously.22 Thus two years before the genocide in Rwanda, the civil war there
had already taken the global ethnic hue that was later to provide the local trigger for the regional/global civil war in the Congo (1996–2002). The Rwandan civil war culminated in 1994 in the orgy of violence of the national genocide that lasted three months and claimed an estimated 800,000 lives.

From 1994 and all the way into the years of the resulting war in the Congo the army tried to turn itself from a regional Tutsi army into a national Rwandese Army and at the end of the war in 2003 renamed the RPA (a Tutsi connotation) as the RDF (national connotation). The tool to achieve this transformation was Ingando—the ideological/nationalist propaganda program developed by the Army in the years following the genocide. This program was part and parcel of the enormous ideological effort by the RPF to reintegrate—socially and ideologically—the (Hutu) majority of the Rwandan population. This was a typical Rwandan approach to political and social problems and the previous Hutu-led regime had operated in a very similar manner to promote the Rubanda Nyamwinshi—or majority people, pro-Hutu ideology.

Ingando worked better for the army than it did for civil society largely because the integration of Hutu soldiers into the fighting forces was a more successful evolution than any similar attempt at promoting Hutu in civilian avenues of society. The war in the Congo forced the RPA to integrate ever larger numbers of Hutu into the army, but this was seen by RPF political leadership as an achievable process, even if dangerous. There were several reasons for this. First, the FAR (recall, the former Hutu-run post-colonial army) had been guilty of massive violence toward the civilian population and there was a guilt ballast that loaded the approach of the problem by the military. On the opposite side the RPA military command needed large numbers of troops for the Congo war and knew from experience that the militiamen it recruited inside Congo could not be trusted in the heat of battle. And finally the hierarchical nature of the Army enabled easy, close monitoring of the soldiers’ behavior and opinions—something that was much more difficult to achieve in the case of civilians. To top it all, RPA—later RDF—was materially and symbolically satisfying, thus providing the “integrated” Hutu a modicum of social standing that their ethnic group could not so easily acquire in the new Tutsi-dominated regime. This resulted in a better degree of political success in the Army than was the case in other similar programs, such as the Gacaca Justice program that was aimed at reintegrating civilians who were suspected of crimes during the genocide. In the Army many social advantages—regularly paid salaries, health care, good food, promotions, and access to higher education—gave the RDF a high degree of cohesion.

Disintegration of the Army in Burundi

In many ways Burundi is an inverted twin of Rwanda. Independence in Burundi was marked by a transfer of power from the Belgian colonial mandate not to a Hutu revolutionary regime but to a conservation of the traditional Tutsi aristocracy. As a result, the later challenge to established power came from the Hutu while the state violence was carried out by the Tutsi. In July 1993, after 31 years of Tutsi-led independence, a Hutu President was elected in the first free and fair election organized in Burundi. President
Ndadaye ruled for slightly more than three months before being assassinated by members of a Tutsi army cabal and his murder triggered a decade-long ethnic civil war. The peace process lasted three years, during which an army integration process allowed a fifty-fifty sharing between the mostly Tutsi Forces Armées Burundaises (FAB) and the guerrillas from the ruling party, the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD–FDD), who were 100 percent Hutu. This resulted in the creation of the unified National Defense Forces (FDN according to the French acronym). Unexpectedly, the blending of the regular army with the guerrillas worked fairly smoothly.

One of the integrating factors was the participation of the FDN in AMISOM starting in 2007. Burundi contributed to the new unified Tutsi–Hutu units where the officers were largely Tutsi of the old FAB army while the rank-and-file troops were almost all former CNDD–FDD guerrillas. As I remember a Burundian Tutsi officer telling me in Somalia: “confronting the same enemy and getting shot at when you are side-by-side is a very strong factor in motivating a new esprit-de-corps.” Similar attempts by South Africa and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to integrate regular armies with their former guerilla enemies have been fraught with problems, but Burundi was the exception.

The political and military process culminated in the August 2005 democratic election of President Nkurunziza, Chairman of the CNDD–FDD. This led to a consociation power-sharing system designed to protect the rights of the Tutsi minority. Paradoxically the problem was the President, whose attitude reflected that of a monarch rather than a democratically elected president. His first mandate invented a conspiracy in which 90 percent of the political class were supposed to be involved, to include those people who were direct enemies of one another and who could not be part of a common plot. When this house of cards collapsed, he moved to control civil society functions and arrest opponents, to include mild dissenters. He also started a shadow army to the FDN with a private party militia, the Imbonerakure—or those who can see far ahead, which he equipped with heavy weapons.

The Imbonerakure were 100 percent Hutu and many of them were social misfits. The FDN, who were a positive example of Tutsi–Hutu cooperation, did not like the Imbonerakure, whom they perceived as violent, uneducated, tribal, and unpatriotic. This judgment was severe but not untrue. Imbonerakure included the margins of society and near criminal elements. Loose instructions, a sentiment of impunity, and a political agenda that often was in clear violation of legal rights, coalesced to create a corps of thugs whose loyalty was not to the nation, the government, or to the party; rather, to the President himself.

In 2015 it became evident that the President had no intention to abide either by constitution or by terms of the Arusha Peace Agreement when on April 25 he announced his decision to run for an additional term. Demonstrations against the declaration immediately ensued, killing eight and wounding 37. Three weeks later the head of military security, General Niyombare orchestrated a coup d’état that ultimately failed and he fled to Rwanda. In a country where the ethnic cleavage was so strong and so old it
was unusual that it was the political choice and not ethnicity that had separated the putschists from the loyalists.

All of the Tutsi sided with the constitutionalist camp but surprisingly so did many of the Hutu. The broader popular opinion, traumatized by a decade of civil war and filled with hope from the Arusha Peace Agreement, did not want to resort to violence again, even in the name of ethnic majority triumph. The Hutu population was appalled and fled. There were 21,000 refugees within a month and more than 160,000 within three months. Most of the refugees fled to Tutsi-ruled Rwanda, even the Hutu who ended up seeking protection from a Tutsi-led regime.

At the end of July, Nkurunziza was re-elected with 69.4 percent of the vote. The polls were a bit doctored but Nkurunziza would have won even without rigging. Why this contradiction? Because this undemocratic president had had a fairly good track record in terms of social management, education, and agronomic problems. He was also a passionate soccer player and a very religious man. As a result, quite apart from problems of constitutionalism and adhering to the democratic path, he had a folksy appeal for the ordinary uneducated voter. The people who panicked and ran away tended to be from urban areas, from the majority, and many had some degree of education. Whereas those who voted for Nkurunziza were from rural areas and were often less educated.

For the army, the situation was catastrophic. The level of political consciousness among the officers and even the troops, was superior to that of the median level of the population. The men in uniform also knew what war was since they had been fighting each other only a decade prior and they knew that if peace broke down they would be back in the hills, laying ambushes for one another. As a result they were keener on the respect of the constitution than were the civilians. And now the war was back in their lives, through no choice of their own.

On August 2, 2015 General Nshimirimana was shot and killed in the capital city of Bujumbura. He was the exact opposite of Niyombare and had been the enforcer of the political decisions made by the President. His brutality was well-known and he had taken a direct hand in organizing the Imbonerakure. Two weeks later General Bikomagu, a retired Tutsi general who had been Chief of Staff during the civil war, was murdered in retaliation.

Things started getting worse as the President obstinately tried to re-ethnicize the situation and blame the Tutsi for opposition to his unconstitutional re-election. One of his main targets was the popular politician Sinduhije (a Tutsi) who had fled to Rwanda. Well-known civil society activist and political moderate Mbonimpa was shot but survived. CNDD–FDD activists tried to paint the demonstrations (and the armed attacks) as being the work of Tutsi, who were nostalgic for the dominance of their ethnic group—something that was completely untrue. As more moderate Hutu and more Tutsi of all hues fled toward Tutsi-ruled Rwanda, President Nkurunziza’s propaganda tried to depict all opponents as enemies of the Arusha Peace Agreement. The opponents, however, were in fact supporters of the Agreement who felt that its demise would eventually lead to a revival of the civil war and most were Hutu. But the stream of refugees towards the North was recuperated by the Tutsi supremacist segment of the RPF. Twenty years after the
genocide it had become a divisive orientation particularly since segments of the army were supporting the opposition Rwanda National Congress. The refugees were a fertile ground to recruit members for the three main rebel groups:

The *Front National de Libération* (FNL) is a carryover of the civil war. When former FNL guerilla leader Agathon Rwasa returned to the political scene in 2013 this was felt to be a triumph for peace. In fact it was more a triumph for careerism because when President Nkurunziza illegally ran for a third mandate, he did not part ways with the government and stayed in Parliament. Several of his associates—Aloys Nzabampena, Isidore Nibizi—did not accept the constitutional violation and went back to the bush. The new FNL is recruiting among the refugees.

The *Résistance et Démocratie* (RED–Tabara) is the armed expression of the former alliance of legal opposition parties called CNARED. This alliance existed on paper and never reached the level of a coherent organization.

The *Forces Républicaines du Burundi* (FOREBU) is led by General Niyombare—the officer who had tried to overthrow the illegal re-election of Nkurunziza and who fled to Rwanda, a former Chief of Staff of the CNDD–FDD guerilla army, and the chief negotiator with FNL Leader Rwasa when the new regime had tried to integrate the reluctant FNL into the new Army. Niyombare and FOREBU seem to be the leading armed opposition force, largely because Niyombare still has a broad network of former army comrades who secretly sympathize with him and try to help him.

It is likely that Rwandan President Kagame thinks of the situation as a strategic godsend, because the organization of armed Burundian opposition groups suddenly is opening the possibility for Kagame to undercut the rear bases of the *Front Démocratique pour la Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR), the militant Hutu organization that is in many ways a direct heir to the old génocidaire regime of 1994. The FDLR was based in the Congolese province of South Kivu and the Burundian fighters Rwanda could gather from the Mahama refugee camp could be used first as a Rwandese counterinsurgency force before they are themselves turned into insurgents against the Nkurunziza regime.

**An Overview of the Role of Armies in East Africa**

This short study did not include a detailed discussion of the Kenyan and Tanzanian armies since they do not really fit in the paradigm we have used to understand the social and political role of military forces in East Africa. In Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi armed forces have played a major role in shaping and controlling the state.

In Uganda the army intervened in politics after 1966—not of its own choice but because the civilian regime drafted the military for use in its own power struggle. This lasted for twenty years, after which the army ruled the country. In 1986 the Ugandan Army played a key role, largely because President Museveni, who was involved with the rebellions that toppled his predecessors—was keenly aware of the danger his armed forces represented to his power, and managed to get them permanently involved in wars abroad. Fighting the LRA in the north and later in the Sudan; invading the Congo; projecting a large expeditionary force in AMISON—so occupied
the Army (and also provided a nice opportunity for financial gain) that the forces always had something better to do than to interfere with their own national politics.

Even today tight control of the army is a key factor in ensuring civil peace in Uganda, partly because even Museveni’s most radical opponents are still scared of the army. Nobody wants to see the army used to repress civilian troubles (where would it stop?) and nobody wants to see it overthrow the President (same problem). The terrible memories of the army days in the sixties, seventies, and eighties are a two-way deterrent—no one supports the idea of a politically active army, neither for repression nor for revolution. This keeps this mute partner as a key (non) player at the center of the political game.

The Rwanda genocide—where the FAR played a key role—and later the RPA-led anti-genocide regime, have left the country punch drunk. Probably no country in the world has been as traumatized in the contemporary period as Rwanda. Many of the opponents of the hard-line dictatorship in Rwanda are fearful of seeing it collapse. There was no real opposition to President Kagame’s modification of the constitution to give him a near limitless number of constitutional mandates. In Rwanda the army is everywhere and it represents the ultimate level of authority—no matter what the civilian regime can say (and usually none of what it says ever contradicts what the army says or does). The formula French revolutionary Mirabeau once used apropos of Prussia can be used today: “it is not a country which has an army, it is an army which has a country.”

Is President Kagame the head of a civilian administration or the chief executive of a military force? The answer is both. This dual power is all the stronger for not being split—the RDF is both a people’s army and an army that is not an “army of the people.” It is closer to the army of the People’s Republic of China than to the French revolutionary army of 1792 or the U.S. Army in World War II. The Rwandan army is a force drawn from the very bowels of society but it is more professional than popular.

Burundi’s Army was a real “army of the people” at the time of the Arusha Agreement but it has been torn apart by the brutal ambition of President Nkurunziza. Today the armed forces are split by a social divide—the Imbonerakure are rank-and-file Hutu but theirs is a more political than military purpose. The Imbonerakure are what the Interahamwe were in Rwanda at the time of the genocide.34 Their morals and personal integrity are also comparable, but the relationship between Imbonerakure and the regular army today is drastically split between the political allies of Nkurunziza’s CNDD–FDD and those who sympathize with the insurgents.

This explains why the armies in Kenya and Tanzania cannot be viewed on the same level as these extremely political military forces. In Kenya and Tanzania the army never ruled the country nor did it attempt to rule the country. Their armies never tried to kill a segment of the nation nor did they pretend to be its savior and rebuilder. The Kenyan and Tanzanian armies never invaded a neighboring country except to defend itself from

In Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi armed forces have played a major role in shaping and controlling the state.
foreign aggression, which is the basic task of a really professional non-political army. In this way the armies of the Great Lakes region are more similar to the armies of the Horn of Africa—Ethiopia, the Sudan, Somalia—than to those of the southern African cone—Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Zambia—that tend to stay clear of intense national politics. The day when the armies of the Great Lakes regions will mostly stay in their barracks or on the training ground is not yet there. PRISM

Notes

1. The Tse Tse fly carries a parasite that is harmful and often deadly for most large mammals to include humans.
2. The best synthetic work on this probably is that of Birgitta Farelus, Origins of Kingship: Traditions and Symbolism in the Great Lakes Region of Africa (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2012).
3. The socio-economic process is well summarized by the South African sociologist Archie Mafeje, Kingdoms of the Great Lakes Region (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1998).
5. The case of the Zanzibar Sultanate was special since the troops there were the Sultan’s men rather than soldiers from the British Empire. See Abdul Sharif and Ed Ferguson, editors, Zanzibar under Colonial Rule (London: James Currey, 1991).
7. Amin fired the old KAR cadre and the British educated soldiers. The bibliography on Amin is plentiful but uneven. What is probably the best work is: David Martin, General Amin (London: Sphere Books, 1974).
8. The African Union was loath to act against a fellow African President, drawing from President Nyerere a fuming apostrophe when he told the assembly of heads of state in Addis Ababa: “You are not the Organization of African Unity, you are only a Trade Union of Heads of State.” See Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey, War in Uganda: the Legacy of Idi Amin (Dar es Salaam: T.P.H., 1982).
9. This is a rough estimate because, beyond the ethnic factor, there was another one—religion. The Protestant victors had totally marginalized the large Catholic community, which was mostly Bantu but also represented the Northwestern Nilotic electorate. So the civil war was fought along both ethnic and religious lines.
10. I went back as soon as the war stopped and I was present for the opening of the mass graves in the Luwero. For a popular view of the war see Pecos Kutesa, Uganda’s Revolution (1979–1986): How I Saw It (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2006). For an assessment of the country at the end of the war, see Holger Bernt Hansen & Michael Twaddle, editors, Uganda Now (London: James Currey, 1988).
After the new constitution was proclaimed in 1995 it was renamed Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF).


After the end of the war, the Baganda left the former guerilla-turned-Army en masse, and went into business and politics.

Except of course in West Nile, which was a hotbed of post-Amin veterans and a Catholic region.


Today its surviving force is based in the eastern Central African Republic. Its soldiers are a multinational group of ruffians where the Ugandans have become a minority.

The Ugandans who joined the U.S. invasion of Iraq were there as former soldiers, having resigned their UPDF status to join the US Army as an auxiliary force. They almost never saw combat but were used in security and logistical assignments.

The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) was the old name of the force during its revolutionary insurrectional phase. It became later the Rwandese Defense Force (RDF).


Not only a Munyankole, but from the Muhima aristocratic sub-group, which in popular imagination in Uganda was assimilated to the Tutsi. In fact during the Ugandan civil war, government propaganda always depicted Museveni as a foreigner—“a Rwandese Tutsi.”

See Gérard Prunier “Eléments pour une histoire du Front Patriotique Rwandais” Politique Africaine 51 (October 1993).


The study by M.E. Desrosiers and S. Thompson, ”Rhetorical Legacies of Leadership: Projections of ‘Benevolent Leadership’ in Pre- and Post-Genocide Rwanda,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 49.3 (2011), 429–53. This demonstrates the coherence of style between the two regimes and their similar ideological approach in spite of totally opposed standpoints.

More than 800,000 Tutsi casualties but also more than 60,000 Hutu casualties.


Something that is not often achieved in many African armies.


Burundi committed 1,700 men to AMISOM.

Interview by Gerard Prunier in Mogadishu (April 2011).

The Agreement gave a governance outline that shared power between the democratic Hutu (i.e. Hutu who had opposed the genocidaire regime and the Tutsi elements around the RPF.

The RNC had been created abroad in 2010 by former high-ranking RPF civil and military leaders. It was illegal in Rwanda. President Kagame had reacted violently and several of the RNC leaders had to hide and/or live underground; some were murdered.

After fighting alongside CNDD–FDD, he had long delayed rejoining civilian life after the conclusion of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

In Europe the German *Schutz Staffeln* (SS) or the Vichy French *Milice* were similar political armies.

Both the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda in 1978 and the 2012 occupation of parts of Somalia by the Kenyan Army were reactive and defensive.
Suakin port in north-eastern Sudan, on the west coast of the Red Sea. (Besançon)
Islam in from the Cold

A Muslim Brother’s Reflections on the Past, Present, and Future of the Islamic Movement in the Sudan

BY MARIE BESANÇON

Ahmed found himself in Khartoum’s notorious Kober prison with Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi, éminence grise of political Islam, shortly after the 1989 coup d’état in the Republic of the Sudan. He and the coup leader al-Turabi, who infamously welcomed Osama bin Laden into the country in 1991, were close friends for years before he served as one of the leading members of the Sudanese Islamic Movement’s shura. Thus prison began the saga of the second Islamist rule in the Sudan with all of its twists and turns, and a watershed moment in Ahmed’s long journey as a Muslim Brother.

Handsome and dynamic at eighty plus years old, Sayyed Ahmed Abdul Rahman Mohamed Ahmed—who was born in 1933, one year after Sheikh al-Turabi—easily claims the privilege of elder statesman. Clad in the long white jalabiya and turban of ancient Sudan and defying the 100 plus degree temperatures of summer, Ahmed coolly reflects on the grand scheme of creating a modern Islamic government and society in the Sudan, and offers revisions and recommendations—giving an inside glimpse of his spiritual and political ambitions at the beginning, and what they are thinking now about the parlous future of the Sudan.

It is of paramount importance for the world to understand Islamists who are not intent on killing infidels, but focused on their own national political system in a world where the violence

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of radical movements such as Daesh threatens
to define all Muslims. "The world now is
taking for granted that the Sudanese are
synonymous with Islamists," and it is not
particularly accurate from Ahmed’s perspec-
tive. There are many identities within the
Sudan—while the majority are Muslims, they
would not necessarily consider themselves
Islamists. Most of the Islamists also distin-
guish themselves as apart from any extremist
organization. They see themselves as religious
and promoters of political Islam, but cer-
tainly not terrorists.

As the Sudanese have in recent years
begun to re-forge ties with the West and with

The Sudanese Islamists themselves
had fundamental differences with the
Cairo Brothers from the beginning:
the Sudanese were more focused on
gaining independence from Egypt
and Britain, and were not interested in spreading their political beliefs—only in establishing their own Islamic political institutions and identity.7

traditional Muslim countries—and would like
to build closer ties with the United States—
they have the potential for being a force for
stability in the region.5 It is a crucial time in
history to know who the Sudanese Muslim
Brothers are and who are the Sudanese
people, not the least because the new U.S.
Administration is poised to label the Muslim
Brotherhood a terrorist organization.6

The Sudanese Islamists themselves had
fundamental differences with the Cairo
Brothers from the beginning: the Sudanese
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from Egypt and Britain, and were not
interested in spreading their political beliefs—only in establishing their own Islamic political institutions and identity.7

Their original vision may have evolved,
morphed, and changed, but it is by no means
dead.8 The pioneers are loath to let go of their
political dreams that began in the 1960s and
crystalized into a political party during stints
in Kober and Suakin prisons—culminating in
their Islamic Revolution.

In Kober Prison with al-Turabi, The
Sudan’s Third Coup d’etat

Ahmed describes the spacious white prison
cell in Kober that he shared with five others
including Sheikh al-Turabi in 1989 as fairly
lavish compared to the prison digs of the
ordinary criminals. Their common room had
a ceiling fan, comfortable furniture, and a
television set where they could watch other
world events besides their own coup d’état—
the dissolution of the Iron Curtain, the
aftermath of Tiananmen Square, and
Apartheid’s demise. After all, Sheikh al-
Turabi, the leader of the Islamic Movement
and engineer of the coup, knew he was going
to jail and had made arrangements to have
some of his books and other personal items
brought to the prison. So did Ahmed and his
other colleagues in the movement, who
shared their cell with the Secretary General of
the Sudanese Communist Party and one of
the National Umma Party (NUP) notables.9

It was all part of the elaborate deception
of the coup—to hide the fact that it was
staged by a small group of nationalist and
Islamist officers directed by Sheikh al-Turabi.
Even though the Ba’athist military officers
were preparing a coup themselves, the
Islamists secretly upstaged them; so for a few
days, the world thought it was a military coup.
similar to Mubarak’s takeover in Egypt. Sheik al-Turabi was behind the entire charade and had chosen Omar Hassan al-Bashir, then a committed Muslim Brother, to lead the coup—surprising those who thought he would pick Osman Hassan, the plot’s acting coordinator. Al-Bashir’s military colleagues held him in high regard as a decorated officer, thus he was a strategic choice; even the Ba’athists had wanted him to lead their efforts.

Ahmed was privy to the coup’s entire projected course of action, so to help reinforce the ruse, he and his closest collaborators served time together along with the ousted sectarian leaders—NUP Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi (Ansar Sufi) and Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Khatmiyya Sufi leader—whose shared cell was across the compound from the others. Ahmed found it ironic that al-Mahdi and al-Mirghani ended up sharing the same accommodation in prison considering their family rivalries that dated back prior to the British times. As the Khatmiyya generally were supporters of the government of the day it was odd for them to be in jail at all. During their three months of internment in Kober prison and one month in Gezira prison, Ahmed and his fellow detainees all slept outside at night in the private prison yard reserved for the political incarcerated to escape the heat. During the day, the athletic and fit Prime Minister Sadiq joined in the organized sports with the other prisoners. He and his tough Ansar followers from western Sudan easily outplayed the more delicate intellectuals from the Khatmiyya and the Muslim Brothers.

The deposed Prime Minister called upon Ahmed to be a mediator when some of his Ansar followers objected to Sheikh al-Turabi leading the daily prayers and readings from the Quran while in prison. They felt that since Sadiq had taken over the mantle of Imam of the Ansar when his uncle Hadi al-Mahdi was killed, that he should be the one leading prayers. Ahmed reasoned with him that al-Turabi, who had come to the prison several days before Sadiq, had already assumed the prayer leadership, and moreover, he knew the Quran better than anyone else in the prison. Ahmed then suggested that Sadiq could lead the Ansar prisoners in prayer repeating parts of the *Ratib* twice daily at the *Asr* (afternoon prayer) and the *Maghrib* (sunset prayer)—and Sadiq agreed. The prison yard reflected the historic and ongoing competitive relationship between the sectarian Sufi parties of the Ansar and the Khatmiyya, and the Muslim Brothers who were vying to take over power. It would be hard to say which were most fundamentalist.

The early iterations of the Sudanese Ikhwan—the Muslim Brotherhood in the Sudan that had multiple nomenclatures including the Islamic Charter Front, finally settling on the Sudanese Islamic Movement (SIM)—had practiced more of a traditional *ulama* role in the Sudan—that is of advising and directing political leaders from behind. But in 1985, after President Jaafar Mohammed Nimeiri kicked Ahmed, al-Turabi, and the other Ikhwan members out of his government and put them in prison, they consolidated their plans to form a bona fide political party—the National Islamic Front (NIF)—and effectively to make the political decisions themselves. This much less comfortable month and a half of imprisonment for Ahmed—first in Khartoum’s Kober prison, then in Darfur’s disreputable Shalla
Ansar praying near the Madhi’s tomb during ceremony for Eid al Adha. (Besançon)
prison where they nearly starved during their week’s stay, and finally a month in Suakin prison—gave Ahmed and his fellow Muslim Brothers plenty of time together to scheme, plot, and organize.\(^{17}\)

Before the 1989 coup, the leadership of the coalition government under Prime Minister Sadiq and his NUP had become weak and ineffective. Granted, they had taken over an impossible economic situation after Nimeiri’s dictatorship had left the government deeply in debt as well as embroiled in a second civil war. Ahmed recollected that things had deteriorated to the extent that “the Secretary-General of the Democratic Unionist Party stated openly in the parliament that even a dog that tried to take over the government would find little resistance.” The people were ready for a change; the NIF thought it was time to take charge to ensure their group would not be sidelined again if another party such as the Ba’athists took power.

Though the NIF officially was dissolved with all other parties at the time of the coup along with the constitution, the name continued to be used mostly by their detractors. Sheik al-Turabi as head of the Islamic Movement's Central Committee (small shura)—backed by the military's Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation—governed the country. As they were still a minority group in power, eventually they had to do something to expand their power base; so in 1996, they formed the National Congress Party (NCP), ostensibly to be an inclusive body with 40 percent from the Islamic Movement and 60 percent from other parties and community leaders, including the southerners.\(^{18}\) Some of the Ba’athists, some former communists, businessmen, and others had joined them so as to be close to the new power brokers. Local government leaders joined simply to be a part of the current government; they did not particularly care who it was.

### Ahmed’s Interest in Political Islam

Like many of the Islamists, Ahmed’s interest in political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood started well before he met al-Turabi—Sudan’s most well-known and decidedly controversial Islamist. In his early childhood, he was influenced by his maternal uncle, Dr. Sayem Ibrahim Mousa, who was one of the major founding members of the student anti-communist movement—the nucleus of the Ikhwan in the Sudan. Ahmed’s life began in Berber, just north of Atbara; the oldest of nine children, he attended the khalwa (Quranic school) like most young Muslim children at the age of five, where he learned the Quran, prayers, basic social duties, and chores.\(^{19}\) Ahmed’s father was a railway stationmaster who moved frequently because of his job, so Ahmed’s uncle Sayem and his grandmother Medina took on some of the responsibility of raising the children. After his first year of primary school in Berber at age seven, Uncle Sayem took him to Omdurman for his second year—near the capital Khartoum.\(^{20}\) When Uncle Sayem decided to pursue a law degree in Cairo, he sent Ahmed to live with his grandmother and attend intermediate school in Berber. Life in Berber from the 1930–50s was fairly carefree except for the World War II years, when the air raid warnings sent the children running home from the khalwa or diving into the nearest ditch.\(^{21}\)

It was in 1949 during his secondary schooling in Omdurman, where he had formally joined the Ikhwan, that Ahmed met
al-Turabi who was at the University of Khartoum. Since Ahmed had returned to Berber after secondary school to teach intermediate school for a few years, he was a fairly mature student when he studied at the University of Khartoum from 1954–58. His stint back home teaching afforded him time for Islamic studies, to save a little money, and to develop his political activism.

During this era, religion classes took place during the last school period of the day, particularly in intermediate school, and everyone found them boring. Ahmed wanted to try to make the religious instructions more interesting and relevant to the students, and to deepen their religious knowledge. In addition to teaching English and geography, Ahmed said: “When I got back to Berber, I was in a position that I had been asked to teach the Islamic program in the intermediate school... so I had to take it more seriously.” The Sudanese schools were mostly teaching the Maliki school of thought from the 8th century, so Ahmed added some studies that were more modern in his curriculum. He said: “As we grew up we started to read and were influenced by what we received from the Islamic movement in Egypt—culturally and politically. When we were at the University, we read and were knowledgeable about Islamic revivalists in Asia, India, and Pakistan.”

In Khartoum in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Muslim Brothers taught the new members verses and talking points from the Quran according to the Muslim Brother’s program from Egypt. They taught them in small groups of followers (cell groups) to preach and spread the word. Sheikh al-Turabi’s philosophy however, was that the university students should read the whole Quran, not just limit themselves to the particular verses chosen by the Egyptian Brothers. His father was a sharia judge, so he himself wanted to be well versed in all Islamic studies and encouraged his followers and colleagues to do the same.

At the University of Khartoum Ahmed was active in the Students’ Union and the Islamic Students Movement. The University would have a decades-long debate between the Islamists and the communists; although both were small groups nationally, they were the dominant student organizations. Ahmed and his fellow student activists succeeded in changing the Students’ Union Board to a proportional representative system from majoritarian, adding communists and other party members beyond just the Islamists who dominated during that period (19 out of 40 were Islamists, 9 or 10 communists, and the rest were independents). This system was later rescinded under President Nimeiri in the 1970s. The issue of who should be represented in the Students’ Union was again contentious last year, with inter-rivalry between the students of various political parties and persuasions one of several causes of violent demonstrations.

These were politically tumultuous years in Egypt, the Sudan’s neighbor to the north, where Gamal Abdel Nasser led the overthrow of the monarchy in 1952, and was now actively confronting the Muslim Brothers in Cairo. They had been in solidarity with him in deposing the monarchy, and the only organization that Nasser had allowed to remain after his coup d’état; however, he had no intention of sharing power. After an attempt on his life in 1954, Nasser executed some of the Muslim Brother leaders and jailed many others. Ahmed along with the
Inside the Tomb of Sayyid Hassa in Kassala, Sudan on the border of Eritrea. Ahmed served four years of civil service in Kassala. (Besançon)
other students at the University of Khartoum held weekly demonstrations in support of the Egyptian Brothers; and the National Assembly held prayer vigils for the souls of the departed. Even though the Sudanese Ikhwan had never been a part of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as an organization, after what happened in Cairo Ahmed and his colleagues temporarily aligned with the Egyptians in mourning their dead.

After completing his undergraduate courses, Ahmed studied an additional year in the School of Administration under the Faculty of Law. The program required the graduates to work as civil servants in the field after the course; thus Ahmed functioned as a town clerk in Kassala, near the Eritrean border, where he stayed for four years before returning to the Institute for Public Administration in Khartoum. The United Nations had newly established the Institute to train the civil service and provide study abroad opportunities in the United States or Europe. A master’s degree offered at the International Institute for Social Sciences in the Hague appealed to Ahmed so he started the program in 1963. He ran for the board of students while he was there, was elected President of the Board, and served as co-Chair with the wife of the Institute Director.

Ahmed had campaigned for the board on African Asian solidarity because he had represented the Khartoum students in the African Asian People’s Conference on Solidarity in Cairo back in 1957. While he served on the board, he took the opportunity to include others in the administrative responsibilities and became adept at delegating tasks—skills of both a leader and administrator.

Ahmed’s Early Political Career and the Rise of the National Islamic Front

At the same time that Ahmed was studying in the Hague, al-Turabi was finishing up his PhD studies in Paris. The two friends were closely in touch via visits and letters; and prior to the 1964 October Revolution, al-Turabi made sure that Ahmed was involved in the events beforehand and the activities after the demonstrators succeeded in bringing down General el-Ferik Ibrahim Abboud’s government, that had come into power in 1958 in the Sudan’s first coup d’état. \(^{27}\) In the late 1960s he took a high paying job for a few years helping the Saudis set up some administrative reforms as part of his duties at the Institute of Public Administration in Riyadh; he had insisted on being paid the same salary as his American coworkers.

When he received word of the 1969 coup d’état of Nimeiri—the Sudan’s second coup—Ahmed was still in Saudi Arabia about to commence teaching in Jeddah at King Abdullah University—where he took a huge cut in salary because he wanted to be in closer proximity to his family in the Sudan, just across the Red Sea. \(^{28}\) Ahmed asked to meet with the uncle of Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal; and then was invited to meet King Faisal himself, to discuss the implications of a communist leaning regime taking over in the Sudan. \(^{29}\) The three were in agreement on the gravity of this taking place during the Cold War era and the potential of it destabilizing the region.

After the coup, and before commencing teaching in Jeddah, Ahmed traveled to Beirut, Lebanon to meet with a contingent of young leaders in opposition to President Nimeiri: Osman Khalid Mudawi (Ikhwan), Mubarak
al-Fadel al-Mahdi (NUP/Ansar), Omar Nour al-Dayyim (NUP/Ansar), Mahdi Ibrahim Mohamed (Ikhwan), and Sharif al-Hindi (DUP). The Ansar were the main “muscle” behind the newly formed Sudanese National Front’s militant arm under the blessing of Imam Hadi al-Mahdi, their leader. Initially Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie, who was neither a friend of communism nor of Nimeiri, hosted the Sudanese National Front in Addis Ababa where they had Saudi support. The National Front planned an attack against President Nimeiri’s government in 1970 from the Mahdi family’s Aba Island a few hundred kilometers south of Khartoum. Having been tipped off, Nimeiri—allegedly with air support from Egypt—led a brutal counter-offensive killing hundreds of mostly Ansar. When al-Hadi lost his life in the aftermath of the battle, his nephew Sadiq al-Mahdi assumed the Ansar and the Front’s leadership role.

Although Ahmed himself was not a part of the actual battles on the ground against the government in the 1970s and was generally against violence, he definitely was part of the opposition planning. He was the head of the National Front’s branch in Jeddah while he was teaching there until 1976 when the Saudis politely asked him to leave. Saudi Arabia wanted the National Front to reconcile with Nimeiri after he had defeated the communist counter-coup attempt in 1971, and to make peace. The Saudis also did not like the fact that Qadhafi was now training the National Front in Libya. The Front had not by any means given up after being defeated at Aba Island. On the civil side, it organized a successful peaceful uprising spearheaded by the University of Khartoum students in 1973. Through the support of the Libyans, they launched another military offensive against the regime in 1976, which did not end well. Nimeiri crushed them, threw most of the leaders in jail, and sentenced Sadiq al-Mahdi to death in absentia since he had eluded capture and escaped abroad. Ahmed said that if he had to do it over again, he would not have had any part in planning militant takeovers; the 1976 insurgency had been particularly ugly and in his words “shameful.”

Through the mediation of a childhood friend of Nimeiri’s, Sadiq al-Mahdi returned to the Sudan in late 1976 to meet with President Nimeiri in Port Sudan. As the leader of the Sudanese National Front he officially reconciled with the President, who then released everyone else from prison. Sadiq had not consulted with the other members of the National Front before the meeting with Nimeiri; nevertheless, Ikhwan leader al-Turabi agreed with his decision and backed him. Ahmed was in London at the time, as was a contingent of other Ikhwan members of the Sudanese National Front; hence al-Turabi sent his close colleague Ali Osman Taha (future vice president) to London to meet with them and persuade them that reconciliation was the right move. Ahmed had started his graduate studies at the School of African and Oriental Studies, so remained in Great Britain, later continuing PhD studies at the University of Edinburgh. Focused on administration in the early Islamic period, he finished all but his dissertation; then returned to the Sudan in 1977 to join Nimeiri’s government as al-Mahdi and al-Turabi had already done.

A few stable years for the Ikhwan ensued, but then suddenly in 1985 Nimeiri expelled the Ikhwan from the government at the
advice of some of the Arab leaders and then U.S. Vice President George H. W. Bush, imprisoned Ahmed, al-Turabi, and 30 some odd Ikhwan government leaders—officially giving birth to the NIF, a move that the Ikhwan had been planning for decades. Nimeiri’s government fell that same year. Ahmed had served as the Minister of Internal Affairs under Nimeiri’s regime. Subsequently he ran for parliament, where the NIF won a significant minority, and then was appointed Minister of Social Affairs under Sadiq al-Mahdi’s elected government before joining the coup that overthrew Sadiq.

During conversations with several of the Muslim Brothers, including Ahmed, they all mentioned identity as a driving factor for those who started the Sudanese Islamic Movement. Ahmed mused: it was “our way to try to see and find our identities, so we became more knowledgeable to find ourselves, to say we would like to have something Sudanese, or Islamic. We are still in the search for this, we can hardly say we have found it.” Ahmed and his colleagues longed for new identities as Muslims—and not just identities but a government that “abided” by religious teaching in both theory and practice. They wanted religion to govern all aspects of human life—to them it was not just an issue between the individual and God.

This trend had not arisen through the traditional religious schools, but spread through the secular schooling system established by the British. Sheikh al-Turabi and his Ikhwan colleagues were all highly educated and most had attained graduate degrees from the West. Al-Turabi himself had become a widely influential Islamic writer and philosopher whose impact extended as far as Tunisia. Ahmed, al-Turabi, and the other Islamists had had the chance to see what worked technically in the Western regimes and then to contemplate how Islam could be incorporated as the political system in the Sudan making them uniquely modern, Sudanese, and Islamic at the same time. They wanted to be free of any negative foreign influence.

While it was not that difficult for them to overthrow the al-Mahdi government in 1989, it was not so easy for the Ikhwan to build their dreams into workable institutions on the ground, or to realize the notions that existed in their imaginations and in the writings of the Islamic scholars. Their choice to operate as a political party (NIF) and to make policy had been a break from traditional Islamic thinking. But they had seen how the government had been operating over the years without properly applying Muslim mores and practices in governing, though many individuals in their society were good practicing Muslims. As Ahmed recounted: “We found that there was a dichotomy between what we were taught in our religious heritage and what we saw in real life. We were taught in the Quran and the Prophet’s teachings, and in the traditions of the community what is good and what is not good; but we did not see that this was respected and observed by the former governments.”
Ahmed and those who had formed the NIF along with al-Turabi wanted a political party that had a vision to change the community socially and economically on the basis of Islamic thought and doctrine. In their minds, introducing the Islamic banking system was a success—though the system is now posing serious challenges and needs development and revision. They also established an official government department charged with collecting and distributing the zakat (Islam’s form of tithing 2.5 percent of their gross capital for charity). Their comprehensive national strategy stated that the government should be based on belief in the existence and the oneness of God; and that humans are bound by values of equality, brotherhood, and justice.

To Ahmed, whose daughter Afaf (now serving in parliament) was his most favored child, the issue of equality and inclusion of women, particularly in leadership, was an important new trend in Islamic practice and set the Sudanese apart from their Muslim neighbors in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. So we came early to try to say that Islam is calling all individuals to contribute to making their lives better (women and men). Whatever we do in the male sections then is wasted if we ignore the other half—the female. Even in our organization we said men and women are the same, they can both compete for leadership of the party, this was very early. In all echelons of the organization we find women; this is unique in the Sudan. But the policies for all citizens to “abide” by Islam’s teachings in all aspects of life also set them apart from their Muslim neighbors who followed secular governance paradigms like Egypt and Jordan.

Shortly after the Islamic Movement took power in the Sudan, al-Turabi—with the backing of the Central Committee—created the Popular Arab and Islamic Congress (PAIC), which held three international conferences during the next decade. Though essentially most of the Middle Eastern/North African Arabs considered the Sudanese as Africans rather than Arabs, al-Turabi and his colleagues wanted to raise the status of the Sudan in the Arab world through the PAIC. Al-Turabi invited rebel, radical, and Islamic individuals and organizations from around the world to join the Congress. The long list included the likes of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Palestinian Liberation Front (Fatah), al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, and the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria.

Though Ahmed was supportive of some of the organizations, he was not particularly supportive of the ensuing activities of the PAIC. However, the new government wanted to prove that the views of the West toward the Sudan were not particularly fair and that the Sudan indeed did have friends and allies. This strategy did not pan out well and the Sudanese to this day have not been able to shake the stigma. Initially it helped to gain domestic support for a small party that had taken over in a military coup, but ultimately it was one of many missteps catapulting the Sudan into international pariah fame. The Saudis were not happy about the PAIC, the Egyptians were not happy about it, and some Sudanese intellectuals were not happy about it; but it did attract some of the youth and new followers to the party and movement. It also succeeded in drawing the attention of the Arabs in particular to the importance of the Sudan and its ability to be both a “threat as well as a blessing” in the region.
Ahmed, among others, had expected the leaders to hold elections soon after the 1989 coup; however, the prevailing rhetoric was that the multiparty system had constantly failed, thus why risk voting again too soon. They also were keenly aware that as a minority party, they had a very short time in which to consolidate their power. The military Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation remained in place for four years before there were any kind of elections, after which a few of the military officers including al-Bashir were then incorporated into the Central Committee headed by al-Turabi, who essentially was directing all traffic in the country. Though he had initially acted in consultation with the others, al-Turabi shrewdly assumed complete control. He was running the organization and country as a charismatic absolute ruler steering them uncomfortably close to radicalism. The Islamist intellectuals and the rest of the party disagreed strongly with this turn of events, ultimately leading to a split in the party and the movement; al-Turabi apparently had forgotten that the intellectuals that supported him had minds of their own.

Though Ahmed was not one of the signers of the famous “memorandum of ten” that purportedly led to the schism in the Islamic Movement and he never broke ties with al-Turabi, he was, however, in support of the memo. Nonetheless, he was not in favor of the procedure; he felt that any serious question should be properly vetted through the Islamic consultation channels of the Central Committee (small shura) then to the larger National Congress Party. Those behind the “memorandum of ten” had acted behind al-Turabi's back and it smelled of a conspiracy; however, since he wielded absolute power, there was no other way. Consequently al-Bashir took over power at the end of 1999 with the backing of the majority of the Islamist intellectuals and al-Turabi was expelled from the party and government.

Ahmed points out that the NIF had stood for granting the Sudan’s southerners a federal system embodied in the Sudan Charter of 1987; contrary to the traditional northerners who had mostly sidelined the southerners. The intentions of a federalist system for the south were never fully implemented from pre-independence time up to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. The south chose to secede after the 2011 referendum ultimately destabilizing the areas of Abyei, the Nuba Mountains, and the Blue Nile State—and the entire newly formed South Sudan itself. Ahmed observed that “the Sudan joined the Arab League right after independence and the northerners were not even cognisant of its negative impact on the southern question. After the October Revolution of 1964, the traditional leaders ignored implementing the recommendations of the ‘12-man committee,’ which called for regional administration for the South.” His analysis is that this also was partially a question of identity; those in the north wanted to identify with the Arabs so they ignored the African parts of their heritage. This is slowly changing, but the glacial pace should not be so difficult to understand when viewed in the perspective of only 60 years of independence, and in view of years of struggles with racial tensions and ethnic identities in many other nations including the West. Paradoxically in 2014, the Southern Sudanese requested to join the Arab League likely in disenchantment with the fate of the South.
The Islamist Experiment

In Ahmed’s opinion the Islamist experiment has been mostly successful, yet he also says that no one can say that what we are doing now is real Islam—the government was not manifesting Islamic values before the coup, but it is far better now than before the coup. There is still a gap between the ideals and their realization. Ahmed revealed that several months before al-Turabi died in 2016: “In the Congress Party there is a very active youth organization. All of the leaders met with al-Turabi in his house after fasting for Ramadan—honestly they asked him, was the Islamic experiment a success? The experiment is a success with some weak points—he said the ‘weak points’ in a very light Arabic way. Now he has come back to reality, he would like to see this dialogue continue, but in a broader arena because he would like to join the government again.” By then al-Turabi had joined the national dialogue that President al-Bashir initiated in 2014 and was very much obsessed with the possibility of re-uniting the Islamic Movement—to leave a positive legacy in his final years. Some of his former colleagues including Ahmed supported this move and were convinced that al-Turabi had reformed, but not everyone believed so. Many were still wary of his motives.

The evening before President al-Bashir introduced his national dialogue initiative to the public, Ahmed had hosted al-Turabi and former Vice President Ali Osman Taha in his house for dinner—they had not been on speaking terms for years. Taha, who had been one of al-Turabi’s closest colleagues, had backed President al-Bashir over al-Turabi when the Party split, leaving behind a deeply acrimonious rift. This historic meeting at

Ahmed’s house was to discuss the importance of uniting the Islamic Movement as well as the grave potential for chaos arising in the country. According to Ahmed, al-Turabi was ambitious and confident that he could re-unite the movement, but the government was reluctant to trust him again.

Ahmed believes that the NCP will remain in power. He says the nucleus of the party’s reference is Islam, but the new direction is that religion should be geared to serving the people, which brings it back to politics. He thinks that is why the younger members of the party are now politically and religiously moved to join. “Some of the youth are saying that the Congress Party is the only (majority) party, but not all of them. If you have elections, or call on people to go to the ballot, a good number—one third—will be for the Congress Party. The Islamists have put a lot of time on the youth because they think it is the future, this is the strength of the movement. Families were not taking care of the youth, so the Islamic Movement was paying special attention to this—we were organizing everything for the youth.”

Ahmed the politician—and pragmatist according to some of his contemporaries—knows that the Sudan is at another crossroads
and now there is a crucial call for social and economic change. “The Sudanese should have the right to talk loudly about change both within the NCP and without,” he says. It is his opinion that the party should not be afraid of change and should accept what will come. “Some of the leading people in the NCP are for competition, but what is missing is trust. There are still members who believe that competition means encouragement of dissent within their own party.” According to Ahmed, it is in the interest of the party and the country to have an opposition. “Islam says that had it not been for challenge and opposition, the world would be a worse place. You don’t see your own mistakes, but others will.” He says that the government is now striving to create a better record for the Sudan globally and domestically, fighting poverty and backwardness, and repairing alliances in the region. The Sudan had a rich heritage for centuries prior to the Ottoman and Anglo-Egyptian times—and could again build regional leadership and stability beyond any of its own post–colonial civil wars and governmental failures. Embedded corruption, repeated conflicts, and an omnipotent security system, however, are not simple things to eradicate.

As a former teacher and administrator, Ahmed is a strong advocate of education and recognizes that the education system has to improve and change. “For an Islamic society to work, literacy needs to be high and poverty needs to be low, but reality is the opposite in the Sudan.” Ahmed himself is now on the board of a privately owned university (Sudan International University) dedicated to teaching some practical skills; and he is the Secretary-General of the Sudanese Association of Arab–Chinese Friendship Societies that is charged with educational, economic, and business exchanges with China. Two of Ahmed’s four children have graduate degrees from the United States, his only daughter obtained undergraduate and graduate degrees from the University of Khartoum, and his eldest son was educated in Turkey and Sudan. The Sudanese, far ahead of some of their fellow Muslim countries, are big advocates of education for women, at least in the urban centers. The University of Khartoum’s enrollment boasts more than 60 percent females and the Sudan has one of the oldest African universities dedicated to educating women, particularly the disadvantaged—Ahfad University for Women.

Ahmed suggests that the Islamic Movement should be more about what they are for rather than what they are against. Moreover, they should clearly articulate these goals to their regional partners and the world. To the West, since Islam does not separate itself from the state, it is a theocracy; however, to ignore Islam in a Muslim society is contrary to how most Muslims think. When asked if he thinks people should be forced to follow Islam, Ahmed said: “No. One of the most important tenets of Islam says that religion should be by conviction, and not be by compulsion. Islam is very clear on this. An
Ahmed at a function in Omdurman Islamic University 2005. (Besançon)
Islamic government should come with the consent of the people, whether they do so by direct or indirect election, but not by force.” It is vital to articulate this concept in a world where Islam is frequently equated with extremism and terrorism. The majority of the Sudanese Islamists fall far to the moderate end of the Islamic spectrum.

The Sudanese Islamic Movement however, is not without its conundrums—the Islamists say that they want a government that will abide by Islamic values and “be” Islamic values and yet they say they want the support of the people to implement these Islamic rules. When faced with this dilemma, Ahmed’s answer is that the majority of Muslims will consent. As previously indicated, a partial but significant piece of the puzzle for the Islamists wanting Islam to be the basis of governance in the Sudan was an identity issue; the Sudanese wanted to separate themselves from their past colonial legacy and the “meddling” of foreigners, to create a uniquely modern Muslim, Sudanese society.

As also noted, making the ideal into a reality is not and has not been straightforward: economically, institutionally, or socially. There are ever the challenges of those who are not Muslims in the Sudan, those of Muslim heritage who are not religious, and a sizable number who are wholly from African non-Muslim origins. Ahmed muses further that, “Islam itself says we will be rewarded according to our obligations and intentions. Our intentions were and are to try to implement Islamic values and principles in the midst of the modern challenges of a heterogeneous society…and this world is getting smaller and smaller.”

**Concluding Thoughts**

The elder statesmen who joined the Ikhwan in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s achieved their goal of sidelining communism in partnership with the West, and partially of making Islam the basis of the government. These urbane Islamist intellectuals and scholars of the Sudan bear little to no resemblance to the modern jihadists of today’s news. Though they came from the same basic roots as the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, which spawned al-Qaeda and other extremist groups, they took a very different path. Nonetheless they share elements of the traditional Islamists of the Arab world and have a deep understanding of the roots of radicalism in general and Islamist radicalism in particular and most take a strong stance against it.

Consultation with some of these scholars could prevent the younger generation from suffering the same political and radical pitfalls they experienced, and lend helpful guidance to politicians and diplomats from the international community. The Southern Sudanese are now calling for the Sudanese to become more involved with their troubled nation. Some of the scholars are meeting with the youth in nascent efforts to regroup and reformulate what could democratically work in contemporary Sudan and merge with the rest of the world. Through the more capable technocratic elements of the NCP, civil society members, and some of the opposition groups, the national dialogue of the past two years has formulated a more inclusive representational framework with some durable solutions for the Sudan. The test will be how soon and how well the
government adopts these plans that include a new constitution.

Unlike most of the other parties, the Islamists and the NCP always seem to have a design and a vision. The larger sectarian opposition parties, that the West tends to support for the simple reason that they were at one time elected, have stagnated into archaic family operations that lack new leadership or strategies other than to actively impede the sitting government, or passively support it. These parties are no less Islamic than the Islamic Movement. Though the NUP has a large potential constituency of Ansar followers, to appeal to the current generation they would need a leader that is not a family member and to have a better blueprint than the current government—clinging to the old ways has not advanced either their cause or the cause of the Sudanese people. The Umma Party as well as the Popular Congress Party (PCP), the party that al-Turabi started after he was barred from the NCP, could be instrumental in stopping the civil wars if they wanted to, but their goals are to topple the current government so they can return to power. The government has been alternately attempting to negotiate a peaceful solution to its civil rebellions while trying to militarily beat the rebel insurgents outright. International support and internal opposition support for the rebel groups throw insurmountable obstacles to either solution.

While some of the smaller opposition groups have leadership, and civil society groups including university professors have proposed much needed changes to the government, the solution needs a larger cohesive constituency with a credible leader willing to compromise with the sitting government, which also wishes to retain power. Much as that sounds distasteful to the Western ear, the NCP still has the majority backing and is still the most organized body in the country.

The Sudan has had its share of oppressive governments and economic contretemps, and the international community has indeed judged it harshly for its internal wars and its human rights record. Nevertheless, the Sudanese surprisingly lack hostility toward the United States; though they blame the United States for continuing the sanctions imposed by President Clinton, Congress, and the United Nations in spite of many verbal promises by various U.S. leaders to abolish them. They have a legitimate complaint that the United States retains them on the "State Sponsors of Terrorism" list when they have signed all the international conventions against terrorism and have been cooperating with the United States since expelling bin Laden from the country in 1996. They never fail to bring up the fact that the United States is easing Iran’s economic dilemmas, while keeping the Sudan under fire. The Sudanese, who are Sunni and support the Saudi “Operation Decisive Storm” with troops on the ground in Yemen, and medical care for the Yemeni wounded, fear that the United States is deliberately exacerbating the Shia–Sunni divide in the Middle East North Africa region.
Shia–Sunni divide in the Middle East North Africa region.

Dealing with the current government means dealing with an establishment that has fairly functioning institutions, maintains relative stability, and a government that is glacially on the way to transforming itself. Dissolving the current government begs the question of who or what would take its place. The major grievances of the Sudanese people are: the economy, the sanctions (that have entrenched the current government), the corruption, and the control and concentration of the wealth with the NCP and the Islamists. The people also object to the heavy-handed security forces that put down most forms of dissent—though these same forces also keep extremist groups at bay and keep a close eye on young folk wanting to join Daesh. Some intellectuals question Islam’s role in the government but most Muslims accept that Islam should be part of the government—though not the implementation of the more draconian punishments.

Notes

1 This article reflects multiple interviews and exchanges with Sayyed Ahmed Abdul Rahman and portrays what he remembered and wanted to convey from his experiences with the Sudanese Muslim Brothers and how he sees the future of the Islamic Movement and Sudan. The author first met and interviewed Ahmed in 2005, then in 2009; regular weekly or monthly interviews from January–May 2106, then occasional interviews from August 2016 to January 2017.

2 A shura is a consultative council. The small shura in the Sudan is also referred to as the Central Committee of the Sudanese Islamic Movement, which is comprised of an estimated 40 members. The larger shura, is the entire party or movement depending on if you are talking about the National Congress Party or the Sudanese Islamic Movement.

3 The first Islamist rule in the Sudan was in the 19th century, imposed by the conquest of the warrior Imam Mohamed Ahmed al-Mahdi, the purported chosen savior or “expected one” of Islam.

4 Instead of referring to individuals by title and surname, as is PRISM standard, this article employs a tailored approach that acknowledges the extensive use of particular given and surnames in the region. This approach reflects common usage and seeks to minimize confusion between actors with shared given or surnames.

5 The Sudanese have a significant number of troops in Yemen supporting the Saudis as part of "Operation Decisive Storm." They also have cut off ties with Iran, closed the Iranian cultural centers in Khartoum and have forged bilateral alliances with Chad, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Uganda in the past five years, and formed numerous business and cultural ties with Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and other European countries.


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While most of the Sudanese Muslim Brothers opted out of the International Muslim Brotherhood and their Cairo base decades ago, they would not necessarily consider it a terrorist organization, and most Sudanese revere founder Hassan al-Banna as a philosopher and scholar. Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya and al-Qaeda—among others—radical organizations that broke off from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, have already been declared terrorist organizations. Egypt’s jailing of tens of thousands of Muslim Brothers and their families has done little to stem the tide. Mary Anne Weaver, A portrait of Egypt: A Journey Through the World of Militant Islam, Macmillan, 2000).

There are individual Muslim Brothers in the Sudan that are connected with the Cairo Branch, though the Sudanese Islamic Movement is not.


Ahmed mentioned these particular individuals who shared their cell by name: Ibrahim Sanouisi, a colleague of al-Turabi’s, Fathi Abdul Rahman Abdoum, a military pilot and paratrooper contemporary of al-Bashir, also Ikhwan, Muhamed Ibrahim Nugud, the head of the Communist Party, and Idris al-Banna from the Umma Party.

The Ba’athist Party is a pan-Arab party that originated in Syria, through Syrian Christian thinkers, with fundamental differences from terrorist organizationsloosopher and thinker on political Islam an organization, the Sudanese cho then the party extended to Iraq—in both countries they formed the ruling elites. Their aim was to restore the Arabs to bygone glory days, primarily through coups d’état; recruiting mostly military, they were somewhat fascist. Factions formed in different Arab countries with allegiances either to the Iraqis or the Syrians, but the Iraqi Baath Party outside Iraq was the strongest. During Saddam Hussein’s era, a Sudanese person was responsible for the formation of offshoots of the Iraqi party. The party got its start in the Sudan after independence and before the October Revolution (1957–64). The Ba’ath Party in the Sudan is secular with members from multi-religions and, although one of the main parties in the Sudan, it is a small, secretive one. The NCP, DUP, and the NUP are the three largest parties, and essentially the only ones with sufficient constituencies to win an election. Information obtained from discussions with a retired Sudanese official in Khartoum, January 2017; and from Mohamed Ali Jadien, The Nationalist Current and the Sudanese Baath Party, (Khartoum: Azzah Press, 2011) – title and sections translated from the Arabic for the author by Dr. Sahar El Faki – University of Khartoum.

Other author interviews in Khartoum during 2014 revealed that al-Bashir was chosen among several military officers that al-Turabi had in mind to lead. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has accused President al-Bashir of crimes against humanity and genocide; however, this past year several African Union members have opted out of the ICC in protest of Africa centric indictments.

The Ansar are followers of the 19th century warrior Imam Mohamed Ahmed al-Mahdi and those who inherit the family title of “the Mahdi.” Most of the Mahdi’s supporters were from western Sudan (Darfur) and farther west in Africa. The political party is the National Umma Party, or just the Umma Party (NUUP).

The Khatmiyya Sufi sect hail from eastern Sudan, have their roots in Saudi Arabia, and claim the closest ancestry to the Prophet Mohammed (Interview with former permanent undersecretary: Khartoum January 2014). They formed the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and favored unity with Egypt at independence. Many of the Muslim Brothers came from this sect.

The Ansar, the Khatmiyya, the Muslim Brothers, and Jaafar Nimeiri’s Islamist allies all advocated a constitution based on sharia.

Ikhwan means the brotherhood and will be used for the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood here at its inception, though it was separate from Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

The plans had been a couple of decades in the making, but only launched after this particular prison stint.

Nimeiri did not want al-Turabi near any borders in case he tried to escape, so on the way from Shalla to Suakin, the plane stopped in al-Obeid to leave Turabi and two other of the Muslim brothers in al-Obeid prison. The plane then landed in Khartoum where the rest of the prisoners stayed a couple of hours in Kober Prison before they were transported the rest of the way to Suakin Prison on the coast.

According to the former Secretary General of the NCP, the NIF was dissolved at the time of the coup d’état on 30 June 1989 along with all political parties, and the name “National Congress Party” was officially adopted at the 1996 internal shura elections. The Muslim Brothers adopted the name Sudanese Islamic Movement (SIM) or the Islamic Movement. NIF and the NCP are not coterminous though they often are.
incorrectly used conterminously. According to Ahmed and the Secretary General of 1996, the percentages for members of the NCP stated in text are correct.

19 Ahmed’s ancestors were from the Ababda tribe who came from Iraq to Egypt, then on to the Berber area of the Sudan. The tribe was famous for reading the stars to navigate the trade routes. His grandmother claimed to be a descendant of Abdullah Ibn Al Zubair.

20 His uncle was transferred to the town of Wad Medani, south east of Khartoum, so Ahmed finished his primary years at the Nahar School.

21 The Sudanese Defense Forces supported the British in North Africa and Ethiopia in World War II.


23 Sheikh Mohammad Nasir ud-Din al-Albani, Abul Ala Maududi, Maulana Abul Hassan al-Nadwi, and the poet Mohammed Iqbal.

24 The communists operated in the same way, spreading communist doctrine in small furtive cell groups.

25 Islamic law according to Ahmed, is a way of life, guided by certain principles written in the Quran, and supported and interpreted by the Prophet Mohammed’s traditions and his companions (Sahaba) as recorded in the hadiths. This is a broad way of life calling for the belief in one God; fasting at Ramadan; praying five times a day; going to the hajj once if financially able; and paying zakat to the poor. Though sharia teaches kindness and tolerance to one’s neighbors, it also gives instructions for punishments for the determined transgressors. Similar edicts are mandated in the Old Testament. In the Sudan the law is a mixture of sharia and British law. The death penalty is mostly bought out—as is permitted and encouraged under sharia and traditional tribal laws—instead of meted out. The most egregious application of sharia punishment was under Nimeiri when he imposed the September laws in 1983, encouraged by al-Turabi and continued initially under his regime. The enforcement came from politicians and advocates who were not well versed in sharia—to the protest of the well-educated chief justices and lawyers who opposed the September laws, but not sharia in general. To them, proper interpretation of the law in accordance with the will of the people rarely results in executions or amputations. Such punishments have not occurred in the Sudan for years and lighter punishments such as flogging (mostly symbolic public humiliation for such things as drunk driving) are more commonly implemented. There are still reports of interrogations and torture by the security forces (NISS—National Intelligence Security Services), which has little to do with Islam.

26 Ahmed said that the NUP and DUP worked under the umbrella of independents, they were not ready to openly commit to anything politically yet.

27 General Abboud was the Republic of the Sudan’s first military dictator. Al-Turabi was one of the chief organizers of the student led demonstrations that ousted him from power in the 1964 October Revolution. After Abboud was deposed, Sadiq al-Mahdi had one of his first elected terms of office in a coalition government that alternated with Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub. They were deposed in a coup where Nimeiri assumed power. For an eye witness account of the uprising see: Mahmoud A. Suleiman “52nd Anniversary of the Glorious October 21, 1964 Sudanese revolution,” Sudan Tribune, October 21, 2016, available at <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article60608>.

28 Initially Ahmed was a lecturer in Management, after that, he was the Director of Admissions and Administration.

29 Nimeiri’s Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) party was the sole legal party in the country during his tenure in office as an autocrat.

30 Some reports say that on Aba Island thousands (10,000) were killed in the attack, but at least one of the warriors who was there said it was only hundreds. This warrior was one of several of the Muslim Brothers who were involved in importing arms to stash on Aba Island (with the consent of the Mahdi family) both for this attack and the 1976 attack on Khartoum.

31 Imam Hadi al-Mahdi was captured trying to escape at the border with Ethiopia and likely killed by Nimeiri’s security.

32 Nimeiri had ousted most of the communist leaders from his government, inciting their ire and instigating an attempted coup to retake the government.


34 Fatha al-Rahman al-Bashir was an old friend of Nimeiri’s from grade school, who was a trusted community leader. Sadiq al-Mahdi was hesitant to
meet with Nimeiri in the Sudan, but was reassured by Fatha, a fellow Ansar. Ahmed had met Sadiq in London and encouraged him to go meet Nimeiri, assuring him that Nimeiri had likely consulted with the Saudis and the Egyptians on the reconciliation move.

Some of the revolutionaries, who had been captured after the coup attempt, had already been executed after coming before the military tribunal.

Ahmed suspected that the agreement that Sadiq had brokered might be just for himself and not on behalf of the entire National Front, so with al-Turabi’s blessing, he traveled to Sudan to speak with Nimeiri. Fatha al-Rahman al-Bashir had arranged the meeting for Ahmed as he had done for Sadiq, however, some of Nimeiri’s SSU party members who were strongly against the Muslim Brothers, barred him from seeing Ahmed. Ahmed stayed five days in the Sudan meeting with various factions (some in favor and some not in favor of reconciliation like al-Hindi), then met with Nimeiri’s representative. Ahmed made his point that the Muslim Brothers were committed to reconciliation, and Nimeiri sent a message back to Ahmed that he also was committed to reconciliation with Ikhwan. Ahmed then returned to London.

The University of Edinburgh at the time had one of the pre-eminent Western scholars on Islam, Dr. William Montgomery Watt.

Though the date for formation of the NIF differs, according to Ahmed they officially declared themselves a political party after the 1985 jail term beginning in Kober prison and ending in Suakin prison. It was a mystery as to why the Vice President of the United States delivered the message that Nimeiri should kick the Ikhwan out of the government. The southern stability ended in 1983 with the resumption of the civil war following Nimeiri’s split of the south into three states and the introduction of the September laws; however, this is another story.

This was also a move against the secularism and “Godlessness” of communism of the era.

The author would have preferred using the word “imposed” instead of “abided,” but the Sudanese Arab/Africans prefer speaking “lightly” as they say.

Linda S. Bishai, Sudanese Universities as Sites of Social Transformation, United States Institute of Peace Special Report No. 203, 2008, available at <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr203.pdf>. The University of Khartoum taught its courses entirely in English and was one of the oldest, most elite universities in Africa. Almost all of the older Islamists speak excellent English as a result of their privileged educations. In the early 1990s, the Islamist government began changing the curriculum to Arabic. This was in-line with evolving Middle Eastern philosophy that Arabic should be the dominant language according to a former Minister of Education. The Islamic leaders now regret this move, as it has disadvantaged their students and lowered the quality of education in the Sudan.

Other opinions including some of the CEOs and general managers of the Islamic banks are not as optimistic about the success of the Islamic banking experiment. In discussions with the author, in Khartoum 2016.


Al-Turabi in particular was seen as a champion for women and is perhaps quietly even more revered by the Muslim Sisters than the Muslim Brothers. This does not cancel out Turabi’s more nefarious actions.

PAIC: the official Arabic name—al-Mu’tamar al-Sha’bi al-Arabi al-Islami—translated means Popular Arab and Islamic Conference. It is also referred to as the Popular Arab and Islamic Congress and the Pan Arab and Islamic Conference.

Though it is difficult to find an official list of all of the nefarious organizations that participated in the PAIC because when the Sudanese Security raided the Popular Congress Party’s offices, they confiscated all of their documented material, Wikipedia and the World Heritage Encyclopedia list more than thirty organizations that participated in the Congress. For an unofficial list of attendees of the conferences see: World Heritage Encyclopedia, “Popular Arab and Islamic Congress,” available at <http://www.gutenberg.us/articles/popular_arab_and_islamic_congress>.

The Ikhwan do not deny that certain elements of the security apparatus were implementing draconian, cruel, and unnecessary enforcement methods during this time (ghost houses, etc.) and many claim that Turabi was aware of these events, even behind them, but chose to publicly ignore them. In late 1999 ten of the Islamist intellectuals crafted a memorandum condemning al-Turabi’s control of the government.

He subsequently formed his own party the Popular Congress Party (PCP).

A rare copy of the Sudan Charter from Muslim Brothers has the date January 1987.

Senator John Danforth, President Bush’s Special Envoy to the Sudan, was adamantly opposed to splitting the Sudan toward the end of his tenure. M.
Besançon, “Blessed are the Peacemakers: Senator Danforth as Special Envoy to the Sudan,” Harvard Business Review, Case Study CR14-09-1905.0 (October 14, 2009).

53 This was a committee put together by the international community after the Round Table Conference that included seven leading African countries. They discussed regionalism for the south. According to Ahmed, Turabi put a lot of effort into convincing others to give the south its own regional administration, but general Arab sentiment in the MENA region was against federalism. Robert S. Kramer, Richard A. Lobban Jr., Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Historical Dictionary of the Sudan (Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2013), 627.

54 “Abiding” by Islam and following the new government was enforced with a heavy hand at the beginning of the regime. The Islamists now say that while it was done to consolidate power at the beginning of the regime, oppression should not be a part of the behavior of the government.

55 In principal, most Muslim Sudanese are not opposed to sharia—though many wish for alcohol consumption to be legal. This means to them, the proper interpretation of sharia from learned lawyers and judges rarely resulting in the more draconian measure of execution, stoning, or amputation.

56 In December 2016, Ahmed, who still has good connections in Cairo, headed a delegation from the Sudanese Council for Foreign Affairs that met with the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, and the Secretary General of the Arab League. They discussed vital questions of bilateral relationships and regional development with reference to the Renaissance Dam.

57 According to a professor at the University of Khartoum, current statistics place the number of female students higher than 60 percent. Interviews with women’s groups from a decade ago already claimed the number of women at the University of Khartoum as greater than 50 percent.
66 Imam Sadiq al-Mahdi, the head of the NUP, has refused to take part in the national dialogue. Abdulrahman al-Sadiq al Mahdi, Sadiq al-Mahdi's son retains the position of assistant to the president, and Mohamed al Hassan al-Mirghani, one of the al-Mirghani family, also holds the position of presidential assistant under al-Bashir.

67 Since they have a large constituency from Darfur, the Umma Party/Ansar hold sway in the Darfur conflict. Turabi's cohorts have a lot of influence on one of the rebel factions, the Justice and Equality Movement. Mahmood Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror* (Three Rivers Press, May 25, 2010); Julie Flint and Alex DeWaal, *Darfur: A New Short History of a Long War* (Zed Books, March 1, 2008).

68 The University of Khartoum—the seat of most of the political movements of the Sudan—has drafted and submitted election reform and proportional representation plans to the government several times in the last decade, but so far the implementation is weak or non-existent.


70 All of the groups, rebel and government are guilty of brutality toward each other, however as official keeper of the law, the government bears the greater responsibility.


72 The President and his military backers essentially control the government and the Sudanese Islamic Movement. Members of the Islamic movement, in discussion with the author, 2014–16. Atta el Battahani, “The Sudan Armed Forces and Prospects of Change,” *CMI Insight*, no. 3 (April 2016). The opposition parties deplore the lifting of sanctions now, but publicly called for the lifting of sanctions before. They are stirring trouble on campuses and do not want stability; they want to bring down the government so they can again be in power.

73 The opposition—al-Mirghani (DUP) and the al-Mahdi (NUP) families—also hold a vast amount of wealth. There is a large show of wealth in Khartoum and some of the other cities and villages, but the poor are evident everywhere. There is an influx of Syrian refugees that run good businesses and the Ethiopians and Eritreans come to the Sudan for jobs. The Yemeni wounded are said to prefer treatment in the Sudan.

74 Some people have traumatic memories of the amputations from Nimeiri and Turabi’s times. Current laws are phasing out the older punishments.
This Present Darkness: A History of Nigerian Organized Crime

By Stephen Ellis
Oxford University Press, 2016
256 pp., $29.95

REVIEWED BY RAYMOND GILPIN

Nigerians are no strangers to international controversy. This book opens by recounting a comment by erstwhile U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell who described Nigerians as scammers who “tend not to be honest.” In May 2016 then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom David Cameron described Nigerians as “fantastically corrupt” during an unguarded conversation with Queen Elizabeth. Regardless of how one interprets these comments, there is no denying that unlawful activity is ubiquitous across Nigerian society. Multiple decades of criminal activity have been debilitating and stultifying for the vast majority, but extraordinarily profitable for a few. This Present Darkness uses a historical lens in an attempt to unravel the scope, complexity and longevity of corruption and criminality by Nigerians in their country and worldwide. This book bears the hallmarks of Stephen Ellis’ work—meticulous research (endnotes and references account for almost one-fifth of this book); balanced policy-relevant analysis; and a very lucid narrative. Well-placed vignettes inform and illuminate this very engaging read.

Ellis takes the reader back to the dawn of Nigeria’s statehood as he tries to answer the following questions: Why is corrupt behavior condoned (explicitly or implicitly)? Why is impunity rife? Does an enduring legitimacy crisis explain why successive institutions of governance have been unable to address systematic malfeasance? Is Nigeria’s reputation for organized criminal activity justified? Legitimacy and leadership are recurring themes, starting with the amalgamation of vastly disparate regions into one nation as a colonial convenience. Nigeria’s size and diversity challenged the British model of indirect rule. It must, however, be noted that Nigeria was not peculiar in this regard. Other colonized parts of the world had a similar experience. The roots of Nigeria’s legitimacy crisis lay in the grand bargain the British crafted with the emirs in the north, the elite in the east, and traditional leaders in the South to facilitate indirect rule. Ellis points out that in early colonial Nigeria (with the notable exception of the northern Islamic emirates) legal systems were seen as an “expression of power in that it resulted from a command; it was not based on any perceptions of truth held by the indigenous population.”1 This dynamic laid the foundation for an ambivalence to the rule of law and the view that the state is driven by power, not laws.

Customary law, which is heavily influenced by the metaphysical, holds sway in most Nigerian communities and defines the

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country’s political economy. Group survival and personal advancement are still determined by “wonder workers” and traditional shrines, described by Ellis as the backbone of a de facto theocratic administration in Nigeria. By sanctioning vices like embezzlement, trafficking, kidnapping and ritual murder as legitimate means to economic prosperity and political prominence, these shrines have woven Nigeria’s social fabric. Unfettered capitalism and Machiavellian politics supplanted ethics and empathy. The new “theocracy” redefined impunity and offered a generously sliding scale in matters of morality. This notion has endured over the decades. Contemporary religious and traditional leaders celebrate ill-gotten wealth and aggrandizement. Ellis noted that at independence, politics in Nigeria was not about “nation-building but the control of Federal power and therefore the resources of the nation.” The net effect was that zero-sum politics was institutionalized and criminal activity was not only accepted, but justified.

Nigeria’s acute legitimacy crisis, predatory approach to politics, and climate of impunity (facilitated by some religious and traditional leaders) set the stage for pervasive crime in Nigeria’s early independence years. Originally, crime was organized along family and ethnic lines. Over time, it became more political and institutionalized. Ellis explains that while the oil boom intensified domestic embezzlement (unabated under both civilian and military governments), the oil price shocks of the late 1970s triggered a globalization of organized criminal activities by Nigerians. “Nigeria, which had long been a magnet for immigrants” from neighboring countries suddenly became “an exporter of people,” many of whom were university graduates. Nigerian university fraternities and secret societies, and their political patrons, provided the ideal network for the globalization of organized crime. The internet was both the gateway and the highway. Correspondence fraud, narcotics, prostitution, tax evasion, and the sale of stolen crude flourished.

While many political patrons excused globalized crime by explaining they were collecting a colonial debt—alluding to perceived injustices suffered under colonial rule, in reality the slump in oil prices severely reduced the size of Nigeria’s “national cake” and the patrons required other sources of income with which to lubricate their nepotimonal political networks. Ellis, and other commentators, describe this as the dawn of the Nigerian 419 scam (nicknamed after the section of Nigeria’s penal code it contravenes), which globalized and democratized organized crime in Nigeria. Complex alliances of financiers and facilitators spanned continents. Opportunistic entrants who could prove themselves quickly swelled the ranks. Even though these alliances were not as tightly knit or hierarchical as storied organized criminal groups in Europe, South America, or the United States, Nigerian criminal syndicates quickly carved out a global niche. Being nimble and flexible allowed these syndicates to proliferate.

This Present Darkness does not provide a history of organized crime in the classic sense; rather, it plots the trajectory of the institutionalization (and rationalization) of criminal activity by Nigerians even before the dawn of nationhood. This invaluable contribution to scholarship closes with a poignant question: “Why Nigeria?” Why does unethical behavior seem so pervasive in Nigerian communities at home and abroad? Why is
the line between ethical and unethical choices so blurred in Nigeria? Is Nigerian organized crime *sui generis*? Some readers might be disappointed that Ellis elects not to provide direct answers. Instead, he revisits the recurring themes of leadership and legitimacy, and underscores the cumulatively corrosive effect of Nigeria’s perverse “theology” of impunity and greed. By so doing, Ellis masterfully unmasks the multi-headed hydra that is organized crime in Nigeria. His historical analysis should be viewed as a backdrop, not a prescription. He challenges the reader to connect the dots and try to figure out how this phenomenon could be better understood and curtailed. It is only by so doing that we can rewrite the narrative and take meaningful steps to curb Nigerian organized crime at community, state, federal and global levels. PRISM

**Notes**

2 Stephen Ellis, 34.
3 Stephen Ellis, 63.
4 Stephen Ellis, 120.
5 Stephen Ellis, 223.

**Security in Africa: A Critical Approach to Western Indicators of Threat**

By Claire Metelits
Rowman & Littlefield, 2016
156 pp., $85.00

**REVIEWED BY HILARY MATFESS**

Claire Metelits in *Security in Africa: A Critical Approach to Western Indicators of Threat* illustrates clearly and concisely that the most commonly used threat indicators provide a narrow, flawed view of threats in sub-Saharan Africa. Metelits’ work should not be as groundbreaking as it is: consider that on a recent survey conducted by AfroBarometer—a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys in more than 35 countries in Africa—the police were perceived as the most corrupt institution throughout sub-Saharan Africa, where survey data from Gallup suggests that police are among the most trusted institutions in the United States—even when trust levels are at a 22-year low.1 However, Metelits’ book is one of the few venues that fully appreciates the

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ramifications of this disconnect between citizens and states throughout the region. Metelits demonstrates how western, and particularly American, state-centric security indicators are ill-suited to understanding power structures and governance on the continent. Security in Africa unpacks what it means for a country to be “stable” and “secure,” or “impoverished” and “ungoverned;” she also delves into the significance of who is given the authority to characterize regions as such.

Though the book is primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa, Metelits also engages with security studies as a field generally in the first chapter of the book. Her discussion of the evolution of the field from nuclear deterrence to counterinsurgency provides valuable insights as to how we have arrived at our current security institutions. This intellectual history of security studies as a field is truncated, filling just one chapter, but illuminating as to how we have arrived at such ineffective metrics. Western security metrics and institutions emerged from Westphalian states whose greatest threats, historically, have come from other states. Metelits extends American political scientist Jeffrey Herbst’s prior work on the contrast between state formation in Western Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, applying it to a discussion of security and authority.2 Metelits astutely notes that, although states are tasked with providing stability, other units of analysis (including regions, networks, and localities) are often the better unit for understanding modern crises in Africa.

Metelits’ work addresses four areas in which the Western approach to security fails acutely when applied to sub-Saharan Africa: the “securitization of space;” the “securitization of instability;” the “securitization of Muslim populations;” and the conceptualization of poverty as a threat in the region. The book clearly articulates the fear of so-called “ungoverned spaces” in sub-Saharan Africa and illustrates that what appears to be “ungoverned” because of state-centric, Western metrics is merely alternatively governed. A focus on state control of spaces, replicating the sort of sovereignty exercised in the United States and Western Europe, precludes a more nuanced analysis of the balance of power in “ungoverned spaces.” Metelits raises an interesting point in her discussion of the securitization of space— “destabilizing actors” foreign to the area face the same difficulties as the state, foreign governments, and the international aid community. The very “ungoverned/ungovernable” nature of these locations may be an inoculation against the sorts of violent groups that the state fears.

Metelits’ discussion of “stability” raises the question of which actors benefit from “stabilization” operations. These operations, with their emphasis on procedures (in particular, elections) and institutions consistently prioritize formality over effectiveness or authenticity. This tension between stability and representative politics has been on display in a number of African elections and electoral preparations throughout this past year.3 Metelits’ analysis gives credence to the activists who assert that the international community’s refrain “elections should be peaceful and credible” does not take into account the possible contradictions between these two conditions. Further, the book discusses the risks of ignoring informal conflict mitigation and governance mechanisms, which results in overlooking
demonstrably effective mechanisms because they do not fit into a state-centric mold.

Metelits’ most interesting contributions come in her discussion of the securitization of demographic characteristics—most notably Muslim communities and the poor. Securitizing Muslim populations, counterintuitively, means de-politicizing them. Consider how designating a movement as being a terrorist group often erases its political, local roots. The nuanced conditions from which these groups arise, their recruitment strategies and levels of local support, and the ways in which “radical” sects’ scriptural interpretations differ from “mainstream” doctrine is hardly broached in Western capitals. Too often the association of a Muslim sect with extremism fails to identify the particular school of thought within the sect or mention that radicalization is a rare occurrence.

Metelits observes that the threat narrative constructed around Muslim communities has been leveraged by autocratic governments eager to squelch dissent and used to justify expanded military presence. I have written previously with the Center for Complex Operations (CCO) at the National Defense University on how counterterrorism measures are often legislative lipstick on the pig of a repressive government to include in Ethiopia, where thousands have falsely been jailed under the country’s Anti-Terrorism Law. Allowing the counterterrorism narrative to mask domestic political oppression undermines American priorities related to democratization and the promotion of human rights.

Similarly, the linking of poverty and underdevelopment to issues of security has the potential to radically alter the ways in which the United States engages in development work. The persistent refrain that poverty is linked to violent extremism is part of the threat narrative that skews American understanding of conflict. Certainly poverty is a facilitating condition, but it is neither sufficient nor necessary for radicalization. Consider the work done by anthropologist Scott Atran that suggests that many suicide bombers in the Middle East are from middle class families—in addition to the simple fact that the vast majority of the global poor are neither radical nor violent. Making poverty a security threat further blurs the line between development work, humanitarianism, and military intervention. This is not the whole-of-government approach that many have advocated—it is a dangerous muddling of mandates.

Metelits’ book has a number of policy implications, though many remain underdeveloped. It is important to identify that the state-to-state relationships cultivated at present are sub-optimal; however, alternative methods of engagement are not discussed. Also underdeveloped are those interesting policy questions that emerge—in what ways, and why, have certain foreign actors been more effective at integrating into local networks than others?

Although African governments are often predatory and problematic security partners, it is unclear if that means that reform efforts should be intensified, abandoned, or handled at the unit level. As PRISM and the CCO have so frequently asserted, the Westphalian state system may be imperfect, but it is the best system devised yet. Metelits discusses how this framework is not the best for understanding governance in sub-Saharan African states, but alternative frameworks are difficult to envision. Similarly, Metelits discusses the
creation and dissemination of off-base threat narratives, but does not necessarily outline a way to repudiate these claims. Ultimately, Metelits’ book provides an incisive first step towards a more effective, holistic, and nuanced understanding of security in sub-Saharan Africa. PRISM

Notes


2 Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton University Press, 2000). The book’s argument is summarized by the publisher as “theories of international relations, assumed to be universally applicable, have failed to explain the creation of states in Africa. There, the interaction of power and space is dramatically different from what occurred in Europe. In States and Power in Africa, Jeffrey Herbst places the African state-building process in a truly comparative perspective. Herbst’s bold contention—that the conditions now facing African state-builders existed long before European penetration of the continent—is sure to provoke controversy, for it runs counter to the prevailing assumption that colonialism changed everything.”

3 There was concern in some Africanist policy circles that the 2016 elections in Ghana were characterized by an emphasis on ‘peaceful,’ rather than free and fair. Similarly, the preparations for the 2017 elections in Kenya seem to prioritize preventing electoral violence, rather than ensuring free polls.


In 1990, with the Cold War having just concluded, I delighted in reviewing analyses written during the previous decade, which confidently assumed that the bipolar world order was a permanent description of the global landscape. 2016 may represent another threshold year. The Brexit vote and Donald Trump’s election require re-examination of critical assumptions that gained traction between the end of the Cold War and 2015 regarding the inevitability of economic and political progress in the developing world, including Africa.

Steve Radelet’s The Great Surge: the Ascent of the Developing World, published at the end of 2015, provides an example of a book that deserves a serious reread in the context of the post–2016 reality. Indeed, 2015 can already be seen as a high point for consequential development diplomacy. Three major conferences demonstrated the international community’s appreciation of specific...
development challenges and a determination to tackle these challenges in a collective fashion. In July of that year, world leaders meeting in Ethiopia adopted a global framework for financing international development. Two months later, the United Nations General Assembly approved a set of 17 ambitious global goals under the rubric of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. And 2015 culminated with the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, where 195 countries adopted the first universal, legally-binding, global climate deal.

Radelet’s book, although not directed toward these conferences, reflects the bullish mindset of development professionals at the end of 2015. In a readable style with the inclusion of the occasional personal anecdote, he describes the tremendous progress that was made since 1990 in the developing world. The book builds on and expands his thesis presented in an earlier, well-received monograph—Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries Are Leading the Way, which was published in 2010 by the Center for Global Development—a leading Washington think tank.

Radelet focuses on four dimensions of development progress: poverty; income; health and education; and democracy and governance. With respect to each dimension, the post–Cold War progress has been dramatic. Worldwide extreme poverty began to fall in 1993 and by 2011 had been reduced to fewer than one billion people, or an estimated 17 percent of global population; while China and India account for much of the decline, progress has been evident in vast majority of the 109 developing countries that Radelet uses as the basis for his empirical analysis. Simultaneously, incomes have risen, and health and education indicators have improved. Significant progress was also achieved with respect to increased personal freedoms and more open political systems, with a concurrent reduction in the incidence of conflict.

Radelet acknowledges that not all countries are making progress, as some countries remain stuck in conflict, dictatorship, and stagnation. However, by his count, in 2015 this group was “down to around twenty, accounting for less than one-fifth of the developing countries. They are the exception, while most of the countries are now on the move.” The book is a powerful argument against the widespread pessimism that has long dominated segments of the policy community who believe the developing world can be ignored or isolated, while more serious discussions about the fate of the globe take place among and about the more developed countries. Recognizing that foreign aid often dominates discussions about international development, he places this policy tool in a proper perspective: “Aid is not the most important driver of development, but it has played an important secondary in the development surge of the past two decades.”

What explains the dramatic progress documented in The Great Surge? Radelet summarizes his argument as follows:

[B]eginning in the 1980s and 1990s, many of the ‘unfreedoms’ that had inhibited development began to be removed. The combination of huge geopolitical shifts, changing economic and political systems, deepening globalization, access to new technologies, stronger leadership, and courageous
action created the conditions, opportunities and drivers necessary for progress. The result was the great surge.5

Radelet emphatically argues that the progress he describes is good for the western world by enhancing global security, increasing global income growth and spreading “shared values of openness, prosperity and freedom.”6 However, he acknowledges:

There are many dark clouds forming on the horizon that could impede further advances. The global economy has not recovered fully from the 2008 financial crisis, and there are growing concerns as to whether the world’s leading economies and emerging markets can return to the pace of growth achieved before the crisis. Growth has slowed in both China and India. The global shift toward democracy has stalled, and some countries reversed, raising questions about a more widespread democratic recession. After a decade of unprecedented global peace, conflict is on the rise. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, several skirmishes along China’s borders, Syria’s implosion into civil war, and terrorist attacks around the world may signal the beginning of a new era of hostilities. Population growth, increased urbanization, greater resource demands and climate change are creating enormous risks and challenges, especially for many low-income countries.7

The data on deaths through conflict exemplify one of the more troubling negative trends. Radelet relies on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program—one of the most accurate and well-used data sources on global armed conflicts—which reports fewer civil wars and fewer people dying in war between 1990 and 2011. However, data for the period 2013–15, show significant increases in the number of deaths in war for both 2014 and 2015. The numbers are still well below those of the 1980–90 period, but the trend, reinforced by images from places like Syria, South Sudan, Yemen, and elsewhere, is worrisome. Thus, the closing chapters of The Great Surge include alternative scenarios, which describe what could happen if the wrong policies are adopted—we can expect either diminished progress as developing countries simply muddle through an uncertain global order, or derailed progress as climate and conflict halt development to the detriment of all.

Reading Radelet’s book in the present context raises a number of questions: Will the populist challenges to globalization, free trade, and the cross-border exchange of ideas halt and potentially even reverse the progress described in the Great Surge? Is there sufficient institutional resilience to ensure that the global order—represented by the United Nations and other multilateral actors and by adherence to international legal norms that collectively have fostered The Great Surge—will remain intact? While the new Administration has yet to articulate policies on democracy promotion and African development, the implications of anticipated changes merit consideration in the context of whether they will further or hinder the progress described by Radelet.

Since the end of the Cold War, norms of democratic governance, the institutionalization of open government principles and the expansion and influence of civil society actors have been promoted by advocates of the liberal global order. However, backsliding in
influential countries like Russia, Turkey, and Venezuela during the past decade has raised questions regarding the universal acceptance of these norms. Equally significant, China is now projecting an alternative model of development, which is increasingly followed by other countries, including several of the most significant examples of development progress in sub-Saharan Africa: Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda. Moreover, the Chinese and other authoritarian governments have demonstrated, at least until now, that they can successfully contain the political import of advances in communications technology while growing their economies and interacting with the global community.

Two initiatives of the Obama Administration highlight the implications of projecting less concern about human rights and political freedoms through diplomacy and assistance programs: Launched in 2011 with eight governments, the Open Government Partnership (OGP)—a multilateral initiative that aims to secure concrete commitments from governments to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen governance—has grown to 75 member countries. In December of last year, the OGP meeting culminated with a declaration that seeks to prioritize “efforts on Climate Change and Sustainable Development; Transparency, Integrity and Anti-Corruption, and Digital Commons.” Announced in 2013, President Obama’s Stand with Civil Society Initiative is a global call to action to support, defend, and sustain civil society amid a rising number of countries that adopted laws and practices to restrict the operations of civil societies. The Initiative involved a multi-prong effort to raise the profile of the concern through bilateral diplomacy and in multilateral fora, and through targeted assistance programs.

In both his earlier monograph and The Great Surge, Radelet presented the optimists perspective on development in Africa and attributes the progress achieved to specific policy choices made by African leaders and the international community. Mozambique represents an example of a seeming success story. According to Radelet, beginning in the early 1990s government policies stabilized the economy, privatized state-owned enterprises, lowered import tariffs and improved incentives for farmers. Donor support helped reduce a crippling debt, rebuild roads, schools and clinics, and improve government operations. While Mozambique remains a poor country, “the turnaround since the end of the war has been remarkable, with much greater progress than most people could have imagined.”

Is this progress now under threat? Even with the economic progress of the past 25 years, agriculture remains the mainstay of the economy, employing 80 percent of the labor force. Climate change represents an obvious danger; the threats posed by extreme weather events, including droughts, floods, and tropical cyclones, would be catastrophic for the country’s rapidly growing population. Recent reports also suggest a rise in civil conflict, which is reviving the sharp divides of the brutal 17-year post-independence civil war, and reflects the persistence of violent conflicts throughout Africa, and their dire consequences for development on the continent.

Clearly, Mozambique’s future will largely be determined by the policy choices made by its local political leaders, but continued
international community attention to the challenges facing the country is essential. Without concerted collaboration as mandated by the Paris Agreement to reduce climate change and mitigate its impacts, Mozambique and other poor countries will lose years of economic progress. Without assistance programs like those launched during the Obama Administration, including Food Security, Global Health, and Power Africa Initiatives, countries like Mozambique will struggle to provide the services that the population has come to expect. And without prodding by diplomats from the United States and other like-minded countries, and a willingness of key international institutions to mediate and, as circumstances warrant, to authorize the placement of on-the-ground monitors or peacekeepers, Mozambique risks falling into a recurring conflict trap, with devastating consequences for the entire region. Thus, new U.S. policies on climate, trade, and democracy, even if not intentionally directed at Africa, are likely to have geometric impacts in a largely negative direction.

Perhaps like many others, I have fallen into the pessimist’s trap of assuming the worst for Africa and that Africa’s fate is subject to events beyond its control. However, the global order has changed and African leaders can influence international community actions that will impact Africa’s future. However, as Radelet emphasizes throughout The Great Surge, this will require wise leadership, which develops realistic policies, obtains internal and external consensus regarding them, and proves deft at countering the populist impulses that threaten the progress of the past quarter century. Rekindling the constructive and cooperative spirit of 2015, rather than accepting the divisiveness and nativism exhibited last year, may provide a useful starting point for ensuring the maintenance of the great surge and the achievement by 2030 of the sustainable development goals articulated by the United Nations. PRISM

Notes

2 Radelet, 5-7.
3 Radelet, 8.
4 Radelet, 18-19.
5 Radelet, 19.
6 Radelet, 21.
7 Radelet, 23.
8 Radelet, 44.
9 Radelet, 45.
Letters to the Editor

Dear Editor:

Regarding the PRISM Vol 6. No.3 article “Special Operations Doctrine: Is it Needed?” by Charles T. Cleveland, James B. Linder, and Ronald Dempsey, I am struck by the curious absence of reference to the long established and mature body of Joint Special Operations doctrine. The authors write as if there was no special operations doctrine until Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3–05 came along in 2012. They opine as to the various reasons for this, including accusing “...the general military doctrine community (of holding) a myopic view of U.S. Special Operations Capabilities.” In truth, their contention is not factually correct.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff first issued bespoke doctrine for special operations in October 1992 (specifically joint publication (JP) 3–05, “Doctrine for Joint Special Operations”). JP 3–05 subsequently was revised and re-issued several times (April 1998, December 2003, April 2011, July 2014), with a new edition in work now. JP 3–05 is, and has been, written by special operators under the lead agency of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and under the sponsorship of the Joint Staff J3’s Deputy Director for Special Operations. Next, the authors do not note that USSOCOM issued its own doctrine for special operations, commencing with “USSOCOM Publication 1” in August 2011. Further, there was other tactics, techniques, and procedures level joint special operations doctrine available to the force—JP 3–05.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations” (December 2001, updated April 2007 and folded into JP 3–05 in 2014), and JP 3–05.2, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning,” effective 21 May 2003, (an update of a similarly named Joint Doctrine from 1993). JP 3–05.2 was also subsequently folded into JP 3–05 and into JP 3–60 (Joint Targeting). There are other joint doctrine publications that touch upon special operations core activities—Counterterrorism, (JP 3–26), Unconventional Warfare (JP 3–05.1), Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (JP 3–40), Foreign Internal Defense (JP 3–22), Counterinsurgency (JP 3–24), Military Information Support Operations (JP 3–13.2), Security Force Assistance (Joint Doctrine Note 1–13, being folded into a new JP on Security Cooperation (JP 3–20), and a new JP on Countering Threat Networks (JP 3–25) published in December 2016. This long list hardly constitutes a doctrinal vacuum; nor does it suggest any myopia of the general doctrine community on the topic. The article should have at least considered this foundational doctrine before it moved on to its other points. (As an aside, the Army was involved in the production and review of the JPs listed above, and it is almost certainly 100 percent true that special operations soldiers helped write each joint publication.)

ADP 3–05 did not fill a void as much as join a vibrant and mature special operations
Doctrine community as an Army consideration of the matter... a point that is somewhat lost in the article as constituted. A better title of the article might have focused the reader to the perspectives of the authors—that of Army special operators sharing their thoughts of the need for Army special operations doctrine.

Respectfully,
Jerome M. Lynes, Colonel USMC (Ret.)
Deputy Director for Joint Education and Doctrine
Joint Staff J7

Dear Editor:

In reference to a recent critique of the article “Special Operations Doctrine: Is It Needed,” by Jerome M. Lynes (12/21/16), we acknowledge the existence of Joint Special Operations doctrine. Upon reflection, we could title the article “Special Operations Doctrine: It Is Needed!” The intent of this article was to capture, share, and address recent accomplishments in Army Special Operations Force (ARSOF) concepts, doctrine, organizational lessons learned, and new ideas. The learning curve from more than a decade of war led to our belief that there was a clear need for the Army to articulate ARSOF as a core competency. Released in 2012, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3–05, Special Operations, filled this void—it identified the greater Army’s responsibilities to understand ARSOF capabilities throughout the full spectrum of conflict.

Clearly articulated within Mr. Lynes’s critique, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and the Special Operations Center of Excellence (SOCoE) fully participate in and serve as principal authors of Joint concepts and doctrine, through the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Our Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Regimental Commandants, and our Joint and Army Doctrine Division are involved in the development of Interagency, Joint, NATO, and Army doctrine. In fact, we annually review an estimated 250 NATO, Joint, and Army Publications. This is in addition to our ARSOF and Army Future concept publications.

As addressed in the article some of our major achievements in concepts and doctrine
are: ADP 3–05; Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3–05 (Special Operations); the U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement, Human Domain; resurrection of the Gray Zone; ARSOF 2022; USASOC Strategy 2035; and the recognition of Special Operations as an Army Core Competency in the U.S. Army Operating Concept, Win in a Complex World. Through our new SOF elements located throughout the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the eight Army Centers of Excellence, we have tremendous inclusion in TRADOC and the Army Capabilities Integration Center’s planning teams for their initiatives (Capabilities Integration Enterprise Forum, How the Army Fights, Dense Urban Terrain, etc.). All of these undertakings are in concert with, and in support of joint doctrine.

These clear examples of ARSOF and the Army’s desire to increase interoperability, integration, and interdependence among conventional and special operations forces serve as a testament to the immediate value ADP 3–05 added to the Army enterprise.

Respectfully,

LTG (Ret.) Charles T. Cleveland,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command from 2012–15
MG James B. Linder,
Commanding General of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
CW3 Ronald Dempsey, C Co, 1st BN.
3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne)
The United States Congress in 2009 authorized the establishment of a Center for Complex Operations (CCO) in response to a widely perceived need for interagency interoperability in analysis of, planning for, and intervening in complex operations worldwide. These include reconstruction, stabilization, counterinsurgency, and irregular warfare—operations that demand support from all elements of national power to succeed.

Created within the Department of Defense as a collaborative initiative with support from the Department of State and USAID, the aim of CCO is to:

- enable more effective networking, coordination, and synchronization of preparations for deployment of U.S. Government personnel for complex operations;
- compile best practices and lessons learned;
- identify training and education gaps, and then facilitate efforts to fill those gaps;
- serve as a feedback and information conduit to senior U.S. leaders within the defense, diplomacy, and development arenas.

PRISM is tailored to serve policymakers, scholars and practitioners working to enhance U.S. Government competency in complex operations. PRISM complements Joint Force Quarterly, chartered by General Colin Powell in 1993 to similarly catalyze cooperation and progress in joint, interagency solutions to national security challenges across the spectrum of conflict.